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Abstract 
This study highlights the sensitivity of capital structure determinants in each 
sector within the ensembles of Malaysian Listed Companies. Although the proportion 
of debt financing is similar, each sector adopted different financing patterns and 
slowly focuses on long-term debt financing. Remarkably, this transformation 
occurred after the Asian financial crisis, probably due to the development of the 
Malaysian bond market as a result of the implementation of the Malaysian Capital 
Market Plan in early 2001. Evolution of the capital market development, particularly 
the Islamic bonds, or Sukuk bonds, further highlights the vibrancy of the capital 
market as the main provider of financial resources to the corporate sector. Based on 
pooled OLS, fixed-effect analysis and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), 
the findings of this study reveal that capital structure determinants, namely, firm-
level, sector-level and country-level, vary across sectors due to the nature or 
characteristics of each sector. Both balanced and unbalanced datasets for the period 
1996 to 2007 were employed to check the robustness of these results. 
The overall sample results do not provide the actual mechanism between 
leverage and capital structure determinants. Nevertheless, as the scope becomes 
narrower, the indirect impact of sectoral behaviour on capital structure determinants 
could be observed. Both datasets show that the relationship between types of 
leverage and firm-level determinants, that is, risk, non-tax debt shield, size and 
tangibility, differs across sectors. Discrepancies exist in the coefficient size of 
explanatory variables across sectors, which indirectly reflect the degree of 
importance of each variable in the process of leverage determination. In contrast, 
sector-level variables are strongly significant and produce a substantial effect on 
leverage, particularly among the consumer product, property and plantation sectors. 
The uniformity of different sizes and signs of coefficient across sectors further 
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substantiate the argument of sectoral characteristics on leverage determination. As 
for the country-level variables, lending interest rates are persistently maintained as 
the most significant and important factor to leverage across sectors. The size of the 
coefficients further explains the impact of lending interest rates on leverage across 
sectors in Malaysia. Other country-level determinants tend to be important to 
specific sectors. Despite that, the behaviour of short-term and total debt on leverage 
determinants is similar, as total debt is largely controlled by the short-term debt. The 
chronology of the importance of each variable on leverage is discernible across 
sectors. Interestingly, the impact of sectoral behaviour is clearer on firm-level and 
sector-level determination than on the country-level variables. However, it is 
undeniable that the firm-level variables are consistently maintained as the primary 
factors in determining a firm’s leverage.  
The artificial nested testing procedure provides the preferred model which is 
customized according to each sector. This model selection is highly dependent on 
types of leverage, sectors and sample periods. The first research question confirms 
that the orientation between capital structure determinants and leverage is greatly 
influenced by the sector characteristics which are embedded indirectly and control 
the directions of relationship and the degree of significance. Subsequently, the 
sensitivity analyses, such as different economic conditions and different firm size, 
further substantiate the main hypothesis of this study. The uniformity between both 
datasets confirms the impact of different economic conditions on the mechanisms 
between firm-level determinants and leverage that vary between and within each 
sector in Malaysia. Despite the firm-level determinants, the sector-level determinants 
have been affected indirectly by the different economic sub-periods and this scenario 
is obvious across listed firms in Malaysia. The consistency of relationship between 
sector-level determinants and leverage across both balanced and unbalanced 
 viii 
 
datasets during the stable periods further substantiates the effect of sectoral 
behaviour on sector-level capital structure determinants, as it is not observable in 
the overall sample outcomes. The impact of sectoral characteristics on leverage 
could be seen clearly as the model considers different firm sizes within each selected 
sector in Malaysia. The orientation between leverage and capital structure 
determinants differs across manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. Besides the 
commonalities, differences exist between consumer product and industrial product 
sectors although both sectors are classified as manufacturing firms. The mechanism 
between capital structure determinants and leverage differs between and within 
medium-sized and small-sized firms as the orientation is controlled predominantly by 
the unique behaviour of each sector. 
Additionally, the dynamic framework confirms the existence of optimal 
capital structure across sectors in Malaysia, as the past leverage on current total 
debt is highly significant and observable across both datasets. Despite employing a 
target for leverage, the excursion process towards the target differs across sectors in 
Malaysia, being fastest among the plantation firms, followed by property, 
technology, consumer product, trade and services and construction firms, 
respectively. This is probably attributable to the sector-based adjustment cost that 
indirectly affects the firm-based adjustment cost. Moreover, the unobserved time 
fixed effect affects the pace of adjustment across sectors. Finally, the applicability of 
capital structure theories such as the trade-off theory, the agency theory, the pecking 
order theory and the market timing theory diverge across sectors in Malaysia. 
 
 
 
 ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TITLE PAGE            i 
ACCESS TO THESIS – A          ii 
DECLARATION          iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS         iv 
DEDICATION           v 
ABSTRACT           iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS                    ix  
LIST OF APPENDICES                  xiii 
LIST OF FIGURES                   xiv 
LIST OF TABLES                    xv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS                 xix 
PRESENTATIONS / AWARDS                  xx 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction         1 
1.1 General Overview          1 
1.2 Background of the Study         2 
1.3 Motivation of the Study         4 
1.4 Research Questions        10 
1.5 Justifications for Choosing Malaysia      11 
1.6 Significance of the Study       12 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis       14 
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework  16 
2.1 Introduction         16 
2.2 Capital Structure Theories       17 
2.2.1 Traditional Approach vs MM Theory    17 
2.2.2 Trade-off Theory       18 
2.2.3 Agency Cost Theory       22 
2.2.4 Pecking Order Theory      24 
2.2.5 Market Timing Theory      26 
 x 
 
2.3 Capital Structure Determinants      27 
2.3.1 Firm-level Determinants      27 
2.3.2 Sector-level Determinants      41 
2.3.3 Country-level Determinants      45 
2.4  The Effect of Different Economic Sub Periods    57 
on Capital Structure Determinants 
2.5 The Effect of Firm Size on Capital Structure Determinants   62 
2.6 Target Capital Structure and Leverage and Speed of Adjustment  65 
2.7 Conclusion         71 
 
Chapter 3 Sectoral Performance and Capital Market   73   
Development in Malaysia 
3.1 Introduction         73 
3.2 Sectoral Performance in Malaysia      73 
3.3 Capital Market Development in Malaysia     82 
3.4 The consequences of Asian financial crisis in Malaysia   88 
3.5 Conclusion         89 
 
Chapter 4 Data and Methodology      91 
4.1 Introduction         91 
4.2 Data Sources and Classification of Datasets     91 
4.3 Formulation of Variables       96 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables       96 
4.3.2 Book Value vs Market Values of Leverage    97 
4.3.3 Independent Variables      99 
4.4 Model Specification and Estimations               101 
4.4.1 Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Analysis            101 
4.4.2 Fixed effect Analysis                           104 
4.4.3 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)                        110 
4.4.4 Partial Adjustment and Speed of Adjustments                       114 
4.4.5 Diagnostic Test                           119 
4.5 Conclusion                                                                                                    120 
 
 
 
 xi 
 
Chapter 5 Impact of Sectoral Behaviour on Capital                      121 
 Structure Determinants 
5.1 Introduction                   121 
5.2 Descriptive Summary and Correlation Matrix Analysis             122 
5.3 Firm-level Determinants Analysis                143 
5.3.1 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based             143 
  on Balanced Panel Data  
5.3.2  Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based             158 
on Unbalanced Panel Data 
5.4 Sector-Level Determinants Analysis                167 
5.5 Country-level Determinants Analysis               175 
5.6 Overall Regression Analysis                 188 
5.7 Model Selection Analysis                 191 
5.8 Conclusion                   199 
 
Chapter 6 Sensitivity Analysis I: Different Economy Periods       202 
Effect on Capital Structure Determinants 
6.1 Introduction                   202 
6.2 Firm-level Determinants Analysis                203 
6.2.1 Firm-level Determinants based on balanced overall sample            203 
6.2.2 Firm-level Determinants based on unbalanced overall sample        207 
6.3 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on sectors in Malaysia            215 
6.4 Sector-level Determinants Analysis                250 
6.5 Conclusion                   264 
 
Chapter 7 Sensitivity Analysis II: The Firm Size Effect on          266 
Capital Structure Determinants 
7.1 Introduction                   266 
7.2 Firm-level Determinants based on Overall Balanced Panel Data            267 
7.3 Firm-level Determinants based on Overall Unbalanced Panel Data            270 
7.4 Firm-level Determinants based on Sectors with Different              274 
 Firm Sizes 
7.5 Conclusion                   293 
 xii 
 
Chapter 8 Speed of Adjustment and Target Capital Structure     295 
across Sectors      
8.1 Introduction                   295 
8.2 Dynamic Capital Structure among Malaysian Listed Companies            296 
8.3 Sectoral Analysis on Dynamic Capital Structure              302 
8.4 Speed of Adjustment across Sectors in Malaysia              319 
8.5 Conclusion                   327 
 
Chapter 9 Conclusion and Future Research                                   329 
9.1 Overview of the Study                 329 
9.2 Summary of the Key Findings                329 
 9.2.1 Research Question 1                 329 
 9.2.2 Research Question 2                 331 
 9.2.3 Research Question 3                 332 
 9.2.4 Research Question 4                 333 
9.3 Contribution of the study                 334 
9.3.1 Contribution to the Theory Development              334 
9.3.2 Policy Implications of the Study               336 
9.4 Limitations of the Study                 338 
9.5 Future Research                  339 
9.6 Conclusion                   340 
 
APPENDICES                  342 
BIBLIOGRAPHY                 350 
  
 xiii 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1  Hausman Test                 342 
Appendix 2  Testing Over-identifying Restrictions             345 
Appendix 3  Artificial Nested Testing Procedures              349 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiv 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 5.1 Trend of the leverage based on the balanced dataset             126 
Figure 5.2 Trend of the leverage ratio based on the unbalanced dataset            133 
 xv 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2.1 Summary of Empirical Evidence on Capital Structure   53 
Determinants 
 
Table 3.1 Sectoral Performance of Malaysia from 1996-2007    74 
 
Table 4.1 Total Number of Malaysian Listed Firms     93 
 
Table 4.2 Definitions of Book Value of Leverage     98 
 
Table 4.3 Definitions of Independent Variables               100 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Firm-level Determinants             125 
based on Balanced Sample 
 
Table 5.2 Correlation Matrix of Firm-level Determinants             129 
based on Balanced Sample 
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Firm-level Determinants             132 
based on Unbalanced Sample 
 
Table 5.4 Correlation Matrix of Firm-level Determinants             136 
based on Unbalanced Sample 
 
Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Sector-level Determinants             140 
based on Balanced Sample 
 
Table 5.6 Descriptive Statistics of Sector-level Determinants             141 
based on Unbalanced Sample 
 
Table 5.7 Descriptive Statistics of Country-level Determinants            142 
based on Unbalanced Sample 
 
Table 5.8 Pooled OLS Regression based on Firm-level Determinants            150 
and Leverage within Balanced Sample 
 
Table 5.9 Fixed Effect Analysis based on Firm-level Determinants            151 
and Leverage within Balanced Sample 
 
Table 5.10 Pooled OLS Regression based on Firm-level Determinants            165 
and Leverage within Unbalanced Sample 
 
Table 5.11 Fixed Effect Analysis based on Firm-level Determinants            166 
and Leverage within Unbalanced Sample 
 
Table 5.12 Pooled OLS and Fixed Analysis on Sector-level             169 
Determinants and Firm Leverage based on Balanced and    
Unbalanced Sample 
 
 
 xvi 
 
Table 5.13 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis on Sector-level            174 
Determinants and Median Leverage based on Balanced 
and Unbalanced Sample 
 
Table 5.14 Pooled OLS Analysis on Country-level Determinants            179 
 and Leverage within Balanced Sample 
 
Table 5.15 Fixed Effect Analysis on Country-level Determinants            180 
and Leverage within Balanced Sample 
 
Table 5.16 OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis on Country-level             181 
Determinants and Median Leverage within Balanced 
Sample 
 
Table 5.17 Pooled OLS Analysis on Country-level Determinants            185 
and Leverage within Unbalanced Sample 
 
Table 5.18 Fixed Effect Analysis on Country-level Determinants            186 
and Leverage within Unbalanced Sample 
 
Table 5.19 OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis on Country-level             187 
Determinants and Median Leverage within  
Unbalanced Sample 
 
Table 5.20 Regression Analysis on Firm-level, Sector-level             190 
and Country-level Determinants based on Balanced 
and Unbalanced Datasets 
 
Table 5.21 Model Selection Analysis based on Artificial             195 
Nested Testing Procedure 
 
Table 6.1 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on              211 
the Balanced Overall Sample 
 
Table 6.2 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on              212 
Balanced Overall Sample without the 
Trade and Services Sector 
 
Table 6.3 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on              213 
the Unbalanced Overall Sample 
 
Table 6.4 Firm-level Determinants and Leverage based             214 
on the Balanced Overall Sample without the 
Industrial Product Sector 
 
Table 6.5 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             218 
Balanced Consumer Product Sector 
 
Table 6.6 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             219 
Unbalanced Consumer Product Sector 
 
 
 xvii 
 
Table 6.7 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             223 
Balanced Industrial Product Sector 
 
Table 6.8 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             224 
Unbalanced Industrial Product Sector 
 
Table 6.9  Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             228 
Balanced Construction Sector 
 
Table 6.10 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             229 
Unbalanced Construction Sector 
 
Table 6.11 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             233 
Balanced Property Sector 
 
Table 6.12 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             234 
Unbalanced Property Sector 
 
Table 6.13 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             238 
Balanced Plantation Sector 
 
Table 6.14 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             239 
Unbalanced Plantation Sector 
 
Table 6.15 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             243 
Unbalanced Technology Sector 
 
Table 6.16 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             244 
Unbalanced Technology Sector 
 
Table 6.17 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             248 
Balanced Trade and Services Sector 
 
Table 6.18 Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the             249 
Unbalanced Trade and Services Sector 
 
Table 6.19 Sector-level Determinants Analysis based on the             255 
Overall Balanced Panel 
 
Table 6.20 Sector-level Determinants Analysis across Sectors             256 
based on Balanced Sample 
 
Table 6.21 Sector-level Determinants Analysis based on the                             261 
Overall Unbalanced Panel Sample 
 
Table 6.22 Sector-level Determinants Analysis across Unbalanced                   262 
Sector Sample 
 
Table 7.1 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on             270 
Balanced Overall Sample 
 
 
 xviii 
 
Table 7.2 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on             277 
Unbalanced Overall Sample 
 
Table 7.3 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on             278 
Consumer Product Sector 
 
Table 7.4 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on             281 
Industrial Product Sector 
 
Table 7.5 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on             285 
Construction Sector 
 
Table 7.6 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on             288 
 Trade and Services Sector 
 
Table 7.7 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Based on Firm-level             292 
Determinants from 1996-2007(MESDAQ) 
 
Table 8.1 Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure             301 
based on Overall Sample 
 
Table 8.2 Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure             305 
based on Consumer Product Sector 
 
Table 8.3 Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure             306 
based on Industrial Product Sector 
 
Table 8.4 Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure             309 
based on Construction Sector 
 
Table 8.5 Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure             310 
based on Property Sector 
 
Table 8.6 Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure             315 
based on Plantation Sector 
 
Table 8.7 Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure             316 
based on Technology Sector 
 
Table 8.8 Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure             318 
based on Trade and Services Sector 
 
Table 8.9 Speed of Adjustment Using Current and Lag Explanatory            325 
Variables based on Overall Sample and Sectors 
 
Table 8.10 Speed of Adjustment Using Current Explanatory Variables            326 
based on Overall Sample and Sectors 
 xix 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACE   Market Alternative Stock Market 
CMP   Capital Market Plan 
EPF   Employees Provident Fund 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GMM   Generalized Method of Moments 
HH Index  Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IPO   Initial Public Offerings 
IV   Instrumental Variables 
KLSE   Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
MESDAQ  Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing 
and Automated Quotation 
MGS   Malaysian Government Securities 
MM   Modigliani and Miller 
OLS   Ordinary Least Squares 
PDS   Private Debt Securities 
SPNB Syarikat Perumahan Negara Berhad 
 
 
  
 xx 
 
PRESENTATIONS / AWARDS 
 
Ramakrishnan, S, Gannon, G & Liu, R 2012, ‘Sector Analysis on Capital Structure 
Determinants among Malaysian Listed Companies’. Thesis presented at the Final 
Year Presentation, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance Higher Degree 
Research Colloquium (March, 2012), Deakin University Australia. 
 
Ramakrishnan, S, Gannon, G & Liu, R 2011, ‘Capital Structure Determinants across 
Sectors in Malaysia.Does Firm Size Matter?’ Paper presented at the 5th Annual 
International City-Break Conference: Business and Society in a Global Economy, 
19-22 December 2011, Athens, Greece. 
 
Ramakrishnan, S, Gannon, G & Liu, R 2011, ‘Sector Analysis on Capital Structure 
Determinants among Malaysian Listed Companies’. Paper presented at the 
International Conference on Financial Innovations & Change for Survival & Growth, 
7-8 January 2011, New Delhi, India. 
 
Ramakrishnan, S, Gannon, G & Liu, R 2010, ‘Sector Analysis on Capital Structure 
Determinants among Malaysian Listed Companies’. Paper presented at the Faculty of 
Business and Law Higher Degree Research Colloquium, July 2010, Deakin 
University, Australia. Presenter awarded ‘Best Presentation’. 
 
Ramakrishnan, S, Gannon, G & Liu, R 2010, ‘Sector Analysis on Capital Structure 
Determinants among Malaysian Listed Companies.Different Economy Periods Effect 
on Capital Structure Determinants’. Paper presented at the School of Accounting, 
Economics and Finance Higher Degree Research Colloquium (May, 2010), Deakin 
University, Australia. Presenter awarded ‘Best Presentation’. 
 
Ramakrishnan, S, Gannon, G & Liu, R 2009, ‘Sector Analysis on Capital Structure 
Determinants among Malaysian Listed Companies’.Research proposal presented at 
the Faculty of Business and Law Higher Degree Research Colloquium, July 2009, 
Deakin University, Australia. Presenter awarded ‘Best Presentation’.
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 General Overview 
The seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) has led to the 
development of an extensive body of corporate finance literature mainly in the area 
of capital structure. The diversity of the capital structure patterns is well explained by 
a variety of theoretical models. These models have been materialized and tested 
using assumptions based on various capital structure theories. The trade-off theory 
hypothesizes the optimality of capital structure by balancing the benefit of tax 
(Miller, 1977; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980) against the costs of financial distress, 
that is, bankruptcy risks (Baxter, 1967; Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Stiglitz, 1972; 
Kim, 1978) and agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  In a subsequent study, 
Myers and Majluf (1984) challenged the idea of an optimal capital structure by 
arguing that corporate financing practice does not conform to a simple trade-off 
model. Instead, they argue that there is a pecking order among the financing sources 
utilized by firms due to information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. 
It is asserted that firms are normally very dependent on their internal funds as 
their main source of financing but as the internal reserves reduce, they will rely on 
debt financing and, subsequently, external equity asa last resort for financing. 
Nevertheless, Baker and Wurgler (2002) further argue that the pecking order is 
greatly influenced by the market conditions. The market timing theory hypothesizes 
that capital structure is solely dependent on past equity market timing attempts. In 
general, a number of researchers have tested the validity of these theories which vary
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across different countries. None of the capital structure theories is universal, but each 
of the theories is conditional (Myers, 2003). 
1.2 Background of the Study 
Based on the prominent capital structure theories, many empirical studies 
have been conducted on capital structure determinants at the firm level across 
different economies. In the beginning, the majority of the capital structure studies 
focused on the financing behaviour of firms across the United States including 
(Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991; 
Myers, 2001; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Lemmon et al., 2008). Soon after, the focus 
was diverted to other developed nations as Rajan and Zingales (1995) found the 
applicability of similar determinants of capital structure across G-7 countries. The 
identification of the fundamental determinants is strongly associated with the 
institutional factors. Conversely, Wald (1999) found differences across countries 
mainly due to institutional differences. This argument is very much supported by 
Antoniou et al. (2008) with the findings that confirm the variations of capital 
structure determinants across G-5 countries. Furthermore, numerous studies were 
conducted based on the specific non-US developed countries (Marsh, 1982; Ozkan, 
2001; De Miguel and Pindado, 2001). 
Alternatively, Demirguc-Kunt (1992) observed great variation in firms’ 
financing patterns across the developed and developing countries. In addition, 
differences are noticeable on a few aspects such as the level of capital market 
development, quality of accounting practices, institutional settings, and corporate 
governance that indirectly influence the capital structure choices. As a result, the 
outcomes of developed economy studies could not be generalized across developing 
nations. However, Booth et al. (2001) confirm the homogeneity of the determinants 
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across 10 developing countries regardless of the institutional differences. They argue 
that the underlying variables are comparable with the US and UK. In contrast, 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) found big differences across Thailand and Malaysia, as the 
capital structure decision is highly dependent on the firm-specific factors as well as 
the market-related factors, for example, the economic and institutional environment, 
corporate governance practices, exposure to capital markets and the level of investor 
protection in which the firm operates. Similarly, a few studies provide some insights 
on firms across emerging markets and developing countries by concentrating on 
specific regions (Gurcharan, 2010; Sbeiti, 2010; Mat Nor et al., 2011). 
Another strand of the empirical literature concentrates on individual country 
studies within the emerging and developing countries (Wiwattanakantang, 1999 
(Thailand); Pandey, 2001; Pandey and Chotigeat, 2004 (Malaysia); Chen, 2004; Zou 
and Xiao, 2006 (China); Shan and Khan, 2007 (Pakistan); Chakraborty, 2010 
(India)). These investigations further substantiate the uniqueness of the capital 
structure decisions and practices that vary across nations due to their different 
business environments. Recently, most of the studies have included the country-level 
determinants in their model as the impact is noticeable on the capital structure 
decision making. Nevertheless, another section of the literature provides evidence on 
leverage differences across industries or sectors and similarities within an industry 
with respect to the financial structure (Hamada, 1972; Bowen et al., 1982; Bradley et 
al., 1984; Gershon and Rhee, 1984; Harris and Raviv, 1991). Ferri and Jones (1979) 
further argued that the similarities are mainly due to several factors, that is, product, 
cost of materials, technology and skilled labour that finally lead to similar amounts 
of business risk.  
Furthermore, Brander and Lewis (1986) proposed other industry-specific 
factors (e.g., competition on price, quantity, advertising, and research and 
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development) that contribute towards the variations across sectors or industries that 
affect the ultimate decisions on capital structures. MacKay and Phillips (2005) found 
that the impact of industry factors on leverage is discernible across individual firms 
within a particular industry. Firms tend to rely on the changes made by their peers in 
their particular industry. Additionally, Suto (2003) emphasized that the demand for 
both liquidity and fixed investments diverges across industries. Simerly and Li 
(2000) relate to the particular environmental characteristic that affects all the firms 
within an industry. In contrast, Almazan and Molina (2000) argued that similarities 
between capital structure might exist across a few industries as this aspect is highly 
dependent on the intra-industry capital structure dispersion. 
1.3 Motivation of the Research 
Most of the research concentrates on the leverage differences across 
industries though some studies look into single determinants of capital structure, 
such as non-tax debt shields, risk and profitability. Despite the importance of the 
industry, the past literature concludes that the firm-fixed effect becomes more 
influential compared to the industry-fixed effect. This argument is debatable as other 
factors that are related to the industry which are not captured in the industry-fixed 
effect may affect the leverage determination. In conjunction with that, MacKay and 
Phillips (2005) proposed that the intra-industry variation in financial structure in 
competitive industries is well explained by industry-specific factors other than 
industry-fixed effects. However, they concluded that the firm-fixed effect is greater 
than the industry-fixed effect. In the context of developing countries, the importance 
of industry or sector on capital structure is under-explored. In general, most of the 
studies remove the industry-fixed effects by including an industries or sectors 
dummy, and a few studies even tend to ignore the importance of industry in their 
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model specification. In addition, researchers face problems in constructing the 
industry-specific variables due to data limitations across developing countries.  
Recently, a small number of studies have diverted their attention to sector or 
industry analysis solely based on the individual industry (Hung et al., 2002; 
Shanmugasundram, 2008; Mahmod and Zakaria, 2011; Baharuddin et al., 2011). 
This indirectly provides insights about the nature of a particular industry and its 
impact on the decision making of capital structure. Based on the previous discussion, 
the argument between firm-fixed effect and industry-fixed effect is inconclusive 
across developing countries. The underlying argument of de Jong et al. (2008) 
emphasizes the indirect impact of country-level determinants on leverage via firm-
level determinants. Likewise, Kayo and Kamura (2011) found that the mechanism 
between leverage and firm-level determinants is indirectly influenced by both the 
industry-level and country-level variables based on developed and developing 
markets.This study does not take into account institutional settings within developing 
countries, in particular, the rapidly growing emerging markets. There are enormous 
institutional differences, and the impact of sectoral behaviour on capital structure 
determinants, such as firm-level, sector-level and country-level, may differ across 
these markets. Despite that, the unique behaviour of each sector varies within and 
between countries.  
Recent empirical evidence highlights the role of sectors or industries in 
explaining the pattern of a firm’s financing, particularly among developing countries. 
This evolution started from the late 1990s noticeably in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis, and the sector effects rather than the country effects are gaining 
explanatory power across the Asian markets, (L’Her et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2003). 
The power of firm-fixed effect may be attributable through sectoral behaviour as the 
impact of the sector or industry is captured indirectly through the firm-level 
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determinants. Additionally, the relationship between leverage and capital structure 
determinants, such as firm-level, sector-level and country-level, may vary across 
sectors due to the nature of each sector within a country. This is subject to further 
investigations into the impact of sector characteristics on capital structure 
determinants. Therefore, the first hypothesis tests the differences of significant 
capital structure determinants across sectors. 
The Asian financial crisis has provided great lessons for those Asian 
countries that were badly affected. This unforeseen event affects the financing 
decisions of firms as they face difficulties in raising funds to finance investments. To 
capture the impact of the financial crisis on capital structure decisions, a few studies 
were undertaken across Asian countries which had been affected to different degrees 
(Nagano, 2003; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Deesomsak, 2004, 2009; Driffield, 2010). 
These studies have executed a comparative analysis of capital structure determinants 
across countries by looking into the pre- and post-crisis periods. The outcomes of 
these studies provide valuable insights into the financing behaviour of firms during 
different economic conditions, namely, before and after crisis. However, the impact 
of the financial crisis is highly correlated with the institutional settings of each 
country. Likewise, some researchers have diverted their attention to single country 
case studies across Asian countries, (e.g. Suto, 2003; Pandey and Chotigeat, 2004; 
Hsien and Lie, 2005; Ariff et al., 2008). 
On the other hand, Claessens et al. (2000) argue that the profitability and 
financing patterns of firms were affected by the industry-specific shocks during the 
financial crisis although the idiosyncratic shocks seem to have been the most 
important factors. In line with this argument, Braun and Larrain (2005) found that the 
impact of recession differs across industries and is strongly associated with the 
degree of external funds dependency. Industries that rely more on external funds 
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were badly affected during the downturn periods due to severe deterioration in the 
financial environment. Furthermore, a greater effect is observable across industries 
that are highly dependent on soft assets. Therefore, these studies give some 
indication of the nature of industries or sectors that react differently during the 
downturn periods and how these reactions tend to vary across countries. However, 
none of the studies highlights the sensitivity of capital structure determinants on 
leverage during the downturn period across sectors. As mentioned earlier, the Asian 
financial turmoil has increased the importance of sector effects within each nation 
across developing countries. Hence, the unique behaviour of each sector or industry 
may influence the orientation and magnitude between capital structure determinants 
and leverage during crisis periods. Moreover, recovery mechanisms may differ 
across sectors within Asian countries. The entire set of evidence and arguments 
provides motivation for further investigations about the impact of sector 
characteristics on the capital structure decision making across different sub periods. 
Hence, the second hypothesis tests the differences of significant capital structure 
determinants across sectors during different economic conditions.  
Past studies have shown that financial structure differences exist across large 
and small firms (Gupta, 1969; Bates, 1971; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Chittenden et 
al., 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Voulgaris et al., 2004; Bas et al., 
2009). In the early studies, Gupta (1969) found that small firms tend to utilize their 
internal resources as external funds are inaccessible to them. Soon after, Remmers et 
al. (1974) argued that large-sized firms are less risky as they were diversified into 
multi-product businesses and, therefore, tend to use more debt. Meanwhile, the 
small-sized firms seem to be riskier as their business depends on single-product lines 
and, thus, they carry lower amounts of debt. The arguments fit perfectly with the 
findings across US firms, while the non-US firms produce opposite results. In other 
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words, the small-sized firms across non-US countries utilize greater amounts of debt 
compared to larger firms. This implies that the financing patterns of large and small 
firms are strongly associated with the development level of each country. In line with 
this argument, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) found great variations in the 
use of long-term debt between large and small firms across developed and 
developing countries.  
The recent study of Beck et al. (2008) explains the rationale behind these 
findings by looking into more detail on the behaviour of small firms around the 
world. They argue that the financing patterns of small firms are strongly reliant on 
the institutional environment within each economy. The small firms that operate 
under a developed institutions and financial market framework tend to use external 
finances, mainly from the bank. Conversely, as their underlying institutional settings 
are under-developed, the small firms utilize other sources of finances that are more 
easily accessible. At this point, the literature emphasizes that the financing behaviour 
of large and small firms is strongly associated with the institutional settings and the 
development within each country. On the other hand, a few studies (e.g., Pettit and 
Singer, 1985; Scherr and Hulburt, 2001; among others) highlight the interdependence 
between firm size and industry. Das and Roy (2000) argued that the variation in 
capital structure is attributable to firm size and industry classification, though it is 
mainly driven by the nature of the industry. However, they did not concentrate on the 
indirect impact of industry on the relationship between capital structure determinants 
and leverage among the large and small firms across sectors. The distinctive 
characteristics of each sector or industry may affect the capital structure of large 
firms across sectors under common institutional settings. Subsequently, the small 
firms may also differ as the nature of the sector seems to dominate the orientation of 
capital structure and its determinants. The research to date has tended to focus on the 
CHAPTER 1 
 
9 
 
financial structure differences across large and small firms within a particular sector, 
rather than across sectors. This provides a stepping stone for further investigations on 
the impact of sectoral behaviour on different firm sizes across sectors. As a result, 
the third hypothesis tests the differences of significant capital structure determinants 
across firm size and sectors.  
Up until now, the discussions were based on the assumption that the observed 
debt ratio is a proxy for the optimal debt level. However, the dynamic capital 
structure theory predicts that firms can systematically deviate from target leverage 
with the presence of adjustment costs (Fischer et al., 1989). In general, firms adjust 
their financing based on the internal and external shocks. Therefore, the firms tend to 
adjust their leverage ratio in order to maintain or achieve a target capital structure 
(Marsh, 1982; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Fama and 
French, 2005; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Chakraborty, 2010; Ovtchinnikov, 2010; 
Guney et al., 2011). However, such costs adjust partially due to the inability of the 
firms to adjust immediately to their target capital structure, as shown in past 
empirical studies (e.g., Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Fischer et al., 1989; Hovakimian 
et al., 2001; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Guney et al., 
2011; Mat Nor et al., 2011). 
So far, most studies have concentrated on the target debt ratio and speed of 
adjustment across firms, while too little attention has been paid across sectors. On the 
other hand, MacKay and Phillips (2005) emphasized the importance of the industry 
and how it affects the financial structure of each firm at the intra-industry level. In 
other words, a firm’s financial structure is dependent on the firm’s position within its 
industry or sector. Recently, Elsas and Florysiak (2011) also found heterogeneity 
across industries in the speed of adjustment as they grouped firms based on industry 
classifications. Moreover, this result is based on the US sample and might not be 
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appropriate for emerging market samples due to different institutional factors and 
financial developments. However, they did not observe the magnitude and 
relationship between leverage and capital structure determinants across industries, in 
the context of dynamic capital structure. In addition, industries might react 
differently as shocks occur in the operating environment which might indirectly 
affect the relationship between leverage and firm-level determinants. According to 
Ovtchinnikov (2010), capital structure is extremely responsive to exogenous shocks 
such as deregulation, and firms are sensitive to changes in the operating environment 
which are industry-or sector-specific. Due to the existence of sector-based 
adjustment costs, target leverage might be similar at the intra-sector level and 
variations across sectors might be possible. This provides a gap in the series of 
dynamic capital structure literature, as less attention has been paid to this matter, and 
is untapped in the context of developing countries’ sample analysis. Consequently, 
the fourth hypothesis tests the differences of significant capital structure 
determinants and speed of adjustment across sectors under the dynamic framework. 
1.4 Research Questions 
1. (a) What are the significant determinants of capital structure within the 
ensembles of Malaysian listed firms? 
(b) What are the significant determinants of capital structure in each sector 
within the ensembles of Malaysian listed firms? Do they differ across 
sectors? 
(c) Is the behaviour of each sector explained by capital structure theories? 
 
2. (a) What are the effects of different economic periods on the determinants of 
capital structure within the ensembles of Malaysian listed firms? 
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(b) What are the effects of different economic periods on the determinants of 
capital structure in each sector within the ensembles of Malaysian listed 
firms? Do they vary within and across sectors? 
(c) Is the behaviour of each sector explained by capital structure theories? 
 
3. (a) Does firm size affect the determinants of capital structure within the 
ensembles of Malaysian listed firms? Does it vary within and across 
sectors? 
(b) Is the behaviour of each sector explained by capital structure theories? 
 
4. (a) What are the significant determinants of capital structure within the 
ensembles of Malaysian listed firms based on the dynamic framework? 
Do Malaysian listed firms have target leverage in their capital structure? 
 (b) What are the significant determinants of capital structure in each sector 
within the ensembles of Malaysian listed firms based on the dynamic 
framework? Does each sector have target leverage in their capital 
structure? Does the speed of adjustment differ across sectors in 
Malaysia? 
1.5 Justifications for Choosing Malaysia 
As mentioned earlier, the starting point of this study is the argument that the 
explanatory power of the sector effect is amplified across developing countries as a 
result of the Asian financial crisis. In conjunction with that, the investigation is likely 
to be more effective as this study adopts a particular country from the Asian market 
that has been strongly influenced by the Asian financial crisis. Based on these 
criteria, Malaysia would be the best choice and is a unique example for various 
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reasons. First, Malaysia was hit badly by the financial crisis but managed to 
overcome the problems independently by taking their own initiatives and without 
depending on the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Secondly, Malaysia is an 
emerging market that is developing at a rapid rate. The advancement and vibrancy of 
its financial market, particularly the bond market, is observable in comparison to 
other emerging markets, and is mainly due to the implementation of the Capital 
Market Plan in 2001. Thirdly, to the best of my knowledge, none of the studies 
focuses on the impact of sectoral behaviour on capital structure determinants across 
Malaysian listed firms using the largest number of observations. Moreover, this is the 
first extensive study across developing countries that examines the nature of sectors 
and their impact on the capital structure decision making. 
1.6 Significance of the Research 
In general, the significant contributions of this study are twofold, namely, 
theoretical development and policy implications. In relation to the theory 
development, this study fills the gap in the literature series by capturing the indirect 
impact of sectoral behaviour on capital structure decision making. In relation to this 
point, Kayo and Kimura (2011) found that the mechanism between leverage and 
firm-level determinants is indirectly influenced by industry-level and country-level 
factors based on developed and developing markets. They did not address the 
indirect effects of the industry or sector across sectors within or among the developed 
or developing countries. The relationship, however, between leverage and capital 
structure determinants may vary across sectors due their unique behaviour. In 
addition, the past literature emphasized the divergence of the behaviour of a 
particular sector that can differ across countries due to its diverse institutional 
settings. This is the first extensive study that considers the effect of sectoral 
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behaviour on capital structure determinants across sectors using both static and 
dynamic frameworks. Since most of the studies concentrate on the developed 
markets, this study serves to fill the gap in the empirical evidence in the context of 
developing markets. The impact of sectors on capital structure decision making is 
likely to differ across developing countries due to its enormous institutional 
differences, particularly among the emerging markets. 
The development of emerging capital markets also varies across countries 
which contributes to the degree of accessibility of funds as firms become more 
dependent on external funds. Furthermore, the evolution of debt varies greatly across 
emerging markets, although short-term debt is greater than long-term debt utilization. 
This indirectly contributes towards the major theories of capital structure as the 
relationship between leverage and capital structure determinants is highly controlled 
by short-term debt consumption. Furthermore, the theoretical contributions can be 
seen on several aspects as the study concentrates on the different economic 
conditions and firm sizes across sectors, both of which indirectly affect the capital 
structure choices. 
From a practical point of view, this study provides good guidelines for the 
corporate sector and banking institutions. As for the corporate sector in particular, 
this study provides a good recipe for managers to consider an appropriate set of 
capital structure determinants related to a specific individual sector in their capital 
structure decision making. Moreover, the guidelines could assist firms to react 
effectively and efficiently during different economic conditions as the importance of 
the determinants changes across sub-periods and sectors. Likewise, the banking 
sector could strategize lending procedures by prioritizing the importance of capital 
structure determinants across sectors. In other words, the evaluations should consider 
the underlying capital structure determinants that vary across sectors. Despite the 
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determinants, this study highlights the importance of short-term and long-term debt 
across sectors as well as the other factors, namely, different economic conditions, 
firm size and capital market developments, that drive the mechanism between the 
types of leverage and capital structure determinants. This piece of information could 
be helpful for the banking sector to form custom-made evolutions according to 
sectors and, ultimately, reduce the default risk. 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two provides an 
extensive literature review on capital structure theories and their determinants, that 
is, firm-level, sector-level and country-level determinants across developed and 
developing countries. Subsequently, the literature review also provides insights into 
the impact of different economic conditions and firm sizes on the capital structure 
determinants. Finally, the chapter discusses the dynamic capital structure and speed 
of adjustment. Chapter Three covers issues related to Malaysian scenarios pertinent 
to capital structure issues. The first section describes the performance of each sector 
during the sample period of this study. Subsequently, the following section focuses 
on the development of Malaysia’s capital market, and the final section concentrates 
on the impact of the Asian financial crisis on Malaysia, particularly the corporate 
sector.  
Chapter Four outlines the methodologies employed in this study. This study 
utilizes the econometric techniques related to panel data analysis, that is, static 
models (pooled OLS and fixed effect analysis) and dynamic models (Difference 
GMM with two-step estimator) using both balanced and unbalanced panel data. 
Chapter Five illustrates the findings of the first hypothesis that concentrates on the 
differences of significant capital structure determinants across sectors in Malaysia. 
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Chapter Six demonstrates the outcomes of the second hypothesis that focuses on the 
differences of significant capital structure determinants across sectors during 
different economic conditions. Chapter Seven describes the findings of the third 
hypothesis that argues on the differences of significant capital structure determinants 
across firm size and sectors. Chapter Eight presents the findings of the fourth 
hypothesis that relates to the differences of significant capital structure determinants 
and speed of adjustment across sectors under the dynamic framework. Finally, 
Chapter Nine concludes the research findings and discusses the contributions, 
limitations and future research extensions of the current study.
16 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Capital structure is a crucial component in the financing decision at the firm 
level and has been a mainstream theme of corporate finance. In general, capital 
structure is the combination of a firm’s long-term financing, that is, debt, preferred 
stock and common stock. According to Parrino and Kidwell (2009), an optimal 
capital structure is achieved when a firm minimizes the cost of financing and 
maximizes the total value of the firm. The proportion between debt and equity varies 
between firms and depends on several factors, namely, firms’ characteristics, 
availability of sources, market timing, macroeconomic variables, among others 
which directly affect the financing decision of a particular firm. Each and every firm 
should attempt to determine the best mixture of financing for itself, and establish an 
optimal capital structure based on the relevant determinants. An appropriate capital 
structure exists for every firm and the structure will change over time with the 
growth of the firm and through the external changes in the capital market and 
regulatory framework (Mahmud, 1998). 
The most controversial and debatable issue in corporate finance theory is the 
question that has been highlighted by Myers (1984: 575), How do firms choose their 
capital structure? One of the main roles of the corporate financial manager is to 
determine an appropriate capital structure that lowers the cost of capital and 
maximizes the wealth of shareholders. Hence, the next question is, What is the best 
combination of capital structure, i.e., between debt and equity, that maximizes the 
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shareholders’ wealth? Over the past fifty years, various studies have attempted to 
answer these questions, with great discussion taking place since the ground-breaking 
paper (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) by the recognised pioneers of the development 
of capital structure theories. This series of literature explains capital structure 
patterns with solid empirical evidence across developed countries and, more recently, 
with studies across developing and emerging economies. However, capital structure 
issues remain a puzzle in the heart of corporate finance theory. In the capital 
structure series, several major theories have been discussed and tested empirically, 
therefore, this chapter covers the entire theoretical models and provides empirical 
evidence. 
The first section of the literature review covers the five major capital 
structure theories: (i) Modigliani-Miller (MM) theory; (ii) trade-off theory; (iii) 
agency theory; (iv) pecking order theory, and (v) market timing theory. The second 
section focuses on past studies on capital structure determinants at firm-level, sector-
level and country-level across developed and developing countries, although a few 
studies concentrate on single-sector or industry-level case studies. The third section 
focuses on the past literature that tests the impact of different economic sub-periods 
on capital structure determinants. The fourth section discloses the past literature of 
firm size effects on firm-level capital structure. The final section discusses the 
dynamic capital structure and speed of adjustment. 
2.2 Capital Structure Theories 
2.2.1 Traditional Approach vs MM Theory 
The traditional approach of capital structure accentuates the existence of an 
optimal capital structure whereby the firm can reduce its cost of capital and 
maximize the total value by consuming more leverage. At the initial stage, there is 
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not any trade-off between the increase in cost of equity and the benefit of cheap debt, 
although investors demand for a higher required rate of return on equity. As demand 
for leverage increases continuously, investors require higher equity return due to 
higher risk, which eventually offsets the benefits of cheaper debt funds. Hence, this 
approach explains the dependency of cost of capital on the firm’s capital structure, 
and further substantiates the existence of an optimal capital structure. 
In contrast, Modigliani and Miller (1958), authors of the MM theory, or 
theory of capital structure irrelevance, argue that the value of the firm is independent 
on the firm’s leverage. In other words, the value of a firm is highly dependent on its 
operating income and the level of business risk, irrespective of its actual capital 
structure. The MM theory presented three propositions based on a few assumptions, 
such as frictionless capital markets, no taxes, homogenous risk class, absence of 
bankruptcy, riskless debt and homogenous expectations. Under proposition 1, MM 
stressed that the cost of the capital of a firm is constant and independent of the 
debt/equity ratio
1
. Proposition 2 illustrates that the required rate of return increases 
linearly as the debt/equity ratio is increased. In short, an increase in the cost of equity 
is exactly offset by the benefits of the cheap debt. MM’s proposition 3 emphasizes 
that the cost of capital is determined based on the cut-off rate of a new investment, 
regardless of the type of security that has been utilized to finance those investments. 
2.2.2 Trade-off Theory 
Based on the modification of MM’s Proposition 1, the static trade-off model 
implies that firms tend to choose an optimal level of debt-equity mix that is 
determined by the trade-off between the costs and the benefits of debt. Most firms 
                                                          
1Underpinning Proposition 1 is a statement about the behaviour of the relevant cost of capital 
concepts. 
CHAPTER 2 
 
19 
 
would like to balance the debt level against the tax advantages and possible financial 
distress. This could be written with the following model: 
                                                        (2.1) 
where FV represents the value of an unlevered firm, PV denotes the present value of 
future taxes that have been benefited from deductions of interest tax, and PV 
represents the present value of future cost in the event of default. Hence, each firm 
sets its target and eventually moves towards its target or optimal capital structure. 
After relaxing the assumption of no taxes, Modigliani and Miller (1963) found that 
interest is tax-deductible and, therefore, it escapes from the process of taxation. This 
indirectly increases the usage of leverage and leads to firm value maximisation. 
Consequently, the value of levered firms will be greater than that of unlevered firms 
due to the additional gains from leverage.  
Consistent with the trade-off theory, firms with lower marginal tax rates were 
more inclined to utilize equity, compared to highly profitable firms that favour debt. 
Later on, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) found that the tax shield benefits are offset 
by the cost of financial distress. In contrast, even with the tax benefit, Merton (1977) 
highlighted the irrelevancy of capital structure under equilibrium, and Miller (1977) 
found that the advantage of debt disappears under a variety of tax regimes and, thus, 
the value of a firm becomes independent of its capital structure. DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) found that the expected gains from leverage are reduced by other 
deductions of taxable income which is known as non-tax debt shield, that is, 
depreciation and investment tax credits. In addition, Myers (2003) further argued that 
the benefit of interest tax deductions may disappear at the bottom layer of taxation. 
This is mainly due to equity incomes that are generated through capital gains, as it is 
realized through lower tax rates imposed on both dividend and interest income. 
Empirically, Myers (1984) found that tax effects seem to be a minor issue. 
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From the cost point of view, higher levels of leverage increase the bankruptcy 
cost and financial distress cost. The probability of bankruptcy is highly dependent on 
the proportion of debt that is utilized in financing a particular project. As the amount 
of debt increases, the default risk increases (Stiglitz, 1972; Kraus and Litzenberger, 
1973; Kim, 1978). The costs of financial distress can be either direct or indirect. The 
direct costs of financial distress are incurred during the reformation process of a firm, 
or when a particular firm is declared bankrupt attributable to excessive use of debt. 
These include legal and administrative costs, and shutting down the operations and 
asset disposals. This cost is important for small firms though it could be less 
important for larger firms. Meanwhile, the indirect costs are mainly due to the 
agency costs generated by conflicts of interest between debt and equity investors. 
This cost could be substantial for both types of firms (Warner, 1977). Therefore, 
firms with more financial distress costs tend to reduce the consumption of debt. 
Despite the benefit of tax, firms have to be more cautious in issuing debt as they 
move closer to financial distress. This occurs amongst firms or industries with above-
average business risk, intangible assets and high growth opportunities. These firms 
should be more cautious and operate at a lower debt ratio level. According to Bradley 
et al. (1984), the costs of financial distress, for example, bankruptcy costs and the 
agency costs of debt, decrease as the firm reduces the amount of debt. In line with 
this argument, Brounen et al. (2006) found that European firms tend to balance 
between the benefits of tax shield and financial distress, when determining the 
appropriate amount of leverage. These firms have a moderate target debt ratio based 
on tax and bankruptcy considerations. 
Besides the interest tax shield benefit, debt can be advantageous to a firm in 
different ways. Debt also plays a role as a valuable device for signalling by firms 
(Ross, 1977); debt can help overcome the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986) and, 
CHAPTER 2 
 
21 
 
finally, reduces the consumption of perquisites by managers. Conversely, debt can 
also harmful to firms besides increasing the cost of distress or bankruptcy. Excessive 
debt leads to an asset substitution problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and also 
creates an underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977). Based on this static trade-off 
theory, each and every firm sets its target and eventually moves towards its optimal 
capital structure as the benefit of the interest tax shield is offset by the cost of 
financial distress. This model assumes that firms only consider possible changes in 
the debt-equity ratio without regard to their assets and operations (Ross et al., 2001). 
The static trade-off theory is only applicable in the absence of adjustment 
cost, and indirectly explains that firms observe their current debt ratio as the optimal 
debt ratio. According to Myers (1984), firms are exposed to a cost of adjustment, in 
the process of excursion towards the optimal debt ratio. Therefore, cost and lags are 
involved in the adjustment process towards the optimum ratio. The cost of 
adjustment increases as the variations of actual debt ratio become wider. Based on 
the past literature, a target debt ratio is unobservable and therefore, it is constructed 
from other variables, for example, size, non-tax debt shield, and growth etc. (Fama 
and French, 2002). 
2.2.3 Agency Cost Theory 
In relation to optimal capital structure, the concept of agency cost becomes a 
crucial factor. As the pioneers, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the probability 
of cash flow is invariant to ownership structure. Being constant on firm size and 
external financing, firm value is a function of agency cost. They define the agency 
relationship as a contract between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers), 
where managers are delegated with some decision making authority to perform some 
services on behalf of the shareholders. In most cases, there is great divergence of 
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interest between principal and agent as both parties are utility maximisers. Therefore, 
managers fail to act in the best interests of the shareholders. In general, two types of 
conflict arise in the agency problem: (i) between managers and shareholders, and (ii) 
between shareholders and debt holders.  
Conflict between managers and shareholders arises from the shareholders not 
capturing the entire gain from the earnings, while having to bear the cost from those 
activities
2
. This scenario is observable amongst firms with free cash flow. In general, 
free cash flow is a form of excess cash flow that is normally used to finance the 
positive NPV projects. However, managers tend to misuse the excess funds by 
investing them in negative NPV projects, other inefficient activities within the 
organization, or for their own personal benefit. Therefore, to address this problem, 
debt is used as a device to discipline the managers. Jensen (1986) also argues that 
debt financing mitigates the “free” cash problem in the firm which may lead the 
managers to utilize it for personal benefit. By engaging in debt financing, managers 
are contractually obliged to creditors in terms of interest and principal payments. If 
the managers fail to fulfil the creditors’ requirements, eventually the firm is exposed 
to bankruptcy risk.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued conflict between debt holders and 
shareholders arises due to inequality in the debt contract. If the project is successful, 
the shareholders enjoy most of the profit. On the other hand, the debt holders have to 
bear the loss if the project fails. This conflict leads to several consequences such as 
overinvestment (risk shifting) or underinvestment (asset substitution) problems. The 
overinvestment problem explains how stockholders tend to exploit bondholders once 
the debt is issued. In other words, managers who act on behalf of shareholders tend 
to accept negative NPV projects (which is risky) in order to increase the 
                                                          
2
As the firm increases the proportion of financing through debt, the managers could increase their 
shares (equity) in the firm. Ultimately, the conflict between these two parties could be reduced. 
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shareholders’ wealth rather than the total value of the firm. If the project fails, the 
risk will be shifted to the bondholders. Conversely, as the project increases the 
amount of debt and decreases the value of equity, managers try to avoid such projects 
even though the net present value is positive. This issue is known as the 
underinvestment problem or asset substitution problem. Firms are willing to reject 
good investments, as the proceeds of the projects are not attractive, at the expense of 
shareholders. 
The agency cost of debt could be reduced if managers choose safer projects 
with higher probability of success. A firm’s reputation and the types of project, that 
is, a safe project or a risky project, determine the amount of debt as the younger 
firms have less debt compared to older firms. In accordance with Diamond (1989), 
the older firms tend to choose safe projects and adopt longer debt repayments with 
lower borrowing costs that eventually lead to better reputation. Meanwhile, the 
younger firms with lesser reputations tend to undertake risky projects and, ultimately, 
switch to a safe project if they survive without any default. However, Hirshleifer et 
al. (1992) argued that firms might end up with higher levels of debt as firm’s 
reputation is being considered as the main factor in pursuing the safe project. 
Consistent with the agency problems, a few studies highlight different capital 
structure models. Harris and Raviv (1990) found that while some managers are 
interested in continuing certain projects they are strongly opposed by the 
shareholders who would prefer liquidation. This model predicts that firms with 
higher liquidation values or valuable tangible assets and lower investigation costs 
will have more debt and a greater probability of default. However, these firms have 
higher market values than firms with higher investigation costs and lower liquidation 
values. Therefore, a positive relationship is noticeable between leverage and firm 
value. The debt level relative to income is associated negatively with the probability 
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of reorganization default. If the cash flow is poor, debt will overcome this problem 
by giving the shareholders the option of liquidation. Alternatively, Stulz (1990) 
argued that the optimal target debt is achieved by balancing the benefit of debt by 
avoiding the value decreasing projects against reducing the value increasing projects 
that increase the costs of debt. Basically, there is a trade-off between reduced free 
cash flow and underinvestment. This situation occurs when a takeover target is 
expected and these firms are expected to have more debt compared to anti-takeover 
firms. Firms with higher investment opportunities will have a lower level of debt. 
2.2.4 Pecking Order Theory 
In accordance with the literature of information asymmetry, Ross (1977) 
proposed debt as a tool for signalling confidence to investors. As the utilization of 
debt increases, investors perceive it as a signal of high quality. In other words, 
increasing debt indirectly signals the future cash flow of a firm and the manager’s 
confidence level. In general, increasing debt excessively will lead a lower quality 
firm to bankruptcy and, eventually, the loss of managers’ jobs. Therefore, firms will 
only increase their debt level if they have a lower level of bankruptcy costs. 
Subsequently, Myers and Majluf (1984) confronted the existence of the simple trade-
off model by demonstrating a pecking order across finance sources as a result of 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. When investors are not able 
to value shares due to lack of information on the future value of the firm, managers 
are assumed to be better informed and to act in the best interest of the shareholders. 
They further argued that announcement of a stock issue could be good news for 
investors as it reveals the growth opportunity of the firm. Conversely, it could also be 
bad news for managers who attempt to issue the overvalued shares. Interestingly, 
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they suggest that the announcement of debt issuance has a smaller impact on the 
stock price compared with the announcement of an equity issuance. 
 As a result, the pecking order theory implies that there is a hierarchy in 
raising funds for financing a firm’s investments. Firms prefer internal financing to 
external financing and if they obtain external funds, they prefer debt to equity. Due 
to the existence of information costs associated with debt and equity, Myers (1984) 
argued that firms tend to rank internal equity such as retained earnings and other 
internally generated cash, as their first choice of long-term financing. These internal 
sources of financing have a lower level of information asymmetry cost and seem to 
be the safest. Firms tend to use their liquid assets, that is, their cash balance or 
marketable securities, as the amount of retained earnings fails to accommodate the 
initial investment outlays due to unforeseen variations in profitability and investment 
opportunities, together with sticky dividend policies. 
In contrast, when internally-generated cash flows are greater than the amount 
required, the firms pay off debt or invest in cash or marketable securities. Then, as 
external financing is required, firms tend to prioritize securities according to the 
safety level. Debt financing is most preferred, followed by hybrid securities such as 
convertible bonds. From the investors’ point of view, equity is riskier than debt. 
Equity has a larger adverse selection risk premium than debt, and investors will 
demand a higher rate of return. Therefore, debt becomes the first choice for external 
financing, after retained earnings. Finally, external equity (common stocks) financing 
becomes a last resort for financing and has the highest cost of information 
asymmetry. In this theory, there is no notion of a target debt ratio as the debt reflects 
the cumulative external financing. 
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2.2.5 Market timing theory 
Equity market timing theory hypothesizes that capital structure is highly and 
solely dependent on past equity market timing attempts, which is completely 
contradictory to the trade-off theory. Some past studies have documented the 
importance of equity market timing on corporate financial policy. Taggart (1977), 
Marsh (1982) and Hovamikian et al. (2001) explain that firms are reluctant to borrow 
and issue equity when the market value increases, and to repurchase as the market 
values decrease. The cost of capital tends to affect a firm’s capital structure 
decisions. In general, firms would like to choose proper financing at lower cost after 
considering other aspects. In accordance with Jegadeesh (2000), as the cost of equity 
decreases, firms tend to issue equity and repurchase as the cost increases. Based on 
the survey conducted across Chief Financial Officers (CFO), Graham and Harvey 
(2001) concluded that managers rely on market timing in issuing equity and 
convertible debt.  
Soon after, Baker and Wurgler (2002) discovered that the importance of 
market timing as the most powerful cross-sectional variable of both book and market 
leverage, and the impact of market to book ratio increases over time. They conclude 
that managers have clear preferences to raise capital when market values are 
relatively higher compared to book values, and that such attempts have a long-lasting 
impact on observed capital structures. Additionally, the results suggest that current 
capital structure is strongly associated with historical market values. The 
interpretation of market-to-book ratio is solely based on public information. 
However, managers may have private information and this kind of information may 
help them to time their equity issues. Moreover, it is difficult to understand why they 
would time their financing choices based on public information. 
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According to Leary and Roberts (2005), rebalancing of capital structure 
seems to be costly due to the presence of adjustment costs. Therefore, firms 
rebalanced within their optimal range and it was found that the market timing 
variable is generally much stronger for firms with high adjustment costs. In the short 
run, firms tend to respond to the equity issuance and price shocks and, eventually, 
leverage rebalancing takes place. In the long run, the effect of market timing 
becomes weaker. They conclude that the persistent effect of shocks on leverage is 
mainly due to the adjustment cost rather than indifference towards capital structure. 
By decomposing the market timing variable into two components: (i) a true market 
timing component, and (ii) long-term average market-to-book ratio, Kayhan and 
Titman (2007) argued that the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002) were highly 
driven by average market-to-book ratio rather than a market timing component. They 
contended that the market timing component variable has a short-lived effect on a 
firm’s future capital structure. Meanwhile, the average market-to-book ratio conveys 
information about target debt ratio rather than market timing motives. Similar results 
are noticeable in Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008) that reveal the effect of equity 
market timing is short-lived on leverage. They further argue on the irrelevancy of a 
market timing effect on leverage, though a negative relationship exists between 
historical market-to-book ratio and leverage. The rebalancing of leverage due to 
equity issuances is more consistent with the dynamic trade-off theory. 
2.3 Capital Structure Determinants 
2.3.1 Firm-level Determinants 
This section provides a detailed review of capital structure determinants with 
related prominent capital structure theories. The firm-level determinants are selected 
based on past empirical studies in the context of developed and developing countries, 
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particularly Malaysia. The following literature also discovers studies focussed 
primarily on the sector or industry-level rather than solely concentrating on the 
country-level studies. Based on a pilot study, seven determinants are finalised (after 
dropping operating leverage from the model) from studies of Malaysian firms. The 
determinants are: profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, growth 
opportunities, size, and risk. 
(i) Profitability 
From the perspective of the trade-off theory, profitable firms carry a larger 
amount of debt due to the benefits of tax deductibility. This increases the confidence 
level among the creditors to provide larger loans in the future and establishes a 
positive relationship between leverage and profitability. Bowen et al. (1982) and 
Dammon and Senbet (1988) showed a positive association between these variables. 
In addition, Frank and Goyal (2009) found that highly profitable firms tend to issue 
debt and repurchase equity. In relation to the agency theory, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argued that managers of profitable firms tend to increase their debt in order to 
reduce the agency cost of equity. Basically, debt is used as a device to discipline and 
ensure the managers act on behalf of investors, rather than build their own empires 
(Jensen, 1986)
3
. In the context of information asymmetry, an increase in the debt 
ratio of profitable firms indirectly reflects the quality of financial management 
amongst investors. Large and profitable firms with fewer investment opportunities 
tend to reduce equity issues and, hence, increase the utilization of leverage, and vice-
versa for the small firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Contrary to the tax shield hypothesis, the pecking order theory emphasizes 
that profitable firms will use their profits (internal funding) to finance their 
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 The avoidance of disciplinary role of debt is common among the managers of profitable firms that 
lead to a negative correlation between profitability and debt. Nevertheless, suppliers are willing to 
lend as the current cash flows become attractive. 
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investments, and use less debt or other external funds. Hence, a negative relationship 
is established between profitability and leverage. From the external funds context, 
debt is preferred to equity as the cost of equity is high probably due to asymmetric 
information or transaction cost. The majority of past studies show that leverage has a 
negative relationship with profitability (Titman and Wessels, 1989; Harris and Raviv, 
1991; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Booth et al., 2001; Mitton, 2006; Zou and Xiao, 
2006; Correa et al., 2007; Shah and Khan, 2007; Mazur, 2007; de Jong et al., 2008; 
Lemmon et al., 2008). In relation to that, Chen (2004) found a different pecking 
order across developing countries in raising their finances. Managers perceived 
internal funds to be the fastest and easiest source of financing, followed by the 
issuance of new equity and bank borrowings; the issuance of new debt becomes the 
last resort for financing. Besides the pecking order hypothesis, Chen (2004) further 
justifies the negative relationship as an avoidance of the underinvestment problem 
and mispricing of new projects. 
Moreover, Nagano (2003) emphasized that firms across East Asian countries 
are highly dependent on internal funds compared to those in industrialized countries 
due to significant differences between the external and internal cost of financing. 
Firms tend to rely heavily on bank loans due to the significant information 
asymmetry that exists between insiders and outsiders and, as a result, the debt to 
equity ratio increases. This is not the case for firms across developed countries that 
have greater accessibility to finance with longer maturities, and indirectly provides 
greater flexibility to manage their operations efficiently and, therefore, increases the 
level of profitability. Delcoure (2007) found a negative association between these 
variables regardless of types of leverage like short term debt, long-term debt and 
total debt. However, according to Mittoo and Zhang (2008), profitability is positively 
related so short-term debt and negatively to long-term debt. 
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At the sector or industry level, Feidakis and Rovolis (2007) found that 
profitability is negatively related to both book and market values of total debt as well 
as to short-term debt amongst European construction firms. The long-term debt 
seems to be insignificant as the firms may prefer to use their internal funds to cover 
their short-term debt. This indirectly shows that profitability may affect the maturity 
structure of debt across the large construction firms in Europe. Similar results are 
observable across manufacturing firms in India (Rajagopal, 2011). In Turkey, 
Gonenc (2003) found a similar relation between profitability and leverage, that is, 
total debt and long-term debt, across industrial firms. In the Malaysian context, most 
of the studies support the pecking order theory hypothesis. A few studies, including 
Booth et al. (2001), Deesomsak et al. (2004), Fraser et al. (2006) and de Jong et al. 
(2008) concluded that highly profitable firms in Malaysia use low amounts of debt 
compared to the least profitable firms. In conjunction with that, Pandey (2001) and 
Pandey and Chotigeat (2004) documented that profitability has a significant inverse 
relationship with all types of book and market value debt ratios. Baharuddin et al. 
(2011) found a negative relationship between profitability and total debt ratio with 
large magnitude across the construction sector in Malaysia. In contrast, Mohamad 
(1995) found a positive relationship between profitable firms and leverage. 
(ii) Size 
Based on the trade-off theory, large firms have a larger capacity for leverage 
due to lower bankruptcy risk and agency cost of debt with stable cash flows 
compared to smaller firms. Bankruptcy cost really matters in deciding on an optimal 
capital structure as this cost represents a smaller proportion of the total value for 
larger firms and a larger proportion for smaller firms. Bates (1971) found that small 
firms tend to be more self-financing. They rarely issued stock and relied more on 
bank financing and trade credits. Likewise, Titman and Wessels (1988) argued that 
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firms tend to reduce short-term debt as they grow larger. Alternatively, Marsh (1982) 
found that large UK firms rely more on long-term debt due to better access to credit 
markets. In relation to that, Leary et al. (2009) point out that firm size seemed to be 
an important determinant of capital structure as this variable represents a proxy for 
differences in capital accessibility. 
At the developing country level, Booth et al. (2001) found that larger firms 
have higher amounts of total debt and long-term debt compared to smaller firms. 
They argue that small-sized firms are not able to increase their external financing as 
they become more financially constrained than large ones. As a result of market 
imperfections across developing countries, small firms have inadequate access to 
external finance (Beck et al., 2008). Therefore, a positive relationship exists between 
leverage and firm size. In relation to that, a few researchers (e.g., Fraser et al., 2006; 
Harris and Raviv, 1990, 1991; Ullah and Nishat, 2008; Wiwattanakantang, 1999; 
Zou and Xiao, 2006) conclude that leverage has a positive association with larger 
firms. Gonenc (2003) found a similar correlation between firm size and leverage, that 
is, total debt and long-term debt, across industrial firms in Turkey. However, 
Feidakis and Rovolis (2007) provide some mixed results based on European 
construction firms, in which the utilization of short-term debt, long-term debt and 
total debt increases as the firms grow larger. As the UK property firms grow larger, 
the utilization of long-term debt increases (Ooi, 1999). 
However, due to information asymmetries that exist between insiders and 
outsiders, larger firms issue more equity, as it is closely observed by analysts and 
reduces the amount of debt financing. In line with that, Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
argued that larger firms tend to be more transparent than smaller ones as they are 
required to disclose more financial information to investors and therefore, the large 
firms favour equity financing. Furthermore, larger firms have better access to the 
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equity market due to their reputation and the attraction of capital gain in the 
secondary market (Chen, 2004). Conversely, in the case of Greece, information 
asymmetry and moral hazard were greater for small firms as they failed to disclose 
more information to investors (Voulgaris et al., 2004). Based on the pecking order 
theory, a few studies (e.g. Antoniou et al., 2008; Gupta, 1969; Mitton, 2008; Titman 
and Wessels, 1989) conclude that leverage has a negative relationship with size. 
Chen (2004) found that firm size is negatively correlated to long-term debt but 
produces a positive correlation to total debt but with insignificant values. Conversely, 
manufacturing firms in India tend to decrease both long-term debt and total debt as 
they grow larger (Rajagopal, 2011). Booth et al. (2001) found a different relationship 
between types of leverage and size across developing countries.  
In the Malaysian context, Pandey (2001), Fraser et al. (2006) and de Jong et 
al. (2008) emphasized the size of the firm is positively related to debt ratio; Pandey 
and Chotigeat (2004) argued that larger firms are more diversified which leads to 
lower bankruptcy risk. Small firms across developing countries, for example, in 
Malaysia, use relatively more external financing than firms in the US (Beck et al., 
2008). Besides that, Suto (2003) claimed that corporate size is one of the key factors 
to leverage by illustrating that larger firms can easily issue debt. Consistent with that, 
Krishnan and Moyer (1996) and Mohamad (1995) found the size of the firm plays a 
significant role in determining a firm's capital structure. At the construction sector-
level, large construction firms tend to rely heavily on debt financing which seems to 
be the second most important variable after tangibility, with significant impact 
(Baharuddin et al., 2011). Mooi (1993) and Mahmud (1998) argued that there is no 
significant difference between capital structure and firm size across Malaysian 
industries, though they found significant differences between capital structure and 
industries. 
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(iii) Tangibility 
Corresponding to both the trade-off theory and agency theory, firms with 
larger tangible assets compared to intangible assets have greater leverage capacity, 
which reduces the possibility of mispricing in the event of liquidation. Thus, it 
secures the lenders in the event of financial distress and reduces the agency cost of 
debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As firms are able to present more fixed assets as 
security against debt, creditors are willing to advance more credit and this mitigates 
monitoring the operations and performance of the firms (Shah and Khan, 2007). 
Hence, tangibility is positively related to leverage and this is demonstrated across 
past literature (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1991; Zou and Xiao, 2006; Antoniou et al., 
2008; de Jong etal., 2008; Lemmon etal., 2008; Mittoo and Zhang, 2008). Besides 
confirming the positive relationship between leverage and tangibility, Frank and 
Goyal (2009) further emphasized that tangibility is one of the core factors for market 
leverage. For instance, Turkey’s industrial firms increase their long-term debt and 
reduce the total debt as their tangibility increases (Gonenc, 2003). 
Similarly, Feidakis and Rovolis (2007) emphasized that tangibility is 
positively correlated with long-term debt and negatively associated with short-term 
debt, amongst European construction firms. He further argued that European 
construction firms tend to adopt the matching principles as they try to match their 
assets with their liabilities according to the maturity structure. The manufacturing 
firms place more emphasis on long-term debt as the collateral level increases, while 
short-term debt becomes immaterial (Rajagopal, 2011). On the other hand, a few 
studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Pandey, 2001; Correa et al., 2007; Mazur, 2007; 
Mitton, 2008; Ullah and Nishat, 2008) found that more tangible assets will use less 
debt, supporting the pecking order theory. Booth et al. (2001) concluded that 
tangibility affects total debt negatively across developing countries except Mexico. 
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Wijst and Thurik (1993) found that tangibility is negatively related to short-term debt 
and total debt, while maintaining a positive relationship with long-term debt. 
However, the diverse relationship between long-term debt and tangibility is observed 
across different industries. According to Ovtchinnikov (2010), the association 
between these variables differs across industries such as utilities and transport with a 
negative correlation, and petroleum and gas with a positive correlation, due to 
regulation processes. 
Focusing on Malaysian firms, Booth et al. (2001) argued that asset 
tangibility was related positively to long-term debt with insignificant values, but 
negatively and significantly related to total debt. In addition, both studies, that is, 
Pandey (2001) with a fixed effect model and Pandey and Chotigeat (2004) with a 
pooled GLS model, found that tangibility is negatively correlated with short-term 
and total debt, while long-term debt shows insignificant values. He argued that 
short-term debt is more collateralized than long-term debt. However, Fraser et al. 
(2006) and de Jong et al. (2008) stated that tangibility is positively associated to 
leverage across Malaysian listed firms. Recently, Baharuddin et al. (2011) discovered 
that asset tangibility has the largest influence on total debt across construction firms 
in Malaysia. They argued that as the firm own a greater amount of tangibility, the 
demand for debt in financing the assets increases. 
(iv) Growth Opportunities 
In relation to the agency theory, firms with high growth rates tend to accept 
risky projects and try to increase the shareholders’ wealth. However, creditors are 
reluctant to lend due to the higher risk and, hence, the cost of borrowing increases to 
compensate for the additional risk. As the cost of borrowing increases, firms tend to 
avoid debt and divert into equity financing. Consistent with that, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) found that firms with optimal negative growth hold larger amounts 
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of cash generated from the operations and should have more debt. High-growth firms 
are more inclined to expropriate wealth from debt holders, (Jensen, 1986; Myers, 
1977). Despite using risky debt, these firms utilize a greater amount of equity which 
could overcome the underinvestment problem (Smith and Watts, 1992). Therefore, 
these firms are encouraged to use internal or external equity rather than debt. Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) argued that financial distress is unlikely to be blamed for the 
negative correlation, as the result is highly driven by firms with high market-to-book 
ratios rather than firms with low market to book ratios.  
This is completely opposite to the findings of Fama and French (1992). They 
found the negative association is also driven by large equity issuers
4
. Some studies 
support the argument that high-growth firms prefer to use lower amounts of debt 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Hovakimian et al., 2004; Zou 
and Xiao, 2006; Shahand Khan, 2007; Antoniou et al., 2008; de Jong et al., 2008; 
Lemmon et al., 2008; Mitton, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009). Other studies 
demonstrated the effect of growth opportunities by splitting the total debt into short-
term and long-term debt. Toy et al. (1974) found a negative relationship between 
growth and long-term debt amongst manufacturing firms across five industrialized 
countries. In addition, Gonenc (2003) found similar results between growth 
opportunities and leverage, that is, total debt and long-term debt, across industrial 
firms in Turkey. Conversely, short-term debt could be a good substitute for long-
term debt in reducing the agency problem across firms with high growth 
opportunities (Myers, 1977). Therefore, short-term debt is positively correlated to 
growth opportunities. As evidence, industries with a high growth rate and moderate 
profitability need to raise short-term finance in order to fulfil their additional funding 
requirements (Gupta, 1969). 
                                                          
4
 Market to book ratio is inversely related to book value of leverage across firms that have a 
propensity to issue stock as their price is high relative to earnings on book value. 
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In contrast, in order to reduce the agency problem, growth causes firms to 
divert their financing from new equity to debt. A greater information asymmetry 
exists between investors and managers related to the quality of projects as the firms 
are exposed to a higher level of growth opportunities. Therefore, the pecking order 
theory hypothesized that growth is positively associated with leverage. Some studies, 
such as Harris and Raviv (1991), Chen (2004), Pandey and Chotigeat (2004), and 
Ullah and Nishat (2008), point out that growth opportunities are positively related to 
debt ratios. In addition, Titman and Wessels (1988) confirm that growth is positively 
associated with long-term debt. Booth et al. (2001) found a positive relationship 
between market to book ratio and both total debt and long-term debt across 
developing countries, except in Pakistan and Zimbabwe. This finding is consistent 
with results reported by Feidakis and Rovolis (2007). The manufacturing firms in 
India tend to increase their total debt and long-term debt and reduce the short-term 
debt, as they are exposed with higher growth (Rajagopal, 2011). Nevertheless, Chen 
(2004) argued the irrelevancy of the trade-off theory between these variables across 
Chinese firms. First, most of the manufacturing and heavy industry sectors in China 
owned greater amounts of tangible assets compared to intangible assets, thus limited 
leverage growth opportunities are observable. Secondly, equity markets and banks 
recognize the value of growth opportunities, which has been reflected in their share 
prices. Therefore, firms with attractive earnings and growth prospects utilize a 
greater amount of leverage. Finally, the willingness of banks to issue longer term 
debt is highly dependent on capital market recognition, that is, high market 
capitalization. 
Based on Malaysian studies, Pandey (2001) found a positive correlation 
between growth opportunities and all types of leverage, as the fixed effect model 
used controls for cross-sectional differences. However, the results changed when the 
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model adopted the pooled GLS model, where leverage is only significant and 
positively related to long-term debt (Pandey and Chotigeat, 2004). Furthermore, 
Booth et al. (2001) emphasized that growth opportunities are positively related to 
debt ratio, while de Jong et al. (2008) found an inverse association between these 
variables, although Fraser et al. (2006) argue that investment opportunities appeared 
to be unrelated to leverage in Malaysia. In a recent study, Baharuddin et al. (2011) 
found a positive relationship between growth and total debt across construction firms 
in Malaysia. 
(v) Risk 
As the firm’s earnings volatility increases, it increases the probability of firm 
default on debt payment. This reduces the confidence level amongst creditors to 
extend new loans to risky firms and, finally, ends up with higher financial cost. 
These firms need to reduce debt in order to minimize their bankruptcy risk. When 
cost of bankruptcy is superior, an increase in earnings volatility diminishes a firm’s 
debt ratios. Therefore, the trade-off theory emphasizes that leverage should be 
negatively related to risk. Equally, the pecking order theory also emphasizes a 
similar relationship between risk and leverage. Risky and volatile firms tend to 
accumulate their funds during profitable periods and use them during unstable 
periods. Some studies, such as Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), 
Pandey (2001) and Ullah and Nishat (2008), emphasize that risky firms will use less 
debt.  Feidakis and Rovolis (2007) support this further by highlighting that leverage 
is negatively related in European construction firms. A similar result is discernible 
across manufacturing firms in India (Rajagopal, 2011). As a result, highly volatile 
industries tend to issue more short-term debt (Guedes and Opler, 1996) 
However, recent empirical evidence confirms that earnings volatility has a 
positive relationship with leverage ratios, which is consistent with Wiwattanakantang 
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(1999), Suto (2003) and Correa et al. (2007). Firms may ignore earnings volatility as 
the firm borrows below their debt servicing capacity. This situation is obvious across 
firms with concentrated and family-based ownership (Deesomsak et al., 2004). 
Conversely, Booth et al. (2001) found some mixed results across ten developing 
countries, such as positive associations across Mexican and Jordanian firms, and 
negative associations amongst South Korean, Turkish and Zimbabwean firms.  
From the Malaysian point of view, Mahmud (1998) found a significant 
positive correlation between earnings volatility and total debt across Malaysian listed 
firms. Similarly, Suto (2003) found that firms with higher risk are more dependent on 
debt. In addition, Booth et al. (2001) highlighted that listed firms in Malaysia have 
low business risk compared to other developing countries. However, they are more 
sceptical about the estimation of business risk by using variability in return on assets 
as a single value for all the years and it is not significant amongst Malaysian firms. 
Although this variable produced an insignificant result, the sign of the coefficient 
confirms a positive relationship between them. Conversely, in line with both the 
trade-off and pecking order theories, de Jong et al. (2008) found a different 
relationship and confirmed a negative and significant association between risk and 
leverage across Malaysian listed firms. Nevertheless, Pandey (2001) could not see 
any significant values between risk and all types of leverage as the cross-section is 
fixed. Using a different methodology, Pandey and Chotigeat (2004) found that risk 
is negatively correlated with the long-term debt ratio. Annuar and Shamsher (1993) 
and Deesomsak et al. (2004) argued there is no significant effect of volatility on debt 
ratios. This is possibly due to the nature of the creditors who emphasize the security 
of fixed assets rather than the variation in income for the repayment of principal and 
interest (Shah and Khan, 2007). 
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(vi) Non-Tax Debt Shield 
Firms could reduce tax payments by using more debt rather than equity in 
financing their investments. The potential tax benefit will be reduced if the firm’s 
non-tax debt shield increases. This establishes a negative association between 
leverage and non-tax debt shield and is consistent with the DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) model that demonstrates the effect of non-tax debt shields on optimal debt 
level. Based on these authors, the existence of non-tax debt shield reduces the benefit 
of taxon debt. In line with the model that supports the trade-off theory, Antoniou et 
al. (2008) found a similar result across all G-5 countries except France. Likewise, 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) also found similar results across Thai firms and concludes 
that non-tax debt shields could be a substitute for debt. In accordance with Mackie- 
Mason (1990), the negative association between non-tax debt shield and leverage 
should be stronger across firms that experience tax exhaustion. He argued that larger 
firms tend to have high taxable income and, thus, utilize a larger proportion of 
leverage. Meanwhile, the smaller firms that pay little tax are likely to issue less debt 
due to the trade-off between interest deduction and non-tax debt shields. At the 
industry level, manufacturing firms tend to reduce their long-term debt consumption 
as their non-tax debt shield increases (Rajagopal, 2011).  
In contrast, some studies found a positive association between non-tax debt 
shields and leverage (Bradley et al., 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Wald, 1999; 
Mao, 2003; Mitton, 2006). Being a primary component of non-tax debt shield, 
depreciation reflects the value of tangible assets owned by firms. Such firms could 
use those assets as collateral and this indirectly increases their debt capacity and 
enjoys the benefit of tax. From the industry point of view, non-tax debt differs across 
industries probably due to differences in financial leverage across industries (Bowen 
et al., 1982). However, the argument of Boquist and Moore (1984) is contradictory to 
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the findings of Bowen et al. (1982). Additionally, Chang et al. (2009) found a 
positive association between non-tax debt shields and all types of leverage, that is, 
short-term debt, long-term debt and total debt. As for the Malaysian-based studies, 
Suto (2003) and Deesomsak et al. (2004) argued that leverage and non-tax debt 
shield is negatively related. Booth et al. (2001) highlight that tax is negatively 
correlated with leverage in Malaysian firms and this indirectly indicates that non-tax 
debt shield is positively correlated with leverage. 
(vii) Liquidity 
Based on the trade-off theory, highly liquid firms have relatively high debt 
ratios in order to meet their short-term obligations. In early studies, Martin and Scott 
(1974) found a positive correlation between liquidity and leverage ratios. 
Furthermore, Feidakis and Rovolis (2007) state that liquidity is positively related to 
long-term debt and negatively related to short-term debt within the European 
construction firms. However, the pecking order theory emphasizes that firms do not 
need to raise debt when they have a sufficient level of liquidity to finance their 
investment and, hence, have lower leverage. As the firms possess more current 
assets, they could finance their future investments using their accumulated internal 
funds. In line with those arguments, de Jong et al. (2008) found a significant negative 
relationship between liquidity and debt, specifically in developed countries, with 
insignificant results for developing countries.  
However, a few studies across developing countries provide significant 
results. For instance, Ullah and Nishat (2008) found highly liquid firms rely on 
equity financing and avoid debt financing. Deesomsak et al. (2004) also found a 
similar relationship between liquidity and leverage across Malaysian listed firms. 
Mazur (2007) found a negative relationship between liquidity and leverage across 
Polish firms. Moreover, Sbeiti (2010) found a similar relationship across Gulf 
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Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and argued that firms tend to finance their 
investments based on a pecking order. 
2.3.2 Sector-level Determinants 
Based on past literature on developed countries, quite a few studies (Ferri and 
Jones, 1979; Aggarwal, 1981; Bowen et al., 1982; Bradley et al., 1984; Brander and 
Lewis, 1986; Aggarwal, 1990; Claessens et al., 2000; Das and Roy, 2000; 
Hovakimian et al., 2004; MacKay and Phillips; 2005; Frank and Goyal, 2009) 
highlight the importance of industry or sector on firm’s financial structure. The 
sector or industry-specific factors were measured based on variables such as research 
and development, uniqueness, product market development, and price competition 
among others. The past evidence substantiates the influence of these variables on 
firms’ financial structures which vary systematically and significantly across 
industries and with the existence of similarities within the industries (Brander and 
Lewis, 1986; Maksimovic, 1988). In accordance with Kayo and Kimura (2011), past 
literature often neglects industry or sector effects, though a few studies include 
dummy variables to represent industries, or include variables that characterize the 
industry or sector. 
In the context of developing countries and particularly Malaysia, these 
variables could not be measured due to data limitations. Based on the past studies on 
developing countries, industry or sector effects are captured based on industry 
dummies, aggregation of firm-level variables or median leverage. For instance, Suto 
(2003) argued the choices of financing differ across sectors due to different demand 
for both liquidity and fixed investment. Nevertheless, he captured the differences by 
using dummies across non-manufacturing sectors. These methods do not provide a 
clear picture that characterizes a particular industry’s effect on firm financial 
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structure. Therefore, to capture the real impact of sector or industry behaviour on 
firm’s capital structure, this study adopted three new variables, munificence, 
dynamism and the HH Index. The HH index has been used recently by Kayo and 
Kimura (2011) who are the pioneers who analysed the direct impact of these 
variables on firm leverage. To my knowledge, prior to Kayo and Kimura (2011), 
MacKay and Phillips (2005) used the HH index to examine the association between 
industry concentration and firm leverage across US firms, and the index is widely 
utilized in other financial studies (e.g. Chevalier, 1995; Kovenock and Phillips, 1997; 
Almazan and Molina, 2002; Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). 
The other two variables (which are adopted from the strategic management 
area) seem to be new in the area of capital structure studies. Basically, these 
variables are generated from the Beard and Dess (1984) model which consists of 
three dimensions, i.e. munificence, dynamism and complexity. This model reflects a 
multidimensional model of organizational environment. So far, these variables have 
been used to focus on the importance of external factors in determining corporate 
strategies for a particular firm, and the influence of environmental behaviour on 
entire firms within an industry. Therefore, Kayo and Kimura (2011) analysed the 
effects of the specific characteristics of a given industry on a firm’s capital structure 
that operates within the particular industry. 
(i) Munificence 
According to Beard and Dess (1984), munificence is the capacity of an 
environment to maintain persistent growth. Almazan and Molina (2002) found that 
variations in capital structure are greater in industries that have abundant growth 
opportunities. Industries that operate within an environment with high munificence 
will have abundance of resources. These industries tend to have high levels of 
profitability due to the low level of competition. Hereby, the impact of industry is 
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noticeable as the firm operates in an industry that experiences a high munificence 
level with abundance of resources and will generate higher profits. A positive 
association between munificence and leverage confirms the pecking order theory, 
and an inverse relationship substantiates the agency theory. In relation to that, Kayo 
and Kimura (2011) found a negative relationship between munificence and long-term 
debt across developed and developing countries, which confirms the applicability of 
the agency theory. However, munificence tended to be insignificant across developed 
countries. 
(ii) Dynamism 
Firms within an industry are expected to experience a similar environment 
and the characteristics of environment and its changes differ significantly between 
industries. This instability of environmental change is known as environmental 
dynamism (Simerly and Li, 2000). From this study, they found that leverage is 
positively related to the performance of firms that operate under a stable 
environment, while a negative relationship is observed for firms in dynamic 
environments. They further argued that the level of environmental instability differs 
across industries and, hence, affects similar activities differently across industries. In 
addition, the notion of dynamism is strongly associated with the conception of a 
firm’s business risk (Kayo and Kimura, 2011). As business risk increases, firms are 
exposed to greater variation in future income and this variation takes place as the 
environment becomes unstable. Firms that operate within a particular industry or 
sector tend to have similar characteristics such as similar products, cost of skilled 
labour, raw material, and technologies. As a result, they are expected to face a 
similar environment. As the environment becomes more unstable, all of the firms 
within the industry are exposed to business risk as their future income stream is 
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uncertain. Therefore, high dynamism creates uncertainty in future income and, 
finally, reduces the utilization of leverage. 
 In relation to agency theory, firms that operate within a dynamic 
environment may increase the use of equity financing to reduce the transaction cost 
arising from increased risk. Debt becomes more expensive due to uncertain 
outcomes. Conversely, firms should go for debt financing as the rate of 
environmental dynamism decreases. According to Kayo and Kimura (2011), 
environmental dynamism and long-term debt are positively correlated but 
insignificant across emerging countries. Nevertheless, this variable is related 
negatively and significantly to long-term debt amongst developed countries. 
(iii) Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HH Index) 
From the past literature, the level of industry concentration determines the 
amount of leverage used by firms in their investment. In relation to that, Almazan 
and Molina (2002) found that variations in capital structure are greater across highly 
concentrated industries. In other words, these two types of industries, highly 
concentrated and low-concentrated industries, affect firm leverage differently. 
Therefore, the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HH Index) is used to capture the impact 
of industry concentration on leverage by measuring the size of a firm in relation to 
the industry or sector. According to Brander and Lewis (1986) and MacKay and 
Phillips (2005), firms in highly concentrated industries will use a larger amount of 
leverage, and vice-versa for low-concentrated industries.  
In general, these two types of industries vary greatly in terms of their 
characteristics. As for the concentrated industries, they are exposed to lower risk, less 
dispersion in risk, higher and more stable profitability and asset size, which leads 
these industries to utilize a greater amount of leverage. In contrast, the low-
concentrated industries or those known as competitive industries are exposed to 
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higher risk, high volatility in risk and profitability and, hence, carry less leverage. 
This shows that industry concentration and leverage utilization is positively 
correlated. Contrary to the findings of MacKay and Phillips (2005), Kayo and 
Kimura (2011) found a negative correlation between the HH Index and leverage 
(measured by long-term debt) across developed and emerging economies. 
2.3.3 Country-level Determinants 
A few studies (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996, 1999, 2002; La Porta 
et al., 1997; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Desai et al., 2004) argued that a firm’s capital 
structure decision is not only primarily based on the firm’s characteristics but also on 
the specific country’s legal framework, corporate governance, institutional 
environment and macroeconomic factors. Nevertheless, the combined economic 
significance of country-variables effects might be secondary compared to firm-level 
determinants (Mitton, 2008). The review of institution is crucial and may affect the 
correlation between leverage and factors at the firm-level (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995). Booth et al. (2001) found systematic differences between developing 
countries, mainly on country factors such as GDP growth, inflation rates, and capital 
market development. To understand the differences between bank-oriented and 
capital market-oriented countries, Antoniou et al. (2008) report the role and strength 
of various variables of leverage that are highly sensitive to the economic 
environment of the country in which the firms operate. In other words, they argued 
that a particular type of economy cannot be generalized to a firm that operates in 
other types of economies. Based on these findings and arguments, five core country-
level determinants were finalised, and further confirmed with a pilot study using the 
Malaysian data. The selected determinants are growth of GDP per capita, inflation, 
lending interest rate, debt market development and stock market development. 
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(i) Real GDP per capita 
During an economic downturn, firms tend to reduce borrowing due to bad 
sales performance, an increase in expected bankruptcy cost and a reduction in cash 
and coverage ratios. Alternatively, during a boom period, firms tend to generate more 
profits through undertaking good projects and implementing expansionary programs. 
These firms try to increase their internal funds during upturn periods and use them 
during the downturn periods. Based on these arguments, leverage is positively 
associated with the growth of the economy and that supports the trade-off theory. 
According to some past literature (e.g. Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; de 
Jong et al., 2008; Mitton, 2008; Bas et al., 2009), firms with higher economic growth 
will tend to use higher levels of debt to finance new investment. In contrast, 
Michaelas et al. (1999) and Bokpin et al. (2009) found a negative association 
between GDP and total and short-term debt, while long-term debt maintains its 
positive relationship. In addition, Feidakis and Rovolis (2007) found that growth in 
real GDP is positively related to long-term debt and negatively related to short-term 
debt within the European construction firms. 
Firms should reduce debt and rely on their internal funds as their profits 
increase due to high performance during expansion periods and that strongly 
supports the pecking order theory. This is consistent with findings of Ariff et al. 
(2008) who indicate that Malaysian firms tend to increase debt as the economy slows 
down due to a decline in profitable investments. Thus, firms raise short-term debt 
borrowings in order to maintain the dividend policy. Additionally, Gurcharan (2010) 
found a negative correlation between these variables across selected ASEAN 
Countries. Alternatively, Michaelas et al. (1999) argued that construction firms are 
more prone to increase their long-term debt and reduce short-term debt during 
recession periods. Nevertheless, Mat Nor et al. (2011) found mixed results across 
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South East Asian countries. As the growth of the economy increases, Malaysian 
firms tend to increase the usage of leverage whilst Singaporean firms react inversely. 
They further argued that Singaporean firms divert into equity financing instead of 
using debt as their economy grows.  
(ii) Stock Market Development 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) found that firms’ financing choices are associated 
with the role of financial market development. Firms prefer to adopt equity financing 
rather than debt financing when the stock market’s activity increases, which is 
consistent with the market timing theory. Managers tend to take advantage of 
mispricing as they actively time the stock market. Likewise, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1996), Deesomsak et al. (2004), Mitton (2007), Frank and Goyal 
(2009) and Sbeiti (2010) emphasized that stock market development is negatively 
associated with both long-term and short-term debt. This indirectly shows that the 
equity market becomes a substitute for the debt market in channelling funds for listed 
firms. Gurcharan (2010) and Mat Nor et al. (2011) found a negative correlation 
between these variables across non-financial Malaysian listed firms. According to 
Booth et al. (2001), Malaysia has a relatively large amount of equities available that 
are not traded frequently. 
The advancement of the equity market tends to reduce the cost of equity (de 
Jong et al., 2008) and eventually creates additional competition among the debt 
market providers, specifically banks in the developing countries, due to undeveloped 
bond markets (Demirguc-Kunt, 1992). In contrast, in an attempt to move towards an 
optimum, the trade-off theory emphasizes that firms with lower market debt ratios 
should issue more debt parallel with the performance of the stock market. In other 
words, both equity and debt markets are complementary in providing financing to 
firms, and this is demonstrated across the developing markets, especially in emerging 
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stock markets (Demirguc-Kunt, 1992). Recently, Kayo and Kimura (2011) found a 
positive relationship across the developed countries and a negative relationship 
among the developing countries. From the developing countries’ perspective, large 
firms tend to increase their leverage utilization as the stock market develops, while 
the financing choices of smaller firms are not affected by the financial market 
development (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996).  
(iii) Debt Market Development 
Firms tend to utilize more debt financing as the capital market concentrates 
on debt market development, that is, the bond market. However, as the stock market 
develops, firms tend to reduce debt and go for equity financing. Therefore, in relation 
to market timing theory, a positive relationship is noticeable between leverage and 
debt market development. In line with the explanations, de Jong et al. (2008) argued 
that as the bond market developed, issuing and trading bonds became easier and 
hence, firms increased the amount of debt in financing their investments. Firms have 
more choice of borrowings and lenders or creditors are willing to provide debt. Firms 
prefer to use more debt rather than equity as they operate within countries that 
impose high local tax rates (Desai et al., 2004). Moreover, firms tend to use the 
internal capital market, as external finance becomes costly and tax arbitrage 
opportunities arise. In addition, Mitton (2008) found that credit market development 
affects the use of leverage positively, but the stock market development decreases the 
debt ratio
5
. Furthermore, Booth et al. (2001) argued that private sector debt is related 
positively to debt market development but not for long-term debt. On the contrary, 
Kayo and Kimura (2011) found a negative relationship between leverage and bond 
market development across different developed and developing countries. However, 
Mat Nor et al. (2011) found mixed results across the South East Asian countries. As 
                                                          
5
 The benefit from the credit market is offset by the effect of stock market development. 
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the bond market develops, Malaysian firms tend to increase their leverage utilization 
by raising more bond issues as an alternative to traditional bank financing. 
Conversely, Thai firms reduce their leverage consumption as the bond market 
develops due to liquidity issues. 
(iv) Inflation 
As the occurrence of inflation is unanticipated, the effects differ across capital 
market participants. The uncompensated loss of creditors will be a gain for the 
shareholders. As inflation is predicted, lenders tend to include an inflation premium 
in the nominal interest rate that eventually reduces the default risk issues. In 
accordance with Taggart (1986), an inflation premium does not increase the overall 
real interest rate, but it compensates creditors for the decline in the real value of the 
debt payment. An inflation premium indirectly increases the interest rates of debt as 
the cost of borrowing increases. The dependency on external financing reduces as the 
levels of inflation increase and, thus, firms lessen the use of bank and supplier 
finance (Beck et al., 2008). This indirectly explains why inflation and leverage are 
negatively correlated and is strongly supported by Booth et al.’s (2001) results. They 
suggest that book debt ratios decrease due to higher interest rates as a result of high 
inflation. 
In line with the trade-off theory, leverage increases as the tax advantage of 
corporate debt increases together with inflation. Taggart (1986) stressed that there is 
a positive association between inflation and debt financing. However, the impact of 
inflation is more likely to be caused by inflation uncertainty rather than tax 
advantage. In addition, the market timing theory emphasizes a positive relationship 
between inflation and leverage. Equity becomes undervalued due to high inflation 
and, hence, managers tend to reduce equity financing and use more debt. Recently, 
Frank and Goyal (2009) obtained a positive correlation between inflation and 
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leverage, that is, total debt and long-term debt. Interestingly, they found mixed 
results as the sample periods were clustered into different sub-periods. This 
indirectly shows that the mechanism between these variables is highly sensitive to 
economic conditions. Taggart (1986) further added that the effect of inflation is 
clearer as total debt is split into short-term debt and long-term debt. However, the 
impact of inflation on short-term debt is limited compared to long-term debt. As the 
uncertainty of the inflation rate increases, the utilization of long-term debt decreases 
due to an increase in the inflation premium in the long-term interest rates. Consistent 
with that argument, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) found a negative 
association between inflation and long term debt across developed and developing 
countries.Conversely, Bass et al. (2009) found that inflation is negatively related to 
both total debt and short-term debt, while positively related to long-term debt. 
(v) Lending Interest Rate 
In the presence of bankruptcy cost, firms prefer to use more debt as the cost 
of borrowing is low. In contrast, borrowing becomes more expensive as interest rates 
increase causing firms to utilize less leverage or postpone their borrowings in order 
to reduce the probability of financial distress (Deesomsak et al., 2004). During these 
periods, firms could not afford to service their periodic interest payments mainly due 
to a weak interest coverage ratio, and therefore, they were unable to extend any new 
loans. Barry et al. (2008) emphasized that firms will use more debt if the current 
interest rate is lower than past interest rates. Consistent with the shareholders’ 
maximization goal, Antoniou et al. (2008) argued that managers are reluctant to use 
debt as long-term interest rates are relatively high. Similar results are noticeable 
across the manufacturing and services firms. Additionally, Desai et al. (2004) argued 
that interest rates tend to be high across countries with underdeveloped capital 
markets and poor creditor legal rights. In the case of Malaysia, Ariff et al. (2008) 
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found a negative correlation between interest rate and leverage across healthy and 
distressed firms. Therefore, in line with the trade-off theory, interest rates are 
expected to be negatively related to leverage. 
Alternatively, consistent with the market timing theory, firms may shift from 
equity to debt financing as the interest rates increase due to incorporation of expected 
inflation, and this establishes a positive association between leverage and interest 
rates (Thies and Klock, 1992; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Similarly, Diamond (1991) 
and Stein (1998) predict a positive association between these variables, and Cantillo 
and Wright (2000) extended the study by focusing on different firm sizes and 
provided consistent evidence with Diamond’s predictions. Deesomsak et al. (2004) 
stated that the lending interest rate is positively related to leverage and only 
significant after the financial crisis period. They argued about the awareness and 
reaction of firms of the effect of future inflation on the cost of capital rather than the 
immediate risk of default. Bokpin et al. (2009) found similar results between interest 
rates and short-term debt across the emerging economies. 
Based on the findings of Bas et al. (2009), firms continue to be financed by 
short-term debt as the interest rate increases, despite avoiding the long-term debt. 
They found the interest rate is positively related to short-term debt and total debt, but 
negatively to long-term debt. Lately, Mat Nor et al. (2011) have found some mixed 
results across South East Asia countries. Malaysian firms tend to increase their 
leverage as the interest rates increase, in contrast to a negative relationship for both 
Thai and Singaporean firms. They further argued that the impact of interest rates on 
leverage is invariant due to less volatility observed in interest rates. Table 2.1 
presents the summary of empirical evidence on the relationship between capital 
structure determinants, that is, firm-level determinants and country-level 
determinants, based on country-based, sector or industry-based and Malaysian-based 
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studies. The applicable theories can be seen clearly as the results are classified into 
various capital structure theories, such as trade-off theory, agency theory, pecking 
order theory and market timing theory. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Evidence on Capital Structure Determinants 
Determinants Study Relationship Theory 
 
Firm-Level Determinants 
Profitability   Country-level Studies: 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Bowen et al. 
(1982), Jensen (1986), Dammon and 
Senbet (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995)  
and Frank and Goyal (2009). 
 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Mohamad (1995). 
 
Positive Trade-off 
Theory and 
Agency Theory 
  Country -level Studies: 
Titman and Wessel (1989), Harris and 
Raviv (1991), Wiwattanakantang (1999), 
Booth et al. (2001), Chen (2004), Zou and 
Xiao (2006), Mitton (2006), Correa et al. 
(2007), Delcoure (2007), Shah and Khan 
(2007), Mazur (2007), de Jong et al. 
(2008), Lemmon et al. (2008), Mittoo and 
Zhang (2008), Chakraborty (2010) 
 
 Industry or Sector-level Studies: 
Gonenc (2003), Feidakis and Rovolis 
(2007), Rajagopal (2011). 
 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Booth et al. (2001), Pandey (2001), 
Pandey and Chotigeat (2004), 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), Fraser et al. 
(2006), de Jong et al. (2008) and 
Baharuddin et al. (2011). 
 
Negative Pecking Order 
Theory 
Firm Size  Country-level Studies: 
Bates (1971), Marsh (1982), Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Harris and Raviv (1990, 
1991), Wiwattanakantang (1999), Booth 
etal. (2001), Gonenc (2003), Fraser et al. 
(2006), Zou and Xiao (2006), Beck et al. 
(2008), Ullah and Nishat (2008), de Jong 
etal. (2008) and Leary et al. (2009). 
Positive Trade-off 
Theory 
  Industry or Sector-level Studies: 
Ooi (1999) and Feidakis and Rovolis 
(2007). 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Pandey (2001), Suto (2003), Pandey and 
Chotigeat (2004), Fraser et al. (2006) and 
Baharuddin et al. (2011). 
 
  
  Country-level Studies: 
Titman and Wessels (1989), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001), 
Chen (2004), Voulgaris et al. (2004), 
Mitton (2008) and Antoniou et al. (2008). 
 Industry or Sector-level Studies: 
Gupta (1969) and Rajagopal (2011). 
 
Negative Pecking Order 
Theory 
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Tangibility  Country-level Studies: 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shah and 
Khan (2007), Harris and Raviv (1991), 
Zou and Xiao (2006), Antoniou et al. 
(2008), Lemmon et al. (2008), Mittoo and 
Zhang (2008) and Frank and Goyal 
(2009). 
 Industry or Sector-level Studies: 
Gonenc (2003), Feidakis and Rovolis 
(2007) and Rajagopal (2011). 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Fraser et al. (2006), de Jong et al. (2008) 
and Baharuddin et al. (2011). 
 
Positive Trade-off 
Theory and 
Agency Theory 
  Country-level Studies: 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Pandey 
(2001), Booth et al. (2001), Correa et al. 
(2007), Mazur (2007), Mitton (2008) and 
Ullah and Nishat (2008). 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Pandey (2001) and Pandey and Chotigeat 
(2004). 
 
Negative Pecking Order 
Theory 
Growth 
Opportunities  
 Country-level Studies: 
Titman and Wessel (1989), Harris and 
Raviv (1991), Booth et al. (2001), 
Pandey and Chotigeat (2004), Chen 
(2004) and Ullah and Nishat (2008). 
 Industry or Sector-level Studies: 
Feidakis and Rovolis (2007) and 
Rajagopal (2011). 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Pandey (2001) and Baharuddin et al. 
(2011). 
 
Positive Pecking Order 
Theory 
  Country-level Studies: 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Baker and 
Wurgler(2002), Hovakimian et al. 
(2004), Deesomsak et al. (2004), Zou and 
Xiao (2006), Shah and Khan (2007), 
Mitton (2008), Antoniou et al. (2008), de 
Jong et al. (2008), Lemmon et al. (2008), 
Frank and Goyal (2009) and Kayo and 
Kimura (2011). 
 Industry or Sector-level Studies: 
Gupta (1969), Toy et al. (1974) and 
Gonenc (2003). 
 
Negative Agency Theory 
Risk  Country-level Studies: 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Correa et al. 
(2007) and Suto (2003). 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Mahmud (1998) and Suto (2003). 
 
Positive - 
  Country-level Studies: 
Titman and Wessels (1989), Harris and 
Raviv (1991), Pandey (2001) and Ullah 
and Nishat (2008). 
 Industry or Sector-level Studies: 
Feidakis and Rovolis (2007) and 
Rajagopal (2011). 
Negative Trade-off 
Theory and 
Pecking Order 
Theory 
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 Malaysian Studies: 
Pandey and Chotigeat (2004) and de 
Jong et al. (2008). 
 
Non-Tax Debt 
Shield 
 Country-level Studies: 
Bradley et al. (1984), Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Wald (1999), Mao (2003), Mitton 
(2008) and Chang et al. (2009). 
 
Positive - 
  Country-level Studies: 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Mackie- 
Mason (1990), Wiwattanakantang (1999) 
and Antoniou et al. (2008). 
 Industry or Sector-level Studies: 
Rajagopal (2011) 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Suto (2003) and Deesomsak et al. (2004). 
 
Negative Trade-off 
Theory 
Liquidity   Country-level Studies: 
Martin and Scott (1974). 
 Industry or Sector-level Studies: 
Feidakis and Rovolis (2007). 
 
Positive Trade-off 
Theory 
  Country-level Studies: 
de Jong et al. (2008), Ullah and Nishat 
(2008) and Sbeiti (2010). 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Deesomsak et al. (2004). 
 
Negative Pecking Order 
Theory 
Sector-level Determinants 
 
Munificence  Country-level Studies: 
Kayo and Kimura (2011). 
 
Negative  Agency Theory  
Dynamism   Country-level Studies: 
Kayo and Kimura (2011). 
 
Negative  Agency Theory  
HH-Index  Country-level Studies: 
Brander and Lewis (1986), Almazan and 
Molina (2002) and MacKay and Phillips 
(2005). 
Positive - 
  Country-level Studies: 
Kayo and Kimura (2011). 
 
Negative - 
Country-level Determinants  
 
Real GDP   Country-level Studies: 
Booth et al. (2001), Deesomsak et al. 
(2004), Mitton (2007), de Jong et al. 
(2008), Bas et al.(2009), and Bokpin et 
al. (2009). 
 Industry or Sector-level Studies: 
Feidakis and Rovolis (2007). 
 
Positive Trade-off 
Theory 
  Country-level Studies: 
Gurcharan (2010). 
 Industry or Sector-level Studies: 
Michaelas et al. (1999). 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Ariff et al. (2008). 
Negative Pecking Order 
Theory 
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The table presents the summary of empirical evidence on the relationship between capital structure determinants, i.e., the 
explanatory variables based on country-based, sector or industry-based and Malaysian-based studies. In addition, the results are 
classified according to various capital structure theories. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stock Market 
Development  
 Country-level Studies: 
Kayo and Kimura (2011). 
 
Positive Trade-off 
Theory 
  Country-level Studies: 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), Mitton (2008), 
de Jong et al. (2008), Frank and Goyal 
(2009) and Sbeiti (2010). 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Gurcharan (2010) and Mat Nor et al. 
(2011). 
 
Negative Market Timing 
Theory 
Debt Market 
Development  
 Country-level Studies: 
Booth et al. (2001) and de Jong et al. 
(2008). 
 
Positive Market Timing 
Theory 
  Country-level Studies: 
Kayo and Kimura (2011). 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Mat Nor et al. (2011). 
 
Negative Trade-off 
Theory 
Inflation   Country-level Studies: 
Beck et al. (2008) and Frank and Goyal 
(2009). 
 
Positive Trade-off 
Theory 
Market Timing 
Theory 
  Country-level Studies: 
Taggart (1986), Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1996), Booth et al. (2001) 
and Bass et al. (2009). 
 
Negative - 
Lending Interest 
Rates 
 Country-level Studies: 
Diamond (1991), Thies and Klock 
(1992), Stein (1998), Cantillo and Wright 
(2000), Frank and Goyal (2003), 
Deesomsaket al. (2004), Bokpin et al. 
(2009). 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Mat Nor et al. (2011). 
 
Positive Market Timing 
Theory 
  Country-level Studies: 
Barry et al. (2008), Antoniou et al. (2008) 
and Bas et al. (2009). 
 Malaysian Studies: 
Ariff et al. (2008). 
 
Negative Trade-off 
Theory 
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2.4 The Effect of Different Economic Sub-Periods on 
Capital Structure Determinants 
Based on the series of past literature, the capital structure decision is highly 
sensitive to economic conditions. In other words, several past studies emphasized the 
importance of different economic conditions in capital structure decisions. Uncertain 
economic conditions due to regional or global shocks affect a firm’s financial 
structures. The mechanism and power between explanatory variables and leverage 
may change as the firm experiences different stages of economic conditions like a 
downturn, or growth and upturn sub-periods. Claessens et al. (2000) argued that 
many firms had weak financial structures during and after the economic downturn. 
Besides the firm and country-specific effects, Deesomsak et al. (2004) found that 
financial crises affected a firm’s capital structure significantly by highlighting 
different results between pre- and post-crises periods. However, Booth et al. (2001) 
argued that different time periods would not affect the debt estimations though the 
book value of debt ratios increases during an economic downturn, and decreases as 
the economy grows.  
As a result, this section will review the effect of different economic sub-
periods on capital structure decision making, predominantly the firm-specific factors. 
Moreover, the discussion focuses specifically on past studies related to the Asian 
financial crisis rather than other economic crises, as the sample period of this study 
covers 1996 until 2007. As mentioned earlier, the following discussion only covers 
seven determinants, namely, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, 
firm size, growth opportunities, and risk. As for profitability, Bris and Koskinen 
(2002) argued that profitability declined across Asian firms even after currency 
depreciation. Both Thai and Indonesian firms tend to reduce their leverage utilization 
during both pre-crises and crises periods. However, the magnitude of reduction is 
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greater during a pre-crisis period and debt becomes more important during the crisis 
period (Bunkanwanicha et al., 2008). A few studies highlighted the impact of 
financial crises on the mechanism between profitability and leverage across 
Malaysian listed firms. Pandey (2001) and Pandey and Chotigeat (2004) found that 
profitability is significant and negatively related to all types of leverage during the 
crisis periods. The impact of a crisis could be seen through the magnitude of 
parameters as the firms are actively reducing the amount of leverage, mainly short-
term debt as the level of profits increases. In relation to that, Driffield (2005) shows 
that Malaysian firms increase leverage enormously as their profits decrease. 
Nevertheless, the level of leverage increases significantly, by up to 25 times, during 
the crisis periods, and only increases by 5 times after the crisis periods as the 
economy recovers. In addition, Deesomsak et al. (2004) found a similar relationship 
with highly significant values during the pre- and post-crises periods. In contrast, 
Deesomsak et al. (2009) found a positive relationship between long-term debt and 
profitability after the crises periods, implying that financial crises raised the 
awareness of tax effects. In line with that, the evidence shows that Malaysian and 
Thai firms diverted into long-term debt financing and reduced their usage of short-
term debt after a crisis period (Deesomsak et al., 2009). 
In the event of an economic downturn, the survival of firms is highly 
dependent on firm size. Consistent with that argument, Pandey (2001), Suto (2003) 
and Pandey and Chotigeat (2004) found that size is significant and positively related 
to all types of leverage during crisis periods. According to Suto (2003), the close 
relationship between borrowers and lenders across large firms explains the positive 
association between firm size and leverage. Despite smaller information asymmetry, 
this close relationship exists as the major commercial banks, that is, the major 
players in the domestic capital market, underwrite most of the corporate bonds that 
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are issued by large Malaysian firms. However, Deesomsak et al. (2004) obtained 
similar significant results after the crisis period rather than during the crisis periods. 
They point out that firms become more concerned with their survivability and the 
bankruptcy risk as the lenders are more reluctant to lend to large firms in order to 
reduce their default risk. Interestingly, Nagano (2003) found a negative relationship 
between size and leverage which was highly significant during both the pre- and 
post-crises periods across Malaysian firms. This is possible as Bunkanwanicha et al. 
(2008) documented different relationships between firm size and leverage during 
pre-crises and crises periods across Indonesian and Thai listed firms. The larger firms 
increased their debt financing before the downturn periods and reduced it during the 
crises periods. 
The level of collateral becomes essential for a firm to determine the amount 
of leverage to be utilised. It also portrays the ability of firms to raise finances, that is, 
debt finances, during different economic periods. In conjunction with that, Pandey 
(2001) found that tangibility affects leverage positively during crisis periods, though 
the long-term debt seems to be insignificant during pre-crisis periods. By using the 
different methods, Pandey and Chotigeat (2004) found that tangibility influences 
short-term debt negatively before and during crisis periods. However, the reduced 
effect decreases during the crisis period compared to upturn periods. Additionally, 
Suto (2003) found tangibility is significant and positively related to leverage during 
crisis periods, whilst Nagano (2003) could only observe this during post-crises 
periods and this effect was highly significant across Thai firms. However, Malaysian 
firms laid a greater emphasis on this variable particularly during the post-crisis 
periods (Driffield, 2005). In relation to that, Nagano (2003) pointed out two solid 
reasons in explaining this issue by relating it to the agency cost of banks and low 
information asymmetry between debtors and creditors. Tangibility becomes essential 
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during the crises period in raising debt financing across Indonesian listed firms, 
while Thai firms emphasize tangibility during pre-crises periods with a smaller 
coefficient (Bunkanwanicha et al., 2008). 
In the growth opportunities context, Pandey and Chotigeat (2004) argue that 
Malaysian firms increase their long-term debt as the growth opportunities increase. 
This is observed before and during crisis periods though the consumption of leverage 
is greater during the upturn periods compared to downturn periods. In contrast, 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) found significant results between these variables after the 
crisis. Surprisingly, these variables are negatively correlated as the firms reduce their 
leverage in order to avoid those restrictions imposed by lenders. He argued that the 
high growth firms tended to borrow less due to the rapid economic recovery of 
Malaysia. As growth opportunities increase, both Indonesian and Thai firms increase 
their leverage during pre-crises periods. As the countries are hit by the crises, this 
relationship becomes insignificant (Bunkanwanicha et al., 2008). 
Firm’s earnings become highly volatile during downturn periods whilst 
remaining stable during boom periods. Therefore, firms tend to reduce their 
leverage during the downturn periods. This argument is strongly supported by the 
trade-off and pecking order theories. However, a few studies that focus on the 
Malaysian sample provide different results. Pandey (2001) and Pandey and 
Chotigeat argued that risk has a consistent positive influence over each sub-period 
on short-term and total debt ratios, except for long-term debt that highlights a 
negative relationship during crisis periods. As the risk level increases, firms 
increase their short-term debt consumption during the pre-crisis and crisis periods, 
although the consumption level is smaller during the downturn periods. In general, 
the utilization of leverage decreased across Malaysian firms though both variables 
are positively correlated. Consistent with these studies, Suto (2003) emphasized 
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that risk is positively correlated with leverage and is significant during and after the 
financial crises. Deesomsak et al. (2004) argued that firms might ignore earnings 
volatility if the consequences of liquidation are low. Nevertheless, Deesomsak et al. 
(2009) obtained insignificant values between long-term debt and earnings volatility 
in post-crises periods. 
In accordance with the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) model, Suto (2003) 
argued that leverage and non-tax debt shield is negatively related and significant 
during financial crises periods. However, Suto (2003) argued the instability of this 
variable during the crisis periods is due to the uncertainty in economic conditions 
surrounding the firms in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, a non-tax debt shield becomes 
irrelevant to determine financing choices across Malaysian listed firms as the 
economy stabilizes. Alternatively, Deesomsak et al. (2004) documented a similar 
association between these variables and noted a significant effect after the financial 
crises. He argued that firms looked for possible different ways to minimize their tax 
with increased cost of borrowing, and cautiously perceived the risk of bankruptcy 
after the crisis. 
Due to liquidity risk as a result of a financial crisis, Bris and Koskinen (2002) 
argued that the current ratio further declines for two years consecutively after the 
event of financial crisis in Asia due to the slow economic recovery. Deesomsak et al. 
(2004) found that liquidity is significant after the financial crisis and is negatively 
related to leverage. In raising the external debt, they argued that firms relatively use 
their liquid assets to finance their projects. Alternatively, they go for equity financing 
as the share prices increase. Furthermore, Deesomsak et al. (2009) argued that 
liquidity becomes significant and positively associated with long-term debt after the 
downturn periods. This indirectly implies that the strategy of firms with higher levels 
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of liquidity is to issue more long-term debt in order to avoid cash shortages after the 
crisis periods. 
2.5 The Effect of Firm Size on Capital Structure 
Determinants 
In the financial structure context, significant differences are observable across 
large and small firms (Bates, 1971; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Stochs and Mauer, 
1996; Bas et al., 2009). The financing patterns vary across large and small firms due 
to different characteristics and different levels of development (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999). Additionally, the level of accessibility to financial markets 
varies across firm size although they are operating within a particular economy 
(Beck et al., 2008). This clearly explains the systematic differences in the financial 
decisions across large and small firms. The impact of different firm sizes on capital 
structure could be seen in various studies. Hence, this section will review the past 
literature that concentrates on the impact of different firm sizes on capital structure 
determinants, mainly the firm-specific factors, such as, profitability, tangibility, 
liquidity, non-tax debt shield, growth opportunities and risk. 
In early studies, due to the diseconomies of scale associated with the 
operation of small-sized firms, Gupta (1969) found that small firms consistently tend 
to show a lower sales margin than the larger-sized firms. Profitability determines the 
types of leverage to be utilised as the small firms rely on long-term debt due to 
insufficient time to accumulate their own reserves (Chittenden et al., 1996). 
Conversely, Voulgaris et al. (2004) show that small firms in Greece tend to decrease 
their leverage consumption and external equity as their profit levels increase due to 
high cost of debt and external equity. Meanwhile, the larger firms also prefer to use 
their internal reserves and go for external debt only when additional finance is 
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needed. This further explains the financing patterns of Greek firms that maintain a 
pecking order in raising their finances regardless of the firm size. In relation to the 
tax shield hypothesis, Pettit and Singer (1985) explain that large firms tend to utilize 
more leverage in order to enjoy the tax benefits, as they are more likely to generate 
high profits. Conversely, the small firms may not choose debt financing for the 
purpose of tax shields as their profits are lower compared to large firms. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) found a different relationship between profitability and leverage 
across small and large firms. According to their study, profitability is negatively 
associated with leverage for small firms, while positively associated for large firms. 
They argued that profitability may serve as a proxy for two main aspects, namely, the 
funds that are generated internally, and the quality of investment opportunities for 
small firms. This is entirely opposite to the findings of Bas et al. (2009) who found a 
negative correlation between profitability and leverage across small and large firms. 
In general, large firms own a greater amount of tangibility compared to small 
firms, hence, they have a greater capacity to raise leverage. According to Scott 
(1977), firms that invest largely in tangible assets are exposed to lesser costs of 
financial distress compared to firms that depend on intangible assets. Therefore, 
firms that fail to provide some kind of guarantees in the form of collateral would face 
problems in raising debt, particularly long-term debt. Chittenden et al. (1996) argue 
that small firms are forced to use short-term debt instead of long-term debt mainly 
due to their weak asset structure. Firms that spent more on intangible assets tend to 
use more short-term debt (Stohs and Mauer, 1996). Voulgaris et al. (2004) suggest 
that credit becomes available as the firms grow larger with more fixed assets and 
lower risks of information asymmetry. Hereby, the impact of tangibility is greater in 
small firms compared to large ones due to type and maturity of existing assets. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) show firms tend to have greater long-term 
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borrowing capacity as they operate with larger fixed assets, while those firms with 
higher sales-to-assets ratios tend to utilize more short-term financing in order to 
support their sales. At the industry level, Petti and Singer (1985) documented that a 
greater proportion of large manufacturing firms require a substantial investment in 
their fixed assets and, therefore, they raise long-term debt. Meanwhile, the small 
firms in retailing, wholesaling or other industries have more short-term assets and the 
probability of raising long term debt is lower. 
As for growth opportunities, small firms have greater growth options 
compared to larger firms (Petti and Singer, 1985). Long-term debt is issued by larger 
and relatively low-growth firms (Stochs and Mauer, 1996). On the other hand, small 
firms with higher levels of growth tend to have a large amount of short-term 
borrowings with respect to their total assets. This is demonstrated across small firms 
in Greece as they increase their short-term debt in line with the pace of growth 
opportunities (Voulgaris et al., 2004). He further argued that small firms have greater 
flexibility to alter the structure of assets and operations in order to grab the 
opportunities available in the market. 
In accordance with Remmers et al. (1974), firm size is a proxy for perceived 
business risk as the large and multi-product firms are usually less risky compared to 
small firms with a single product. In other words, they relate risk to the level of 
diversification based on the number of different products or businesses. Consistent 
with the pecking order theory, larger firms are generally more diversified and show 
less volatility. Large firms are less volatile and able to mitigate the information 
asymmetry problems, while the smaller ones are highly dependent on short-term debt 
due to higher business risk and informational opacity (Fama and French, 2002). 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) found that smaller firms with greater earnings volatility 
use lower amounts of leverage while the larger ones utilize more leverage. In line 
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with that, Stochs and Mauer (1996) find that long-term debt is issued by larger firms 
due to less risk. Meanwhile, the small firms are risky and use lower amounts of 
leverage attributable to their higher probability of insolvency (Berryman, 1982). 
Based on Gupta (1969), small firms are more illiquid than large firms due to 
lower current ratios. Since smaller firms are highly dependent on their internal funds 
they seek short-term debt if additional funds are needed. As a result, their current 
liabilities turnover becomes lower and this reduces their ability to fulfil the short-
term obligations. The illiquidity problem faced by the smaller-sized firms is mainly 
due to the over-reliance on short-term finances as a result of the unavailability of 
long-term finances. This argument supports the findings of Chittenden et al. (1996) 
who obtained a negative correlation between firm size and liquidity. They suggest 
that the inverse relationship postulates the association between stage of development 
and liquidity. In other words, small firms are less liquid due to weak internal reserves 
and are unable to raise long-term finances. Voulgaris et al. (2004) observed similar 
results across small firms in Greece. 
2.6 Dynamic Capital Structure and Target Capital 
Structure 
Firms will periodically readjust their capital structures towards a target or 
optimum debt ratio that reflects the costs and benefits of debt financing. Marsh 
(1982) argued that financing choices are highly dependent on the difference between 
the firms’ current and target debt ratios. In addition, he suggests that firms try to 
maintain their target, although there are short-term deviations due to the response 
from capital market conditions. He found that firms that are more likely to issue 
equity are firms with debt ratios below their target debt ratios, low amounts of fixed 
assets, and a lower bankruptcy risk. Jalilvand and Harris (1984) demonstrated that 
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the financial behaviour of firms is highly dependent on a partial adjustment process 
towards long-run financial targets. 
As the pioneers, Fischer et al. (1989) developed a theory of dynamic capital 
structure in the presence of corporate recapitalization cost. They found that the 
amount of deviation between the actual debt and target debt ratio differs across firms. 
Firms can recapitalize at any point, and transaction cost is incurred to rebalance the 
firm’s financial structure. Subsequently, Hovakimian et al. (2001) continued the 
study by arguing that firms may face obstacles in their excursion towards their target 
debt ratio. In addition, target debt ratios may change over time due to a firm's 
profitability and stock price changes. Their findings confirm that profitable firms 
tend to reduce leverage. Nevertheless, these firms are more likely to issue debt rather 
than equity, and repurchase equity rather than retire debt. They also provide evidence 
that the pecking order becomes applicable in both the short-run and long-run. This is 
consistent with the findings of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) who emphasized the 
importance of the pecking order theory that provides a better empirical description of 
capital structures rather than the traditional trade-off models. However, firms tend to 
make financing choices that move towards the target debt ratios that support the 
trade-off models of capital structure choice, which is in line with Auerbach (1985). 
On the other hand, Fama and French (2002) argued that capital structures are 
highly dependent on the outcomes of past market timing efforts, as the shocks affects 
leverage persistently. With the assumption of zero adjustment cost, firms are able to 
rebalance their capital structures continuously toward their target. Nevertheless, 
firms have to react rapidly to the shocks on capital structure in the presence of 
adjustment costs (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). In accordance with Myers (1984), firms 
take extended excursions away from their targets as their adjustment cost is large and 
outweighs the benefits. Leary and Roberts (2005) further explore the importance of 
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transaction cost as an important factor that influences a firm’s decision to change its 
capital structure. Despite active rebalancing behaviour, firms manage to demonstrate 
the existence of adjustment costs resulting from any shocks, such as, internal or 
external costs that affect leverage persistently. In line with Fischer et al. (1989), they 
found that firms are more likely to increase leverage under three circumstances, that 
is, if their debt level is relatively low, is decreasing, or they have recently decreased 
their debt in the past. Using partial adjustment models, they found that the reversion 
process of an actual debt towards its target debt ratio is slow, which is in line with 
some studies (e.g. Taggart, 1977; Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Fama and French, 
2002; MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Kayhan and Titman, 2007). 
Using Spanish data, De Miguel and Pindado (2001) documented that Spanish 
firms face a lower transaction cost compared to US firms. The underdeveloped bond 
market has forced Spanish firms towards greater private debt and, hence, the 
transaction cost is lower than for US firms that rely more on public debt rather than 
private debt. Their target adjustment model includes past leverage and its target 
leverage ratio. Their target leverage ratio is derived from firm’s characteristics, such 
as, cash flow, investment, non-tax debt shield and financial distress cost, rather than 
the observed debt ratio. This is also observed in other past and recent studies 
(Hovakimian et al., 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Kahyan and Titman, 2007; 
Antoniou et al., 2008). Instead, some studies have showed that firms tend to adjust at 
faster rates. For instance, Ozkan (2001) found that UK firms have target debt ratios 
and the adjustment process towards the target is relatively fast across firms. Using a 
more general partial adjustment model, Flannery and Rangan (2006) concluded that 
firms do have targets and firms adjust relatively quickly towards their target. The 
firms close about 30% of the gap between its actual and its optimal debt ratio each 
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year. Likewise, Chakraborty (2010) further explains that Indian firms return 
relatively quickly to their target by altering the dividend policy.  
The speed of adjustment varies across firms and time periods due to the 
varying adjustment costs incurred by firms. A slower speed of adjustment occurs if 
the adjustment cost is higher, while lower cost of adjustment allows a faster pace of 
adjustment towards the target debt ratio. Hereby, the trade-off between the cost of 
adjustment and the cost of being off target occurs (Hovakimian et al., 2001). If the 
actual change in leverage is equal to the desired change, there is no adjustment in 
leverage and therefore, firms set their current debt ratio to the past leverage. 
However, managers adjust their financing mix according to internal changes or 
external shocks, and this involves cost. In the presence of transaction cost, firms not 
able to adjust their leverage regularly, as Leary and Roberts (2005) showed, firms 
tend to adjust their leverage normally once a year. 
In general, the adjustment cost is highly dependent on a few factors that drive 
the pace of adjustment. Taggart (1977) provides evidence that both the liquid assets 
and short-term debt seemed to be important in the adjustment process. Soon after, 
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) suggested that speed of adjustment is strongly driven by 
firm size, interest rates and the levels of the stock price. They documented those 
large firms able to adjust faster towards a target of long-term debt ratio compared to 
small ones. Meanwhile, the pace of adjustment towards the target equity level seems 
to be slower than for smaller firms. Besides that, interdependencies between different 
financial decisions exist due to market imperfections, therefore, firms can only adjust 
partially to their long-run financial targets. The speed of adjustment is also crucially 
dependent on the financial system and the traditions of corporate governance in each 
country. Recently, Antoniou et al. (2008) found that the speed of adjustment varies 
across countries. They point out that French firms were able to adjust quickly to their 
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target, followed by the remaining countries, namely, US, UK, Germany and, finally, 
the Japanese firms that maintained the slowest pace of adjustment. A similar impact 
is observed across selected South East Asian countries, such as, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Thailand (Mat Nor et al., 2011). A great distinction in the speed of adjustments 
is noticeable between these countries due to the diversity in the region and country-
specific factors. 
The following discussion extends the literature on the empirical capital 
structure determinants of firms regarding borrowing decisions under a dynamic 
environment. Using the partial adjustment model, most of the past literature 
highlights a negative correlation between profitability and leverage (e.g., Ozkan, 
2001; Antoniou et al., 2008; Chakraborty, 2010; Sbeiti, 2010; Guney et al., 2011; 
Mat Nor et al., 2011). Hovakimian et al. (2001) argued that profitable firms become 
under-levered and a firm’s financing choices tend to offset the earnings-driven 
changes in their capital structures. Firms with large investment expenses prefer to use 
external financing compared to profitable firms that have greater cash balances 
(Leary and Roberts, 2005). In a recent study, Lemmon et al. (2008) documented that 
firms that persistently generate high profits tend to use lower amounts of leverage 
compared to firms that experience transitory shocks on their profitability. 
As the partial adjustment model includes the lagged independent variables, 
Ozkan (2001) found that past profitability is significant and positively related to total 
debt. He borrowed the argument of Jensen (1986) who explains that managers have 
to pay out cash by levering up and, at the same time, the debt suppliers are willing to 
lend more funds, particularly to firms with higher profits. Conversely, Nunkoo and 
Boateng (2010) found a positive association between past profitability and leverage 
across Canadian firms. They argued that profitable firms would demand for greater 
tax shelters as their debt capacity increases. However, these results are contradictory 
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to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) who emphasize a negative relationship between 
these variables and represent them as a proxy for future growth opportunities. As for 
growth opportunities, Ozkan (2001) obtained a negative relationship with leverage 
and argued that firms tend to issue stock when their stock price is high relative to 
their earnings or book value. This argument is strongly supported by and consistent 
with Rajan and Zingales (1995). Additionally, several recent studies (Lemmon et al., 
2008; Antoniou et al., 2008; Nunkoo and Boateng, 2010; Chakraborty, 2010) obtain 
a similar relationship. 
Some studies, such as Ozkan (2001), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Antoniou 
et al. (2008) and Guney et al. (2011), provide a little evidence that firm size has a 
positive effect on their leverage ratios. Conversely, a few of the researchers (e.g., 
Fischer et al., 1989; Lemmon et al., 2008; Nunkoo and Boateng, 2010; Chakraborty, 
2010; Sbeiti, 2010) found that firms tend to reduce their leverage utilization as their 
firms grow larger. Lately, Mat Nor et al. (2011) have obtained a positive association 
between firm size and leverage amongst Thai and Singaporean firms, and 
insignificant results across Malaysian firms. However, Ariff et al. (2008) found this 
variable to be positively related and statistically significant with leverage across 
Malaysian firms. As the model includes the lagged firm size, Ozkan (2001) and 
Nunkoo and Boateng (2010) show a negative relationship. Hereby, mixed results are 
observed across nations and even contradictory results are noticeable within the 
Malaysian samples. Consistent with past studies (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2006; 
Antoniouet al., 2008; Lemmon et al., 2008; Chakraborty, 2010), as firms increase 
their tangibility position, they tend to divert into debt financing. Mat Nor et al. 
(2011) found a significant positive correlation particularly across Singaporean firms. 
The insignificant values for Malaysian and Thai firms further explain the easy 
accessibility of firms to bank loans and the importance of collateral. The impact of 
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past tangibility on leverage could be seen among the firms that heavily invest in 
tangible assets that eventually lead them to do further borrowings at lower interest 
rates (Sbeiti, 2010). 
Despite an inverse significant relationship between non-tax debt shield and 
total debt, the large magnitude explains the importance of this variable on leverage in 
Spanish firms. Ozkan (2001) and others (e.g., Ariff et al., 2008; Guney et al., 2011) 
also confirmed a similar sign between these variables. In contrast, Antoniou et al. 
(2008) found a positive relationship between non-tax debt shield and market 
leverage. His argument relates to Mackie-Mason’s (1990) study that explains the 
positive relationship between these variables. As mentioned earlier, the fixed assets 
play an important role in the attainment of secured debt. This indirectly allows firms 
to increase their borrowings and save more on tax. There is no any evidence that 
explains the relationship between past values of non-debt tax shields and corporate 
leverage. Most of the studies show that liquidity is negatively correlated with 
leverage (Sbeiti, 2010; Guney et al., 2011). For instance, Ozkan (2001) argues that a 
firm’s liquidity reflects the manipulation of assets by shareholders at the expense of 
bondholders. 
2.7 Conclusion 
In relation to MM theory, alternative theories have been developed such as 
the trade-off theory, pecking order theory, agency theory and market timing theory. 
Based on these theoretical models, numerous empirical studies have been conducted 
on capital structure determinants in the context of developed countries as well as a 
few studies across developing countries. According to Myers (2003), none of the 
capital structure theories is universal but each of the theories is conditional. The 
substance of each factor differs across theories which could affect the choice 
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between debt and equity. As a whole, the literature provides some insights and 
indicates that sector analysis is under explored, particularly within developing 
countries. In addition, capital structure decision making may differ across sectors or 
industries due to its unique behaviour, and these differences may affect the leverage 
decisions via the capital structure determinants. Thus, the power of capital structure 
determinants may varies across sectors as each determinant could be important in 
some sectors, yet unimportant to other sectors within a particular nation. Moreover, 
the substance of each factor may change due to circumstances that occur within the 
sector, the nation or even globally.
73 
 
CHAPTER 3 
SECTORAL PERFORMANCE AND CAPITAL 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The main hypothesis of this study examines the indirect impact of sectoral 
characteristics on capital structure decision-making. The indirect impact of sectoral 
behaviour can be captured through various factors. As explained in the previous 
chapter, some of the determinants are munificence, dynamism, and the HH Index that 
is sector-specific. Nevertheless, there are other factors that are unobserved and not 
included in the model specifications. This chapter explains the real situations 
experienced by each selected sector in Malaysia. The first section describes the 
performance of each sector during the sample period of this study. The discussion is 
entirely based on the Economic Report of Malaysia from 1996 until 2007. 
Subsequently, the following section focuses on the development of the capital market 
of Malaysia. This section describes the evolution of capital market development 
since the 1980s and the advancement of the Malaysian capital market, particularly 
the bond market. The final section concentrates on the impact of the Asian financial 
crisis on Malaysia as this study covers the crisis sub-period in the sample. 
3.2 Sectoral Performance in Malaysia 
Based on the economic reports of Malaysia, the performance of firms differs 
across sectors although they are affected at the macro-level. The following 
discussion explains the behaviour of each sector during three different sub-periods, 
namely, the crisis period (1996-1998), a growth period (1999-2002), and a stable 
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period (2003-2007). The chronology of the discussion follows the format of the 
economic reports of Malaysia. The sectors are divided into four main categories; the 
consumer product and industrial product sectors are combined under the 
classification of manufacturing sector. This is followed by the agriculture sector 
where the discussion focuses solely on the plantation sector. The construction and 
property sectors will be combined into one, and, finally, the last section explains the 
performance of the trade and services sector. 
While demonstrating the performance of each sector, the following table also 
explains the volatility of growth within each sub-period that vary which varies 
greatly across sectors in Malaysia. These sectors were highly sensitive to different 
economic conditions within the economy resulting in a few sectors experiencing 
slow growth during the boom periods. Therefore, the outcomes of this section 
provide a good foundation for observing the indirect effect of sectors on capital 
structure decision-making, as the performance of each sector is highly dependent on 
the economic conditions and other factors that are unrelated to domestic economic 
growth. 
 
Table 3.1: Sectoral Performance of Malaysia from 1996-2007 
Sector Performance 
(i) Manufacturing Sectors: 
Consumer Product and 
Industrial Product 
Crisis Periods (1996-1998) 
 The growth of this sector accelerated due to a sturdy recovery in the 
production of export and domestic oriented industries during the 
first seven months of 1997. In the remaining five months of that 
year, the overall scenario changed as the output of domestic oriented 
industries started to slow down. 
 The performance of production in both the domestic and export 
market oriented industries decreased drastically in the first eight 
months of 1998. This was mainly due to low domestic demand, 
lethargic sales orders from the East Asian region, and strong 
competition in the global market. 
 The costs of production increased tremendously due to higher prices 
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of imported parts, stiff liquidity, higher interest rates and the 
instability of ringgit movements. 
Recovery Periods (1999-2002) 
 In 1999, the manufacturing sector recorded growth of 5.3% as the 
performance of export-oriented industries was enhanced by the 
stronger external demand. Additionally, the government‘s 
resolution to peg the ringgit at a competitive rate also indirectly 
facilitated sales performance in the overseas markets. The fiscal 
stimulus package introduced by the Government and the low 
interest rate regime contributed extensively to the recovery of 
domestic-oriented industries.  
 In the last six months of 2000, the growth became moderate due to 
capacity constraints of some major industries as well as the slower 
pace of export sales due to the slowdown in the US economy. 
Nevertheless, strong recoveries in other major Asian markets as 
well as a moderate recovery in Europe had a counter effect on the 
impact of the economic slowdown in the US economy. 
 The performance of the manufacturing sector deteriorated in 
2001due to weak exports, although the economy was warming up 
at a steady pace. The sharp declines in the global demand for 
electronic products had severely affected the production of the 
export-oriented industries. On the other hand, this phenomenon 
affected the domestic-oriented industries by producing continuous 
positive growth. 
Stable Periods (2003-2007) 
 In 2003, the industrial gases sub-sector strongly contributed to the 
higher growth of domestic-oriented industries due to the increased 
demand for natural gases from the strong activities in the 
manufacturing sector. 
 The export-oriented industries contributed slightly more than half 
of the total output of the manufacturing sector due to high demand 
for rubber products and apparel, as SARS (an acute worldwide 
respiratory virus) boosted the production of gloves. Nevertheless, 
the electric and electronic industries maintained their position as 
the major contributors to this sector. 
 The demand for manufacturing goods, predominantly electronic 
products, increased in 2004 as China experienced strong growth 
together with a US recovery. These positive developments drove 
the manufacturing sector to expand its output and contributed to 
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the growth of GDP. 
 In 2005, most of the export-oriented industries showed lower 
growth although their contribution towards the overall 
manufacturing output remained at more than 50%. Alternatively, 
the production of domestic-oriented industries expanded further 
and recorded substantial growth due to improved consumer 
sentiment and higher disposable income. 
 In 2006, the growth of the manufacturing sector expanded further 
due to huge production in the export-oriented industries. Sales 
values of the manufacturing sector increased mainly due to the 
improvement in prices as well as higher output of some of its 
industries. The domestic-oriented industries performed better in 
2007 due to weak external demand.  
 
(ii) Agricultural Sector: 
Plantation Sector 
Crisis Periods (1996-1998) 
 Production inthe agricultural sector increased mainly due to crude 
palm oil production during the first eight months of 1997. In 
contrast, the production of rubber deteriorated due to factors such 
as the continuous conversion of rubber land for other uses, labour 
shortages and less attractive rubber prices. 
 The performance of the agricultural sector worsened as the country 
was hit by financial crises. However, the deterioration of 
performance was not solely caused by the financial crisis. The 
production of palm oil and cocoa deteriorated mainly caused by 
tree stress and an El Nino weather pattern. In spite of currency 
depreciation across the main producing countries, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, the price of rubber decreased as a result of 
the oversupply of rubber production in the world.  
Recovery Periods (1999-2002) 
 Recovery in the agricultural sector could be observed in 1999 due 
to an extensive increase in crude palm oil production. This was 
mainly due to crop recovery from the biological tree stress, 
improved weather, and higher oil extraction rates. Moreover, the 
production of cocoa and pepper also contributed indirectly towards 
the better performance of this sector. In contrast, the performance 
of rubber further declined in the first eight months of 1999 due to 
unfavourable prices, labour shortages and the declining rubber 
hectares. 
 Intervention by the government improved palm oil prices and 
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productivity in 2001. The rubber industry, however, experienced a 
consistent downturn period. As a whole, the agricultural sector was 
improving at a good pace. 
 Production of rubber increased during the first six months of 2002 
as the government undertook a range of interventions such as 
increasing productivity, encouraging downstream processing of 
rubber and co-operating with other rubber producing countries in 
order to stabilise the price of rubber. Nonetheless, the palm oil 
industry maintained its position as the major contributor to the 
agricultural sector.  
Stable Periods (2003-2007) 
 Stronger growth was noticeable mainly across the palm oil and 
rubber industries in 2003. Nevertheless, the rubber industry faced 
difficulties due to slow increase in supply of rubber despite price 
increases. Continued positive growth in the agricultural sector was 
observed in 2004 although it was marginally lower than the 
preceding year due to slower growth in the output of crude palm oil 
and lower soybean oil prices. Several factors, i.e. government 
intervention in food production, superior tapping technologies, 
quality tree clones and land consolidation and rehabilitation 
programmes, boosted the sector towards better performance. 
 This sector grew continuously in 2005 as crude palm oil recorded 
higher outputs due to improved productivity and expanded mature 
areas. Conversely, output of rubber declined largely due to a 
prolonged winter that affected overall production. However, the 
government further supported the industry by encouraging the 
utilization of a special tapping system, continuing rubber replanting 
programmes, and adopting higher-yield rubber treeclones. 
 These efforts become fruitful as the overall performance of the 
agricultural sector increased in 2006 mainly due to a significant 
increase in rubber production. Comparably, the palm oil industry 
contributed towards the overall performance of this sector.  
 In the beginning of 2007, the output of the agricultural sector 
slowed down as a result of the unfavourable weather conditions in 
Peninsular Malaysia. Both palm oil and rubber industries were 
affected badly.  
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(iii) Construction and 
Property Sectors 
Crisis Periods (1996-1998) 
 In 1997, the growth of the construction and property 
sectorsremained moderate compared to the previous year due to the 
slowdown in the construction of office space and retail outlets as 
well as high-end condominiums. However, lower and medium-
priced housing properties remained strong.  
 In addition, the banking system was also supportive by providing 
more loans to finance the construction sector. To develop Malaysia 
as a conference and exhibition centre, the 1997 Budget approved 
tax incentives for investment in local hotels and tourism projects. 
 The financial crisis dampened the growth of the construction sector 
in 1998 mainly due to excess supply and a slowdown in 
construction in certain segments of the property market. The major 
factors contributing to the slowdown in construction were high 
interest rates, a sharp drop in share prices that reduce financial 
wealth, and difficulty in getting financing for the construction and 
purchase of properties. 
 Nonetheless, constructions for low and medium-cost houses were 
persistent as the demand remained sturdy in 1998. This was mainly 
due to the intervention of the Federal Government that initiates and 
offers easier access for financing in order to increase the demand 
for medium and low-cost houses. 
Recovery Periods (1999-2002) 
 The performance of the construction sector remained moderate 
particularly in 1999, mainly due to more extensive civil 
engineering works as well as higher construction in low and 
medium-cost housing projects. The Central Bank of Malaysia also 
relaxed lending guidelines to purchasers to increase the demand for 
low and medium-cost residential houses. In order to reduce the 
excess supply, developers cleared the stocks by reducing the price 
of costly properties and diverted their attention to low and 
medium-cost houses. 
 The performance of the construction sector remained at a moderate 
level in 2000 attributable to a few factors, i.e., low interest rates, 
relaxation of eligibility conditions for government housing loans, 
withdrawal options provided by the Employee’s Provident Fund, 
and higher disposable incomes. Besides that, development of 
infrastructure projects and construction of residential properties 
remained active. 
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 In 2001, growth of this sector improved due to expansion in fiscal 
spending. Sales in the residential property sector increased 
attributable to stamp duty exemption on sales, an increase in home 
loans and other ownership campaigns launched by the Real Estate 
and Housing Developers Association. The government further 
supported it by allocating an additional number of low-cost houses 
and various special schemes for the lower income group. 
Stable Periods (2003-2007) 
 In 2003, the continuous demand for residential housing and higher 
than expected budgetary allocation for public infrastructure 
projects further boosted the construction and property sectors. 
During the first five months of 2003, the construction of residential 
properties remained active even though the demand for the housing 
was slow due to the Iraq war and SARS which influenced the 
confidence level of consumers. 
 The government undertook several actions and incentives, (e.g., 
individual income tax relief was given on specified interest 
payments for housing loans and changes were made to foreign 
ownership procedures). Additionally, Syarikat Perumahan Negara 
Berhad (SPNB) purchased unsold completed apartments and 
allocated them to eligible government employees.  
 The construction sector was affected slightly in 2004 by delays in 
completion of several huge infrastructure projects and a lower 
number of new contracts granted by the Government. However, 
higher growth in residential construction was observed as a result 
of high demand and sales attributable to higher incomes, lower 
interest rates and attractive loan packages.  
 The growth of the construction and property sectors further 
increased during the first half of 2005 due to the residential sub-
sector remaining active, although civil engineering activities 
reduced. This was mainly due to several factors such as favourable 
economic and business conditions, expansion in household 
incomes, low mortgage rates, favourable labour market conditions, 
as well as an increasing number of young workers supporting the 
demand for housing.  
 In the remaining six months of 2005, the construction sector started 
to slow down due to the slowdown in the civil engineering sub-
sector. Therefore, most of the well-established local firms started to 
venture into overseas markets such as India and the Middle East. 
Besides that, residential sub-sector activities became slower which 
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was attributable to high costs of building materials and 
transportation.  
 The execution of 9th Malaysian Plan boosted the performance of 
the construction sector in 2007. Hence, civil engineering activities 
increased and enhanced the growth of the construction sector. On 
the other hand, a vigilant buying sentiment due to higher inflation 
and interest rates in the first half of 2007 moderated the activities 
of the residential sub-sector. Nevertheless, during the second 
quarter of 2007, the consumers started to purchase more properties 
as interest rates and inflation became lower together with 
availability of attractive loans. Moreover, developers became more 
confident with the development of housing projects and incentives 
being approved. 
 
(iv) Trade and Services 
Sector 
Crisis Periods (1996-1998) 
 In 1997, growth of the services sector expanded mainly attributable 
to the utilities sub-sector. Besides that, the government undertook 
continuous efforts to further develop the other sub-services sectors 
as a contribution towards overall GDP. 
 The growth of this sector deteriorated in 1998 mainly due to 
reduced economic activities, lower real incomes and depressed 
level of external trade. Almost all of the sub-sectors performed 
poorly compared to the prior year. However, some of these sub-
sectors performed better during the second half of 1998 due to a 
reduction in interest rates, flexible credit terms on hire purchase 
terms, as well as the Commonwealth Games being hosted by 
Malaysia. Importantly, the services sector is the only sector that 
registered an increase towards the real GDP. 
Recovery Periods (1999-2002) 
 This sector performed positively in 1999 predominantly due to a 
few sub-sectors that performed remarkably well. For instance, the 
superior performance of the wholesale and retail trades was mainly 
due to the collection of sales tax by the Royal Customs and Excise 
Department, whereas, in the hotel and restaurant sub-sector it was 
attributable to strong demand and inflow of tourists as well as a 
marginal increase in per capita income. 
 In 2000, the performance of the trade and services sector further 
increased as the main contributor towards overall GDP. The 
wholesale and retail trade, and the hotel and restaurants sub-sectors 
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were maintaining their major role as the primary contributors to the 
overall growth of the trade and services sector. 
 In 2001, this sector remained the main contributor to the growth in 
the economy although a sharp downturn was noticeable in the 
manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, the wholesale and retail trade, 
hotel and restaurants sub-sectors recorded slower positive growth.  
 The boom period of the trade and services sector was evident as 
this sector sustained its position. This was mainly due to better 
global economic conditions and the consolidation of an efficient 
banking system and improved consumer confidence in the 
economy. The Government laid greater emphasis on the tourism 
sub-sector in order to capture a larger share of the tourism market. 
Stable Periods(2003-2007) 
 As the economy stabilized, the contribution of the sector to overall 
GDP increased marginally in 2003. Government services 
maintained their position as the main contributor to the trade and 
services sector while the remaining sub-sectors also performed 
well. Nevertheless, the performance of the wholesale and retail 
trades and the hotel and restaurants sectors slowed as a result of the 
negative effects of SARS during the second quarter. The global 
SARS epidemic and the Iraq war severely affected the tourism 
industry and reduced the number of tourist arrivals.  
 To overcome these critical issues, the following effective actions 
were undertaken: the cost of doing business was reduced, a Special 
Relief Guarantee Facility was provided and rescheduling of loans 
were rescheduled by banking institutions. In order to stimulate 
domestic consumption, the Government reduced the Employees 
Provident Fund (EPF) contributions by 2%, allocating a half-month 
bonus for civil servants, and granted tax exemption for hotels and 
restaurants.  
 In 2004, this sector performed well mainly due to higher consumer 
spending as a result of rising disposable incomes and the number of 
tourist arrivals. The transport, storage and communication sub-
sectors tended to be the main contributors to this sector supported 
by the superior trades and domestic economic activities and 
competitiveness in the communications industry. This was 
followed by the utilities sub-sector due to high demand for 
electricity from industrial and commercial sectors as well as 
improved operational efficiency. 
 During 2005, the pace of growth superseded the overall GDP and 
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the trade and services sector maintained its position as the largest 
sector in the economy with sturdy support from new growth areas. 
The major contributions were derived from the wholesale and retail 
trade, and hotels and restaurants due to higher disposable incomes, 
strong domestic spending as well as higher tourist arrivals and the 
establishment of new retail outlets. The remaining sub-sectors also 
performed well and contributed positively to this sector 
 This sector continued to be the key driver of growth in the 
Malaysian economy during 2006 although the manufacturing 
sector performed equally well. The superior performance of the 
trade and services sector is mainly driven by the growth of finance 
and insurance, real estate and the business services sub-sector. 
High turnover in the equity market, positive growth in the 
insurance industry, the sustainability of bank lending, and 
expansion in Islamic financial services were the major factors that 
contributed to the performance of this sub-sector.  
 In the following year, solid growth was discernible within this 
sector. The financial and business services maintained their 
position as the main contributors. Besides that, the wholesale and 
retail trade, hotel and restaurants sub-sectors grew rapidly as 
disposable incomes increased and retail activities expanded. 
Moreover, tourist arrivals increased dramatically and government 
encouraged the foreigners to stay longer in Malaysia with the Visit 
Malaysia Year 2007 campaign.  
Source: Malaysian Economic Reports from 1996 to 2007 
 
3.3 Capital Market Development in Malaysia 
Based on past evidence, Malaysia’s capital market is progressing and is 
highly developed compared to other emerging economies. In accordance with Harun 
(2002), the development of the capital market could be seen through the enlargement 
of market size, number of instruments and the level of efficiency. The development 
of the Malaysian capital market is observable as the overall market has progressed 
rapidly since the end of 1989 (Shinimoto, 1999). In general, the Malaysian capital 
market is classified into two major markets, equity and debt markets, that operate 
either under the conventional or the Islamic approach. The equity market seems to 
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have matured the most; it was established in 1960 and is known as the Malayan 
Stock Exchange. In 1973, the Malayan Stock Exchange was split into two entities, 
namely, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) and the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore, due to currency issues. Being a limited liability company, KLSE becomes 
a hub for raising new funds as well as a marketplace for transacting shares, bonds 
and other securities in Malaysian listed firms. In 2004, the exchange changed its 
name to Bursa Malaysia. 
On the other hand, the debt market consists of government and private 
securities markets. In the late 1980s, the government raised funds through issues of 
Malaysian Government Securities (MGS) and dominated the debt market as the 
funds were needed to finance the public sector investments. According to Suto 
(2003), the development of the corporate debt securities market was hindered for the 
following reasons. First, the private placement of corporate bonds was preferred 
rather than a public offering to create an obstacle to the existence of an active 
secondary market. The corporate debt securities were concentrated in the financial 
institutions. The commercial banks, as the major players in the domestic capital 
market, underwrote the corporate bonds issued by the larger-sized firms in Malaysia. 
Secondly, the strong relationship with banking institutions allowed the firms to issue 
debt securities more easily. Moreover, Malaysian firms had their primary banks as 
their shareholders. In addition, Harwood (1993) points out those firms were reluctant 
to shift away from bank loans as bond issuance involved a long and detailed approval 
process. Hence, the corporate bonds became less attractive at that time when the 
market conditions changed. 
Subsequently, the private sector started to raise more funds as their needs 
increased as a result of privatisation in the early 1990s. Private Debt Securities (PDS) 
played an important role for the private sector’s investments as the main source of 
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capital, together with equity through rights issues and initial public offerings (IPOs), 
(Singh and Yusof, 2002). At this time, the capital market started to expand, with 
several new products and services appearing as a result of lower interest rates, 
corporate debt restructuring and expansion of financing by both the public and 
private sectors. In the beginning, firms were over-relying on banks to finance their 
investment. The banking system played a major role as the funds supplier to the 
corporate sector. However, the occurrence of the Asian financial crisis provided a 
great lesson to the corporate sector because of its high dependency on the banking 
sector. Generally, the banking sector was badly affected by the financial crisis as 
large amounts of funds had been lent to the corporate sector without proper 
supervision. During the boom periods, firms purchased shares by taking loans from 
the banks and raised funds from the equity market. The firms were performing well 
as the economy picked up from 1992 until 1996 and firms could afford to pay their 
debt. 
As the country was hit by the financial crisis, most firms faced difficulties 
settling large debts as the share prices deteriorated drastically. This led to big losses 
among the banking institutions and stockbrokers as customers defaulted on their 
debts. As the stock brokers were unable to manage their losses, they became 
distressed while the banking institutions were secured by the Central Bank of 
Malaysia. However, the banking institutions could not provide further loans to the 
corporate sector as the banks were facing severe liquidity problems. Moreover, the 
stock market was undergoing a tough period as the Composite Index plummeted 
dramatically. Additionally, international borrowing became costly due to currency 
depreciations (Shinimoto, 1999). As a result, firms experienced difficulties in raising 
funds for their investments. Many small firms were declared bankrupt due to their 
inability to settle their huge outstanding debts. 
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The financial crisis imposed several negative impacts due to improper risk 
diversification within Malaysia’s financial system (Ibrahim, 2006). Suto (2003) 
argued that financial distress across Malaysian firms during the financial crisis was 
highly attributable to the concentration of risks in the banking sector, and the 
dispersion of corporate governance mechanism that induces excess corporate 
investment. Furthermore, the bond market could not be developed due to high 
reserve and liquidity requirement ratios with inefficient open market operations 
(Shinimoto, 1999). Thus, the government initiated several positive actions in order to 
overcome this problem. For instance, the corporate bond market was promoted as a 
substitute for banks in providing sources of finance to the private sector as the bond 
market was under-developed. In 1999, the value of outstanding bonds was only 67% 
of GDP compared to outstanding bank loans of 157% of GDP (Singh and Yusof, 
2002). This effort indirectly mobilized sufficient funds to the corporate sector and 
reduced the credit intermediation through the banking sector. In early 2001, the 
government introduced the Capital Market Plan (CMP) to further enhance 
Malaysia’s capital market. According to Harun (2002), CMP predicted that the 
economy needed RM930 billion for capital expenditure from 2001 until 2010 in 
order to increase the output by 7.3%. 
The ultimate vision of the CMP was to create a capital market that was 
competitive internationally across core areas, highly efficient and supported by a 
strong facilitative regulatory framework. Six broad objectives were identified as the 
basis to achieve the main vision of the CMP, and these objectives were: 
 To be the preferred fund-raising centre for Malaysian companies 
 To promote an effective investment management industry and a more 
conducive environment for investors 
 To enhance the competitive position and efficiency of the market institutions 
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 To develop a strong competitive environment for intermediation services 
 To ensure a stronger and more facilitating regulatory regime 
 To establish Malaysia as an international Islamic capital market centre 
The objectives of the CMP were implemented in three different phases. In the 
first phase (2001-2003), the initial plan was to strengthen the domestic capacity and 
develop strategic and nascent sectors. The subsequent phase (2004-2005), 
emphasized strengthening the key sectors and gradually liberalising market access. 
The final phase (2006-2010) focused on expanding and strengthening the market 
processes and infrastructure to become a fully developed capital market. The 
implementation of the CMP has gradually improved Malaysia’s capital market. PDS 
outstanding have grown by nearly 380 times and have contributed 28% to the overall 
GDP, although the bond market was dominated by public bonds during the third 
quarter of 2001 (Harun, 2002). By mid-2005, 96 recommendations had been 
implemented, while the remaining 44 recommendations were still at the 
implementation stage. The IMF statistics in 2005 demonstrated the advancement and 
growth of the corporate debt market in Malaysia that registered a 45-fold increase. 
Moreover, the corporate bond market had progressed well and contributed 37% of 
the country’s overall GDP, recording 8% of the total Asian bond market in 2004 
(Ibrahim, 2006). Hereby, the bond market played an important role in providing 
funds to the private sector as well as complementing the role of the banking sector. 
In 2005, a balance between public and private bond markets is observable and 
the corporate bond market accounted for approximately 25% of the total debt 
financing, including bank loans, in the economy. However, the banking sector 
consistently provides funds to the private sector although the burden has been 
reduced by the developing bond market in Malaysia. In accordance with Aziz (2008), 
the development of the bond market was highly dependent on several factors. First, 
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the private sector could finance their large investment projects by raising financial 
resources via the bond market rather than depending solely on the banking sector. 
Secondly, the bond market allowed foreign investors to raise funds as the bond 
market became more liberal. The foreign holdings increased to 15% within seven 
years, that is, from 2000 until 2007. Thirdly, the development of Islamic finance, 
particularly the Sukuk bonds, performed better than conventional bonds with greater 
issuance. The Islamic bond market progressed successfully and contributed to the 
development of Malaysia’s capital market. One of the objectives of the Islamic 
capital market is to be a niche market. The fast growth of the Malaysian Islamic bond 
market is noticeable as the market represents an International Islamic Capital Market 
centre that covers 85% of the global Islamic bond markets. As the world’s largest 
issuer of Islamic securities globally, Malaysia issued bonds amounting to 
approximately US$30 billion out of US41 billion (Ibrahim and Minai, 2009). 
According to these authors, the rapid growth of Islamic bonds is because firms can 
reduce their cost of capital due to larger investments in Islamic debt securities 
developed compared to conventional debt. Hence, firms could increase their wealth 
relatively higher by issuing the Islamic bonds compared to conventional bonds.  
Fourthly, a major structural enhancement took place in regard to capital 
market intermediaries with the introduction of investment banking in 2006. Finally, 
continuous reinforcements were put in place in order to ensure the robustness of the 
bond market through strong financial infrastructure, a settlement system, and legal 
and regulatory frameworks. All of these factors contributed to a 46% increase in the 
total annual turnover volume in 2007. This provides a good indication of the growing 
bond market being used to mobilize and allocate financial resources domestically and 
internationally. 
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3.4 Consequences of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia 
The Asian financial crisis affected most of the East Asian emerging markets 
in 1997. The crisis originated from Thailand as a result of the deregulation of the 
exchange rate of the Baht against the US dollar. A contagion effect spilled over to 
other Asian countries due to the high degree of economic interdependence. 
Inadequate and under-developed financial sectors with improper mechanisms for 
capital allocation severely affected the capital markets of each region. Governments 
responded differently as the capital markets experienced a significant outflow of 
foreign investment (Nesadurai, 2000). Thailand, Malaysia, The Philippines and 
Indonesia experienced severe currency depreciation as a result of insufficient foreign 
reserves. Nevertheless, the impact of currency depreciation and stock market 
declines varied across countries that were badly affected. Subsequently, the impact of 
the financial crises also spread to Russia and other countries in Latin America.  
In the context of Malaysia, the effect of the financial crisis started in the 
middle of 1997 as the ringgit depreciated enormously. The equity market, that is, the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) now known as Bursa Malaysia Securities 
Berhad, suffered badly as the Composite Index dropped extraordinarily from 1271.45 
points to 262.7 points within 19 months as a result of the huge capital outflows 
(Sulaiman, 1999). This impacted on the listed firms as they suffered huge losses 
caused by the fall in their market capitalization. As the crisis deepened, most firms 
faced difficulties settling their large debts as the share prices deteriorated drastically. 
In addition, the banking sector could not provide any further loans to the corporate 
sector due to their severe liquidity issues, and banking institutions became more 
cautious with their lending activities as a result of growing numbers of non-
performing loans. The amount of loans granted by the banking sector diminished by 
22.5% within the time frame of July 1997 to August 1998. The liquidity risk had 
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strongly affected the survivability of Malaysian firms. Firms experienced difficulties 
in raising funds for investments as their internal reserves were in a diminished state. 
Some firms, particularly the small ones, became distressed and disappeared from the 
market due to huge, unsettled, outstanding debts. 
Instead of depending on International Monetary Fund (IMF) support, the 
Central Bank of Malaysia took a similar approach to that implemented by the IMF. 
To overcome the liquidity problem, the Central Bank of Malaysia supported the 
banking sector by reducing the reserve requirement from 13.5% to 4%. This 
indirectly increased the liquidity position within the banking institutions. Meanwhile, 
to inject liquidity into the banking system, interest rates were reduced, however, the 
regional financial market remained volatile. Therefore, the ringgit exchange rate had 
to be further depreciated in order to implement such a policy. On the other hand, 
speculative activities, as a result of a large gap between offshore and onshore interest 
rates, created great pressure to increase interest rates in order to support the exchange 
rate. Deciding which policies to implement became a dilemma and a trade-off 
between domestic and international considerations. This finally led to the 
implementation of a fixed exchange rate regime, RM3.80 to the US dollar, on 
September 1998. In 1999, the economy gradually recovered with the expansion of 
economic activity within the country. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a clear picture of the performance of each sector across 
the different economic conditions. Moreover, the discussion also emphasizes the 
variations in performance across sectors though the entire sectors despite the fact 
they are exposed to similar stages of economic conditions. The performance of each 
sector is greatly influenced by several other sector-specific factors not just similar 
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macro factors, which are common across firms within the nation. Nevertheless, the 
common factors also differ across sectors. For instance, the impact of the financial 
crisis varied across sectors in Malaysia and, subsequently, the evolution of the capital 
market points to the vibrancy of the capital market as the main provider of financial 
resources to the corporate sector. Finally, the Asian financial crisis provides 
important lessons to both policy-makers and the corporate sector in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the empirical research methodologies that have been 
employed in this study. In general, this study utilizes econometric techniques related 
to panel data analysis, namely, static and dynamic models using both balanced and 
unbalanced panel datasets. These models are used to capture the impact of sectoral 
behaviour on the relationship between capital structure determinants and leverage. 
The first section discusses the data sources and classification of datasets, the 
balanced and unbalanced panel data. The second section explains the definition of 
the dependent and explanatory variables and the rationale between book leverage and 
market leverage. This is followed by the third and final section that describes the 
model specifications and estimations. This section illustrates the static model (e.g., 
the pooled OLS and fixed effect analysis) and dynamic model (using the Generalized 
Method of Moments with two-step estimator Difference GMM) specifications. The 
models are designed based on both theoretical and empirical considerations. 
4.2 Data Sources and Classification of Datasets 
This study mainly relies on secondary data which have been extracted from 
various sources. As at 2007, there are 987 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia 
(formerly known as KLSE). The listed firms are classified according to Bursa 
Malaysia classifications. The firms are either listed on the Main Board for larger 
capitalised firms, the Second Board for medium-sized firms, or the Malaysian 
Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation, also known as the 
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MESDAQ, for high growth and technology firms. Table 4.1 shows the classification 
and number of listed firms across the boards from 1973 until 2012. 
Based on Bursa Malaysia’s listing requirements, a firm seeking a listing on 
the Main Board must have a minimum paid-up capital of RM60 million comprising 
ordinary shares of at least RM0.10 each. The firm needs to ensure that there are at 
least 750 public shareholders who are not employees. Alternatively, if the firm 
maintains a minimum paid-up capital of RM40 million to RM60 million, it can seek 
a listing on the second board. Such firms need to ensure that there are at least 500 
public shareholders who are not employees. However, listing on the MESDAQ 
requires firms to maintain their paid-up capital at a minimum of RM2 million. 
MESDAQ is a separate securities market listing the high technology-based firms. 
This is mainly to promote the development of young and high-growth firms within 
the technology intensive industry. Since 2009, the main board and second board have 
been classified as the Main Market whilst the MESDAQ is known as the Alternative 
Stock Market (ACE Market). The firm-level variables data were obtained from the 
OSIRIS database provided by Bureau Van Djik based on annual data. These data are 
based on the firms’ audited financial statements in their annual reports, namely, 
balance sheets, and income statements, which are denominated in US dollars, for the 
12-year period starting from 1996 until 2007. 
The accuracy and quality of measurement of the variables are subject to the 
independent auditing of accounting reports that comply with the requirements of 
each country’s securities commission (Delcoure, 2007; Ariff et al., 2008). 
Additionally, data related to the market-to-book ratio were obtained from the Bursa 
Malaysia. Compared to other comprehensive studies concentrated on US data and 
other developed countries studies, this study has limitations regarding the data 
related to sector or industry-level variables. 
CHAPTER 4 
 
93 
 
Table 4.1: Total Number of Malaysian Listed Firms 
Source: Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad 
Data on advertising, tax, research and development expenses, selling and 
administration, and uniqueness are incomplete in the OSIRIS and other databases. 
Therefore, the sector-level variables were constructed from the firm-level data. On 
the other hand, country-level variables are collected from various sources, mainly the 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank and Malaysian Economic 
Statistics Time Series, 2007, published by Malaysia Economic Statistics. 
This study utilizes panel data techniques due to the nature of the data that 
involves the combination of cross-sections and time-series, and is based on the 
number of firms with different sectors across a 12-year period. By using panel data 
analysis, the degrees of freedom can be increased due to a greater number of data 
points, and collinearity issues among explanatory variables can be reduced and, 
consequently, lead to more efficient estimates (Antoniou et al., 2008). The 
endogeneity problem is also reduced due to the consideration of specific industry and 
country effects, reverse causality, and measurement error (Sequeira and Nunes, 
2008). The model permits the investigation of problems that cannot be dealt with 
solely by cross-sections or by time-series (Hsiao, 1986). This argument has been 
further emphasized in the study by Sbeiti (2010) in which the author explains that 
cross-sectional analysis is not possible in the context of dynamic capital structure due 
Total Number of Listed Firms 
Year Main Board  Second Board MESDAQ Market Total Firms 
2007 636 227 124 987 
2006 649 250 128 1027 
2005 646 268 107 1021 
2004 622 278 63 963 
2003 598 276 32 906 
2002 562 294 12 868 
2001 520 292 - 812 
2000 498 297 - 795 
1999 474 283 - 757 
1998 454 282 - 736 
1997 444 264 - 708 
1996 413 208 - 621 
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to the differential effects of factors that influence capital structure decisions that vary 
over time. According to Baltagi (2005), by employing panel data, we are able to 
identify and measure several effects, including the dynamic adjustment effects that 
are simply not traceable in a separate analysis across cross-sectional or time-series 
data. In addition, the panel setting enables the analysis of more complicated 
behavioural models compared to cross-section or time-series data. Finally, the 
incorporation of both cross-sections and time-series variables overcomes the omitted-
variable problem though it is unlikely to create a completely specified model 
(Delcoure, 2007). 
This study adopted both balanced and unbalanced panel datasets in order to 
analyse the consistencies and robustness of the sectoral behaviour effect on the 
relationship between capital structure determinants and leverage across Malaysian 
listed firms. From the econometric context, a balanced panel dataset contains firms 
that are observed for the entire time-series. The unbalanced dataset includes firms in 
the analysis that are not observable throughout the entire time-series. According to 
Arellano and Bond (1991), unbalanced panel data are commonly used in financial 
and economic studies as they reduce the effect of self-selection of firms within a 
sample. From the population of 952 firms, 300 non-financial listed firms were 
chosen to form a balanced datasetacross seven sectors, namely, consumer product, 
industrial product, construction, property, plantation, technology, and trade and 
services that survived from 1996 until 2007. This dataset analyses the behaviour of 
firms and sectors that consist of fixed members throughout the 12-year period 
without any exit or entry of firms in the particular sector. Meanwhile, the unbalanced 
panel data consists of 815 non-financial listed firms within the same time period. The 
members of each sector may differ for each year due to entries and exits in a 
particular sector. Therefore, this dataset only analyses the sectoral behaviour rather 
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than firm behaviour, due to there being different sets of firms within a sector across 
the periods considered. The unbalanced panel dataset represents 85% of the total 
population. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first Malaysian study in the area 
of capital structure, and it has the closest sample size to the number of Malaysian 
listed firms. 
Some firms were excluded from the study for two main reasons. First, the 
financial and securities sector was excluded as its financial characteristics and use of 
leverage are substantially different from other non-financial firms. According to 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), the financial sector is eliminated from the sample 
because such firms are highly levered as they are highly dependent on investor 
insurance schemes like deposit insurance and, therefore, their liabilities are not 
comparable to the debt issued by non-financial firms. Moreover, minimum capital 
requirements may directly affect the capital structure of financial firms. This is 
consistent with the explanation of Ariff et al. (2008) in the context of Malaysia. They 
documented that financial firms are subjected to special capital adequacy 
requirements that are strictly regulated by the Central Bank of Malaysia and are 
bound to comply with stringent legal requirements on financing. Secondly, it is 
difficult to obtain data for every firm on specific variables during different time 
periods, therefore, all firms with missing data were excluded from the study. The 
number of firms in the sample could have been increased had some of the variables 
or the time period of the study been reduced. 
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4.3 Formulation of Variables 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
Several definitions of leverage have been used in past capital structure 
studies. However, the definition of capital structure is inconclusive and dependent on 
the aim of the analysis (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Most of the past studies focus on 
a single measure of leverage, namely, total debt. Nevertheless, Harris and Raviv 
(1991) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002) stated that the choice of measures for leverage 
is crucial as different definitions of leverage produce different results. In line with 
the findings, Pandey (2001) emphasized that firm characteristics have different 
impactson different types of debt. Marsh (1982) and Titman and Wessels (1988) 
highlighted reasons to divide leverage into short and long-term debt, as the 
combination of types of leverage into total debt leads to a loss of information. 
According to these authors, separation is mainly due to the capital structure theories 
that have different implications for different types of debt. Additionally, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) perceived total debt as a proxy for the amount that is left for 
shareholders in the event of liquidation, rather than providing a good indication of 
default risk in the future. 
Booth et al. (2001) stated that the difference between the total book to debt 
and long-term debt ratios is more pronounced in developing nations than developed 
nations. He also documented that the utilization of short-term debt is higher than 
long-term debt across developing economies. In addition, Mitton (2008) stated that 
short-term debt had increased enormously across emerging markets over the previous 
25-year period. Based on these arguments and evidence, the classification of leverage 
may provide a clear picture on capital structure decision- making and its linkage with 
the explanatory variables. Therefore, consistent with other studies, such as Marsh 
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(1982), Titman and Wessels (1988), Michaelas et al. (1999), Voulgaris et al. (2004), 
Feidakis and Rovolis (2007), Delcoure (2007), Mukherjee and Mahakud (2010) 
define leverage ratios into three different measures, namely, short-term debt, long-
term debt and total debt. 
4.3.2 Book Value versus Market Values of Leverage 
Based on the capital structure series of literature, several studies (e.g., Titman 
and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Mitton, 2008; 
Lemmon et al., 2008). Flannery and Rangan (2006) obtained similar results using 
both market and book leverage ratios, while Fama and French (2002) obtained 
completely different results. However, some studies put more emphasis on book 
values than market values (e.g., Ferri and Jones, 1979; MacKay and Phillips, 2005). 
Myers (1977) argued that book values of leverage are related to the value of assets in 
place and excludes the capitalized value of future growth opportunities. Thies and 
Klock (1992) argued that book values give a better reflection of management’s target 
book ratios than market values, that are highly dependent on a few factors which are 
beyond the control of the firm. This also provides a channel to identify a negative 
marginal debt capacity of growth options (Barclay et al., 2006). The utilization of 
market leverage values could lead to a distortion of future investment decisions due 
to volatile market prices (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Graham and Harvey 
(2001) report that managers tend to focus on book values rather than market values 
when setting their financial structure, as they are insensitive to price changes and this 
does not reflect on the rebalancing process of capital structure.  
In contrast, a group of researchers has argued the importance of market 
values of leverage compared to book values. Marsh (1982) highlights the importance 
of market values as they are closely associated with corporate decisions. In addition, 
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the measurement of market leverage is more realistic compared to book leverage as 
market values are closer to the intrinsic firm value and tend to reflect the potential of 
future leverage precisely (Kayo and Kimura, 2011). Moreover, Sbeiti (2010) 
emphasized the inconsistencies of book values which are highly influenced by the 
choice of the accounting methods. Conversely, market values may change the 
amount of leverage without altering the amount of outstanding debt or the book value 
of equity. In this study, the information on market values is limited and only caters 
for a shorter period of observations
6
. In order to maintain the sample size and a 
longer time-series, I do not consider the market values in this study. Therefore, this 
study is restricted mainly to the book value of debt, that is, total debt, long-term debt 
and short-term debt, as the dependent variables. The formulation of book leverage is 
shown in Table 4.2 following with the evidence of past studies that utilizes the book 
leverage solely, or together with market leverage. 
 
Table 4.2: Definitions of Book Value of Leverage 
Variables Formulation Past studies 
Total Debt Total debt (total liabilities) divided 
by the book value of total assets 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et 
al. (2001), Fama and French (2002), 
Pandey and Chotigeat (2004), Chen 
(2004), MacKay and Phillips (2005), 
Zou and Xiao (2006), Shah and Khan 
(2007), Lemmon et al. (2008), Sbeiti 
(2010), Mat Nor et al. (2011), 
Rajagopal (2011), Guney et al. 
(2011). 
Long-Term Debt Long-term debt divided by the 
book value of total assets 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et 
al. (2001), Pandey and Chotigeat 
(2004), Fama and French (2002), 
Chen (2004), Zou and Xiao (2006), 
Mat Nor et al. (2011), Rajagopal 
(2011). 
Short-Term Debt Short-term debt divided by the 
book value of total assets 
Pandey and Chotigeat (2004), 
Feidakis and Rovolis (2007), Mat 
Nor et al. (2011), Rajagopal (2011). 
 
                                                          
6
 Titman and Wessels (1988) and Delcoure (2007) used book values rather than market values due to 
data limitation although they preferred to use the market values of debt. 
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4.3.3 Independent Variables 
Based on past literature, the explanatory variables are divided into three main 
categories - firm-level, sector-level and country-level variables. In this study, the 
choice of variables and formulations is motivated by both theoretical and empirical 
considerations. Based on the pilot study, seven final determinants were chosen after 
dropping operating leverage from the model. The firm-level determinants are 
tangibility, profitability, non-tax debt shield, liquidity, firm size, growth 
opportunities, and risk. Due to the unavailability of some data on sector or industry-
specific factors, this study adopted three new variables - munificence, dynamism, 
and the HH Index that has been used recently by Kayo and Kimura (2011). The HH 
Index has also been used in other past studies unrelated to capital structure research.  
Finally, this study also considers the country-level variables, although this is 
a single country-based study as these variables also affect the capital structure 
decision-making process. Based on the series of past literature, a firm’s capital 
structure decision is not primarily based on the firm’s characteristics but is also 
shaped by the specific country’s legal framework, institutional environment and 
macroeconomic factors. Therefore, five commonly used variables - GDP, inflation, 
lending interest rates, debt market development and stock market development - 
were included in this model. Table 4.3 below explains the definition of independent 
variables, together with the evidence from past studies across developed and 
developing countries that have utilized a similar formulation in their respective 
studies. The selection of formulation is dependent on the availability of data that is a 
very common feature of research conducted on developing economies and, in 
particular, Malaysia. 
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Table 4.3: Definitions of Independent Variables 
Variables Formulation Past Studies 
Tangibility Fixed assets/total assets  Booth et al. (2001), Shah and 
Khan (2007), Feidakis and 
Rovolis (2007), Mat Nor etal. 
(2011), Kayo and Kimura (2011). 
 
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxes/total 
assets 
Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Booth 
et al. (2001), Pandey (2001), 
Flannery and Rangan (2006), Zou 
and Xiao (2006), Correa et al. 
(2007), Antonoiu et al. (2008). 
Mat Nor et al. (2011) and Kayo 
and Kimura (2011). 
 
Non-Debt Tax Shield Depreciation/total assets Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Chen 
(2004), Deesomsak et al.(2004), 
Delcoure (2007), Ariff et al. 
(2008), Chakraborty (2010), Mat 
Nor et al. (2011), Guney et al. 
(2011). 
 
Liquidity Current asset/current liabilities Ozkan (2001), Deesomsak et al. 
(2004), Feidakis and Rovolis 
(2007), Sbeiti (2010), Mat Nor et 
al. (2011). 
 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of sales Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Ozkan 
(2001), Booth et al. (2001), 
Pandey (2001), Feidakis and 
Rovolis (2007), Antonoiu et 
al.(2008), Chakraborty (2010), 
Kayo and Kimura (2011), Guney 
et al. (2011). 
 
Growth Opportunities (Net Revenue t – Net Revenue t-1)/ 
Net Revenue t-1 
 
Market-to-Book Ratio 
Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth 
et al. (2001), Hovamikian et al. 
(2001), Correa et al.(2007), 
Antonoiu et al. (2008). 
 
Risk ((Earnings before Interest and Taxes/ 
Total Assets) – Mean (Earnings before 
Interest and Taxes / Total Assets))^2  
 
Correa et al. (2007), Antonoiu et 
al. (2008).  
Munificence Regressing time against sales of an 
industry over the previous 5 years of 
the period under analysis and take the 
ratio of the regression slope coefficient 
to the mean of sales over the sample 
period. 
 
Boyd (1995), Kayo and Kimura 
(2011). 
Dynamism Standard error of the munificence 
regression slope coefficient divided by 
the mean value of sales over this 
period. 
Boyd (1995), Kayo and Kimura 
(2011). 
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HH Index Sum of the squares of market shares of 
firms within a given industry. 
MacKay and Phillips (2005), 
Kayo and Kimura (2011). 
 
GDP  Growth rate of real GDP per capita. Feidakis and Rovolis (2007), 
Ariff et al. (2008), Kayo and 
Kimura (2011). 
 
Inflation  Consumer price-annual %. Ozkan (2001) and Ariff et al. 
(2008) 
 
Lending Interest Rate Rate charged by banks on loans to 
prime customers. 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), Sbeiti 
(2010), Mat Nor et al. (2011). 
 
Stock Market 
Development 
Stocks traded total value as % of GDP. Booth et al., (2001), Deesomsak 
et al. (2004), Sbeiti (2010). 
 
Debt Market 
Development 
Liquid liabilities as % of GDP. Booth et al. (2001). 
 
4.4 Model Specification and Estimations 
This study employs the econometric analysis using panel data that combines 
the features of time-series and cross-sectional data. In accordance with Baltagi 
(2005), panel data analysis notation differentiates this model from time-series or 
cross-section analyses by double subscript on its variables. One subscript represents 
the cross-section unit, that is, firms, sectors, countries etc., while the other subscript 
denotes the time. In line with the objectives of this study, this study uses three main 
estimations - pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Fixed Effect (FE) for the 
static panel model, and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) forthe dynamic 
panel model. 
4.4.1 Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Analysis 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is utilized to estimate the regression 
models as it minimizes the error between the estimated points on the line and the 
actual observed points (Hill et al., 2008). In general, OLS ignores the individual and 
time effects. This model assumes that firms are homogenous with regard to capital 
structure, therefore, the impact of cross-sectional or time effect on leverage is 
insignificant. In accordance with Shah and Khan (2007), the OLS model assumes 
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that firms have similar intercept values, and the slope of coefficients of the 
explanatory variables is indifferent across firms. The following estimated equation 
(4.1) assesses the association between firm-level determinants and leverage for the 
balanced panel: 
                                                      
                                                                                             (4.1) 
where    is the debt ratio for firm   in year  , and the firm-level determinants are 
tangibility (      ), profitability (      ), growth opportunities (     ), non-
debt tax shield (    ), liquidity (   ), firm size (       ) and risk (    ). The 
disturbance term is denoted as     and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with 
mean zero. As for the unbalanced panel data, market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy 
for growth opportunities. Therefore, the following estimated equation (4.2) assesses 
the association between the firm-level determinants and leverage for the unbalanced 
panel: 
                                                      
                                                                                                (4.2) 
The subsequent regression will focus on the three sector-level variables, 
munificence, dynamism and the HH index that highlight the distinction of decision-
making on leverage across seven sectors. 
As for the sector-level analysis, the following estimated model (4.3) assesses 
the relationship between sector–level determinants and firm leverage: 
                                                                        (4.3) 
where     is the firm debt ratio for sector j in year t, with sector-level determinants 
such as munificence (MFCE), dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI). The 
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disturbance term is denoted as      and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with 
mean zero. To further understand the mechanism between sector-level determinants 
and leverage, the book values of leverage are converted into median values. 
Therefore, the following estimated model (4.4) assesses the relationship between 
sector-level determinants and sector leverage: 
                                                                         (4.4) 
where    is the median debt ratio for sector j in year t, and sector-level determinants 
are munificence (MFCE), dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI). The disturbance 
term is denoted as     and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero. 
 
Finally, the following estimated equation (4.5) assesses the association 
between country-level determinants and firm leverage across firms: 
                                          
                                            
(4.5) 
where    is the debt ratio for firm i in year t, and the country-level variables are 
growth of GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), inflation (INF_CP), lending interest rate 
(LENDINT), liquid liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and stock total value to 
GDP(STV_GDP). The disturbance term is denoted as     and is assumed to be 
serially uncorrelated with mean zero. To further understand the mechanism between 
country-level determinants and leverage in the sectoral perspective, the firm book 
values of leverage were converted into sector median values. 
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4.4.2 Fixed effect Analysis 
Based on the previous modelling, the relationships between leverage and 
capital structure determinants are likely to be mis-specified due to the exclusion of 
the time-invariant component of leverage ratios, that are likely to be correlated with 
the right-hand side variables (Lemmon et al., 2008). The author further added that 
the model specification is dependent on the objective of the study. As the objective 
of this study emphasizes the marginal effects of a particular determinant, the firm 
fixed effects play a major role in addressing the omitted variables problem in the 
model. Moreover, the pooled OLS analysis may fail to show the true relationships 
between leverage and the explanatory variables across firms as the fundamental 
assumptions of the models are not fulfilled (Shah and Khan, 2007). In the context of 
the panel data analysis, different types of methods could be utilised, either the fixed 
effect or random effect. 
However, the selection of method is dependent on the nature of the dataset 
that is determined based on the Hausman test
7
. The Hausman specification test is 
employed to test the fixed effects model versus the random effects model (Hausman, 
1978). In general, this specification test is used to test for orthogonality of the 
common effects and the regressors. As for this study, the test is statistically 
significant for total, long-term debt and short-term leverage for individual sectors 
and the whole sample; thus, the random effects model can be rejected in favour of 
the fixed effects model at the significant level of 1%. Therefore, the fixed effect 
model is the suitable and appropriate specification for both balanced and unbalanced 
panel datasets. As a result, the firm fixed effects model is utilized to examine the 
effect of independent variables on leverage ratios on the basis of variation of 
leverage over time for each firm within a sector. As the intercept varies across firms 
                                                          
7
Defined in Appendix. 
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and/or time, the model captures the entire information including the effect of omitted 
variables (Booth et al., 2001). This study employs the cross-sectional fixed effect 
method as the subscript i on the intercept term varies across firms. In other words, 
the model captures the effect of individual firms on leverage or controls for omitted 
variables that differ across firms but is constant over time. 
Based on this assumption, the following estimated equation (4.6) assesses the 
association between the firm-level determinants and leverage based on the balanced 
panel. 
                                                      
                                                                                       (4.6) 
where    is the debt ratio for firm   in year  , with firm-level determinants such as 
tangibility (      ), profitability (      ), growth opportunities (    ),non-
debt tax shield (    ), liquidity (   ), firm size (       ) and risk (    ).The 
firm-fixed effects    control for cross-sectional differences in the firm characteristics. 
The disturbance term is denoted as     and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with 
mean zero. Conversely, the following estimated equation (4.7) assesses the 
association between the firm-level determinants and leverage for the unbalanced 
panel data: 
                                                      
                                                                                         (4.7) 
The entire explanatory variables remain except that market-to-book ratio is used as a 
proxy for growth opportunities instead of growth. Consequently, a similar analysis to 
sector-level and country-level determinants was repeated to measure the variation of 
leverage across and within sectors. As for the sector-level analysis, the following 
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estimated model (4.8) assesses the relationship between sector-level determinants 
and firm leverage: 
                                                                  (4.8) 
where     is the firm debt ratio for sector j in year t, with sector-level determinants 
such as munificence (MFCE), dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI). The firm-
fixed effects    control for cross-sectional differences across firms. The disturbance 
term is denoted as      and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero. To 
further understand the mechanism between sector-level determinants and leverage, 
the book values of leverage are converted into median values. The following 
estimated model (4.9) assesses the relationship between sector-level determinants 
and firm leverage: 
                                                                  (4.9) 
where    is the median debt ratio for sector j in year t, with sector-level determinants 
such as munificence (MFCE), dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI). The sector-
fixed effects    control for cross-sectional differences across sectors. The disturbance 
term is denoted as     and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero 
The next equation (4.10) assesses the association between country-level 
determinants and capital structure over time: 
                                                                                  
                                                  
(4.10) 
where      is the debt ratio for firm i in year t, and the country-level variables are 
growth of GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), inflation (INF_CP), lending interest rates 
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(LENDINT), liquid liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and stock total value to GDP 
(STV_GDP). The firm-fixed effects    control for cross-sectional differences across 
firms. The disturbance term is denoted as     and is assumed to be serially correlated 
with mean zero. To further understand the mechanism between country-level 
determinants and leverage in the sectoral perspective, the book values of leverage, 
that is, the dependent variables, are converted to median values 
This final section combined the entire models into a single model that 
assesses the relationship between the capital structure determinants- firm-level, 
sector-level and country-level determinants- and different types of leverage. The 
estimated equation (4.11) is as follows: 
                                                      
                                                                       
                                                                           
                                                                                
                                                                                                                                              (4.11) 
where       is the debt ratio - short-term debt, long-term debt and total debt - for firm 
i within sector j in year t; firm-level determinants are tangibility (TANGIB), 
profitability (EBITTA), growth opportunities (GRWTH), non-debt tax shield (NTDS), 
liquidity (LIQ), size (LNSALES) and risk (RISK); sector-level determinants are 
munificence (MFCE), dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI); and country-level 
determinants are growth of GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), inflation (INF_CP), 
lending interest rate (LENDINT), liquid liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and stock 
value to GDP (STV_GDP). As for the unbalanced dataset, the growth variable is 
replaced by market-to-book ratio (MTBR) as a proxy for growth opportunities. The 
firm-fixed effects      control for cross-sectional differences across firms, whilst the 
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sector-fixed effect      controls for cross-sectional differences across sectors. The 
disturbance term is denoted as      and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with 
mean zero. 
The subsequent discussion focuses on the model selection analysis using an 
Artificial Nested Testing Procedure employed in Chapter 5. This test selects the 
preferred model based on the F-test
8
. In general, this study focuses on three different 
levels of determinants, namely, firm-level, sector-level and country-level 
determinants, that affect leverage. Model 1 (M1) contains the entire determinants that 
are related to firm-level variables including, for example, profitability, tangibility, 
liquidity, non-tax debt shield, firm size, risk and growth opportunities. Model 2 (M2) 
is related to the sector-level determinants, munificence, dynamism and HH Index. 
Finally, Model 3 (M3) concentrates on the country-level determinants such as growth 
of GDP per capita, inflation, lending interest rates, debt market development and 
stock market development. The F-test is conducted based on the unrestricted model 
(the combination of M1, M2 and M3) against the restricted model, that is, the 
combination of M1+M2, M1+M3 or M2+M3 across sectors. The following equation 
(4.12) is used to calculate the Artificial Nested F-test: 
   
                 
             
 
                  (4.12) 
where      denotes the sum squared errors from the restricted model, whilst        
is the sum squared errors from the unrestricted model. The number of variables that 
have been excluded from the restricted model is captured in  . Meanwhile, 
  represents the total number of regressors in the unrestricted model, and   denotes 
the total number of observations in the sample. To capture the impact of the financial 
                                                          
8
Defined in Appendix. 
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crisis, this analysis is solely based on the unbalanced datasets, as the balanced dataset 
only includes the sector-level data from 2000 until 2007. Subsequently, each sample 
is divided into two sub-samples, with and without crisis periods. 
The second hypothesis relates to the first sensitivity analysis of this study that 
mainly captures the effect of different economic conditions on the relationship 
between capital structure determinants (particularly firm-level and sector-level 
variables) and leverage employed in Chapter 6. Pandey (2001) suggests that the 
economic periods could be divided into several sub-periods such as upturn, stable, 
growth and downturn, in order to capture the differences in the economic conditions 
in the Malaysian economy. Therefore, the selected observation periods are divided 
into three sub-periods based on the GDP trends in Malaysia; 1996-1998, 1999-2002 
and 2003-2007. Subsequently, these trends were compared to other trends of 
macroeconomic variables (e.g., inflation, interest rates etc.). Based on these sub-
samples, a similar methodology, that is, pooled OLS and fixed effect models, was 
repeated for each economic sub-period to capture the sector effect in different 
economic conditions in the Malaysian economy. This section focuses on the firm-
level and sector-level determinants. 
First, the models were tested employing both the overall balanced and 
unbalanced samples. The next section looked into the effect of different economic 
periods on the determinants of capital structure in each sector with similar analyses. 
The third hypothesis, or the second sensitivity analysis, emphasizes the impact of 
different firm sizes on capital structure decisions, as the past literature highlights the 
divergence of behaviour across different firm sizes employed in Chapter 7. As a 
result, financial structure differences exist across large and small firms (Gupta, 1969; 
Bates, 1971; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Chittenden et al., 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999; Voulgaris et al., 2004; Bas et al., 2009). Several methods have 
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been applied in past studies. The classifications of firms are mainly based on total 
sales, total assets and number of employees. In regard to the Malaysian sample, the 
firms are divided into three categories, main board (large firms), second board 
(medium-sized firms) and MESDAQ (small-sized firms), based on Bursa Malaysia’s 
listing requirements, in order to capture the firm size effect on capital structure 
determinants. 
Parallel to the previous hypothesis, the models were tested using pooled OLS 
and fixed effect analysis based on the overall balanced and unbalanced samples. 
Subsequently, the following analysis focuses on the variations within and between 
sectors across different types of firm size, either large, medium or small. Three 
sectors, namely, property, plantations and technology, were dropped from this 
analysis due to limited observations, which is not comparable with other sectors. 
Hence, this section focuses primarily on four selected sectors (e.g. consumer product, 
industrial product, construction, and trade and services). In addition, this analysis 
concentrates solely on the firm-level determinants as the past literature emphasizes 
the substance of firm-level characteristics as the most powerful determinants that 
influence the capital structure decision-making. Importantly, this analysis captures 
the indirect behaviour of sectors on the relationship between firm size and leverage. 
4.4.3 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
In general, the static model has a few shortcomings compared to the dynamic 
model. The observed debt ratio may not be optimal as assumed in the trade-off static 
model due to the high cost of adjusting the capital structure (Myers, 1977). 
Moreover, the static model fails to explain the dynamic shocks - internal and external 
- that affect a firm’s capital structure decision-making. Nevertheless, the dynamic 
model portrays the long-run relationship between leverage and capital structure 
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determinants compared to a static model that discloses the short-run relationship. 
From the econometrics point of view, the pooled OLS and fixed effect suffer, 
potentially, from severe biases and this occurs specifically while dealing with speed 
of adjustment. The OLS specification assumes that all the explanatory variables are 
strictly exogenous. In accordance with Hsiao (1985), OLS estimation would be 
biased as    is unobservable and tends to be correlated with other independent 
variables in the model. The correlation between independent variable and error 
termwould produce inconsistent estimates of coefficients.The inefficiency of OLS 
remains although the variables are converted into first difference form in order to 
eliminate the time-invariant fixed effect. The correlation between difference in error 
terms and difference in lagged dependent variables causes the correlation between 
difference in error terms and difference in lagged explanatory variables (Antoniou et 
al., 2008). According to Hsiao (2003), pooled OLS is biased downward due to 
ignoring the presence of fixed effects, while the firm-fixed model effect produces 
upward biases. Conversely, fixed effect would not be able to address the endogeneity 
problem that is attributable to the correlation between the contemporaneous error 
term and past values of lagged dependent variables. 
GMM estimates could alleviate the deformation caused by fixed effects, 
simultaneity and endogeneity (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
The application of GMM to the panel data provides an efficient estimator of the 
econometrics that considers both dimensions, that is, cross-sectional and time-series 
estimates (Hsiao, 1985). Furthermore, the utilization of a dynamic panel data model 
and GMM could not only solve the endogeneity problem by permitting the inclusion 
of unobservable shocks in the cross-sectional component and time dummies in the 
model, but also provide more efficient instruments that control for endogeneity. The 
efficiency of this estimator is dependent on the validity of the lagged values of the 
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dependent variable and other independent variables in the model (Ozkan, 2001). As 
suggested by Lemmon etal. (2008), GMM also provides an estimate that the speed of 
adjustment lies somewhere between the pooled OLS and firm-fixed effects. 
Therefore, GMM estimation is more efficient compared to OLS and fixed effect 
models. 
Initially, in order to overcome the endogeneity problem, Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) proposed an instrumental variables (IV) technique known as AH estimator, 
where         or        can be utilized as an instrument for        . This is valid as 
        or        is correlated to         but not with     . As a result, the IV 
estimation results will be consistent as the     is not serially correlated. Nonetheless, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) argued on the inefficiencies of the IV technique of 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982), known as the AH method, as the technique does not use 
the entire moment conditions. As an alternative solution, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
suggest GMM which uses additional instruments obtained by utilizing the 
orthogonality conditions that exist between the disturbances and the lagged values of 
the dependent variable (Baltagi, 2005). In accordance with findings of Ferson and 
Foerster (1994), GMM estimators are able to minimize the variances compared to IV 
estimators of the AH method. Moreover, they found the standard errors can be 
reduced as the sample size gets larger. In order to deal with the endogeneity of 
explanatory variables, the endogenous variables in first differences are instruments 
with appropriate lags of specified variables in levels, while strictly exogenous 
regressors are first differenced for use as instruments in the first-differenced 
equations. This two-step GMM method can control for the correlation of errors over 
time, heteroskedasticity across firms, simultaneity, and measurement errors due to 
the utilization of orthogonality conditions on the variance-covariance matrix. 
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Arellano and Bond (1991) initiated the Difference-GMM estimators by 
transforming the regressors, using the differencing estimation with Generalized 
Method of Moments. The Difference-GMM specification is superior compared to 
other methodologies (Antoniou et al., 2008). However, the Difference-GMM 
estimator could be inefficient and produce imprecise estimates as the potential 
informative moment conditions are ignored in the first-difference approach. Later on, 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argued that the first 
differences of instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. The 
efficiency level could be increased as it allows more instruments in the estimations. 
As a result, Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the System-GMM estimator, an 
extension of Arellano and Bover (1995), in which the first-differenced estimator is 
combined with the estimator in levels to form a more efficient method. They further 
argued that one could reduce the finite sample bias substantially by exploiting the 
additional moment conditions, as the lagged first-differenced and lagged levels 
instruments are included in the instrument set. This estimator has greater efficiency 
gains over the Difference-GMM (Baltagi, 2005).  
The System-GMM estimator tends to improve the precision and decreases the 
finite sample bias. Similar to other methods, the System-GMM estimator has its own 
limitations. First, the two-step System-GMM outperformed the one-step System-
GMM estimators, due to the level of efficiency. The System-GMM estimator 
employs a greater number of instruments relative to the sample size (Antonoiu et al., 
2008). Thus, this study adopts both estimators, that is, Difference-GMM and System-
GMM, in testing the dynamic panel model as the relevance and applicability of 
estimators are dependent on the nature of data and model specifications. 
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4.4.4 Partial Adjustment and Speed of Adjustments 
Based on the perfect market hypothesis with zero adjustment cost, the firm 
would immediately respond with complete adjustment by equalizing the existing 
leverage ratio with its optimal leverage. In other words, the observed leverage ( ) of 
firm i at time t should be indifferent to the optimal leverage (    
 ), that is,     =    
 . 
Nevertheless, in the real world, the firm will not completely adjust its actual leverage 
due to the existence of significant adjustment costs. In accordance with the series of 
past literature, the observed leverage ratio would not be equal to the optimal debt 
ratio at any point in time. In the presence of adjustment costs, firms do not 
completely adjust their actual debt to optimal leverage, therefore, only partial 
adjustment takes place in order to attain the optimal leverage. If the coefficient of the 
lag dependent variable is between zero and one, the leverage ratio converges to its 
desired level over time. This is an indication that firms tend to adjust their leverage 
ratio to attain their target debt ratio, and substantiates the existence of dynamism in 
the capital structure decision (Antoniou et al., 2008). 
Generally, the adjustment of a firm’s capital structure is strongly dependent 
on time and speed of adjustment. A slower speed of adjustment occurs if the 
adjustment cost is higher, while lower cost of adjustment allows a faster pace of 
adjustment towards the target debt ratio (Guney et al., 2011). Hereby, the trade-off 
between the cost of adjustment and cost off being target exists. According to Ozkan 
(2001), the target debt ratio is a function of several variables and the estimated model 
(4.13) is as follows: 
     
   ∑       
 
                             (4.13) 
where     
 is the firm target debt ratio for firm i in year t and is explained by the k 
number of explanatory variables,   ,   , ….,  , and     is known as the error term 
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that is serially uncorrelated with mean zero. Firms adjust their current debt ratios     
with degree of adjustment coefficient “λ” to achieve the desired capital structure, and 
the following equation (4.14) explains the partial adjustment model: 
                
                                        (4.14) 
where 0< <1,     is the current debt ratio and    
  is the target debt ratio of firm i at 
time t.     
         is the target change while only a portion of λ of the target 
change is achieved, which is equal to (         ). The coefficient ( ) represents the 
magnitude of desired adjustment between two subsequent periods, or the rate of 
convergence. The combination of model 4.13 and 4.14 produces the following 
equation (4.13): 
                                      = (1  )        ∑                                                        (4.15) 
Based on this equation, if    = 1, the actual change in leverage is equal to the 
desired change and the adjustment is transaction cost free. The entire adjustment is 
made within one period and the firm is consistently at its optimal level. If   = 0, there 
is no adjustment in leverage and, therefore, firms set their current debt ratio to the 
past leverage. In most cases, the value of    or the rate of convergence varies 
between zero and one, due to the adjustment process. If the value of    is greater than 
one, it implies that the firm makes more adjustments than necessary and is eventually 
unable to achieve the optimal level. Mat Nor et al. (2011) argued that leverage values 
are referred to as suboptimal as they don’t reach their optimal level. Leverage half-
life is defined as the time (in years) that it takes a firm to adjust back to the target 
leverage after a one-unit shock to  , ln(0.5)/ ln(1 − λ). 
In the framework of the partial adjustment process, leverage also responds to 
the changes in the observed long-run fundamentals rather than solely responding 
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tothe difference between the actual and optimal levels (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, these models ignore the contemporaneous changes in the explanatory 
variables which may cause bias in the estimation of the speed of adjustment 
coefficient. Therefore, the optimal leverage ratio of a firm is dependent on the sets of 
explanatory variables: (i) observed firm-specific determinants, and (ii) unobserved 
firm-specific and time-specific effect, which is common across firms and changes 
over time (Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; De Miguel and Pindado, 2001; Hovakimian et 
al., 2001; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al., 2008; Chakraborty, 2010; 
Guney etal., 2011). Elsas and Florysiak (2011) argued that the estimation of the 
dynamic partial adjustment model seems to be a challenging task due to the nature of 
the financial dataset which is in the form of unbalanced panels. In most cases, an 
unbalanced panel is used as it has been well proven in past studies. In contrast, the 
balanced datasets are rarely used due to its own limitations (e.g., lack of complete 
data, smaller number of observations etc.). However, this study adopts both balanced 
and unbalanced panel datasets and all the selected models are tested on two different 
dimensions: (i) based on the overall sample of Malaysian listed firms, and (ii) based 
on selected sectors to capture the speed of adjustment across seven sectors. 
Based on the previous studies, four models were adopted in this study. 
According to Ozkan (2001), capital structure decision-making is also affected by the 
past history of the capital structure determinants. These results are reported in 
Chapter 8. In order to capture the past history of the independent variables, the first 
dynamic model with the following equation (4.16) includes the current and lag of 
explanatory variables, with the inclusion of unobservable firm-fixed effect and time-
fixed effect. 
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(4.16) 
where      is the difference in the debt ratio for firm i in year t, and firm-level 
determinants aretangibility (TANGIB), profitability (EBITTA), growth opportunities 
(GRWTH), non-debt tax shield (NTDS), liquidity (LIQ), size (LNSALES) and risk 
(RISK). To capture the impact of past regressors on leverage, the lagged independent 
variables were included. This analysis assesses the factors that are associated with a 
firm’s leverage. The    denotes the time-invariant unobservable firm-specific fixed 
effect as they vary across firms but are assumed to be constant for each firm. 
At the firm level, the time-invariant unobservable firm-specific fixed effects 
areability and motivation, or attitudes toward risk. Additionally, at the industry or 
sector level, the unobserved time-invariant industry or sector-specific effect captures 
a few factors that are related to sector, such as, entry barriers, market conditions and 
others. Alternatively,    represents the firm-invariant time-specific effects which are 
similar across firms at a given point in time but vary across time. The disturbance 
term is denoted as     and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero. As 
for the unbalanced dataset, the growth variable is replaced by market-to-book ratio 
(MTBR) as a proxy for growth opportunities. The second model retains all the 
components, but the lag of explanatory variables was excluded from the following 
equation (4.17): 
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(4.17) 
The following dynamic model (4.18) maintains similar components to Model 11, but 
excludes the time-fixed effect. 
                                                              
                                                
                                                    
                                  
(4.18) 
Finally, the fourth dynamic model in the following equation (4.19) excludes both of 
the lag independent variables and time effect: 
                                                              
                                        
(4.19) 
Nguyen and Shekhar (2007) obtained different targets across sub-samples as a result 
of partitioning the firms based on some of the firms’ characteristics. Moreover, they 
were able to reduce the number of instruments in the model as they partitioned the 
sample into different sub-groups. Consistent with this argument, this study applied 
the four selected models across the sectors, namely, consumer product, industrial 
product, construction, property, plantation, technology and trade and services, in 
order to capture the speed of adjustment that may be highly influenced by the nature 
of the sectoral characteristics. 
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4.4.5 Diagnostic Test of GMM 
A good model should fulfil the validity of the instrumental variables as 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). First, test the non-existence of the serial 
correlation of the error terms using the first and second order serial correlation test. 
In general, first order serial correlation in the differenced residuals should provide a 
significant negative value and no evidence of second order autocorrelation. The 
appropriate AR1 and AR2 tests are then based on the average residual autovariances, 
which are asymptotically distributed N (0, 1). Secondly, a test for exogeneity of 
instruments ensures the consistency of estimates using the Hansen and Sargan tests
9
. 
This overidentifying restrictions test follows a Chi-squared distribution with degrees 
of freedom equal to the difference between the number of moment conditions and 
number of parameters. The J-statistic introduced by Hansen (1982) is commonly 
used in the estimations of GMM to test specificity of the model and the validity of 
the instruments. The null hypothesis implies that the instruments satisfy the 
orthogonality conditions as they are truly exogenous. 
Based on the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity, the Sargan test is a 
special form of the Hansen test (Baum et al., 2003). Sargan (1976) examined the 
covariance between IV residuals and the set of instruments used and derived a Chi-
square test criterion by obtaining the asymptotic null distribution of the scaled 
covariance vector. In simple terms, it tests for the absence of correlation between 
instruments and error term. As the Sargan test discloses that the instruments used in 
the GMM estimation may not be valid, the model is known as a weak model. In sum, 
the Hansen and Sargan tests both test the joint hypothesis between model and 
moment conditions, and the rejection of the null implies that the model is mis-
specified or invalid (Nguyen and Shekhar, 2007), as the shocks that affect leverage 
                                                          
9
Defined in Appendix. 
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may also influence other firm-specific factors. Hence, the explanatory variables may 
not be strictly exogenous or weakly exogenous, while the dependent variable is 
treated as endogenous (Deesomsak et al., 2009). In this study, both the Sargan test 
and Hansen test are reported as over-identifying restrictions tests. Additionally, a 
Wald test is used to test the joint significance of the variables and the estimated 
coefficients which are asymptotically distributed as Chi-squares under the null 
hypothesis of no relationship. In this study, the Wald test proves the impact of time 
on leverage. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The appropriateness of a research method’s determination is a crucial task in 
the arena of research. A systematic procedure is essential to carry out valid research. 
This is very dependent on the data sources, determination and formulation of the 
dependent and explanatory variables, and, finally, on the modelling specifications 
and estimations. This study focuses solely on Malaysian listed firms across seven 
selected sectors. By using both balanced and unbalanced datasets, the indirect effect 
of sectoral characteristics on the relationship between capital structure determinants 
and leverage is captured using the most advanced econometric tools and techniques. 
In general, this study utilizes panel data analysis (both static and dynamic models) in 
testing the hypotheses, as all the models are designed and based on both theoretical 
and empirical considerations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPACT OF SECTORAL BEHAVIOUR ON 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE DETERMINANTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Recent empirical evidence highlights the role of sector or industry in 
explaining the pattern of a firm’s financing, particularly in the developing countries. 
According to L’Here et al. (2002) and Wang et al. (2003), this evolution started in 
the late 1990s, especially after the financial crisis in 1997-1998, when sector effects 
started to gain explanatory power across Asian markets. Several studies (Ferri and 
Jones, 1979; Aggarwal, 1981; Aggarwal, 1990; Annuar and Shamsher, 1993; 
Mohamad, 1995; Correa et al., 2007) have revealed that industry classification plays 
a significant role in determining a firm's capital structure. However, these studies fail 
to consider the differential effect of each sector on the capital structure decision-
making. In general, there are variations of behaviour across sectors that may 
indirectly influence the relationship between capital structure determinants and 
leverage. 
In conjunction with that, Kayo and Kimura (2011) found that the mechanism 
between leverage and firm-level determinants is indirectly influenced by the 
industry-level and country-level based on the developed and emerging markets. 
Nevertheless, this study does not take into account institutional settings within 
developing countries, in particular, the emerging markets that grow rapidly. There 
are enormous institutional differences and the impact of sectoral behaviour on capital 
structure determinants, that is, firm-level, sector-level and country-level, may differ 
across markets. Despite that, the unique behaviour of each sector varies within and 
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between countries. This is subject to further investigations in relation to the impact of 
sector characteristics on capital structure determinants. Hence, this chapter discusses 
the impact of sectoral behaviour on the relationship between leverage and capital 
structure determinants, focusing on firm-level, sector-level and country-level 
determinants across sectors in Malaysia. The first section begins by laying out a 
detailed descriptive statistics summary, trend analysis of leverage and correlation 
matrix analyses across both datasets. Subsequently, the following section focuses on 
the pooled OLS and fixed effect analysis on the three different types of determinants 
- firm-level, sector-level and country-level - across balanced and unbalanced 
datasets. The third section combines the entire sets of variables into a single model 
and assesses the relationship with all types of leverage. The final section deals with 
the model selection analysis using the Artificial Nested Testing Procedure. This 
procedure selects the preferred model based on the F-test. 
5.2 Descriptive Summary and Correlation Matrix 
Analysis 
Based on the balanced overall sample, as shown in Table 5.1, 50% of 
investment capital is financed by total debt. This proportion is primarily generated 
from short-term debt (within the range of 60-70%) rather than long-term debt. This is 
possible in Malaysia as the commercial banks supply more short-term debt, in the 
form of short-term loans, rather than long-term debt for longer term investments. The 
deficiency of long-term debt is probably due to the domestic bond market which is 
currently undergoing a major process of development. The standard deviation 
indicates that the total debt ratio has the highest volatility, followed by the short-term 
debt ratio. Nevertheless, the long-term debt ratio has the lowest dispersion level. This 
strengthens the argument of variation in the leverage utilization, particularly in the 
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usage of short-term debt across firms in Malaysia. This could be attributable to 
several factors such as firm size, the level of accessibility in the capital market, the 
nature of the firm in a particular sector, and other factors that are directly or 
indirectly related to a specific firm. Most firms generate their external finances 
mainly from short-term debt, followed by equity and, finally, from long-term debt as 
a last resort for financing. This pattern of financing creates a pecking order across 
Malaysian listed firms. In relation to that, Chen (2004) found a different pecking 
order across developing countries when raising finance. Managers perceived internal 
funds to be the fastest and easiest source of financing, followed by the issuance of 
new equity and bank borrowings, and the issuance of new debt becomes the last 
resort for financing. 
As the firms were classified by sectors, a high volatility in the total debt ratio 
could be observed, specifically amongst industrial product and plantation firms. 
However, the level of dispersion in short-term debt ratios is greater compared to 
long-term debt, probably due to different levels of short-term consumption across 
firm size. Entire sectors follow a similar financing proportion, except in the 
plantation sector that employs a larger amount of equity financing rather than debt 
financing. A similar situation is noticeable across property and consumer product 
sectors, wherein both sectors are proportionately more financed by equity. Most of 
the sectors employed a relatively higher amount of short-term debt except for the 
property and plantation firms. The property and trade and services sectors utilize the 
largest amount of long-term debt compared to other sectors, although the proportion 
is lower than for short-term debt. Based on the profitability ratio, each sector consists 
of a mixture of performing and underperforming firms. The average values of 
profitability are similar across sectors studied, except property. The level of 
dispersion in profitability is high within the industrial product sector. In addition, 
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other independent variables also highlight the variations across sectors. For instance, 
the plantation sector has the strongest average tangibility and liquidity position 
across sectors in Malaysia. However, the property firms are exposed with higher 
growth opportunities, whilst the trade and services firms experience higher risk due 
to volatile earnings. The levels of earnings are highly dispersed across industrial 
product firms. In Figure 5.1, the leverage trends clearly explain the financing 
behaviour of each sector which varies across periods, except for the consumer 
product sector. Most of the sectors have started to concentrate slowly on long-term 
debt financing but this proportion of debt financing remains smaller compared to the 
short-term debt. Remarkably, this transformation has occurred since the Asian 
financial crisis, and is probably due to the development of the Malaysian bond 
market as a result of the implementation of the Malaysian Capital Market Plan in 
early 2001. The Malaysian corporate debt market has developed substantially; the 
corporate bond market represents 37% of the country’s GDP and accounted for 8% 
of the total Asian bond market in 2004 (Ibrahim, 2006). 
Table 5.2 (Panel A) provides a correlation matrix based on 300 Malaysian 
listed firms from the balanced data set. Tangibility is positively correlated and 
significantly related to non-tax debt shield, and negatively related to profitability, 
liquidity and risk. Profitability is related positively and strongly significantly related 
to risk and firm size. Liquidity is significant at the 1% level, and negatively 
correlated to non-tax debt shield and firm size. Profitability is highly correlated to 
risk and this is primarily caused by the trade and services sector. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Firm-level Determinants based on Balanced 
          Sample 
 
This table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observations for leverage and firm-level 
determinants based on the balanced overall sample and sectors. The sample consists of 3600 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2007. 
The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total 
debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt 
shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables 
definitions.  
SAMPLE STATS BSDA BLDA BTDA EBITTA TANGIB LIQ NTDS SIZE GRWTH RISK 
            
Overall 
Sample 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
SD 
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
0.35 
0.44 
0.004 
10.69 
3600 
0.15 
0.15 
0 
1.50 
3600 
0.50 
0.45 
0.004 
10.69 
3600 
0.05 
0.51 
-2.46 
29.00 
3600 
0.54 
0.21 
0.01 
2.50 
3600 
2.62 
7.31 
0.02 
254.6 
3600 
0.03 
0.02 
0 
0.31 
3600 
12.2 
1.49 
5.45 
16.8 
3600 
0.20 
2.16 
-6.29 
93.61 
3600 
0.28 
14.01 
0 
840.4 
3600 
            
Consumer 
Product  
Mean 
SD 
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.37 
0.23 
0.03 
1.70 
480 
0.11 
0.11 
0 
0.51 
480 
0.48 
0.25 
0.05 
1.90 
480 
0.08 
0.13 
-0.51 
0.79 
480 
0.50 
0.17 
0.13 
0.93 
480 
1.90 
1.78 
0.14 
16.01 
480 
0.03 
0.02 
0.002 
0.08 
480 
12.63 
1.51 
9.57 
16.26 
480 
0.07 
0.27 
-0.85 
2.34 
480 
0.02 
0.05 
0 
0.42 
480 
            
Industrial  
Product 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
SD  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
0.39 
0.66 
0.004 
10.69 
1176 
0.13 
0.14 
0 
1.50 
1176 
0.52 
0.66 
0.004 
10.69 
1176 
0.03 
0.19 
-2.46 
1.41 
1176 
0.53 
0.20 
0.01 
2.50 
1176 
2.62 
7.97 
0.02 
254.76 
1176 
0.03 
0.02 
0 
0.31 
1176 
11.93 
1.50 
5.45 
16.25 
1176 
0.23 
2.96 
-6.29 
93.61 
1176 
1.00 
0.64 
0.00 
6.10 
1176 
            
Construction  Mean 
SD  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.39 
0.20 
0.1 
0.92 
252 
0.14 
0.13 
0.001 
0.71 
252 
0.53 
0.19 
0.14 
1.00 
252 
0.05 
0.06 
-0.33 
0.27 
252 
0.40 
0.16 
0.07 
0.81 
252 
1.88 
0.96 
0.63 
6.17 
252 
0.02 
0.01 
0.001 
0.07 
252 
12.52 
1.13 
10.04 
15.63 
252 
0.09 
0.38 
-0.69 
2.57 
252 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.13 
252 
            
Property  Mean 
SD  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.28 
0.23 
0.005 
2.82 
540 
0.18 
0.14 
0 
0.75 
540 
0.46 
0.27 
0.01 
3.09 
540 
0.02 
0.12 
-1.38 
0.44 
540 
0.58 
0.20 
0.03 
0.96 
540 
3.30 
11.17 
0.02 
169.07 
540 
0.01 
0.01 
0.0002 
0.13 
540 
 
11.79 
1.09 
6.44 
14.33 
540 
0.40 
3.24 
-0.92 
63.76 
540 
0.02 
0.12 
0.00 
2.22 
540 
            
Plantation  Mean 
SD  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.19 
0.49 
0.01 
5.25 
216 
0.16 
0.14 
0 
0.70 
216 
0.35 
0.50 
0.02 
5.25 
216 
0.06 
0.15 
-1.30 
0.76 
216 
0.76 
0.12 
0.40 
0.99 
216 
4.87 
8.07 
0.09 
61.36 
216 
0.02 
0.01 
0.002 
0.11 
216 
 
12.14 
1.60 
8.74 
16.05 
216 
0.24 
0.95 
-0.87 
12.22 
216 
0.02 
0.14 
0.00 
1.69 
216 
 
            
Technology Mean 
SD  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.44 
0.40 
0.07 
2.19 
108 
0.11 
0.12 
0 
0.72 
108 
0.55 
0.40 
0.09 
2.29 
108 
0.05 
0.13 
-0.57 
0.25 
108 
0.45 
0.16 
0.10 
0.93 
108 
1.83 
1.09 
0.19 
7.18 
108 
0.05 
0.04 
0.01 
0.22 
108 
11.80 
0.74 
10.16 
13.12 
108 
 
0.16 
0.41 
-0.72 
1.44 
108 
0.02 
0.04 
0.00 
0.32 
108 
            
Trade & 
Services 
Mean 
SD  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.35 
0.25 
0.01 
2.06 
828 
0.18 
0.18 
0 
1.13 
828 
0.53 
0.27 
0.01 
2.08 
828 
0.09 
1.02 
-2.18 
29.00 
828 
0.55 
0.23 
0.02 
0.96 
828 
2.35 
6.31 
0.06 
111.22 
828 
0.03 
0.02 
0.0002 
0.14 
828 
12.67 
1.61 
6.44 
16.98 
828 
0.15 
0.79 
-3.33 
17.04 
828 
1.05 
29.22 
0.00 
840.74 
828 
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Figure 5.1: Trend of the leverage based on the balanced dataset 
Overall Sample
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Property Sector 
 
Plantation Sector 
 
Techonology Sector 
 
Trade and Services 
 
The figures illustrate the trend of the leverage based on the balanced overall sample and sectors. The sample 
consists of 3600 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2007. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios 
(average short-term debt to total asset (MBSDA), average long-term debt to total asset (MBLDA) and average 
total debt to total asset (MBTDA)). 
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This sector affects the overall sample correlation result due to high correlation 
between risk and profitability, and the larger number of observations compared to the 
industrial product firms in the balanced dataset. Therefore, Panel B presents the 
correlation matrix of the overall sample after excluding the trade and services sector. 
In this exercise, risk and tangibility are no longer significant. Conversely, 
profitability became highly significantly related to liquidity, non-tax debt shield and 
growth. Risk also became significantly related to non-tax debt shield. Based on Table 
5.2, the correlation between these variables varies across sectors due to each sector’s 
characteristics. For instance, tangibility is positive and significantly related to firm 
size across the construction and trade and services sectors, whereas it is negatively 
related among the property and consumer product sectors. Profitability and non-tax 
debt shield is negatively correlated across sectors, except in technology firms. Risk 
and profitability is positively associated across the consumer product, industrial 
product and trade and services sectors, whilst the construction, property, plantation 
and technology sectors produce a negative correlation. Non-debt tax shield 
corresponds negatively to firm size and is significant, specifically among the 
industrial product, construction and property firms. This is not the case within the 
trade and services sector that has reacted in a positive direction. Finally, the 
association between risk and firm size varies across sectors. These results provide 
some indications of the variation of firm-level determinants across sectors. 
Table 5.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the unbalanced overall sample 
across Malaysian listed firms. As can be seen from the table, 46% of investment is 
financed by total debt, which is similar to the balanced panel data. This proportion is 
mainly generated from short-term debt (within the range of 60-70%) rather than 
long-term debt. The standard deviation indicates that the total debt ratio is extremely 
volatiledue to high volatility in short-term debt. The independent variables are 
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similar to the previous dataset, except for the growth opportunities that use a 
different proxy such as, i.e. market-to-book ratio. Most of the variables produce 
similar results except for market-to-book ratio and risk. 
 
Table 5.2: Correlation Matrix of Firm-level Determinants based on Balanced 
             Sample 
 
 
TANGIB EBITTA LIQ NTDS GRWTH RISK LNSALES 
 Panel A: Based on Overall Sample  
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.07* 1 
     LIQ -0.17* 0.02 1 
   NTDS 0.10* -0.003 -0.06* 1 
   GRWTH 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.04** 1 
  RISK -0.04** 0.95* 0.002 0.04** -0.01 1 
 LNSALES 0.02 0.04* -0.13* -0.01 0.001 -0.03 1 
 
Panel B: Based on Overall Sample without Trade and Services Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.13* 1 
     LIQ -0.15* 0.09* 1 
   NTDS 0.05* -0.18* -0.05** 1 
   GRWTH 0.01 0.05* -0.02 -0.04** 1 
  RISK -0.02 0.30* 0.01 0.10* -0.01 1 
 LNSALES -0.06 0.28* -0.12* -0.06* 0.001 -0.09* 1 
 
Panel C: Based on Consumer Product Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.18* 1 
     LIQ -0.35* 0.13* 1 
   NTDS 0.08 0.01 0.03 1 
   GRWTH -0.01 0.17* -0.05 -0.08 1 
  RISK -0.04 0.59* -0.07 0.02 -0.003 1 
 LNSALES -0.13* 0.39* -0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.15* 1 
 
Panel D: Based on Industrial Product Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.14* 1 
     LIQ -0.19* 0.12* 1 
   NTDS 0.28* -0.25* -0.02 1 
   GRWTH 0.001 0.07** -0.01 -0.04 1 
  RISK -0.03 0.34* 0.03 0.08* -0.01 1 
 LNSALES -0.02 0.21* -0.07** -0.08* 0.02 -0.10* 1 
 
Panel E: Based on Construction Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.05 1 
     LIQ -0.14** 0.27* 1 
   NTDS 0.11 -0.15** -0.04 1 
   GRWTH 0.01 0.13** -0.04 -0.05 1 
  RISK -0.08 -0.22* 0.002 0.18* 0.05 1 
 LNSALES 0.25* 0.09 -0.14** -0.23* 0.18* -0.09 1 
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Panel F: Based on Property Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.18* 1 
     LIQ -0.26* 0.06 1 
   NTDS 0.01 -0.42* -0.08 1 
   GRWTH 0.004 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 1 
  RISK -0.05 -0.74* -0.02 0.35* -0.01 1 
 LNSALES -0.10** 0.39* -0.18* -0.13* -0.05 -0.16* 1 
 
Panel G: Based on Plantation Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA 0.03 1 
     LIQ -0.39* 0.06 1 
   NTDS -0.06 -0.41* -0.30* 1 
   GRWTH 0.004 0.07 -0.08 -0.03 1 
  RISK 0.03 -0.64* -0.08 0.50* -0.05 1 
 LNSALES 0.05 0.26 -0.33* -0.08 0.04 -0.18* 1 
 
Panel H: Based on Technology Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.05 1 
     LIQ -0.13 0.27* 1 
   NTDS 0.35* -0.01 0.02 1 
   GRWTH 0.08 0.30** -0.08 -0.003 1 
  RISK -0.09 -0.60* -0.16 -0.03 0.12 1 
 LNSALES 0.14 0.22** -0.09 -0.05 0.10 -0.21** 1 
        Panel I: Based on Trade and Services Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.09** 1 
     LIQ -0.22* 0.01 1 
   NTDS 0.29* -0.10* -0.10* 1 
   GRWTH 0.06 0.03 -0.06 -0.05 1 
  RISK -0.07** 0.98* 0.01 0.09** -0.05 1 
 LNSALES 0.19* -0.05 -0.19* 0.17* 0.02 -0.07 1 
        Significance level at * 5% level and **1% level 
This table shows the correlation matrix between leverage and firm-level determinants based on the balanced overall 
sample and sectors. The sample consists of 3600 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2007. The independent variables 
are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), 
growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. 
 
From the sector point of view, the overall scenario remained consistent with 
the previous dataset, and highlights the importance of short-term debt financing 
among the Malaysian listed firms, predominantly within the construction sector. 
Construction and trade and services sectors are highly dependent on total debt in 
financing their investments compared to other sectors. The property sector employs 
the largest amounts of long-term debt compared to other sectors. The consistency 
between both datasets demonstrates the divergence of leverage utilization across 
sectors in Malaysia. Alternatively, technology firms use lower amounts of total debt, 
which is not the case in the previous datasetthat highlights larger proportions in total 
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debt ratio. This is probably due to a smaller number of observations that have been 
included in the balanced panel dataset. High volatility in total debt is noticeable 
among the trade and services firms due to high volatility in short-term debt. 
Comparable conditions are observed across plantation firms. Parallel to the previous 
dataset, profitability and non-tax debt shield tend to be similar across sectors. 
Likewise, the variations in tangibility across sectors remained consistent as the 
plantation sector accentuates the highest mean values and the lowest values are 
observed in the construction sector. Technology and plantation firms are highly 
liquid compared to other sectors in the sample. Even though the risk level remained 
consistent across sectors, risk is highly volatile across industrial product and trade 
and services firms. Market-to-book ratio is comparable across sectors, except for 
trade and services firms that revealed a huge level of dispersion. 
As shown in Figure 5.2, the trend analysis of the unbalanced dataset 
illustrates a clearer pattern about the financing behaviour of each sector in Malaysia. 
Similarly, long-term debt is escalating slowly compared to short-term debt. This is 
very obvious among the plantation firms; they have focused mainly on long-term 
debt since 2003. Technology firms started to shift slowly to equity financing rather 
than debt financing. The utilization of short-term debt becomes important in the late 
1990s, specifically during and after the financial crisis, and tends to diminish slowly 
in early 2001, probably due to the massive development of the bond market in 
Malaysia. 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of Firm-level Determinants Based on Unbalanced  
Sample 
 
This table shows the mean, standard deviation minimum, maximum and number of observations for leverage and firm-level 
determinants based on the unbalanced overall sample and sectors. The overall sample consists of 6503 firm-year observations from 
1996 to 2007. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset 
(BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), 
liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (MTBR) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 
and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.  
SAMPLE STATS BSDA BLDA BTDA EBITTA TANGIB LIQ NTDS SIZE MTBR RISK 
            
Overall 
Sample 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
SD 
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
0.32 
0.34 
0.003 
10.69 
6503 
 
0.14 
0.14 
0 
1.50 
6503 
0.46 
0.36 
0.004 
10.69 
6503 
0.05 
0.17 
-8.01 
2.16 
6503 
0.51 
0.20 
0 
0.99 
6503 
2.86 
6.48 
0.02 
2546 
6503 
 
0.03 
0.02 
0 
0.56 
6503 
 
11.1 
1.40 
4.09 
16.8 
6503 
 
1.73 
21.56 
-91.19 
1701.5 
6503 
0.07 
0.16 
0.001 
8.02 
6503 
            
Consumer 
Product  
Mean 
SD 
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.33 
0.20 
0.01 
1.70 
1053 
 
0.09 
0.09 
0 
0.50 
1053 
0.42 
0.22 
0.01 
1.90 
1053 
 
0.07 
0.12 
-1.15 
0.79 
1053 
0.48 
0.17 
0.01 
0.93 
1053 
2.45 
4.12 
0.14 
1051 
1053 
0.03 
0.02 
0.001 
0.12 
1053 
12.1 
1.29 
8.42 
16.6 
1053 
1.65 
3.67 
-42.57 
42.53 
1053 
0.07 
0.09 
0.001 
1.211 
1053 
            
Industrial  
Product 
 
 
Mean 
SD 
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
0.32 
0.31 
0.004 
7.39 
2119 
 
0.12 
0.12 
0 
1.50 
2119 
0.44 
0.33 
0.004 
7.41 
2119 
0.04 
0.23 
-8.01 
1.41 
2119 
0.51 
0.17 
0.01 
0.99 
2119 
2.67 
6.32 
0.02 
2546 
2119 
0.04 
0.02 
0 
0.42 
2119 
11.6 
1.25 
8.19 
16.5 
2119 
 
1.26 
3.13 
-91.9 
82.2 
2119 
0.07 
0.22 
0.003 
8.02 
2119 
            
Construction  Mean 
SD 
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.41 
0.19 
0.02 
1.16 
434 
0.14 
0.14 
0.001 
0.79 
434 
0.55 
0.20 
0.07 
1.45 
434 
0.04 
0.11 
-1.05 
0.57 
434 
0.36 
0.18 
0.02 
0.90 
434 
1.97 
2.23 
0.49 
41.8 
434 
0.02 
0.01 
0.002 
0.07 
434 
12.1 
1.14 
8.22 
15.3 
434 
 
1.72 
4.69 
-1.86 
87.88 
434 
0.06 
0.09 
0.001 
1.07 
434 
            
Property  Mean 
SD 
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.29 
0.24 
0.01 
2.82 
791 
 
0.18 
0.14 
0 
0.75 
791 
0.47 
0.26 
0.01 
3.09 
791 
0.02 
0.13 
-1.85 
0.46 
791 
0.57 
0.20 
0.03 
0.96 
791 
2.40 
3.92 
0.02 
92.2 
791 
0.01 
0.01 
0.004 
12.82 
791 
 
11.8 
1.12 
4.09 
14.2 
791 
1.09 
6.01 
-30.13 
160.05 
791 
0.06 
0.11 
0.002 
1.82 
791 
            
Plantation  Mean 
SD 
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
0.21 
0.43 
0.01 
5.25 
345 
 
0.15 
0.14 
0 
0.64 
345 
0.37 
0.45 
0.01 
5.25 
345 
0.06 
0.13 
-1.30 
0.34 
345 
0.72 
0.19 
0.003 
0.98 
345 
5.31 
9.38 
0.04 
65.8 
345 
 
0.02 
0.03 
0.001 
0.56 
345 
11.4 
1.60 
7.13 
16.5 
345 
1.50 
2.11 
-2.11 
19.82 
345 
0.06 
0.11 
0.001 
1.30 
345 
            
Technology Mean 
SD 
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.24 
0.20 
0.003 
1.74 
417 
 
0.08 
0.11 
0 
0.72 
417 
0.33 
0.24 
0.01 
1.75 
417 
0.05 
0.17 
-1.29 
0.74 
417 
0.41 
0.19 
0 
0.96 
417 
6.68 
15.6 
0.36 
1683 
417 
0.03 
0.0 
0 
0.22 
417 
10.0 
1.51 
6.71 
14.4 
417 
2.37 
4.28 
-2.4 
62.39 
417 
1.00 
0.13 
0.001 
1.34 
417 
            
Trade & 
Services 
Mean 
SD 
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
0.36 
0.52 
0.01 
10.69 
1344 
 
0.17 
0.17 
0 
1.15 
1344 
0.54 
0.51 
0.02 
10.69 
1344 
 
0.06 
0.14 
-1.46 
2.16 
1344 
0.54 
0.22 
0.0001 
0.94 
1344 
2.19 
3.15 
0.02 
71.7 
1344 
0.03 
0.02 
0 
0.36 
1344 
12.6 
1.60 
5.45 
16.8 
1344 
2.76 
46.55 
-76.7 
1701.5 
1344 
0.07 
0.12 
0.002 
2.07 
1344 
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Figure 5.2: Trend of the leverage ratio based on the unbalanced dataset 
Overall Sample 
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Plantation Sector 
 
Property Sector 
 
Trade & Services Sector 
 
Technology Sector 
 
The figures illustrate the trend of the leverage based on the unbalanced overall sample and sectors. The sample 
consists of 6503 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2007. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios 
(average short-term debt to total asset (MBSDA), average long-term debt to total asset (MBLDA) and average total 
debt to total asset (MBTDA)). 
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Based on the unbalanced dataset correlation matrix, as shown in Table 5.4, 
the association between independent variables became stronger and highly 
significant compared to the balanced dataset. The association between tangibility and 
size is significant at the 1% level. Equally, risk is negatively related to size at the 1% 
level. Liquidity becomes significantly related to risk. The relationship between 
profitability and size becomes stronger. A similar situation is perceptible between 
non-tax debt shields with risk. The association between profitability and risk changes 
from positive to negative and remained significant at the 1% level. The correlation 
between non-tax debt shield and market-to-book ratio is no longer significant. Due to 
the high correlation between profitability and risk within the industrial product 
sector, Panel B presents an overall sample correlation matrix without the industrial 
product firms. This exercise illustrates a great reduction in the relationship between 
profitability and risk, although the sign and significance level remained consistent 
and a similar situation is discernible among the other explanatory variables. The 
discrepancy between two correlation matrices confirms the dominating power of the 
industrial product sector on the overall results due to the large number of 
observations (, i.e. 256 firms out of 815 firms). Therefore, it is meaningful to analyse 
the overall sample’s results in both ways (with and without the industrial product 
sector). 
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      Table 5.4:  Correlation Matrix of Firm-level Determinants based on Unbalanced                   
Sample 
 
TANGIB EBITTA LIQ NTDS GRWTH RISK1 LNSALES 
 Panel A: Based on Overall Sample  
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.10* 1 
     LIQ -0.18* 0.07* 1 
   NTDS 0.12* -0.12* -0.06* 1 
   GRWTH -0.01 0.02 0.003 -0.0004 1 
  RISK -0.03** -0.67* 0.03* 0.14* 0.01 1 
 LNSALES 0.06* 0.21* -0.19* -0.02 0.04* -0.11* 1 
 
Panel B: Based on Overall Sample without Trade and Services Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.10* 1 
     LIQ -0.16* 0.07* 1 
   NTDS 0.09* -0.05* -0.09* 1 
   GRWTH -0.01 0.02 0.003 -0.01 1 
  RISK -0.06* -0.35* 0.04** 0.13* 0.01 1 
 LNSALES 0.08* 0.26* -0.23* -0.03** 0.04* -0.14* 1 
 
Panel C: Based on Consumer Product Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.11* 1 
     LIQ -0.24* 0.16* 1 
   NTDS 0.24* -0.01 -0.08** 1 
   GRWTH -0.07** 0.42* -0.03 -0.001 1 
  RISK -0.05 -0.005 0.09* 0.03 0.39* 1 
 LNSALES 0.09* 0.30* -0.08** -0.03 0.22* -0.04 1 
 
Panel D: Based on Industrial Product Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.11* 1 
     LIQ -0.22* 0.08* 1 
   NTDS 0.20* -0.20* -0.004 1 
   GRWTH -0.07* 0.02 0.002 -0.03 1 
  RISK -0.004 0.87* 0.03 0.17* 0.05** 1 
 LNSALES 0.01 0.17* -0.11* -0.11* 0.01 -0.10* 1 
 
Panel E: Based on Construction Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.05 1 
     
LIQ -0.18* 0.02 1 
   NTDS 0.05 -0.06 -0.04 1 
   GRWTH -0.0004 0.04 0.06 0.07 1 
  RISK -0.06 0.59* 0.05 0.21 0.02 1 
 LNSALES 0.20* 0.30* -0.24* -0.02 0.03 -0.17* 1 
 
Panel F: Based on Property Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.17* 1 
     LIQ -0.24* 0.09* 1 
   NTDS 0.12* -0.34* -0.12* 1 
   GRWTH -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.14* 1 
  RISK -0.0001 0.73* 0.07 0.32* 0.05 1 
 LNSALES 0.18* 0.35* -0.12* -0.03 -0.08** -0.18* 1 
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Panel G: Based on Plantation Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.13** 1 
     LIQ -0.33* 0.04 1 
   NTDS 0.05 -0.30* -0.18* 1 
   GRWTH -0.33* 0.07 0.04 -0.21* 1 
  RISK -0.19* 0.76* 0.06 0.31* 0.09 1 
 LNSALES 0.24* 0.30* -0.43* -0.01 0.07 -0.12** 1 
 
Panel H: Based on Technology Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.08* 1 
     LIQ -0.22* 0.10** 1 
   NTDS 0.41* -0.10** -0.17* 1 
   GRWTH -0.11* 0.06 0.003 -0.01 1 
  RISK -0.12* 0.57* 0.10** 0.06 0.09 1 
 LNSALES 0.27* 0.33* -0.26* 0.33 0.01 -0.30* 1 
        Panel I: Based on Trade and Services Sector 
TANGIB 1 
      EBITTA -0.13* 1 
     LIQ -0.26* 0.06** 1 
   NTDS 0.24* -0.04 -0.02 1 
   GRWTH -0.004 0.02 0.02 -0.01 1 
  RISK -0.04* 0.12* 0.002 0.10* 0.005 1 
 LNSALES 0.16* 0.20* -0.18* -0.02 0.06** -0.15* 1 
        Significance level at * 5% level and ** 1% level. 
This table shows the correlation matrix between leverage and firm-level determinants based on the unbalanced overall 
sample and sectors. The sample consists of 6503 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2007. The independent variables 
are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), 
growth opportunities (MTBR) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. 
 
Based on Table 5.4, the relationships between explanatory variables reveal 
the variations across sectors. For instance, market-to-book ratio and firm size are 
correlated negatively within property firms, while a positive correlation is observed 
across the consumer product and trade and services sectors. The level of association 
differs greatly between sectors, although the sign of the relationship remained 
consistent across sectors. The relationship between liquidity and firm size varies 
significantly between the plantation and consumer product sectors. Consumer 
product firms showed a strong relationship between profitability and market-to-book 
ratio compared to other sectors. An analogous scenario is visible between risk and 
market-to-book ratio within this sector. 
Despite the firm-level determinants, Table 5.5 reports the descriptive 
summary of the sector-level variables - munificence, dynamism and HH index. For 
the balanced dataset, the entire analysis excludes the first sub-period (from 1996 to 
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1999, which is known as the financial crisis period). These periods were used to 
forecast the first observation, that is, for the year of 2000. Therefore, the observations 
for sector-level variables start from 2000 until 2007. As for the dependent variables, 
firm leverage is transformed into sector leverage, that is, the median leverage for 
each sector. Similar to firm-level analysis, the median leverage is divided into three 
categories, that is,the median of short-term debt to asset, the median of long-term 
debt to asset and the median of total debt to asset. Based on the balanced overall 
sample, most of the investment is mainly financed by short-term debt compared to 
long-term debt. However, the dispersion level within short-term debt is higher 
compared to long-term debt. Most of the sectors rely on short-term debt, except in 
the property and plantation sectors. These sectors tend to use additional amounts of 
long-term debt, although the proportion of short-term debt is greater than long-term 
debt. In general, the plantation sector maintained the lowest level of debt financing 
compared to other sectors in the sample. 
As for the independent variables, on average, the level of munificence is low 
across sectors in Malaysia which indirectly explains the environment’s capacity to 
support the sustained growth. In other words, the level of abundance of resources is 
limited and, therefore, the level of competition is higher. This is probably due to 
sectors such as consumer product, construction, property and plantation, showing a 
higher level of dispersion in the munificence level that eventually affects the overall 
result. However, the level of abundance of resources seems to be greater across 
plantation firms. In contrast, the level of dynamism is stable across sectors, although 
there is a slight level of instability observed among the plantation firms. However, 
the level of environmental instability is difficult to measure, particularly in this 
sample due to the exclusion of the financial crisis periods. The level of industry 
concentration varies across sectors in Malaysia. The plantation sector is highly 
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concentrated and is followed by the construction and technology sectors. In contrast, 
the property and industrial product sectors have a lower level of concentration. 
However, the dispersion level of concentration is lower within each sector, which 
further confirms the similarity of behaviour across firms within a particular sector. 
The unbalanced sample includes the financial crisis periods and the greater 
number of observations across sectors that covers the period from 1996 until 2007. 
As compared to the balanced sample, Table 5.6 confirms the importance of short-
term debt, which was constantly maintained as the prime source of debt financing 
across sectors in Malaysia. The level of munificence increases across sectors, except 
in the trade and services sector that which has the lowest level of abundance of 
resources. Technology firms have the highest level of abundant resources, followed 
by the plantation, industrial product and construction sectors. The level of abundant 
resources increases probably due to the impact of the financial crisis that occurred in 
1997-1998 that slowed down the investments across sectors. Inconsistent to the 
balanced sample, the level of environmental instability is observable across sectors, 
particularly among the technology firms, though the rest of the sectors were exposed 
to a stable environment. In line with the balanced sample, the HH index provides 
similar results and the level of concentration is higher across technology and 
plantation sectors. 
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Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics of Sector-level Determinants based on Balanced  
 Sample 
 
This table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observations for leverage and sector-level 
determinants based on the balanced overall sample and sectors. The sample consists of 56 sector-year observations from 2000 
to 2007. The dependent variables are median book leverage ratios (median of short-term debt to total asset (MEDBSDA), 
median oflong-term debt to total asset (MEDBLDA) and median of total debt to total asset (MEDBTDA)). The independent 
variables are munificence (MUNIFICENCE), Dynamism (DYNAMISM) and Herfindahl- Hirshman Index (HH INDEX). Refer 
to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.  
SAMPLE STATISTICS MED 
BSDA 
MED 
BLDA 
MED 
BTDA 
MUNIFIC. DYNAMISM HH INDEX 
        
Overall 
Sample 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
0.63 
0.16 
0.29 
0.90 
56 
0.11 
0.05 
0.04 
0.22 
56 
0.42 
0.10 
0.18 
0.57 
56 
0.08 
0.06 
-0.07 
0.22 
56 
0.02 
0.01 
0.004 
0.08 
56 
0.11 
0.6 
0.04 
0.22 
56 
        
Consumer 
Product  
Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.82 
0.03 
0.79 
0.87 
8 
0.07 
0.01 
0.05 
0.09 
8 
0.46 
0.01 
0.43 
0.47 
8 
0.06 
0.04 
-0.01 
0.11 
8 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
8 
0.10 
0.01 
0.08 
0.12 
8 
        
Industrial  
Product 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
0.77 
0.03 
0.73 
0.81 
8 
0.09 
0.01 
0.07 
0.10 
8 
0.43 
0.03 
0.40 
0.48 
8 
0.09 
0.04 
0.04 
0.14 
8 
0.02 
0.001 
0.004 
0.02 
8 
0.06 
0.003 
0.05 
0.06 
8 
        
Construction  Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.80 
0.03 
0.75 
0.84 
8 
0.10 
0.03 
0.07 
0.16 
8 
 
0.49 
0.05 
0.43 
0.55 
8 
0.07 
0.09 
-0.07 
0.15 
8 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
8 
0.15 
0.02 
0.13 
0.19 
8 
        
Property  Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.41 
0.02 
0.39 
0.45 
8 
0.17 
0.03 
0.11 
0.22 
8 
0.41 
0.02 
0.39 
0.45 
8 
0.03 
0.06 
-0.07 
0.09 
8 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
8 
0.04 
0.01 
0.04 
0.06 
8 
        
Plantation  Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.39 
0.10 
0.29 
0.53 
8 
 
0.16 
0.05 
0.09 
0.21 
8 
0.22 
0.04 
0.18 
0.28 
8 
0.12 
0.09 
-0.01 
0.22 
8 
0.04 
0.02 
0.01 
0.08 
8 
0.20 
0.02 
0.18 
0.22 
8 
        
Technology Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.81 
0.09 
0.66 
0.90 
8 
0.08 
0.04 
0.04 
0.16 
8 
0.43 
0.11 
0.28 
0.57 
8 
0.09 
0.03 
0.03 
0.11 
8 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
8 
0.15 
0.01 
0.14 
0.17 
8 
        
Trade & 
Services 
Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.68 
0.04 
0.63 
0.76 
8 
0.13 
0.02 
0.10 
0.17 
8 
0.50 
0.02 
0.48 
0.53 
8 
0.07 
0.02 
0.04 
0.11 
8 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
8 
0.09 
0.003 
0.08 
0.09 
8 
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Table 5.6:  Descriptive Statistics of Sector-level Determinants based on Unbalanced 
Sample 
 
This table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observations for leverage and sector-level 
determinants based on the balanced overall sample and sectors. The sample consists of 56sector-year observations from 2000 to 
2007. The dependent variables are median book leverage ratios (median of short-term debt to total asset (MEDBSDA), median 
oflong-term debt to total asset (MEDBLDA) and median of total debt to total asset (MEDBTDA)). The independent variables 
are munificence (MUNIFICENCE), Dynamism (DYNAMISM) and Herfindahl- Hirshman Index (HH INDEX). Refer to Table 
4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. 
 
 
 
SAMPLE STATISTICS MED 
BSDA 
MED 
BLDA 
MED 
BTDA 
MUNIFIC. DYNAMISM HH INDEX 
        
Overall 
Sample 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
0.27 
0.09 
0.08 
0.45 
84 
0.10 
0.04 
0.02 
0.21 
84 
0.42 
0.11 
0.15 
0.64 
84 
0.13 
0.11 
-0.03 
0.52 
84 
0.04 
0.03 
0.003 
0.25 
84 
0.08 
0.07 
0.03 
0.54 
84 
        
Consumer 
Product  
Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.30 
0.04 
0.25 
0.39 
12 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.07 
12 
0.40 
0.04 
0.36 
0.47 
12 
0.11 
0.07 
0.01 
0.22 
12 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
0.05 
12 
0.07 
0.01 
0.05 
0.09 
12 
 
        
Industrial  
Product 
Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
0.28 
0.02 
0.26 
0.32 
12 
0.08 
0.01 
0.06 
0.10 
12 
0.41 
0.03 
0.37 
0.47 
12 
0.17 
0.08 
0.08 
0.33 
12 
0.03 
0.02 
0.003 
0.06 
12 
0.03 
0.004 
0.03 
0.04 
12 
        
Construction  Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.40 
0.04 
0.33 
0.45 
12 
0.10 
0.02 
0.06 
0.13 
12 
0.56 
0.05 
0.49 
0.64 
12 
0.15 
0.13 
-0.02 
0.39 
12 
0.04 
0.02 
0.01 
0.08 
12 
0.08 
0.01 
0.07 
0.09 
12 
        
Property  Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.23 
0.03 
0.20 
0.29 
12 
0.16 
0.02 
0.12 
0.19 
12 
 
0.45 
0.03 
0.41 
0.53 
12 
0.10 
0.12 
-0.02 
0.36 
12 
0.04 
0.02 
0.01 
0.08 
12 
0.03 
0.004 
0.03 
0.04 
12 
        
Plantation  Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.12 
0.04 
0.08 
0.20 
12 
0.12 
0.06 
0.05 
0.21 
12 
0.27 
0.07 
0.15 
0.38 
12 
0.17 
0.09 
0.01 
0.30 
12 
0.04 
0.02 
0.01 
0.07 
12 
0.13 
0.02 
0.10 
0.15 
12 
        
Technology Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.24 
0.07 
0.16 
0.36 
12 
0.05 
0.03 
0.02 
0.13 
12 
0.35 
0.11 
0.23 
0.53 
12 
0.23 
0.14 
0.07 
0.52 
12 
0.08 
0.06 
0.02 
0.25 
12 
0.17 
0.14 
0.05 
0.54 
12 
        
Trade & 
Services 
Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
 
0.29 
0.05 
0.23 
0.35 
12 
0.11 
0.01 
0.09 
0.13 
12 
0.51 
0.04 
0.47 
0.58 
12 
0.01 
0.01 
0.003 
0.05 
12 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.03 
12 
0.07 
0.01 
0.06 
0.08 
12 
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This study also considers the country-level determinants, as their 
importance is strongly emphasized in the past literature. Based on Table 5.7, the 
growth of GDP per capita fluctuated between negative and positive values. The 
negative growth occurs during the financial crisis periods with a slight drop at the 
end of 2001. Equally, the inflation rate increased tremendously during the financial 
crisis periods and then decreased slowly. However, the inflation rates tended to be 
unstable during the sample period. The greater level of dispersion is noticeable on 
the performance of the stock market, mainly due to the financial crisis effect that 
slowed down the stock market. KLSE also suffered severe declines as the 
composite index plunged from 1271.45 points on 25 February 1997 to 262.7 points 
on September 1998 (Shafie et al., 1999). A comparable effect could be observed as 
the average lending interest rates are high due to a drastic increase in the lending 
interest rate during the downturn periods. Generally, the entire country-level 
variables show a similar trend that explains the effect of the Asian financial crisis 
1997-1998 on the economic performance of Malaysia. 
 
Table 5.7:  Descriptive Statistics of Country-level Determinants based on 
Unbalanced Sample 
This table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observations for leverage and sector-level 
determinants based on the unbalanced overall sample and sectors. The sample consists of 12 country-year observations from 1996 
to 2007. The independent variables are growth of real GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), consumer price-annual % (INF_CP), rate 
charged by banks on loans to prime customers (LENDINT), liquid liabilities as % of GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and stocks traded, 
total value as % of GDP (STV_GDP). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. 
  
SAMPLE STATISTICS GRGDPCH INF_CP LIQLIAB_GDP STV_GDP LENDINT  
        
Overall 
Sample 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
Std. deviation  
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
3.56 
3.40 
-5.2 
7.66 
12 
2.75 
1.31 
0.99 
5.27 
12 
126 
4.23 
120 
135 
12 
65.83 
46.21 
22 
172 
12 
7.82 
1.98 
5.95 
12.13 
12 
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5.3 Firm-level Determinants Analysis 
5.3.1 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on Balanced 
Panel Data 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the following equation (5.1) assesses the 
association between the firm-level determinants and leverage using both the 
pooledOLS and fixed effect analysis based on the balanced panel. 
                                                      
                                                                                       (5.1) 
where     is the debt ratio for firm   in year  , with firm-level determinants such as 
tangibility (      ), profitability (      ), growth opportunities (     ), non-
debt tax shield (    ), liquidity (   ), firm size (       ) and risk (    ).  
The firm-fixed effects    control for cross-sectional differences in the firm 
characteristics. The disturbance term is denoted as     that and is assumed to be 
serially uncorrelated with mean zero. Based on the overall sample, as shown in Table 
5.8, most of the explanatory variables are significant across types of leverage. 
Profitability maintains a negative relationship and is significant at the 1% level 
withleverage. Contradictory to the tax shield hypothesis, the pecking order theory 
emphasizes that the profitable firms utilize their profits (internal funding) to finance 
their investments and use less debt or other external funds. This result is highly 
consistent with the findings of Harris and Raviv (1991), Mohamad 1995), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Booth et al.(2001), Deesomsak et al. (2004), Chen (2004), 
Mitton (2006), Correa et al.(2007), Shah and Khan (2007), Fraser et al. (2006), and 
de Jong et al. (2008). Apart of being highly significant, the size of coefficients 
confirms that profitability has the largest impact on both short-term debt and total 
debt. Nagano (2003) emphasized that firms across East Asian countries are highly 
CHAPTER 5 
 
144 
 
dependent on internal funds compared to the industrialized countries due to 
significant differences between the external and internal cost of financing. Liquidity 
also maintains a similar negative relationship and is significant with all types of debt 
except long-term debt, and that is highly consistent with the results of Deesomsak et 
al. (2004) and Ullah and Nishat (2008) that strongly support the pecking order 
theory. They argue that firms do not need to raise debt when they have a sufficient 
level of liquidity to finance their investment and, hence, have lower leverage. 
In relation to the trade-off theory, tangibility is related positively and 
significantly at the 1% level merely to long-term debt, and that is consistent with 
several previous studies (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1991; Fraser et al., 2006; Shah and 
Khan, 2007; de Jong et al., 2008; Antoniou et al., 2008; Mittoo and Zhang, 2008; 
Kayo and Kimura, 2011). Firms with larger tangible assets have greater leverage 
capacity and provide lenders with security in the event of financial distress. Based on 
the agency theory, high tangibility reduces the conflict between stockholders and 
creditors. Eventually, this protects the lenders from moral hazard problems caused by 
them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As with tangibility, size maintained a similar 
association with long-term debt. Larger firms have higher amounts of long-term debt 
compared to smaller ones (Booth et al., 2001). However, in line with the findings of 
Mittoo and Zhang (2008), the utilization of short-term debt decreases as the firms 
become larger. Inconsistent with both the trade-off theory and the pecking order 
theory, earnings volatility maintains a positive relationship with leverage, regardless 
of types of debt, and is significant at the 1% level; this finding corroborates the ideas 
of Suto (2003) and Correa et al. (2007). Deesomsak et al. (2004) further argued that 
firms may ignore earnings volatility if the borrowing level is well below their debt 
servicing capacity. This also occurs within concentrated and family-based firms. 
Non-tax debt shield is the only determinant that maintains a similar relationship with 
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short-term debt and total debt. This variable is significant at the 1% level and is 
positively related to short-term debt and total debt, which is the reversed of results 
reported in the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) hypothesis but consistent with Bradley 
et al. (1984) and Wald (1999). The amount of depreciation, being the primary 
component of the non-tax debt shields, provides a collateral value for the attainment 
of secured debt (Antoniou et al., 2008). The size of the variable reveals that the non-
tax debt shield is the most important variable that determines the amount of leverage 
across Malaysian listed firms. A greater impact could be observed on short-term debt 
and total debt. Finally, growth is the only determinant that is insignificantly related to 
leverage. Again, it may be relevant as the sample is divided into sectors. 
As the cross-section effect is fixed, Table 5.9 demonstrates that the 
explanatory variables uphold similar relationships with leverage, although some of 
the variables become insignificant. For example, risk is no longer significantly 
related to long-term debt, while liquidity has become insignificantly related to both 
short-term debt and total debt. Profitability reveals insignificant results compared to 
long-term debt, and the impact of non-tax debt shield on short-term debt and total 
debt becomes stronger. A few remarkable changes are discernible as the trade and 
services firms were excluded from the overall sample due to a high correlation 
between risk and profitability. Based on the pooled OLS analysis, risk becomes 
insignificantly related to short-term debt and total debt, while profitability is no 
longer significant with long-term debt. The fixed effect result highlights little 
additional information between firm-level determinants and leverage across listed 
firms in Malaysia. Growth becomes significantly related to short-term debt although 
the effect is minimal. Meanwhile, non-tax debt shield became insignificantly related 
to short-term debt and total debt, while profitability and risk became meaningful to 
long-term debt. Based on pooled OLS and fixed effect analysis, a number of 
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interesting issues are noticeable in this section. First, Malaysian listed firms’ leverage 
is highly dependent on non-tax debt shield, followed by profitability. Secondly, non-
tax debt shield maintained a similar relationship with short-term debt and total debt 
whereas, generally, non-tax debt shield sustains a comparable relationship with long-
term debt and total debt. Thirdly, risk is associated positively with leverage which 
contradicts the trade-off theory and pecking order theory. Nevertheless, some studies 
(particularly in Malaysia) supported this finding with rational arguments and 
explanations. Finally, capital structure theories remained consistent between pooled 
OLS and fixed effect analysis. 
Based on ten developing countries, Booth et al. (2001) argues that the 
coefficient size and sign is expected to differ across industries. Therefore, to further 
analyse the impact of sectoral behaviour on the relationship between firm-level 
determinants and leverage, the firms are classified into sectors. As shown in Table 
5.8, profitability plays an important role in determining short-term debt and total debt 
across sectors, specifically amongst the industrial product sector, followed by the 
plantation and technology sectors. Long-term debt also maintains a similar 
relationship and is significantly related to profitability across construction, property, 
and trade and services sectors. As a whole, the mechanism between profitability and 
leverage confirms the applicability of the pecking order theory across sectors in 
Malaysia. This finding is in agreement with Booth et al. (2001) who concluded that 
highly profitable firms in Malaysia use low amounts of debt compared with the least 
profitable ones. Besides that, profitable firms could retain their earnings and 
managers perceived retained earnings to be the fastest and most effortless source of 
financing (Delcoure, 2007). In the case of Malaysia, since banks provide greater 
amounts of short-term debt compared to long-term debt, firms tend to raise their 
finance from the equity market. This indirectly alters the financing chronology of the 
CHAPTER 5 
 
147 
 
pecking order theory. Instead of using retained earnings, followed by debt and finally 
equity, these firms adopted a modified pecking order. They utilize the retained 
earnings as the main source of financing, followed by equity, short-term debt and, 
finally, long-term debt would be the last resort. This is highly consistent with other 
developing countries (Chen, 2004). 
Despite the insignificant values in the overall sample analysis, tangibility 
seems to be one of the most important variables that influences short-term debt 
utilization across sectors, except the industrial product firms. The negative sign 
between these variables strongly supports the findings of Pandey and Chotigeat 
(2004) and Feidakis and Rovolis (2007). Alternatively, firms tend to increase long-
term debt as their tangibility capacity increases. This is applicable across sectors 
particularly among the trade and services sector. These empirical results confirm the 
existence of the trade-off theory across sectors in Malaysia. Remarkably, the 
associations between total debt and tangibility are inconsistent across sectors. 
Positive correlation is only noticeable across industrial product firms that support the 
trade-off theory strongly, whilst the consumer product, construction and technology 
sectors support the subsistence of the pecking order theory. These results are possible 
as Ovtchinnikov (2010) found that the association between these variables differs 
across industries. Sectoral variations do not only take place within a country but also 
occur across countries. For instance, great variations could be observed in the 
construction sector between European Union countries and Malaysia.Tangibility is 
associated positively to long-term debt and negatively to short-term debt (Feidakis 
and Rovolis, 2007). This is not the case in Malaysia as tangibility is related 
negatively to long-term debt and positively to short-term debt and total debt.
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Table 5.8: Pooled OLS Regression based on Firm-level Determinants and Leverage within Balanced Sample 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall balanced sample includes 300 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The dependent variables are 
book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), 
liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). The overall sample presents the entire 300 non-financial listed firms, while the overall sample 1 
presents the entire sample after excluding the trade and services sector due to high correlation between risk and profitability. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in 
parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND.VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE  
OVERALL 
SAMPLE 2 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 LIQ -0.01(-2.70)** -0.01(-2.11)* -0.08(-6.52)** -0.004(-0.73) -0.16(-13.42)** -0.004(-2.89)** -0.01(-2.24)* -0.23(-5.94)** -0.01(-3.43)** 
 TANGIB -0.17(-1.69) -0.09(-0.68) -0.46(-8.06)** 0.37(1.38) -0.63(-21.05)** -0.14(-2.91)** -0.84(-2.03)* -1.06(-6.38)** -0.36(-7.73)** 
 EBITTA -0.93(-5.00)** -1.13(-5.64)** -0.40(-2.70)** -1.34(-4.16)** -0.33(-2.96)** -0.72(-2.57)** -1.12(-2.89)** -0.95(-3.75)** -0.32(-2.17)* 
 NTDS 2.78(3.72)** 2.89(3.26)** 0.67(1.28) 1.88(1.18) 1.09(2.74)** 2.92(2.19)* 7.91(1.74) 0.22(0.49) 1.03(2.12)** 
BSDA LNSALES -0.02(-2.34)* -0.03(-2.07)* -0.03(-6.10)** -0.06(-2.23)* 0.01(2.78)** -0.01(-0.57) -0.03(-0.78) -0.18(-3.95)** -0.004(-0.72) 
 GRWTH 0.004(0.21) 0.001(0.40) -0.003(-0.09) 0.003(0.53) 0.01(0.67) 0.00(0.00) 0.003(0.15) 0.01(0.12) -0.03(-0.34) 
 RISK 0.03(4.93)** 0.02(0.40) 0.76(2.23)* -0.02(-0.58) -0.59(-0.74) 0.09(0.52) 0.24(0.47) -2.53(-2.97)** 0.01(2.09)* 
 F-STAT 19.54 13.01 18.54 34.89 82.12 7.14 4.57 11.20 30.07 
 Obs. 3600 2772 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
           
 LIQ -0.004(-0.82) -0.001(-1.58) -0.005(-2.43)** -0.0004(-0.99) 0.03(4.60)** -0.0002(-0.76) -0.002(-1.78) -0.01(-1.91) 0.001(2.16)* 
 TANGIB 0.26(19.49)** 0.22(14.60)** 0.22(7.24)** 0.20(7.64)** 0.30(7.22)** 0.23(7.87)** 0.17(2.10)* 0.25(3.05)** 0.40(15.01)** 
 EBITTA -0.06(-3.51)** -0.02(-1.01) -0.01(-0.26) 0.02(0.86) -0.25(-3.13)** -0.26(-3.71)** -0.15(-1.73) -0.12(-1.50) -0.10(-2.49)* 
 NTDS -0.55(-4.62)** -0.54(-4.12)** 0.71(2.05)* -0.59(-2.50)* 0.78(2.13)* -0.26(-0.62) -0.25(-0.35) 0.39(2.33)* -0.83(-2.91)** 
BLDA LNSALES 0.03(18.06)** 0.03(15.18)** 0.02(7.36)** 0.03(11.11)** 0.07(8.77)** 0.05(8.44)** 0.02(4.45)** 0.02(1.71) 0.02(7.24)** 
 GRWTH 0.002(0.71) 0.002(0.77) 0.02(0.95) -0.002(-2.60)** -0.02(-1.51) 0.01(6.64)** 0.01(2.10)* 0.03(1.22) -0.01(-1.11) 
 RISK 0.002(3.69)** 0.03(3.56)** 0.16(1.39) 0.03(4.69)** 0.55(-1.18) -0.15(-2.50)* -0.16(-1.93) -0.36(-0.96) 0.004(2.60)** 
 F-STAT 126.03 80.20 21.30 35.30 21.28 34.95 12.73 16.88 153.67 
 Obs. 3600 2772 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
           
 LIQ -0.01(-2.59)** -0.01(-2.08)* -0.08(-6.30)** -0.004(-0.76) -0.12(-10.87)** -0.004(-2.64)** -0.01(-2.53)* -0.24(-6.23)** -0.01(-3.31)** 
 TANGIB 0.10(1.04) 0.12(0.98) -0.24(-3.63)** 0.57(2.28)* -0.33(-7.29)** 0.08(1.44) -0.67(-1.62) -0.82(-4.67)** 0.05(0.93) 
 EBITTA -1.00(-5.45)** -1.15(-5.85)** -0.42(-2.75)** -1.35(-4.12)** -0.60(-6.49)** -0.98(-3.36)** -1.27(-2.94)** -1.07(-4.36)** -0.41(-2.58)** 
 NTDS 2.23(3.19)** 2.36(2.83)** 1.39(2.15)** 1.30(0.85) 1.88(4.19)** 2.65(1.82) 7.65(1.67) 0.61(1.39) 0.21(0.41) 
BTDA LNSALES 0.002(0.25) -0.003(-0.19) -0.01(-1.21) -0.03(-1.30) 0.08(9.49)** 0.04(2.59)** -0.001(-0.02) -0.16(-3.54)** 0.02(3.64)** 
 GRWTH 0.002(0.69) 0.003(0.82) 0.02(0.75) 0.001(0.21) -0.02(-1.11) 0.01(3.54)** 0.01(0.65) 0.04(0.60) -0.01(-0.79) 
 RISK 0.03(5.40)** 0.04(1.23) 0.91(2.66)** 0.01(0.37) -1.12(-2.31)* -0.06(-0.33) 0.08(0.15) -2.89(-3.35)** 0.01(2.54)* 
 F-STAT 22.04 8.81 11.36 4.22 80.66 8.43 7.65 10.71 118.84 
 Obs. 3600 2772 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
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Table 5.9: Fixed Effect Analysis based on Firm-level Determinants and Leverage within Balanced Sample 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes 300 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios 
(short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-
tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). The overall sample presents the entire 300 non-financial listed firms, while the overall sample 1 presents the entire sample 
after excluding the trade and services sector due to a high correlation between risk and profitability. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND.VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE  
OVERALL 
SAMPLE 1 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 LIQ -0.003(-1.76) -0.003(-1.80) -0.06(-2.17)* -0.001(-0.38) -0.14(-5.36)** -0.003(-5.05)** -0.003(-0.85) -0.19(-2.59)** -0.01(-2.43)* 
 TANGIB 0.02(0.08) 0.09(0.24) -0.24(-1.70) 0.58(1.10) -0.59(-6.49)** -0.21(-2.12)* -1.64(-2.00)* -1.06(-1.76) -0.17(-2.13)* 
 EBITTA -0.63(-3.83)** 0.52(-2.24)* -0.45(-4.92)** -0.59(-1.37) -0.11(-1.19) -0.43(-1.50) -0.59-3.72)** -0.64(-1.44) -0.22(-2.03)* 
BSDA NTDS 4.55(2.26)* 4.08(1.87) 1.48(1.27) 3.11(1.06) 0.49(1.01) 4.07(2.75)** 9.90(1.80) 3.07(1.31) 3.06(2.46)* 
 LNSALES -0.07(-2.20)** -0.10(-2.71)** -0.06(-1.92) 0.13(-1.86) -0.01(-0.37) -0.05(-2.57)* -0.18(-2.03)* -0.16(-1.68) 0.02(0.61) 
 GRWTH -0.02(-1.94) -0.02(-2.00)* 0.04(1.77) -0.03(-8.98)** 0.01(0.54) 0.002(0.23) 0.01(0.38) 0.04(0.52) -0.004(-0.38) 
 RISK 0.02(3.67)** 0.26(1.53) 0.40(1.60) 0.24(1.02) 0.31(0.49) 0.20(1.19) 0.11(0.28) -2.24(-2.83)** 0.01(1.86) 
 F-STAT 19.22 7.10 12.92 58.87 16.36 17.79 629.18 48.68 1733.86 
 Obs. 3600 2772 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
           
 LIQ 0.000(-0.00) -0.0003(-0.54) 0.01(1.18) 0.0002(0.82) 0.02(2.01)* -0.001(-2.50)** -0.0000(-0.01) 0.02(0.97) 0.002(2.04)* 
 TANGIB 0.21(4.95)** 0.15(3.24)** 0.27(2.31)* 0.10(1.43) 0.37(4.03)** 0.13(2.10)* 0.11(0.86) 0.38(3.36)** 0.35(4.02)** 
BLDA EBITTA -0.02(-1.22) -0.07(-2.76)** 0.06(0.85) -0.11(-2.69)** -0.16(-1.59) -0.13(-1.56) -0.09(-0.99) 0.16(1.81) -0.04(-0.81) 
 NTDS -0.81(-2.92)** -0.70(-2.96)** 0.32(0.66) -0.90(-2.60)** 0.40(0.80) -0.73(-2.38)* -1.01(-0.90) -0.06(-0.26) -0.90(-1.07) 
 LNSALES 0.04(5.89)** 0.03(5.28)** 0.04(2.44)** 0.02(2.54)* 0.08(3.66)** 0.03(3.31)** 0.07(3.00)** 0.03(1.24) 0.06(2.61)** 
 GRWTH 0.0001(0.05) 0.001(0.24) 0.01(0.50) -0.002(-1.67) -0.01(-1.00) 0.01(4.65)** -0.001(-0.51) 0.06(2.09)* -0.01(-1.19) 
 RISK 0.001(1.49) -0.06(-3.83)** -0.24(-2.37)** -0.07(-3.37)** -0.29(-0.56) -0.06(-0.94) -0.07(-0.96) 0.21(0.62) 0.002(0.98) 
 F-STAT 10.98 18.00 2.07 15.26 5.35 21.61 3.23 96.83 145.96 
 Obs. 3600 2772 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
           
 LIQ -0.003(-1.87) -0.003(-1.87) -0.05(-2.03)** -0.0005(-0.30) -0.11(-4.82)** -0.005(-8.52)** -0.003(-0.89) -0.18(-2.58)** -0.004(-1.83) 
 TANGIB 0.23(0.94) 0.24(0.71) 0.02(0.19) 0.69(1.46) -0.22(-1.47) -0.08(-0.89) -1.54(-1.81) -0.68(-1.06) 0.17(1.61) 
BTDA EBITTA -0.65(-4.10)** -0.60(-2.65)** -0.39(-4.59)** -0.70(-1.65) -0.28(-2.32)* -0.56(-1.97) -0.67(-3.33)** -0.48(-1.11) -0.26(-2.43)* 
 NTDS 3.74(2.03)* 3.38(1.67) 1.81(1.48) 2.21(0.81) 0.89(1.11) 3.33(2.31)* 8.88(1.53) 3.00(1.28) 2.15(2.19)* 
 LNSALES -0.03(-0.93) -0.06(-1.72) -0.02(-0.50) -0.11(-1.48) 0.07(2.89)** -0.02(-0.93) -0.12(-1.22) -0.13(-1.36) 0.08(3.50)** 
 GRWTH -0.02(-1.62) -0.02(-1.59) 0.05(2.58)** -0.03(-10.48)** -0.01(-0.48) 0.01(3.60)** 0.004(0.28) 0.09(1.16) -0.01(-1.14) 
 RISK 0.02(3.98)** 0.21(1.26) 0.16(0.59) 0.17(0.76) 0.04(0.07) 0.14(0.89) 0.05(0.13) -2.24(-2.40)* 0.01(2.36)* 
 F-STAT 31.92 6.77 13.74 92.06 10.46 46.80 6934.98 20.74 2958.05 
 Obs. 3600 2772 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
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As a result, this variable supports the trade-off theory if the sector maintains a 
positive relationship between long-term debt and total debt, which is only visible 
across industrial product firms. Similar positive outcomes are noticeable in recent 
studies such as Shah and Khan, (2007), de Jong et al. (2008), Antoniou et al. (2008), 
Mittoo and Zhang (2008) and Kayo and Kimura (2011). 
Parallel to tangibility, size also reacted in a different direction to total debt 
across sectors. This is feasible as Booth et al. (2001) found different relationships 
between types of leverage and size across developing countries. A similar scenario 
could take place between sectors within a developing country such as Malaysia. The 
construction, property, and trade and services sectors increased total leverage as their 
firm’s size became larger, which is in line with the findings of Harris and Raviv 
(1990), Suto (2003), Pandey and Chotigeat (2004), Feidakis and Rovolis (2007), 
Ullah and Nishat (2008), and Kayo and Kimura (2011). Meanwhile, in line with the 
pecking order theory, the technology sector moves in the opposite direction as firm 
size increases. Due to information asymmetries that exist between insiders and the 
capital market, larger firms issue more equity as it is closely observed by analysts 
and reduces the amount of debt financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Furthermore, 
larger firms have better access to the equity market due to its reputation and the 
attraction of the capital gain in the secondary market (Chen, 2004). Similar results 
could be found with previous studies by Titman and Wessels, (1988) and Antoniou et 
al. (2008). Likewise, a comparable pattern could be seen between firm size and 
short-term debt. The construction sector increases short-term debt as their firms grow 
larger, and the remaining sectors, such as consumer product, industrial product, 
plantation and technology, support the trade-off theory strongly. The positive 
correlation between size and long-term debt supports the trade-off theory across 
sectors and this is consistent with the findings of Mittoo and Zhang (2008). 
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Therefore, this variable supportsthe trade-off theory if the sector maintains a positive 
relationship with total debt. In relation to that, the construction, property, and trade 
and services sectors gravitate towards this theory strongly. 
The association between liquidity and leverage (except long-term debt) is 
indifferent and consistent with the pecking order theory across sectors. The 
association between long-term debt and liquidity differs across consumer product, 
construction, and the trade and services sectors. However, coefficients for both the 
consumer product and trade and services sectors are within a small range even 
though they are significant values with different signs. The magnitude shows that 
liquidity is unimportant to long-term debt. This is not the case for the construction 
sector as these firms greatly consider the importance of liquidity. Consequently, the 
overall results confirm the applicability of the pecking order theory across sectors in 
Malaysia, and the outcomes are consistent with prior studies, for instance, 
Deesomsak et al. (2004), de Jong et al. (2008) and Ullah and Nishat (2008). 
Being statistically significant, non-tax debt shield maintains the largest 
magnitude compared to other determinants in this study. The size of the coefficient 
demonstrates that short-term debt the property sector is highly dependent on non-tax 
debt shield, though the construction and trade and services sectors produce 
significant values. In contrast, this variable maintains a similar relationship with total 
debt of the consumer product and construction sectors though it is inconsistent 
withother studies (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Mackie-Mason, 1990; Suto, 2003; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004) that sustained the existence of the theory. In general, short-
term debt and total debt reacted similarly to non-tax debt shield across a few sectors. 
This is probably due to a proportion of the total debt that is mainly controlled by 
short-term debtand, hence, they move in a similar direction.  
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Surprisingly, the direction between long-term debt and non-tax debt shield 
diverges across sectors, except in the plantation and property sectors that produce 
insignificant values. This finding is in line with Bowen et al. (1982) who argue that 
differential levels of non-tax debt shield are observable across industries. Consistent 
withthe trade-off theory, the industrial product sector moves inversely to long-term 
debt as their non-tax debt shield level boosts up. In relation to that, the Indian 
manufacturing firms tend to reduce their long-term debt consumption as their non-tax 
debt shield increases (Rajagopal, 2011). In addition, the trade and services sectors 
maintained a similar relationship between these variables. The existence of non-tax 
debt shield lowers a firm’s capacity for debt tax benefit, hence, the consumption of 
long-term debt reduces (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980).  
Nevertheless, the mechanism between these two variables changes to positive 
across consumer product, construction and technology sectors, which is similar to the 
findings of Bradley et al. (1984) and Wald (1999). This result is contradictory to the 
trade-off theory as the focus is mainly on the substitution between non-debt shield 
and debt tax shield. Nevertheless, this positive relationship explains that non-tax debt 
shield is possibly a measure of“securability” of a firm, and this leads to a higher level 
of leverage as the firm provides more securable assets (Bradley et al., 1984). 
Moreover, Booth et al. (2001) also highlight that tax is negatively correlated to the 
leverage of Malaysian firms which indirectly indicates that non-tax debt shield is 
positively correlated to leverage. Therefore, this creates suspicion about the 
reliability and validity of the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argument. However, the 
applicability of this theory is observable based on the relationship between long-term 
debt and leverage. Hence, the trade-off theory is pertinent to the industrial product 
and the trade and services sectors. 
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According to the past literature, risk is positively related to short-term debt and 
negatively related to long-term debt and total debt. In this study, the mechanism 
between risk and all types of leverage differs across sectors. The impact of risk on 
leverage also shows a discrepancy across sectors in Malaysia. In line with the trade-
off theory and pecking order theory, technology and construction sectors maintained 
a negative correlation which is highly consistent with results reported by Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Pandey (2001), Feidakis and Rovolis (2007) and Ullah and Nishat 
(2008). The industrial product sector tends to increase short-term debt and reduce 
long-term debt as their earnings become volatile. Lenders are willing to lend short-
term debt instead of long-term debt due to default risk. A similar result is discernible 
across manufacturing firms in India (Rajagopal, 2011). Likewise, the property firms 
also prefer to use more short-term debt rather than long-term debt in financing their 
investments. 
Similar to the overall sample results, the trade and service sector maintains a 
positive correlation between risk and leverage, that is, long-term debt and total debt 
and the results are highly consistent with those of Correa et al. (2007) and Suto 
(2003). Booth et al. (2001) also found a positive relationship between risk and 
leverage across developing countries. Firms that operate in the bank-oriented 
environment have close attachment with the lenders and, therefore, the effective cost 
of failure to service debt could be reduced (Antoniou et al., 2008). Malaysian firms 
are mainly financed by short-term debt which secures the lenders from exposing 
themselves to default risk. The impact of risk on leverage varies extremely across 
sectors due to huge deviations in the size of the coefficient, especially between risk 
and total debt. The utilization of leverage among the technology firms is vastly 
dependent on earnings’ volatility. Similarly, the impact of risk is significant across 
the plantation and property sectors in determining their long-term financing. The 
CHAPTER 5 
 
156 
 
magnification of risk on short-term debt is obvious within the plantation sector. This 
variable tends to be the second most important variable in determining the short-term 
debt of plantation firms. As a result, both theories are applicable to property, 
plantation, technology and construction sectors. These findings are in contrast with 
those of Annuar and Shamsher (1993) and Deesomsak et al. (2004) who argue an 
insignificant effect of volatility on debt ratios.  
This analysis highlights the substance of growth opportunities on leverage 
determination across sectors, although this variable was insignificant based on the 
overall sample. For instance, the industrial product sector utilizes more short-term 
debt as the level of growth amplifies, and this result is strongly consistent with the 
findings of Deesomsak et al. (2004), Mitton (2008), Shah and Khan (2007), de Jong 
et al. (2008), Antoniou et al.(2008), and Kayo and Kimura (2011), and supports the 
agency theory. Firms with high growth rates tend to accept risky projects and 
creditors are reluctant to lend long-term debt due to the high cost of borrowing. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) found that firms with optimal negative growth should 
have more debt. Alternatively, the property firms use less short-term debt and 
increase the utilization of long-term debt and total debt. This relationship strongly 
supports the pecking order theory, (Pandey and Chotigeat, 2004; Chen, 2004; Ullah 
and Nishat, 2008). Consistent with Titman and Wessel (1988), the property and 
plantation sectors employ a greater amount of long-term debt as their growth 
opportunities increase in the market. According to Chen (2004), firms with attractive 
earnings and growth prospects utilize a greater amount of leverage. The willingness 
of banks to issue longer-term debt is highly dependent on the capital market 
recognition, high market capitalization. These findings clearly show that variations 
exist between growth opportunities and leverage across sectors and lead to different 
capital structure theories. 
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Yet, the impact of growth on leverage is diminutive compared to other 
determinants. For instance, this situation is obvious among the property firms though 
the variables revealed significant values at the 1% level. In this study, growth is not 
an important variable compared to other explanatory variables in the model. As a 
conclusion, a number of interesting issues are noticeable in the pooled OLS analysis. 
First, the relationship between types of leverage and firm-level determinants (i.e., 
risk, non-tax debt shield, size and tangibility) differs across sectors. Secondly, 
discrepancy exists in the coefficient magnitude of explanatory variables across 
sectors though the variables are statistically significant either at 1% or 5% level. The 
applicability of the capital structure theories, such as, the trade-off theory, agency 
theory and pecking order theory, diverge across sectors in Malaysia. 
As the cross-section is fixed, a few changes are perceptible between 
sectors.The size of the coefficients confirms that each determinant affects leverage 
differently across sectors. Although this variable is significantly related to long-term 
debt among the trade and services and property sectors, both sectors move in 
different directions. Tangibility became insignificantly related to total debt across the 
consumer product, industrial product, construction, and technology sectors. This 
variable, however, is no longer significant with long-term debt of industrial product 
and plantation sectors. Similar to the overall sample, none of the sectors shows that 
profitability is significantly related to short-term debt. However, this variable became 
significant with long-term debt and insignificant with the total debt of the industrial 
product sector. A little change is visible on the impact of non-tax debt shield on 
leverage, specifically within property firms, although this variable is no longer 
significant with the consumer product, construction and technology sectors. Apart 
from that, the irrelevancy of firm size on different types of leverage is discernible 
across some sectors. 
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Growth becomes significant with the total debt of the industrial product 
sector instead of short-term and long-term debt, with a greater effect on leverage. A 
similar case occurs with the long-term debt of technology firms and the total debt of 
consumer product firms. The association between this variable and short-term debt 
and total debt varies across sectors. Risk became an important factor in determining 
the short-term and long-term debt across consumer product firms. Similarly, this 
variable is the main factor related to long-term debt in construction firms although 
the variable is no longer significant across other sectors. Parallel to the pooled OLS 
analysis, the association between risk and total debt varies across the technology and 
trade and services sectors. Based on the fixed effect analysis, equivalent results to the 
pooled OLS analysis are noticeable. First, the unique behaviour of each sector 
indirectly influences the mechanism between leverage and firm-level determinants 
that can be observed through the sign of the coefficients. Secondly, the magnitude of 
each variable further explains the impact of each determinant on the differing 
leverage across sectors. 
5.3.2 Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on Unbalanced 
Panel Data 
This section focuses entirely on unbalanced panel data that includes 815 
listed firms across seven sectors in Malaysia. The following equation (5.2) assesses 
the association between the firm-level determinants and leverage using the pooled 
OLS and fixed effect analysis: 
                                                      
                                                                                         (5.2) 
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where    is the debt ratio for firm   in year  , with firm-level determinants such as 
tangibility (      ), profitability (      ), growth opportunities (    ), non-
debt tax shield (    ), liquidity (   ), firm size (       ) and risk (    ). 
The firm-fixed effects    control for cross sectional differences in the firm 
characteristics. The disturbance term is denoted as     that and is assumed to be 
serially uncorrelated with mean zero. Based on the overall sample, a few changes are 
perceptible compared to the balanced data set. Table 5.10 reports that profitability 
becomes one of the most important instruments that affect short-term debt. Risk 
determines the amount of short-term debt though it was insignificant in the previous 
data set. Surprisingly, non-tax debt shield is no longer significant with short-term 
debt and total debt, as the role has been taken over by profitability. However, this 
variable remained significant with long-term debt. From the long-term debt financing 
standpoint, a similar outcome is observable except growth that produces significant 
values. Despite being the most critical and powerful determinant, the impact of 
profitability on total debt becomes weaker while risk produces a greater impact on 
total leverage. 
Based on Table 5.11, the fixed effect analysis provides comparable results 
with pooled OLS whereby the explanatory variables maintained similar relationships 
with leverage. Consistent with the balanced dataset, non-tax debt shield has taken 
over the role of profitability as the main factor that influences the determination of 
the short-term and total debt of Malaysian listed firms. After excluding the industrial 
product firms from the overall sample due to high correlation between risk and 
profitability, the OLS analysis produces equivalent results except for risk which is no 
longer significantly related to long-term debt. A few changes are observable within 
the overall sample as the cross-section is fixed. For instance, non-tax debt shield is 
no longer related to short-term debt and total debt. Total debt is not affected by 
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earnings volatility, and tangibility becomes irrelevant to short-term debt. As a result, 
a few fascinating issues are visible from the overall unbalanced sample. First, 
leverage is highly dependent on profitability and non-tax debt shield, whilst the 
balanced panel data highlights the substance of non-tax debt shield and tangibility. 
These variables seem to be the most important factors that determine leverage across 
datasets. Secondly, the association between leverage and the explanatory variables 
remained consistent between both datasets. Thirdly, risk maintained a positive 
correlation with total debt which is inconsistent with the trade-off theory and pecking 
order theory though this variable is correlated negatively with long-term debt. 
Likewise, the mechanism between total debt and non-tax debt shield remained 
inconsistent to the trade-off theory but the negative sign of long-term debt confirms 
the applicability of the trade-off theory across Malaysian listed firms. 
From the sector perspective, the sign remained negative between profitability 
and leverage across sectors which strongly supports the pecking order theory. The 
size of the coefficient confirms the importance of profitability on leverage across 
sectors in Malaysia, specifically amongst the plantation sector. This is a remarkable 
change as the balanced dataset generates a few insignificant results. Therefore, 
comparable results between both datasets confirm the applicability of the pecking 
order theory across sectors in Malaysia. Tangibility is highly significantly related to 
short-term debt and long-term debt across sectors. However, the importance of this 
variable can be monitored through the size of the coefficient. The sign of magnitude 
confirms the validity of the trade-off theory across sectors. For instance, the effect of 
tangibility on long-term debt is greater on the trade and services and construction 
firms compared to plantation firms. This variable is positively and significantly 
related to total debt among the trade and services, whilst negatively related and 
significant across construction and technology firms. The relationships remained 
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consistent with the previous datasetthat which further validates the differential 
impact of sectoral behaviour on tangibility across sectors supports the various capital 
structure theories. 
Consistent with the balanced dataset, comparable results are discernible 
between liquidity and leverage although short-term debt is insignificant across the 
construction and property sectors. Furthermore, this variable remained significantly 
related to the long-term debt of construction firms. The sizes of coefficients 
demonstrate the importance of this variable compared to other independent variables 
in the model. On the whole, all the sectors’ results support the pecking order theory 
except for the construction and industrial product sectors. The employment of short-
term debt is highly dependent on earnings’ volatility across the trade and services, 
consumer product and technology sectors with different signs of coefficients. The 
central issue is the changing of the signs across sectors and the consistencies with the 
preceding dataset, which further reflect the indirect effect of sectoral behaviour on 
the mechanism between risk and leverage. Long-term debt maintains consistent 
correlation with non-tax debt shield across sectors, except for construction and 
plantation. In contrast, this variable becomes more substantially related to long-term 
debt in the property sector compared to the trade and services and industrial product 
sectors. The existence of non-tax debt shield lowers the capacity of debt tax benefits 
across trade and services firms, and further strengthens the argument of DeAngelo 
and Masulis (1980). 
Despite the consistencies, a few differences are observed between both 
datasets. Non-tax debt shield produces different results in the balanced dataset. This 
variable is only significantly related to short-term debt and total debt among the 
property and trade and services firms, and is no longer significant across industrial 
product firms. The association between total debt and firm size is inconsistent in the 
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balanced dataset. Besides the significant values, the technology sector produces a 
positive sign which is consistent with other sectors in the unbalanced dataset. This is 
possibly due to the difference in the number of observations between both datasets. 
The unbalanced dataset produces more significant results with a similar sign across 
sectors except for the property and plantation sectors. Consequently, these results 
further strengthen the applicability of the trade-off theory. This variable could have 
produced superior results as the firms are classified into large, medium and small 
firms. Conversely, risk affects the consumption of long-term debt across the 
industrial product, property, plantation and technology sectors with a similar 
relationship. Technology firms tend to reduce total debt consumption as their risk 
amplifies, but the trade and services and consumer product sectors responded 
inversely. The magnitude of risk explains the substance of this variable on leverage 
among the trade and services firms, although the relationship is contradictory to both 
the trade-off and pecking order theories, whilst the findings of technology firms tend 
to support both theories. As the firm’s earnings’ volatility increases the probability of 
the firm defaulting on debt payment increases. This indirectly reduces the confidence 
level among the creditors to extend new loans to risky firms and, finally, ends up 
charging a higher interest rate. Due to the high cost of borrowing, firms are reluctant 
to borrow. As compared to other explanatory variables, market-to-book ratio seems 
to be unimportant to leverage decision-making across sectors, although two sectors 
provide a little evidence. Despite that, the trade and services sector increases their 
long-term debt as their market-to-book ratio is boosted. Pandey (2001) found a 
positive correlation between growth opportunities and all types of leverage, as the 
fixed effect model controls the cross-sectional differences. However, the results 
change as the model adopted the pooled GLS model and leverage is only positively 
significantly related tolong-term debt (Pandey and Chotigeat, 2004). Additionally, 
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the positive correlation between total debt and the market-to-book ratio in the 
construction sector further supports the applicability of the pecking order theory. In 
line with that, Baharuddin et al. (2011) found a positive relationship between growth 
and total debt across construction firms in Malaysia. 
The firm-fixed effect analysis highlights some variations in the results 
although the changes are mainly on the significance of the variables rather than the 
relationship between leverage and explanatory variables. Generally, profitability 
becomes insignificantly related to leverage across construction, plantation and 
technology firms. This variable is only significantly related to long-term debt across 
industrial product firms. The overall results remained constant and support the 
pecking order theory across sectors. Once again, tangibility is significantly related to 
short-term debt across a few sectors and only significant with total debt of the trade 
and services sector. This variable remained significantly related to long-term 
leverage across sectors. Liquidity maintained similar results except that the consumer 
product and industrial product sectors show some significant values between 
liquidity and long-term debt although the relationships are indifferent across sectors.  
Non-tax debt has become insignificantly related with leverage of trade and 
services firms, whereas the property sector maintains its consistency with OLS and 
remained significant with all types of leverage and is highly dominant. This variable 
became influential to short-term debt across the consumer product, technology and 
construction sectors. Besides maintaining a similar sign of coefficient results in OLS 
and fixed effect analysis, firm size became significantly related to short-term debt 
among the property and technology sectors. Yet, this variable responds similarly to 
both long-term debt and total debt, except for the industrial product sector that 
produces insignificant results with total debt. The mechanism between short-term 
debt and firm size varies across property and technology sectors. Instead, this 
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analysis produces more significant values between leverage (long-term debt and total 
debt) and market-to-book ratio with different relationships across the industrial 
product and technology sectors. Risk is totally immaterial to leverage particularly 
within technology firms. Conversely, this variable became the most important factor 
to trade and services firms. This variable is related negatively to long-term debt 
amongst industrial product and property sectors which indirectly supports both the 
trade-off and pecking order theories. As a whole, a number of captivating issues are 
discernible from this section. First, non-tax debt shield has become an essential 
factor for leverage across all sectors except property. Secondly, a few explanatory 
variables became insignificantly related to leverage and this is very obvious across 
sectors except for property firms. Thirdly, an indirect effect of sectoral behaviour is 
visible between leverage and firm-level determinants that is observable through size 
and sign of the coefficients. Finally, the sign of magnitude remained consistent 
between both datasets except for a minor difference between the liquidity and long-
term debt of plantation firms. Although there are differences between the balanced 
and unbalanced outcomes, similar variables are observable between them. The 
differences could be due to the nature and the setting of the datasets. Since the 
unbalanced dataset includes all the listed firms that survived in each and every year 
within the sample period, the effect of each firm may differ due to aspects such as the 
size of the firm, performance of the firm and other factors that indirectly affect the 
association between leverage and explanatory variables. 
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Table 5.10: Pooled OLS Regression based on Firm-level Determinants and Leverage within Unbalanced Sample 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes 815 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The dependent variables are book leverage 
ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity 
(LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (MTBR) and risk (RISK). The overall sample presents all the 815 non-financial listed firms while overall sample 1 presents the entire 
sample after excluding the industrial product sector due to high correlation between risk and profitability. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are 
computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
DEP. 
VAR 
IND.VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE  
OVERALL 
SAMPLE 1 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 EBITTA -0.50 (-6.23)** -0.54(-6.52)** -0.35(-3.74)** -0.53(-5.77)** -0.41(-2.43)* -0.53(-5.19)** -1.11(-3.87)** -0.40(-6.66)** -0.80(-2.99)** 
 TANGIB -0.23(-9.68)** -0.25(-9.54)** -0.24(-4.89)** -0.19(-3.03)** -0.44(-11.28)** -0.27(-5.09)** -0.40(-2.29)* -0.35(-6.10)** -0.20(-2.74)** 
 LIQ -0.01(-4.04)** -0.01(-5.45)** -0.02(-2.00)* -0.01(-1.46) -0.04(-1.91) -0.02(-1.77) -0.01(-3.01)** -0.003(-4.79)** -0.04(-3.30)** 
 NTDS 0.75(1.52) 0.15(0.68) -0.39(-1.13) 2.31(1.55) 0.31(0.56) 4.61(3.26)** 0.92(0.81) -0.01(-0.03) -1.53(-2.25)* 
BSDA LNSALES -0.002(-0.30) -0.01(-0.93) -0.003(-0.80) 0.02(3.02)** 0.004(0.44) -0.02(-1.85) 0.001(0.06) 0.06(8.74)** -0.05(-2.67)** 
 MBTR -0.0001(-1.67) -0.0001(-1.56) 0.004(0.87) -0.001(-0.75) 0.01(4.37)** 0.002(2.55)* -0.03(-1.23) -0.0000(-0.00) -0.0001(-0.54) 
 RISK 0.34(2.78)** 0.50(3.34)** 0.29(2.17)* 0.21(1.58) -0.18(-0.87) 0.26(1.73) 0.37(0.77) -0.18(-2.56)* 0.96(2.44)* 
 F-STAT 25.25 36.08 8.53 5.54 23.98 35.91 13.42 24.41 11.32 
 Obs. 6503 4384 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
           
 EBITTA -0.12(-7.03)** -0.11(-5.68)** -0.01(-0.36) -0.14(-5.68)** -0.17(-2.81)** -0.19(-3.85)** -0.25(-2.21)* -0.10(-3.76)** -0.11(-3.18)** 
 TANGIB 0.25 (31.07)** 0.25(27.61)** 0.23(12.95)** 0.23(14.39)** 0.32(9.14)** 0.19(7.51)** 0.09(2.66)** 0.17(6.18)** 0.35(18.58)** 
 LIQ -0.0001(-0.66) -0.0003(-1.76) -0.001(-1.39) 0.0002(0.61) 0.01(2.81)** -0.002(-1.88) -0.003(-4.08)** -0.0000(-0.05) 0.001(1.89) 
 NTDS -0.51 (-7.28)** -0.50(-5.89)** 0.01(0.04) -0.45(-3.37)** -0.55(-1.62) -1.32(-4.29)** 0.05((0.18) 0.16(1.10) -0.62(-3.45)** 
BLDA LNSALES 0.03 (26.89)** 0.03(22.47)** 0.02(10.29)** 0.03(14.00)** 0.05(6.71)** 0.04(7.72)** 0.03(5.65)** 0.03(8.19)** 0.03(13.73)** 
 MBTR 0.0001(3.03)** 0.0001(4.80)** 0.001(0.89) -0.002(-1.39) -0.0004(-0.58) 0.0001(0.21) 0.0003(0.09) -0.001(-0.98) 0.0001(4.27)** 
 RISK 0.06(-2.81)** -0.05(-1.97) 0.01(0.39) -0.07(-2.72)** -0.09(-1.21) -0.16(-3.09)** -0.32(-2.56)* -0.11(-3.63)** -0.01(-0.33) 
 F-STAT 269.76 226.87 36.32 68.44 16.70 22.26 30.55 32.32 119.21 
 Obs. 6503 4384 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
           
 EBITTA -0.62(-7.56)** -0.65(-7.31)** -0.36(-3.47)** -0.67(-6.73)** -0.58(-2.74)** -0.72(-5.97)** -1.36(-4.35)** -0.49(-7.78)** -0.91(-3.38)** 
 TANGIB 0.02(0.82) 0.01(0.21) -0.02(-0.27) 0.05(0.77) -0.13(-2.69)** -0.08(-1.34) -0.31(-1.82) -0.18(-2.95)** 0.15(2.06)* 
 LIQ -0.01(-3.84)** -0.01(-5.40)** -0.02(-1.97) -0.01(-1.34) -0.03(-1.73) -0.02(-1.80) -0.01(-3.62)** -0.003(-5.39)** -0.04(-3.26)** 
 NTDS 0.24(0.49) -0.35(-1.51) -0.39(-0.92) 1.87(1.29) -0.24(-0.40) 3.29(2.35)** 0.97(0.77) 0.17(0.64) -2.15(-3.12)** 
BTDA LNSALES 0.03(3.94)** 0.03(3.05)** 0.02(3.74)** 0.05(7.25)** 0.05(5.98)** 0.02(1.18) 0.03(1.23) 0.09(12.27)** -0.02(-0.94) 
 MBTR -0.0001(-0.64) -0.0003(-0.44) 0.004(1.01) -0.003(-1.70) 0.01(3.10)** 0.002(1.85) -0.03(-1.27) -0.001(-0.17) -0.0000(-0.04) 
 RISK 0.29(2.39)* 0.45(2.90)** 0.30(2.06)** 0.14(1.04) -0.26(-1.03) 0.10(0.58) 0.05(0.09) -0.29(-3.91)** 0.94(2.38)* 
 F-STAT 24.51 28.25 6.05 29.69 9.64 14.72 21.21 67.73 9.53 
 Obs. 6503 4384 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
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Table 5.11: Fixed Effect Analysis based on Firm-level Determinants and Leverage within Unbalanced Sample 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes 815 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios 
(short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-
tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (MTBR) and risk (RISK). The overall sample presents all the 815 non-financial listed firms while overall sample 1 presents the entire sample after 
excluding the industrial product sector due to high correlation between risk and profitability. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
DEP. 
VAR 
IND.VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE  
OVERALL 
SAMPLE 1 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 EBITTA -0.36(-6.51)** -0.38(-4.31)** -0.22(-3.71)** -0.37(-5.04)** -0.02(-0.25) -0.36(-3.43)** -0.46(-1.23) -0.05(-0.85) -0.61 (-3.10)** 
 TANGIB -0.18 (-3.71)** -0.16(-1.95) -0.11(-1.12) -0.20(-2.49)* -0.31(-5.25)** -0.13(-1.66) -0.60(-1.43) -0.14(-2.47)* -0.16(-1.58) 
 LIQ -0.004 (-3.63)** -0.005(-3.73)** -0.01(-2.26)* -0.004(-1.72) -0.02(-1.77) -0.01(-1.63) -0.01(-2.22)** -0.001(-3.26)** -0.02(-2.64)** 
 NTDS 2.4(2.51)*          1.26(1.86) 1.19(2.29)* 4.23(1.95) 2.02(2.93)** 6.11(4.43)** 2.00(1.50) 0.84(2.19)* -0.96(-0.80) 
BSDA LNSALES -0.05(-2.69)** -0.06(-1.64) -0.002(-1.57) 0.03(-1.82) 0.01(0.89) -0.06(-2.31)* -0.13(-1.78) 0.03(2.17)* -0.08(-1.34) 
 MBTR 0.0004(0.45) 0.0001(0.64) -0.003-(1.04) -0.003(-1.10) 0.003(2.82)** 0.001(2.20)* -0.02(-1.07) -0.003(-1.83) 0.0001(0.74) 
 RISK 0.28(3.84)** 0.37(2.11)* 0.11(1.67) 0.22(2.54)* 0.24(2.92)** 0.24(1.87) 0.47(0.90) -0.02(-0.24) 0.70(2.23)* 
 F-STAT 10.30 6.68 6.06 7.41 8.76 24.68 2.64 6.05 3.12 
 Obs. 6503 4384 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
           
 EBITTA -0.09(-5.02)** -0.05(-2.39)* -0.01(-0.33) -0.16(-4.71)** -0.10(-1.77) -0.08(-1.52) -0.06(-0.62) -0.04(-1.30) -0.06(-1.67) 
 TANGIB 0.25(16.55)** 0.25(8.50)** 0.23(5.31)** 0.25(7.95)** 0.32(6.18)** 0.12(3.56)** 0.21(3.28)** 0.22(5.28)** 0.37(11.77)** 
 LIQ 0.001(4.09)** 0.001(3.40)** 0.001(2.67)** 0.001(2.66)** 0.01(2.13)* 0.002(1.33) 0.0002(0.48) 0.0002(1.02) 0.001(3.32)** 
 NTDS -0.53(-4.55)** -0.40(-2.70)** 0.51(-1.70) -0.74(-3.19)** -0.26(-0.59) -1.27(-3.53)** -0.28(-1.02) -0.23(-1.06) -0.46(-1.86) 
BLDA LNSALES 0.04(12.14)** 0.04(7.12)** 0.04(6.58)** 0.03(5.68)** 0.03(2.20)* 0.03(3.11)** 0.05(4.25)** 0.03(2.86)** 0.04(7.57)** 
 MBTR 0.0001(0.32) 0.00002(1.04) 0.001(1.03) -0.002(-2.02)* -0.0001(-0.95) -0.001 (-1.56) -0.001(-0.28) -0.001(-0.92) 0.0004(2.98)** 
 RISK -0.05(-2.25)** -0.05(-3.11)** 0.04(1.15) 0.10(-2.76)** -0.13(-1.94) -0.10(-2.06)* -0.08(-0.82) -0.05(-1.30) -0.01(-0.31) 
 F-STAT 56.33 17.66 8.93 16.53 6.83 6.52 5.93 7.86 27.63 
 Obs. 6503 4384 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
           
 EBITTA -0.46(-8.95)** -0.42(-4.89)** -0.23(-4.04)** -0.53(-8.42)** -0.11(-1.24) -0.43(-3.89)** -0.52(-1.42) -0.10(-1.43) -0.67(-3.42)** 
 TANGIB 0.03(0.93) 0.09(1.00) 0.12(1.33) 0.05(0.65) 0.01(0.20) 0.01(-0.13) -0.39(-0.92) -0.08(-1.34) 0.21(2.11)* 
 LIQ -0.01(-3.25)** -0.004(-3.48)** -0.01(-2.06)* -0.003(-1.37) -0.01(-1.46) -0.01(-1.68) -0.004(-2.34)* -0.001(-2.94)** -0.01(-2.25)* 
 NTDS 1.88(2.10)* 0.86(1.29) -0.68(-1.43) 3.45(1.75) 1.77(2.82)** 4.72(3.52)** 1.77(1.22) 0.62(1.60) -1.42(-1.15) 
BTDA LNSALES -0.01(-0.64) -0.02(-0.51) 0.02(1.81) 0.003(0.20) 0.04(2.93)** -0.03-(1.34) -0.08(-1.07) 0.05(4.08)** -0.04(-0.59) 
 MBTR -0.0005(-0.67) 0.0001(1.06) -0.004(-1.76) -0.005(-2.44)* 0.002(2.20)* 0.001(1.22) -0.02(-1.20) -0.004(-2.71)** 0.0001(1.33) 
 RISK 0.23(3.71)** 0.31(1.78) 0.07(1.15) 0.12(1.70) -0.12(-1.02) 0.14(1.02) 0.39(0.76) -0.06(-0.92) 1.02(2.89)** 
 F-STAT 18.61 13.81 5.75 16.77 4.67 15.49 2.46 14.66 6.07 
 Obs. 6503 4384 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
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5.4 Sector-Level Determinants Analysis 
The subsequent section focuses attention on the sector-level variables - 
munificence, dynamism and HH index - which highlight the distinction of decision-
making on leverage across sectors. The following model (5.3) assesses the 
relationship between sector-level determinants and firm leverage: 
                                                                  (5.3) 
where     is the firm debt ratio for sector j in year t, with sector-level determinants 
such as munificence (MFCE), dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI). The firm-
fixed effects    control for cross-sectional differences across firms. The disturbance 
term is denoted as      and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero. 
This analysis focuses primarily on the unbalanced datasetdue to exclusion of sector-
level data during the crisis period from 1996 until 1999 in the balanced dataset. 
Based on Table 5.12, the impact of munificence on a firm’s leverage disappears as 
the equation controls for cross-sectional differences across Malaysian firms. 
Nevertheless, the determination of both short-term and long-term debt is highly 
dependent on dynamism. Firms tend to increase their short-term debt and reduce 
long-term debt as the environment becomes more dynamic. These results further 
substantiate the applicability of the agency theory. 
The substance of sector-level determinants is observable across selected 
sectors except in the consumer product and industrial product sectors. Munificence 
influences short-term debt negatively but is noticeable in the property sector. 
Meanwhile, both the plantation and construction sectors increase their long-term debt 
as the level of abundant resources increases, which strongly confirms the existence of 
the pecking order theory. Alternatively, the relationship between this variable and 
total debt differs across the construction and property sectors. In other words, 
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construction firms tend to increase their total debt as the ratio of munificence 
increases, whilst the property sector reacts inversely. Hereby, the applicability of 
capital structure theories differs across sectors in Malaysia. The technology sector 
tends to be more sensitive to dynamism in setting their short-term debt. These firms 
reduce short-term debt as the environment becomes more dynamic. This result is 
contradictory to the overall sample outcomes. Similarly, the sensitivity of this 
variable can be seen across consumer product firms. However, this sector increases 
its total debt financing as the degree of dynamism increases. Based on the entire 
sector level variables, HH Index tends to be the most important variable that strongly 
affects leverage, particularly among the property firms. Consistent with the findings 
of Brander and Lewis (1986) and MacKay and Phillips (2005), these firms increase 
both short-term and total debt as their concentration level increases. Likewise, the 
trade and services firms followed a similar pattern with short-term debt, although the 
impact is two times lower than the property firms. In contrast, the construction sector 
responds inversely by reducing short-term debt and increases long-term debt as the 
index increases. 
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Table 5.12: Pooled OLS and Fixed Analysis on Sector-level Determinants and Firm Leverage based on Balanced and Unbalanced Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.3) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes both balanced (+) and unbalanced (++) datasets across seven selected sectors. The 
dependent variables are firm book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are 
Munificence (MFCE), Dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust 
to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 MFCE -0.18(-3.74)** -0.02(-0.15) -0.05(-0.48) 0.05(0.42) -0.34(-2.56)* -0.16(-0.79) -0.26(-1.31) -0.48(-0.55) 
BSDA+ 
      (OLS) 
DYSM 
HHI 
0.23(0.93) 
-0.10(-0.90) 
1.17(1.81) 
1.10(1.57) 
0.02(0.04) 
3.28(1.56) 
1.05(1.66) 
-1.98(-1.19) 
-0.32(-0.38) 
14.01(2.82)** 
-1.82(-1.31) 
-4.47(-2.60)** 
-0.90(-1.11) 
0.60(1.46) 
-2.78(-0.93) 
7.17(3.78)** 
 F-Test 8.68 2.62 1.63 2.57 6.36 2.53 0.99 8.52 
 Obs. 3600 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
 MFCE -0.03(-0.67) 0.002(0.02) 0.01(-0.06) 0.09(1.13) -0.33(-2.36)* -0.23(-1.08) 0.17(1.42) -0.33(-0.31) 
BSDA++ 
      (FE) 
DYSM 
HHI 
0.52(2.23)* 
-0.11(-1.03) 
0.91(1.85) 
0.42(0.69) 
-0.39(-0.98) 
1.38(0.69) 
1.00(1.92) 
-1.74(-2.53)** 
-0.36(-0.63) 
14.14(3.45)** 
-1.89(-1.78) 
-4.24(-1.69) 
-0.53(-2.26)* 
0.20(1.19) 
-2.08(-0.64) 
4.97(2.18)* 
 F-Test 6.73 1.95 0.45 5.79 4.27 2.53 10.02 3.07 
 Obs. 6503 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
 MFCE -0.14(-7.15)** 0.10(1.63) 0.04(1.01) 0.10(1.42) 0.03(0.46) 0.19(2.18)* 0.24(-2.54)* -0.47(-1.32) 
BLDA+ 
      (OLS) 
DYSM 
HHI 
0.01(0.15) 
-0.01(-0.25) 
0.23(0.76) 
-0.37(-1.04) 
0.11(0.45) 
-0.74(-0.90) 
-0.41(-0.97) 
1.12(0.99) 
0.08(0.16) 
-2.13(-0.82) 
0.05(0.09) 
2.00(3.81)** 
-0.03(-0.09) 
0.16(0.98) 
-0.50(-0.56) 
-0.30(-0.34) 
 F-Test 26.50 0.95 0.84 2.00 0.61 6.67 2.24 0.64 
 Obs. 3600 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
 MFCE 0.03(1.34) 0.09(1.55) 0.02(0.49) 0.11(2.14)* -0.004(-0.07) 0.18(2.41)* -0.04(-0.53) -0.26(-1.02) 
BLDA++ 
      (FE) 
DYSM 
HHI 
-0.28(-2.69)** 
0.11(2.26)* 
0.12(0.50) 
-0.57(-1.53) 
0.00(0.00) 
-1.32(-1.62) 
-0.77(-2.06) 
1.16(2.06)* 
0.15(0.43) 
-2.28(-1.30) 
0.11(0.39) 
1.77(2.82)** 
0.22(1.21) 
-0.05(-0.60) 
-0.55(-1.01) 
-0.99(-1.46) 
 F-Test 2.92 1.35 0.89 3.34 1.65 6.11 1.21 1.33 
 Obs. 6503 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
 MFCE -0.32(-6.40)** 0.08(0.57) -0.01(-0.04) 0.15(1.40) -0.31(-2.23)* 0.03(0.12) -0.50(-2.30)* -0.95(-1.07) 
BTDA+ 
      (OLS) 
DYSM 
HHI 
0.25(0.95) 
-0.11(-0.96) 
1.41(1.92) 
0.73(0.94) 
0.13(0.20) 
2.54(1.12) 
0.65(1.10) 
0.86(-0.45) 
-0.24(-0.26) 
11.88(2.21)* 
-1.78(-1.21) 
-2.67(-1.44) 
0.93(-1.09) 
0.77(1.83) 
-3.27(-1.10) 
6.87(3.57)** 
 F-Test 23.33 2.34 0.76 2.24 4.21 1.13 2.01 8.33 
 Obs. 3600 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
 MFCE 0.002(0.06) 0.09(0.66) 0.02(0.20) 0.21(2.65)** -0.34(-2.47)* -0.05(-0.23) 0.13(0.87) -0.60(-0.58) 
BTDA++ 
      (FE) 
DYSM 
HHI 
0.23(0.98) 
0.001(0.00) 
1.03(2.15)* 
-0.15(-0.27) 
-0.39(-0.89) 
0.05(0.02) 
0.23(0.41) 
-0.58(-0.72) 
-0.20(-0.41) 
11.87(2.87)** 
-1.78(-1.67) 
-2.47(-1.02) 
-0.30(-1.43) 
0.14(0.92) 
-2.62(-0.83) 
3.98(1.74) 
 F-Test 5.57 1.85 0.28 4.05 3.07 2.59 6.61 1.43 
 Obs. 6503 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
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To further understand the mechanism between sector-level determinants and 
leverage, the book values of leverage are converted into median values. To assess the 
relationship between sector-level determinants and leverage, the estimated model is: 
                                                                  (5.4) 
where    is the median debt ratio for sector j in year t, with sector-level determinants 
such as munificence (MFCE), dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI). The sector-
fixed effects    control for cross-sectional differences across sectors. The disturbance 
term is denoted as     and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero. 
Based on Table 5.13, the balanced dataset explains the relationship between sector-
level variables and leverage from 2000 until 2007
10
. Based on the overall sample 
(refer Table 5.11), munificence and dynamism are negatively and significantly 
related to short-term debt and total debt. Long-term debt is correlated positively and 
significantly related to munificence, which is consistent with the recent findings of 
Kayo and Kimura (2011). These sector-level variables- munificence and dynamism - 
share a similar relationship with leverage. The results change (in terms of sign and 
size) as the firms are classified into sectors. Thus, munificence is related negatively 
to short-term debt of industrial product firms but positively across trade and services 
firms. The impact of munificence is greater within the trade and services sector 
compared to the industrial product sector. In accordance with Kayo and Kimura 
(2011), this variable maintains a positive association with long-term debt across the 
industrial product and plantation sectors and total debt amongst consumer product 
firms, which eventually supports the pecking order theory. Meanwhile, the 
technology firms have a tendency to reduce the utilization of total debt in their 
                                                          
10
This analysis excludes the first sub-period (from 1996 to 1999, which includes the financial crisis 
periods). These periods were used to forecast the first observation, i.e., for the year 2000 in the 
sector-level variable balanced dataset. 
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investment. This negative association further explains the applicability of agency 
theory. 
The importance of dynamism on short-term debt can be monitored across 
trade and services firms. However, this sector reacted differently (positively 
correlated to short-term debt) compared to other sectors in Malaysia except in the 
construction and property sectors. Although dynamism is insignificantly related with 
long-term debt in the overall sample, which is consistent Kayo and Kimura (2011), 
the sector-based analysis demonstrated the substance of this variable on long-term 
debt across the construction and trade and services sectors. These outcomes highlight 
the advantage of sectoral analysis compared to overall sample analysis, as the 
existence of diverse behaviour across sectors within a particular economy could be 
traced. Once again, different signs are discernible across sectors even though some of 
the sectors produce insignificant values. Big discrepancies in relationships are visible 
between dynamism and total debt across the consumer product and technology 
sectors. The influence of dynamism on total debt of technology firms is superior to 
consumer product firms. These results support the propositions of Simerly and Li 
(2000) who argue that the degree of environmental dynamism varies across sectors 
and this affects similar activities differently. 
Inconsistent with the Brander and Lewis (1986) and MacKay and Phillips 
(2005) findings, the construction sector upholds a positive correlation between HH 
index and leverage such as long-term and total debt. The reaction of the consumer 
product sector is different as this index increases, which is in line with the findings of 
Kayo and Kimura (2011). An equivalent situation is perceptible between this 
variable and short-term debt within the industrial product sector which has a positive 
relationship, whilst the trade and services and plantation sectors maintained a 
negative relationship. As a conclusion, all sector-level variables affect leverage 
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across sectors in Malaysia except for property. First, the behaviour between sector-
level variables and leverage varies across sectors, and the significance of these 
variables on leverage differs across sectors. For instance, these variables are strongly 
significantly related to total debt within the consumer product sector, whilst the trade 
and services sector is more responsive in adjusting their short-term debt as these 
variables change. The construction sector is more reactive in regulating their long-
term debt towards the sector-level variables. Secondly, the impact of these variables 
can be traced through the size of the coefficients although they are highly significant. 
Similar analyses were conducted on the unbalanced dataset to further 
understand the effect of sectoral behaviour on leverage. The results are entirely 
different from the prior analysis. This is mainly due to the inclusion in the 
unbalanced datasetof the financial crisis periods which were considered to be very 
influential periods that may affect the significance and mechanism between leverage 
and sector-level variables. As a result, comparison between both datasets is not 
possible. Based on the overall sample, Table 5.14 shows that none of the explanatory 
variables is significant with leverage. This analysis indirectly demonstrates that 
sectors may react differently compared to the overall sample. Munificence is merely 
significant with the short-term debt of plantation firms and the long-term debt of 
consumer product firms. The significance of this variable on total debt is observable 
across the consumer product, property and plantation sectors. 
The leverage of consumer product firms is highly receptive on dynamism. 
This variable also affects the short-term financing of plantation firms and long-term 
financing of property firms. In contrast, HH index tends to be an important variable 
in determining the amount of leverage. This variable is statistically significant with 
short-term debt in the industrial product, property, and trade and services sectors, 
with a comparable positive sign, whilst the plantation sector produces a negative 
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relationship. Similarly, the associations between the HH index and long-term debt 
are significant and vary across sectors except technology and trade and services. 
Apart from being highly significant, the total debt of the trade and services sector is 
strongly responsive to this variable and, correspondingly, to the industrial product 
and property sectors with large coefficients.  
As a whole, sector-level variables are strongly significant and produce 
substantial effects on leverage, particularly in the consumer product, property and 
plantation sectors. These variables are highly responsive to the short-term debt of the 
plantation sector and the long-term debt of the consumer product sector. The 
uniformity of different size and sign of coefficients across sectors validates the 
argument of sectoral characteristics on leverage determination. As the cross-section 
is fixed by sector, the HH index affects long-term debt positively in the balanced 
dataset, and this is consistent with the construction sector. A similar relationship is 
visible in the unbalanced dataset between munificence and total debt which is 
consistent with the consumer product and plantation sectors. 
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Table 5.13: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis on Sector-level determinants and Median Leverage based on Balanced and Unbalanced Sample 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.4) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes both balanced (+) and unbalanced (++) datasets across seven selected sectors. The dependent variables are 
book median leverage ratios (median of short-term debt to total asset (MEDBSDA), median of long-term debt to total asset (MEDBLDA) and median of total debt to total asset (MEDBTDA)). The independent variables are 
munificence (MFCE), dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * 
and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR. 
IND. VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
FIXED 
EFFECT 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 MFCE -1.15 (-3.32)** 0.15(-0.72) 0.15 (0.18) -0.93 (-4.51)** 0.19 (0.78) -0.36 (-0.75) -0.38 (-1.55) 1.10 (0.90) 1.39 (6.28)** 
MEDBSDA+ DYSM 
HHI 
-5.94 (-4.26)** 
0.36 (0.73) 
0.88(0.92) 
-1.36(-1.62) 
-0.54 (-0.23) 
-2.24 (-0.90) 
-1.25 (-0.95) 
6.64 (2.18)* 
1.68 (0.91) 
-0.67 (-0.81) 
2.51 (1.78) 
2.73 (1.28) 
-0.59 (-0.43) 
-4.40 (-2.98)** 
-4.31 (-0.47) 
-5.12 (-1.03) 
7.30 (8.66)** 
-9.42 (-4.67)** 
 F-Test 10.49 8.19 1.50 17.16 1.25 42.93 7.24 0.44 40.55 
 Obs. 84 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
 MFCE 0.04 (0.38) 0.11(1.96) 0.28 (1.65) -0.03 (-0.51) 0.04 (0.27) -0.10 (-1.40) 0.21 (5.31)** 0.12 (0.59) 0.96 (1.45) 
MEDBSDA++ DYSM 
HHI 
0.45 (0.94) 
-0.38 (-1.71) 
0.24(0.58) 
-0.04(-0.24) 
1.98 (2.98)** 
0.06 (0.07) 
-0.19 (-0.80) 
2.68 (2.29)* 
1.09 (1.75) 
-0.93 (-0.61) 
-0.07 (-0.11) 
6.39 (2.32)* 
-0.58 (-2.95)** 
-1.90 (-10.02)** 
-0.73 (-0.74) 
0.32 (0.76) 
-0.14 (-0.05) 
4.43 (2.27) * 
 F-Test 1.32 21.63 4.37 2.53 3.82 3.14 155.20 0.61 7.16 
 Obs. 84 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
 MFCE 0.32 (3.22)** 0.10(0.79) -0.22 (-0.50) 0.37 (2.89)** -0.26 (-2.62)** 0.55 (0.78) 0.24 (2.01)* -0.47 (-0.88) -0.29 (-0.74) 
MEDBLDA+ DYSM 
HHI 
0.88 (1.63) 
-0.15 (-0.99) 
-0.49(-1.08) 
0.81(2.08)* 
-0.32 (-0.27) 
0.56 (0.43) 
1.07 (1.52) 
-0.83 (-0.64) 
-1.88 (-2.22)* 
1.58 (2.93)** 
-0.30 (-0.12) 
-2.19 (-0.77) 
0.10 (0.13) 
1.85 (1.73) 
3.31 (0.78) 
2.16 (0.86) 
-3.31 (-2.07)* 
2.47 (0.87) 
 F-Test 3.51 11.55 0.09 7.67 7.67 1.24 8.25 0.17 2.21 
 Obs. 84 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
 MFCE -0.04 (-0.95) 0.02(0.95) 0.11 (3.57)** 0.06 (1.53) 0.02 (0.76) 0.07 (1.06) 0.15 (1.78) 0.01 (0.14) -0.19 (-0.85) 
MEDBLDA++ DYSM 
HHI 
-0.09 (-0.30) 
-0.04 (-0.27) 
-0.32(-1.69) 
0.19(1.39) 
0.28 (2.36)* 
-0.55 (-3.21)** 
-0.02 (-0.08) 
-1.30 (-2.07)* 
-0.13 (-0.45) 
1.91 (3.53)** 
0.83 (2.08)* 
-4.90 (-2.44)* 
0.32 (0.50) 
3.64 (7.90)** 
-0.11 (-0.21) 
0.08 (0.30) 
-0.91 (-1.11) 
-0.15 (-0.17) 
 F-Test 2.08 2.50 7.05 3.79 5.51 2.70 23.95 0.18 1.42 
 Obs. 84 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
 MFCE -0.48 (-2.25)* 0.06(0.34) 1.19 (5.21)** -0.30 (-0.78) -0.44 (-1.84) -0.05 (-0.09) 0.25 (1.69) -2.78 (-2.96)** 0.46 (1.08) 
MEDBTDA+ DYSM 
HHI 
-3.71 (-4.08)** 
-0.18 (-0.56) 
0.10(0.38) 
-0.12(-0.08) 
-0.88 (-2.56)* 
-4.03 (-5.60)** 
0.83 (0.53) 
2.92 (0.82) 
-1.50 (-0.72) 
2.45 (10.82)** 
0.34 (0.21) 
0.33 (0.15) 
0.25 (0.52) 
0.72 (0.74) 
11.35 (2.47)* 
-1.04 (-0.47) 
0.36 (0.27) 
-2.73 (-1.18) 
 F-Test 16.75 0.09 11.79 1.57 52.93 0.11 3.74 8.02 0.54 
 Obs. 84 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
 MFCE -0.03 (-0.19) 0.19(2.58) ** 0.32 (2.23)* 0.15 (1.63) 0.23 (1.90) -0.09 (-3.87)** 0.37 (2.51)* 0.06 (0.19) -0.14 (-0.63) 
MEDBTDA++ DYSM 
HHI 
0.36 (0.70) 
-0.44(-1.84 
-0.13(-0.23) 
0.15(0.79) 
1.07 (2.32)* 
0.77 (1.52) 
-0.24 (-0.53) 
3.66 (2.29)* 
0.88 (1.51) 
-1.64 (-1.24) 
0.15 (0.68) 
7.67 (8.36)** 
-2.09 (-1.92) 
0.40 (0.39) 
-0.88 (-0.55) 
0.49 (0.68) 
-1.62 (-1.68) 
4.69 (6.68) ** 
 F-Test 3.29 12.98 20.50 3.29 9.35 45.40 7.18 0.12 18.08 
 Obs. 84 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
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5.5 Country-level Determinants Analysis 
This section concentrates on the country-level determinants and their impact 
on the capital structure decision-making. The following equation (5.5) assesses the 
association between country-level determinants and capital structure over time, using 
both the pooled OLS and fixed effect analysis: 
                                                                                                   
                                                  
(5.5) 
where     is the debt ratio for firm i in year t, and the country-level variables are 
growth of GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), inflation (INF_CP), lending interest rates 
(LENDINT), liquid liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and stock total value to 
GDP(STV_GDP). The firm-fixed effects    control for cross-sectional differences 
across firms. The disturbance term is denoted as     and is assumed to be serially 
correlated with mean zero. Based on the overall balanced sample datasetusing firm-
level book leverage values, Table 5.15 shows that the lending interest rate is only 
significantly related to long-term debt across firms in Malaysia. Consistent with the 
market timing theory, this variable seems to be the most influential determinant that 
affects short-term debt and total debt positively, and this finding is in agreement with 
that of Deesomsak et al. (2004). Firms may shift from equity to debt financing as the 
interest rates increase due to incorporation of expected inflation (Diamond, 1991; 
Thies and Klock, 1992; Stein, 1998; Frank and Goyal, 2003 and Mat Nor et al., 
2011). However, this is inconsistent with the idea of Barry et al. (2008) who 
emphasized that firms will use more debt if the current interest rate is lower than past 
interest rates. In the case of the Malaysian sample, the largest proportion of total debt 
is dominated by short-term debt. Therefore, total debt tends to react similarly to the 
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movement of short-term debt. Most firms tend to increase their short-term debt, 
rather than their long-term debt, as the lending interest rates increase. Bokpin et al. 
(2009) found similar results between interest rates and short-term debt across 
emerging economies. Managers are reluctant to use debt when long-term interest 
rates amplify (Antoniou et al., 2008). 
Firms tend to increase their short-term debt as the growth of GDP per capita 
increases, which is inconsistent with the findings of Michaelas et al. (1999) and 
Feidakis and Rovolis (2007). On the other hand, most firms reduce the utilization of 
total debt as the stock market develops, and this finding is corroborated by other 
studies (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Frank 
and Goyal, 2009; Kayo and Kimura, 2011), and further supports the market timing 
theory hypothesis. Due to the strong association between firms’ financing choices 
and the role of financial market development, firms prefer to adopt equity financing 
rather than debt financing when stock market activity increases (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). From the sectors point of view, the lending interest rate affects the short-term 
debt positively but is only significant across the plantation and trade and services 
sectors. In contrast, this variable is meaningful in relation to total debt amongst 
property firms. Nevertheless, the impact of the lending interest rate is greater across 
plantation firms compared to the trade and services and property sectors. Equivalent 
to the overall sample, stock market development is associated with total debt and this 
variable is only significant within property firms. As the cross-section effectis fixed, 
Table 5.16 shows that a few explanatory variables started to react on leverage. Debt 
market development influences the short-term debt with different signs of 
coefficients predominantly across the construction, plantation, technology and trade 
and services sectors. For instance, as the debt market develops, the construction and 
plantation sectors increase short-term debt, whilst the other two sectors decrease their 
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consumption of short-term financing. Since the variable is measured with a proxy of 
liquid liability to GDP, a reduction in short-term debt across technology and trade 
and services sectors is possibly due to the rapid development of the bond market in 
Malaysia. Thus, these sectors might have started to raise their funds via the bond 
market. Conversely, the plantation firms tend to use more short-term debt financing 
as the debt market develops, and reduce long-term debt financing. As the lending 
interest rates increase, the property and technology sectors tend to increase their 
usage of short-term debt whilst the trade and services sector reduces the utilization of 
short-term debt in their investment. In general, firms may ignore the interest ratesif 
the borrowing level is well below their debt servicing capacity. The plantation firms 
tend to reduce long-term debt mainly because of the high borrowing cost. Thus, 
managers are reluctant to use long-term debt and probably shift to equity financing. 
Firms continue to be financed by short-term debt as the interest rate increases, but 
they avoid long-term debt financing (Bas et al., 2009). Despite similar relationships, 
the impact of this variable on total debt is greater in the property sector compared to 
the trade and services sector. 
The growth of GDP per capita significantly affects short-term debt in the 
plantation sector. These firms increase their short-term debt financing as the growth 
of GDP amplifies. The property sector reacted similarly and increases total debt. In 
relation to the trade-off theory, firms with higher economic growth will tend to use 
more debt financing (Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; de Jong et al., 
2008). Conversely, the construction sector reduces its long-term debt financing as 
this variable increases. This contradicts the findings of Michaelas et al. (1999) and 
Feidakis and Rovolis (2007) who found that growth in real GDP is positively related 
to long-term debt in European construction firms. The development of the stock 
market affects total debt and is significant among the industrial product, construction 
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and property firms. Once again, different associations are perceptible across sectors. 
Finally, inflation seems to be insignificantly related with leverage across sectors in 
Malaysia. As a whole, three country-level variables, namely, lending interest rates, 
stock market development, and debt market development, generate inconsistent 
relationships with leverage across sectors. To further understand the mechanism 
between country-level determinants and leverage from a sectoral perspective, the 
book values of leverage are converted to median values. Based on Table 5.17, 
growth of GDP per capita influences leverage positively across construction firms, 
and short-term debt amongst trade and services firms. As for lending interest rates 
and debt market development, a consistent result is visible within the plantation 
sector which reacted positively to short-term debt and inversely to long-term debt. A 
similar situation occurs between lending interest rates and total debt across property 
firms. This further corroborates the reaction of sectoral behaviour on the relationship 
between country-specific variables and leverage. 
Stock market development affects long-term debt across sectors, specifically 
among the consumer product, industrial product and property sectors, but in different 
directions. However, the effect of this variable on long-term debt is immaterial due to 
the diminutive power of the coefficients across sectors, although the variable is 
significant. This analysis also highlights the negative effect of inflation on short-term 
debt amongst trade and services firms. A comparable result is perceptible between 
this variable and total debt across the industrial product sector. These results are 
strongly consistent with the findings of Booth et al. (2001) who emphasizes that debt 
ratio decreases with high inflation due to higher interest rates and monetary risk. 
Lenders will protect themselves by adding an inflation premium into nominal interest 
rates, and firms are reluctant to borrow due to the high interest rates. Recently, Bas et 
al. (2009) found that inflation is negatively related to both total debt and short-term  
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Table 5.14: Pooled OLS Analysis on Country-level Determinants and Leverage within Balanced Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.5) using annual World Development Indicators of the World Bank data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term 
debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are Growth of GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), Inflation (INF_CP), 
Lending Interest Rates (LENDINT), Liquid Liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and Stock Market Value to GDP (STV_GDP). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. The t-values 
shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND.VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 GRGDPCH 0.01 (2.18)* 0.002 (0.27) 0.01 (0.93) 0.003(0.41) 0.01 (1.48) 0.01 (1.56) -0.01(-0.52) 0.01(1.33) 
 INF_CP -0.01(-1.16) -0.003 (-0.21) -0.01(-0.58) 0.01(0.59) -0.01(-1.10) -0.02(-1.26) -0.01(-0.28) -0.01(-0.83) 
 LENDINT 0.03(3.50)** 0.01 (0.78) 0.01(0.93) 0.02(1.09) 0.04(2.86)** 0.05 (2.92)** -0.02(-0.35) 0.02(2.55)* 
BSDA LIQLIAB_GDP 0.001(0.75) 0.001(0.31) 0.002(0.61) 0.04(1.00) -0.001(-0.45) -0.002(-0.58) -0.02(-1.34) 0.004(1.31) 
 STV_GDP -0.001 (-2.55)** -0.0001(-0.29) -0.001(-1.48) 0.0003(0.47) -0.001(-1.72) -0.001(-2.12) 0.002(0.14) -0.001(-1.15) 
 F-STAT 3.98 0.35 1.38 2.42 3.78 3.64 0.41 3.55 
 Obs. 3600 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
          
 GRGDPCH -0.001 (-0.73) -0.002 (-0.75) 0.0001(0.02) -0.01 (-1.44) 0.002(0.47) -0.01 (-0.92) -0.002(-0.28) -0.001(-0.33) 
 INF_CP -0.001 (-0.24) -0.0002(-0.04) -0.001 (-0.35) 0.001(0.24) -0.01(-0.75) -0.00001(-0.01) 0.01(0.86) 0.0002(0.03) 
 LENDINT -0.002 (-0.85) -0.004(-0.69) 0.003(0.70) -0.01 (-1.02) 0.01(0.78) -0.02(-1.48) -0.01(-0.80) -0.01(-1.12) 
BLDA LIQLIAB_GDP -0.001 (-0.64) -0.001(-0.55) 0.0002(0.22) -0.002 (-0.91) -0.001(-0.39) -0.01(-1.91) 0.003(1.04) -0.0001(-0.02) 
 STV_GDP -0.0001 (-0.50) 0.00004(0.16) -0.0001(-0.53) 0.0004(1.07) -0.0004(-1.27) 0.0002(0.36) 0.0004(0.75) -0.0001(-0.31) 
 F-STAT 1.96 0.35 0.35 0.66 0.68 1.73 0.26 2.02 
 Obs. 3600 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
          
 GRGDPCH 0.01 (1.84) -0.0004(-0.06) 0.01 (0.92) -0.003 (-0.44) 0.01(1.53) 0.04(1.27) -0.01(-0.61) 0.01(0.89) 
 INF_CP -0.01 (-1.21) -0.003(-0.20) -0.01(-0.64) 0.01(0.73) -0.02(-1.29) -0.03(-0.80) 0.01(0.13) -0.01(-0.78) 
 LENDINT 0.02(3.12)** 0.01(0.42) 0.02(1.12) 0.01(0.52) 0.05(2.90)** 0.1(1.67) -0.03(-0.57) 0.02(1.72) 
BTDA LIQLIAB_GDP 0.001 (0.49) 0.0002(0.05) 0.003(0.66) 0.002(0.44) -0.002(-0.60) -0.004(-0.37) -0.01(-0.99) 0.003(1.23) 
 STV_GDP -0.001 (-2.68)** -0.0001(-0.20) -0.001(-1.62) 0.001 (1.18) -0.002(-2.10)* -0.004(-1.31) 0.001(0.35) -0.001(-1.31) 
 F-STAT 3.26 0.15 1.65 3.09 2.67 1.62 0.30 1.69 
 Obs. 3600 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
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Table 5.15: Fixed Effect Analysis on Country-level Determinants and Leverage within Balanced Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.5) using annual World Development Indicators of the World Bank data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-
term debtto total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are Growth of GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), Inflation (INF_CP), 
Lending Interest Rates (LENDINT), Liquid Liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and Stock Market Value to GDP (STV_GDP). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. The t-values 
shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND.VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 GRGDPCH 0.005(3.26)** 0.002(0.47) 0.01(1.85) 0.003(0.88) 0.01(1.68) 0.05(1.08) -0.01(-0.72) 0.01(2.21) 
 INF_CP -0.002(-0.94) -0.002(-0.97) -0.01(-1.23) 0.01(1.69) -0.01(-1.37) -0.03(-0.91) -0.01(-0.38) -0.01(-1.36) 
 LENDINT 0.02(6.29)** 0.01(0.93) 0.01(1.47) 0.02(1.31) 0.04(2.66)** 0.12(1.24) -0.02(-0.27) 0.03(2.98)** 
BSDA LIQLIAB_GDP 0.002(2.77)** 0.001(0.41) 0.003(0.85) 0.004(1.88) -0.002(-0.65) 0.0004(0.13) -0.02(-1.54) 0.004(2.05)* 
 STV_GDP -0.0001(-1.03) -0.0001(-0.53) -0.001(-2.31)* 0.0003(0.89) -0.001(-1.76) -0.004(-0.97) 0.0001(0.22) -0.001(-1.89) 
 F-STAT 20.45 0.40 1.49 2.08 2.20 5.57 4.74 2.14 
 Obs. 3600 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
 
 GRGDPCH -0.001(-1.05) -0.0002(-1.11) 0.0001(0.03) -0.01(-2.44)* 0.002(0.64) -0.01(-1.25) -0.002(-0.46) -0.001(-0.49) 
 INF_CP -0.001(-0.36) -0.0002(-0.007) -0.001(-0.48) 0.002(0.42) -0.01(-1.07) -0.0001(-0.02) 0.01(0.90) 0.0002(0.04) 
 LENDINT -0.002(-1.23) -0.004(-1.01) 0.003(0.97) -0.01(-1.68) 0.01(1.06)  -0.02(-1.10) -0.01(-1.13) -0.01(-1.65) 
BLDA LIQLIAB_GDP -0.0004(-0.94) -0.001(-0.82) 0.003(0.30) -0.002(-1.57) -0.001(-0.55) -0.01(-4.19)** 0.004(1.33) -0.00004(-0.04) 
 STV_GDP -0.0001(-0.70) 0.0004(0.22) -0.0001(-0.72) 0.0004(1.62) -0.0004(-1.73) 0.0002(0.36) 0.0004(1.15) -0.0001(-0.44) 
 F-STAT 3.37 0.62 0.63 1.78 1.29 3.71 0.53 4.23 
 Obs. 3600 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
 
 GRGDPCH 0.01(2.49)* -0.0004(-0.12) 0.01(1.23) -0.003(-0.83) 0.01(2.00)* 0.04(0.97) -0.01(-0.86) 0.01(1.73) 
 INF_CP -0.01(-1.95) -0.003(-0.41) -0.02(-1.09) 0.01(2.50)* -0.02(-1.86) -0.03(-0.91) 0.01(0.20) -0.01(-1.67) 
 LENDINT 0.02(4.17)** 0.01(0.79) 0.02(1.48) 0.01(0.99) 0.05(2.96)** 0.10(1.08) -0.03(-0.80) 0.02(2.18)* 
BTDA LIQLIAB_GDP 0.001(0.69) 0.0002(0.09) 0.003(0.94) 0.002(0.82) -0.002(-0.88) -0.005 (-2.03)* -0.01(-.145) 0.004(1.70) 
 STV_GDP -0.001(-3.55)** -0.0001(-0.35) -0.001(-2.15)* 0.001(2.00)* -0.002(-2.36)* -0.004(-0.93) 0.001(0.48) -0.001(-2.29)* 
 F-STAT 4.57 0.51 2.01 6.20 5.97 2.42 0.58 3.58 
 Obs. 3600 480 1176 252 540 216 108 828 
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Table 5.16: OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis on Country-level Determinants and Median Leverage within Balanced Sample 
The table presents estimates of equation (1) using annual World Development Indicators of the World Bank data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variables are book median leverage ratios (median of short-term 
debt to total asset (MEDBSDA), median of long-term debt to total asset (MEDBLDA) and median of total debt to total asset (MEDBTDA)). The independent variables are Growth of GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), 
Inflation (INF_CP), Lending Interest Rates (LENDINT), Liquid Liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and Stock Market Value to GDP (STV_GDP). Refer to Table 4.2and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-
values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND.VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
FIXED 
EFFECT 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 GRGDPCH 0.002(0.47) 0.002(1.71) 0.003 (1.94) -0.001(-0.27) 0.005(3.43)** -0.001(-0.56) 0.01(1.61) -0.001(-0.17) 0.003(3.11)** 
 INF_CP 0.0003(0.02) 0.0003(0.09) 0.003(0.54) 0.01(0.66) 0.05(0.46) -0.001(-0.05) 0.01(0.90) -0.01(-0.15) -0.02(-3.02)** 
MED LENDINT 0.02 (1.67) 0.02(1.76) 0.01(1.11) 0.002(0.39) -0.003(-0.42) 0.01(0.74) 0.06(6.88)** 0.005(0.25) 0.03(9.55)** 
BSDA LIQLIAB_GDP 0.003(0.93) 0.003(1.44) 0.004(2.56)* 0.003(1.64) -0.0002(-0.08) 0.004(1.20) 0.02(3.61)** -0.001(-0.15) -0.002(-1.03) 
 STV_GDP 0.0003(0.92) 0.0003(1.99) 0.00001(0.53) 0.0003(1.14) 0.0001(0.40) 0.0004(1.88) 0.001(3.50)** 0.0003(0.58) -0.0001(-0.73) 
 F-STAT 1.42 3.67 3.51 1.95 4.80 1.76 28.92 0.65 26.61 
 Obs. 84 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
           
 GRGDPCH 0.0003(0.27) 0.0003(0.97) 0.00001(0.16) 0.0002(0.34) 0.001(0.58) 0.001(0.62) -0.001(-0.60) 0.001(0.31) 0.001(0.64) 
 INF_CP -0.0003(-0.08) -0.0003(-0.17) -0.002 (-0.99) -0.001(-0.37) 0.01(0.45) -0.01(-1.25) -0.004(-0.31) 0.004(0.19) 0.003(0.46) 
MED LENDINT -0.003(-1.06) -0.003(-0.97) -0.001(-0.23) 0.001(0.58) -0.002(-0.28) 0.01(1.42) -0.02(-2.71)** 0.0001(0.01) -0.01(-1.41) 
BLDA LIQLIAB_GDP -0.002(-1.92) -0.003(-2.80)** -0.001(-0.62) -0.001(-1.42) -0.002(-0.64) -0.004(-2.14)* -0.01(-3.14)** -0.001(-0.12) -0.003(-1.61) 
 STV_GDP -0.0002(-2.19)* -0.002(-2.66)** 0.0001(2.17)* -0.0001(-2.06)* -0.0001(-0.94) -0.001(-2.72)** -0.0004(-1.99) -0.0002(-0.63) -0.0002(-1.94) 
 F-STAT 1.98 9.71 4.09 1.75 0.79 21.84 17.72 0.32 2.67 
 Obs. 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
           
 GRGDPCH 0.002(0.56) 0.002(1.55) -0.0002(-0.36) 0.0003(0.26) 0.01(5.99)** 0.002(1.23) 0.002(0.67) 0.01(0.92) -0.002(-2.00)* 
 INF_CP -0.004(-0.35) -0.004(-1.19) -0.003(-0.06) -0.01(-2.24)* 0.01(0.49) -0.0002(-0.05) -0.005(-0.36) -0.02(-0.47) -0.003(-0.42) 
MED LENDINT 0.02(1.93) 0.02(4.09)** 0.001(0.21) 0.01(3.06)** 0.03(2.72)** 0.02(6.23)** 0.01(1.49) 0.02(1.03) 0.01(4.11)** 
BTDA LIQLIAB_GDP -0.002(-0.56) -0.002(-1.21) 0.001(0.57) -0.0002(-0.09) 0.0004(0.15) -0.001(-0.48) -0.001(-0.42) -0.01(-1.42) -0.001(-0.48) 
 STV_GDP -0.0003(-0.90) -0.0003(-2.62)* -0.0002(-0.30) -0.0002(-1.23) -0.0001(-0.73) -0.0002(-1.63) -0.0003(-1.15) -0.001(-1.43) -0.0003(-2.21)* 
 F-STAT 0.98 11.94 0.47 3.13 20.09 17.44 2.58 1.07 16.67 
 Obs. 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
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debt, while positively related to long-term debt. The fixed effect analysis shows that 
capital market development, such as debt and stock market development, is 
negatively related to long-term debt. This indirectly provides evidence that most of 
the sectors are diverting into the bond market in order to raise their long-term 
financing. Besides that, each sector tends to raise their total leverage as the lending 
interest rates increase while reducing equity financing through the stock market. 
These results are robust as the dependent variables were also converted into average 
values, although the results are not reported in this study. 
Compared to the balanced dataset, parallel outcomes are noticeable in the 
unbalanced overall sample with minor additional significant variables. Once again, 
Table 5.18 shows that none of the explanatory variables influences the determination 
of leverage except debt market condition that controls long-term debt within 
plantation firms. Most of these variables affect leverage, predominantly across 
property and trade and services firms. Lending interest rates consistently remained 
the dominant factor in the property, technology and trade and services sectors. The 
property sector responded negatively towards the stock market development, by 
reduce their consumption of leverage and raising their equity financing. Trade and 
services firms expand their leverage as the debt market conditions progress. 
A few interesting results are discernible, particularly between explanatory variables 
and long-term debt, as the cross-sectional effect is fixed. As shown in Table 5.19, the 
growth of GDP per capita and debt market development have become important to 
long-term debt among the selected sectors exclusively within the consumer product 
and construction sectors. Apart from long-term debt, the overall sample results 
remained consistent with the prior data set. Long-term debt is negatively and 
significantly related to lending interest rates, growth of GDP per capita and debt 
market conditions. Consistencies of outcome are observable between both datasets 
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and in the construction, property, technology and trade and services sectors. The 
indirect effect of the sector on the relationship between country-related factors and 
leverage remained constant, regardless of the number of firms included in the 
dataset. Besides that, this datasetalso shows the variations across sectors through 
different signs of coefficients. As the debt markets picked up, the construction sector 
increased its short-term debt financing, whilst the technology sector reduced it and 
opted for other financing sources. Correspondingly, the construction firms tend to 
move together with stock market development, whilst the property and trade and 
services firms reduce their usage of total debt and raise equity financing.  
The relationship between the growth of GDP per capita and total debt differs 
between the construction and property sectors. Equivalent to the balanced dataset’s 
analysis, to further capture the impact of sectoral characteristics on the relationship 
between leverage and country-level determinants, the dependent variables are 
transformed into median values. This investigation generates some interesting 
outcomes compared to the previous analysis. Based on results in Table 5.20, the 
country-level determinants started to react significantly towards leverage, 
specifically among the consumer product and industrial product sectors. Lending 
interest rates became significant with all types of leverage, as this variable 
persistently affects leverage across all sectors. The long-term debt of both sectors 
responds negatively to the debt market conditions and the growth of GDP per capita. 
The effect of inflation on total debt varies between construction and technology 
firms. As the inflation rate increases, construction firms raise their total leverage, 
whereas the technology firms move in the opposite direction. This positive 
relationship supports the findings of Taggart (1986) and Frank and Goyal (2009), 
who found a positive association between inflation and debt financing. Leverage 
increases as the tax advantage of corporate debt increases together with inflation. 
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In contrast, the negative association is consistent with the findings of Beck et 
al. (2008) who argue that inflation has a negative effect on the overall reliance on 
external finance and, thus, lessens the use of bank and supplier finance. Similarly, the 
performance of the stock market influences total debt differently across sectors. Both 
the consumer product and construction sectors increase their total leverage as the 
stock market builds up. This is not the case for the property and trade and services 
sectors, which reduce leverage and raise equity to finance their investment. As the 
cross-section is fixed, lending interest rates remained significant with both short-term 
debt and total debt. Stock market conditions consistently influence the determination 
of the long-term debt and total debt. Once again, these results are robust as the 
dependent variables were also converted into average values although the results are 
not reported in this study. 
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Table 5.17: Pooled OLS Analysis on Country-level Determinants and Leverage within Unbalanced Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.5) using annual World Development Indicators of the World Bank data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios 
(short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are Growth of GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), Inflation 
(INF_CP), Lending Interest Rates (LENDINT), Liquid Liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and Stock Market Value to GDP (STV_GDP). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables 
definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND.VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 GRGDPCH 0.01(3.31)** 0.002(0.45) 0.004(0.99) 0.002(0.35) 0.02(2.28)* 0.03(1.68) 0.003(0.27) 0.01(1.76) 
 INF_CP -0.01(-1.34) -0.001(-0.20) -0.002(-0.46) 0.01(0.60) -0.01(-1.39) -0.01(-0.47) -0.01(-0.88) -0.01(-0.66) 
 LENDINT 0.03(5.44)** 0.01(1.86) 0.02(1.99) 0.01(0.94) 0.05(3.44)** 0.08(1.97) 0.05(2.12)* 0.03(2.57)* 
BSDA STV_GDP -0.001(-2.89)** 0.0001(0.35) -0.0005(-1.33) 0.0002(0.40) -0.001(-2.41)* -0.003(-1.46) -0.0001(-0.15) -0.001(-1.44) 
 LIQLIAB_GDP 0.003(2.14)* 0.001(0.42) 0.0003(0.14) 0.005(1.61) 0.001(0.33) 0.004(0.49) 0.001(0.21) 0.01(2.16)* 
 F-STAT 15.06 3.62 1.29 1.85 4.45 1.97 3.47 5.85 
 Obs. 6503 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
 
 GRGDPCH -0.001(-0.79) -0.002(-1.36) -0.001(-0.62) -0.004(-1.35) -0.003(-1.22) -0.01(-1.20) 0.001(0.28) 0.002(0.60) 
 INF_CP -0.001(-0.47) 0.0003(0.08) -0.001(-0.32) 0.003(0.56) 0.002(0.39) -0.004(-0.67) -0.001(-0.72) -0.001(-0.17) 
 LENDINT 0.0003(0.14) -0.004(-1.11) 0.001(0.41) -0.01(-0.87) -0.01(-1.30) -0.01(-1.13) 0.01(1.30) -0.001(-0.23) 
BLDA STV_GDP -0.0004(-0.43) 0.0001(0.80) -0.00004(-0.25) 0.0003(1.03) 0.0001(0.44) 0.0000(0.07) -0.0002(-0.57) -0.0003(-1.06) 
 LIQLIAB_GDP -0.001(-1.41) -0.001(-1.19) -0.001(-1.68) -0.002(-1.28) -0.001(-0.59) -0.01(-2.73)** 0.003(1.04) 0.00004(0.03) 
 F-STAT 0.63 0.80 0.75 1.00 0.86 2.63 2.02 1.54 
 Obs. 6503 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
 
 GRGDPCH 0.01(2.88)** -0.001(-0.17) 0.003(0.65) -0.002(-0.44) 0.01(1.77) 0.03(1.42) 0.004(0.38) 0.01(2.01)* 
 INF_CP -0.01(-1.45) -0.001(-0.15) -0.003(-0.55) 0.01(0.84) -0.01(-1.03) -0.02(-0.61) -0.02(-1.08) -0.01(-0.73) 
 LENDINT 0.03(5.32)** 0.01(1.19) 0.02(2.04) 0.004(0.41) 0.04(2.84)** 0.07(1.71) 0.06(2.61)** 0.03(2.48)* 
BTDA STV_GDP -0.001(-2.95)** 0.0003(0.67) -0.001(-1.33) 0.001(1.09) -0.001(-2.15)* -0.003(-1.43) -0.0004(-0.38) -0.001(-1.91) 
 LIQLIAB_GDP 0.002(1.52) -0.0002(-0.11) -0.001(-0.46) 0.002(0.78) 0.0002(0.05) -0.002(-0.19) 0.004(0.65) 0.01(2.20)* 
 F-STAT 12.55 2.61 1.08 2.22 2.61 0.93 5.19 5.15 
 Obs. 6503 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
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Table 5.18: Fixed Effect Analysis on Country-level Determinants and Leverage within Unbalanced Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.5) using annual World Development Indicators of the World Bank data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-
term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are Growth of GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), Inflation (INF_CP), 
Lending Interest Rates (LENDINT), Liquid Liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and Stock Market Value to GDP (STV_GDP). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values 
shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND.VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 GRGDPCH 0.01(2.81)** 0.0001(0.26) 0.001(0.27) 0.001(0.38) 0.02(2.54)* 0.03(1.27) -0.002(-0.46) 0.01(2.29)* 
 INF_CP -0.004(-1.72) -0.001(-0.80) -0.001(-0.26) 0.01(2.21)* -0.01(-1.61) -0.01(-0.60) -0.01(-0.61) -0.01(-1.02) 
 LENDINT 0.02(3.61)** 0.001(1.39) 0.01(0.96) 0.01(0.90) 0.05(2.99)** 0.08(1.33) 0.02(0.92) 0.02(2.42)* 
BSDA LIQLIAB_GDP 0.001(1.38) 0.0004(0.03) -0.001(-0.55) 0.004(2.29)* 0.001(0.44) 0.003(1.72) -0.004(-2.40)* 0.01(1.78) 
 STV_GDP -0.001(-2.71) 0.00001(0.32) -0.0003(-1.25) 0.0004(1.45) -0.001(-2.39)* -0.003(-1.13) 0.0003(0.45) -0.001(-2.05)* 
 Adj. R² 0.05 0.02 0.003 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01 
 F-STAT 3.30 1.02 0.38 2.05 2.53 6.50 6.23 1.94 
 Obs. 6503 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
 
 GRGDPCH -0.002(-4.16)** -0.003(-3.27)** -0.221(-1.49) -0.01(-2.89)** -0.003(-1.48) -0.005(-1.42) -0.005(-2.39)* -0.001(-0.92) 
 INF_CP -0.0004(-0.46) 0.0001(0.08) -0.001(-0.43) 0.003(1.09) 0.0002(0.07) -0.01(-1.58) -0.001(-0.11) -0.0001(-0.05) 
 LENDINT 0.01(-2.72)** -0.01(-1.95) -0.001(-0.46) -0.01(-1.40) -0.005(-0.97) -0.01(-0.59) -0.01(-1.15) -0.01(-1.63) 
BLDA LIQLIAB_GDP -0.002(-4.42)** -0.001(-2.11)* -0.001(-1.99) -0.003(-2.24)* -0.001(-0.99) -0.01(-4.85)** -0.001(-0.40) -0.0001(-1.36) 
 STV_GDP -0.00001(-0.20) 0.0001(1.28) -0.00003(-0.33) 0.0003(1.73) -0.0001(-0.28) -0.0005(-0.13) 0.0001(0.52) -0.0002(-1.11) 
 Adj. R² 0.0002 0.003 0.001 0.01 0.005 0.04 0.01 0.003 
 F-STAT 8.82 2.57 1.92 2.07 3.16 5.77 1.29 2.36 
 Obs. 6503 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
 
 GRGDPCH 0.003(1.64) -0.003(-1.39) -0.001(-0.28) -0.004(-2.04)* 0.01(2.28)* 0.03(1.10) -0.01(-1.49) 0.01(1.90) 
 INF_CP -0.01(-1.91) -0.001(-0.71) -0.001(-0.46) 0.01(3.17)** -0.01(-1.74) -0.02(-0.87) -0.01(-1.08) -0.01(-1.07) 
 LENDINT 0.02(2.68)** 0.002(0.34) 0.01(0.75) 0.001(0.06) 0.04(2.91)** 0.08(1.24) 0.01(0.44) 0.01(1.36) 
BTDA LIQLIAB_GDP -0.0004(-0.43) -0.001(-0.93) -0.002(-1.57) 0.001(0.35) -0.0001(-0.06) -0.002(-0.94) -0.01(-1.78) 0.004(1.36) 
 STV_GDP -0.001(-2.80)** 0.0002(1.01) -0.004(-1.34) 0.001(2.77)** -0.001(-2.72)** -0.003(-1.16) 0.0004(0.78) -0.001(-2.51)* 
 Adj. R² 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 F-STAT 1.88 2.51 1.00 5.13 2.59 1.53 4.53 1.84 
 Obs. 6503 1053 2119 434 791 345 417 1344 
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Table 5.19: OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis on Country-level Determinants and Median Leverage within Unbalanced Sample 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.5) using annual World Development Indicators of the World Bank data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variables are average book median leverage ratios (median of 
short-term debt to total asset (MEDBSDA), median of long-term debt to total asset (MEDBLDA) and median of total debt to total asset (MEDBTDA)). The independent variables are Growth of GDP per capita 
(GRGDPCH), Inflation (INF_CP), Lending Interest Rates (LENDINT), Liquid Liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and Stock Market Value to GDP (STV_GDP). Refer Table to 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. 
The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP. 
VAR 
IND.VAR OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
FIXED 
EFFECT 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 GRGDPCH 0.01(1.00) 0.01(5.08) 0.001(0.36) 0.01(1.76) 0.01(0.97) 0.01(3.53)** 0.003(1.19) 0.01(1.50) 0.01(2.41)* 
 INF_CP -0.003(-0.34) -0.003(-1.52) -0.003(-0.56) -0.01(-1.44) -0.01(-0.47) -0.004(-1.27) 0.01(1.53) -0.01(-1.70) -0.002(-0.31) 
MED LENDINT 0.02(2.02)* 0.02(5.75)** 0.01(2.80)** 0.01(2.35)* 0.02(2.09)** 0.02(5.14)** 0.01(2.71)** 0.04(5.49)** 0.03(4.24)** 
BSDA LIQLIAB_GDP 0.001(0.42) 0.001(1.60) -0.001(-0.94) -0.0004(-0.39) 0.003(1.01) 0.002(1.91) 0.003(2.17)* -0.0004(-0.18) 0.002(1.40) 
 STV_GDP -0.0001(-0.23) -0.0001(-0.91) 0.0002(0.71) -0.0004(-1.45) -0.0001(-0.29) -0.001(-2.60)** 0.0003(1.59) -0.0004(-0.11) -0.0003(-0.97) 
 F-STAT 3.03 39.08 13.99 2.90 6.32 9.03 42.99 37.42 15.71 
 Obs. 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
           
 GRGDPCH -0.004(-1.64) -0.004(-2.99)** -0.003(-2.90)** -0.003(-2.44)* -0.003(-0.97) -0.01(-2.18)* -0.01(-1.24) -0.003(-1.32) -0.0003(-0.10) 
 INF_CP 0.0002(0.04) 0.0002(0.31) 0.002(1.21) 0.0004(0.18) -0.001(-0.09) -0.001(-0.29) -0.001(-0.08) 0.0003(0.07) 0.002(0.55) 
MED LENDINT -0.01(-1.45) -0.01(-1.48) -0.01(-3.56)** -0.004(-2.10)* -0.002(-0.35) -0.01(-1.41) -0.03(-1.93) 0.01(1.76) -0.01(-0.92) 
BLDA LIQLIAB_GDP -0.002(-1.67) -0.002(-1.84) -0.001(-2.44)* -0.002(-4.49)** -0.003(-1.90) -0.002(-1.52) -0.01(-1.96) 0.02(1.57) -0.0002(-0.17) 
 STV_GDP 0.0002(0.97) 0.0002(3.36)** 0.0002(3.03)** 0.0001(1.21) 0.0001(0.71) 0.0001(0.67) 0.0004(0.49) 0.0004(2.12)* 0.0002(0.11) 
 F-STAT 1.09 68.88 5.72 8.53 2.52 2.36 8.24 24.38 1.73 
 Obs. 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
           
 GRGDPCH 0.002(0.32) 0.002(1.33) -0.002(-1.72) 0.0004(0.17) 0.002(0.98) 0.003(2.23)* 0.01(0.32) -0.003(-0.40) 0.01(3.78)** 
 INF_CP -0.001(-0.05) -0.001(-0.13) 0.0003(0.08) -0.004(-0.65) 0.01(2.36)* -0.001(-0.90) 0.01(0.47) -0.02(-2.34)* 0.000(0.01) 
MED LENDINT 0.02(1.44) 0.02(3.28)** 0.01(2.04)* 0.02(3.19)** 0.01(3.89)** 0.03(7.21)** 0.002(0.06) 0.05(4.12)** 0.03(7.40)** 
BTDA LIQLIAB_GDP 0.0001(0.05) 0.0002(0.18) -0.001(-1.65) -0.003(-1.88) 0.002(2.74)** -0.001(-0.82) -0.001(-0.14) 0.003(1.18) 0.002(1.64) 
 STV_GDP 0.000(0.02) 0.00001(0.05) 0.001(4.10)** -0.0002(-1.12) 0.001(3.65)** -0.0004(-3.81)** 0.00001(0.01) 0.001(1.07) -0.001(-5.25)** 
 F-STAT 2.07 216.13 45.78 10.53 49.60 185.84 0.27 252.89 21.58 
 Obs. 84 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
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5.6 Overall Regression Analysis 
This final section combined all the models into a single model that assesses 
the relationship between the capital structure determinants, namely, firm-level, 
sector-level and country-level determinants, and different types of leverage. The 
estimated equation is as follows: 
                                                      
                                                                       
                                                                           
                                                                                
                                                                                                                                                       (5.6) 
where      is the debt ratio, that is, theshort-term debt, long-term debt and total debt, 
for firm i within sector j in year t, the firm-level determinants are tangibility 
(TANGIB), profitability (EBITTA), growth opportunities (GRWTH), non-debt tax 
shield (NTDS), liquidity (LIQ), size (LNSALES) and risk (RISK), the sector-level 
determinants are munificence (MFCE), dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI), and 
the country-level determinants are growth of GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), inflation 
(INF_CP), lending interest rate (LENDINT), liquid liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) 
and stock value to GDP (STV_GDP).As for the unbalanced dataset, the growth 
variable is replaced by the market-to-book ratio (MTBR) as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. The firm-fixed effects      control for cross-sectional differences 
across firms, whilst the sector-fixed effect      controls for cross-sectional 
differences across sectors. The disturbance term is denoted as      and is assumed to 
be serially uncorrelated with mean zero. As shown in Table 5.21, the balanced 
datasetconfirms the importance of profitability, risk and growth on short-term debt. 
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Conversely, the unbalanced dataset highlights the importance of liquidity, non-tax 
debt shield and tangibility, while maintaining the substance of profitability and risk. 
Being statistically significant at the 5% level, the large coefficient size confirms the 
importance of non-tax debt shield on short-term debt across Malaysian firms. 
However, profitability and risk tend to be the most important variable in 
determining the level of short-term debt, as they are significant at the 1% level across 
both datasets. At the firm-level, long-term debt is highly sensitive on non-tax debt 
shield and significant at the 1% level, while maintaining the negative relationship. 
The balanced dataset further confirms the importance of tangibility on long-term 
debt, followed by profitability and, finally, risk with a diminutive effect. The sector’s 
concentration level tends to be important in the determination process of long-term 
debt, with a greater effect demonstrated via the size of coefficients. The utilization of 
long-term debt is highly dependent on the economic growth of Malaysia. The liquid 
debt market development also influences the level of long-term debt. In line with 
short-term debt, profitability and risk becomes the major variables that determine the 
amount of total debt although the impact of profitability is greater than that of risk. 
The significance of the explanatory variables is observable in the unbalanced dataset.  
At the firm-level, profitability and risk remained significant on short-term 
debt at the 1% level. Liquidity seems to be important although the impact is not as 
large as the other two variables that contribute a greater impact on short-term debt. 
The effect of tangibility and non-tax debt shield can be seen although these variables 
are significant at the 5% level. Consistent with the previous dataset, it is undeniable 
that the impact of non-tax debt shield is enormous.  
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Table 5.20: Regression Analysis on Firm-level, Sector-level and Country-level 
        Determinants based on Balanced and Unbalanced Datasets 
The table presents estimates of equation (5.6) using annual OSIRIS and World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variables are book average leverage ratios (short-
term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). 
The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt 
shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH), risk (RISK), Munificence (MFCE), 
Dynamism (DYSM), HHI (HH Index), Growth of GDP per capita (GRGDPCH), Inflation (INF_CP), Lending 
Interest Rates (LENDINT), Liquid Liability to GDP (LIQLIAB_GDP) and Stock Market Value to GDP 
(STV_GDP). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The balanced panel data includes 
300 non-financial firms from 2000 until 2007, while the unbalanced data covers 815 non-financial firms that 
survived from 1996 until 2007. The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust 
to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
Balanced  
OLS 
Balanced  
FE 
Unbalanced  
OLS 
Unbalanced 
FE 
 LIQ -0.01(-2.52)* -0.003(-1.61) -0.01(-3.93)** -0.004(-3.13)** 
 TANGIB -0.02(-0.11) 0.20(0.47) -0.24(-10.54)** -0.17(-2.48)* 
 EBITTA -0.85(-4.29)** -0.43(-3.34)** -0.51(-6.31)** -0.38(-6.20)** 
 NTDS 2.89(3.09)** 4.54(1.96) -0.80(1.60) 2.39(2.05)* 
 LNSALES -0.04(-2.59)** -0.18(-1.83) -0.01(-0.64) -0.05(-1.49) 
 GRWTH 
RISK 
0.001(0.47) 
0.03(4.23)** 
-0.02(-2.14)* 
0.01(3.29)** 
-0.0001(-1.77) 
0.33(2.71)** 
0.000(0.36) 
0.27(3.18)** 
 MFCE -0.23(-0.99) 0.29(0.78) -0.18(-3.21)** 0.08(0.71) 
BSDA DYSM 
HHI 
-2.19(-2.36)* 
0.17(0.97) 
1.31(1.59) 
-1.66(-1.27) 
-0.87(-3.12)** 
0.35(2.83)** 
-0.34(-1.66) 
0.11(1.20) 
 GRGDPCH 0.01(1.02) -0.00(-0.15) 0.01(2.37)* 0.004(1.99) 
 INF_CP -0.01(-1.01) -0.003(-0.73) -0.002(-0.62) -0.004(-1.26) 
 LENDINT 0.01(0.23) -0.03(-0.61) 0.02(4.17)** 0.01(2.17)* 
 LIQLIAB_GDP 0.002(0.63) -0.002(-0.57) 0.002(1.96) 0.001(0.66) 
 STV_GDP 0.000(0.50) 0.001(1.56) 0.0002(0.12) -0.0001(-0.88) 
 F-STAT 9.92 10.55 23.05 4.69 
 Obs. 2400 2400 6501 6501 
      
 LIQ -0.0001(-0.48) -0.0001(-0.35) -0.0001(-0.62) 0.001(3.47)** 
 TANGIB 0.26(14.34)** 0.17(2.88)** 0.25(31.46)** 0.25(9.62)** 
 EBITTA -0.06(-1.95) -0.07(-2.13)* -0.12(-6.98)** -0.09(-4.87)** 
 NTDS -0.56(-3.59)** -0.85(-2.59)** -0.46(-6.42)** -0.53(-4.03)** 
 LNSALES 0.03(14.00)** 0.05(6.00) 0.03(26.71)** 0.04(8.03)** 
 GRWTH 
RISK 
0.002(0.69) 
0.002(2.08)* 
0.001(0.22) 
0.003(2.23)* 
0.0001(3.31)** 
-0.05(-2.76)** 
0.000(0.32) 
-0.05(-2.06)* 
 
BLDA 
MFCE 
DYSM 
HHI 
-0.14(-1.87) 
-0.60(-1.84) 
-0.04(-0.60) 
-0.07(-0.80) 
-0.34(-1.32) 
0.77(2.17)* 
-0.11(-5.16)** 
0.43(4.60)** 
-0.13(-3.32)** 
0.06(2.09)* 
0.004(0.05) 
-0.06(-1.27) 
 GRGDPCH 0.001(0.52) 0.004(2.75)** -0.002(-2.24)* 0.000(0.04) 
 INF_CP -0.002(-0.52) -0.002(-1.13) 0.001(0.90) -0.002(-1.77) 
 LENDINT -0.01(-1.52) -0.001(-0.18) -0.01(-3.12)** 0.001(0.47) 
 LIQLIAB_GDP 0.000(0.23) 0.002(2.09)* -0.001(-2.88)** -0.001(-1.67) 
 STV_GDP -0.000(-0.27) -0.0002(-1.38) 0.002(2.20)* -0.001(-2.10)* 
 F-STAT 40.83 5.20 133.09 14.62 
 Obs. 2400 2400 6501 6501 
      
 LIQ -0.01(-2.40)* -0.003(-1.74) -0.01(-3.74)** -0.003(-2.81)** 
 TANGIB 0.25(1.92) 0.37(0.94) 0.01(0.36) 0.08(1.10) 
 EBITTA -0.91(-4.58)** -0.51(-4.18)** -0.62(-7.63)** -0.47(-7.98)** 
 NTDS 2.33(2.70)** 3.69(1.71) 0.34(0.71) 1.85(1.68) 
 LNSALES -0.01(-0.59) -0.12(-1.29) 0.03(3.37)** -0.01(-0.32) 
 GRWTH 
RISK 
0.003(0.84) 
0.03(4.54)** 
-0.02(-1.77) 
0.02(4.13)** 
-0.000(-0.79) 
0.28(2.34)* 
0.000(0.56) 
0.22(2.93)** 
 
BTDA 
MFCE 
DYSM 
HHI 
-0.37(-1.56) 
-2.79(-2.90)** 
0.12(0.68) 
0.22(0.56) 
0.98(1.26) 
-0.90(-0.67) 
-0.29(-4.96)** 
-0.43(-1.50) 
0.21(1.68) 
0.14(1.30) 
-0.34(-1.68) 
0.05(0.57) 
 GRGDPCH 0.01(1.17) 0.003(0.86) 0.004(1.46) 0.004(2.09)* 
 INF_CP -0.01(-1.16) -0.01(-1.27) -0.001(-0.27) -0.01(-1.82) 
 LENDINT -0.004(-0.17) -0.03(-0.66) 0.01(2.75)** 0.01(2.37)* 
 LIQLIAB_GDP 0.003(0.69) 0.000(0.18) 0.001(0.78) -0.000(-0.07) 
 STV_GDP 0.002(0.37) 0.001(1.30) 0.002(0.98) -0.000(-1.61) 
 F-STAT 14.70 11.06 29.86 9.23 
 Obs. 2400 2400 6501 6501 
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At the country-level, lending interest rates become important and significant with 
short-term debt at the 5% level. Interestingly, most of the firm-level determinants 
(liquidity, profitability, tangibility, non-tax debt shield and risk) become significant 
at the 1% level.         
Once again, the level of non-tax debt shield seems to be the most dominant 
variable in determining the level of long-term debt across Malaysian non-financial 
firms. In the sector-level determinants context, most firms increase their long-term 
debt as the level of abundance of resources increases within their respective sector. 
The level of long-term debt is also significant and dependent on stock market 
development. Conversely, total debt is more sensitive to the growth of GDP and is 
significant at the 5% level. Despite that, the firm-level determinants (profitability, 
risk and liquidity) tend to be more powerful in deciding the appropriate amount of 
total debt. In general, short-term debt is highly influenced by profitability and risk. 
The impact of sector-level and country-level determinants is traceable on long-term 
debt, although the firm-level determinants maintained their significance level. A 
similar result is perceptible between the firm-level determinants, particularly 
profitability, risk and total debt. However, the macroeconomic variables tend to 
influence the total debt across Malaysian listed firms. This analysis provides an 
indication that firm-level variables tend to be the most influential determinants 
compared to sector-level and country-level variables. 
5.7 Model Selection Analysis 
Since the substance of sector-level and country-level determinants is unclear 
in the previous combined model, the following section concentrates on the model 
selection analysis using an Artificial Nested Testing Procedure. This test selects the 
CHAPTER 5 
 
192 
 
preferred model based on the F-test
11
. Generally, this study focuses on the three 
different levels of determinants, firm-level, sector-level and country-level 
determinants that affect leverage. Model 1 (M1) contains the entire determinants that 
are related to firm-level variables including (e.g., profitability, tangibility, liquidity, 
non-tax debt shield, firm size, risk and growth opportunities). Model 2 (M2) is 
related to sector-level determinants (i.e., munificence, dynamism and HH Index). 
Finally, Model 3 (M3) concentrates on the country-level determinants such as growth 
of GDP per capita, inflation, lending interest rates, debt market development and 
stock market development. The F-test is conducted based on the unrestricted model 
(the combination of M1, M2 and M3) as against the restricted model (i.e., the 
combination of M1+M2, M1+M3, or M2+M3). If the unrestricted model does not 
significantly outperformed the restricted model (because of an insignificant F-test 
statistic) then, the restricted model is the preferred model as the unrestricted model 
adds the explanatory power. It follows that if the unrestricted model is statistically 
superior to the restricted model (significant F-test statistic) then, the restricted model 
is rejected.  
To capture the impact of the financial crisis, this analysis is solely based on 
the unbalanced datasets as the balanced dataset only includes the sector-level data 
from 2000 until 2007. Subsequently, each sample is divided into two sub-samples, 
that is, with and without crisis periods. As shown in Table 5.22, M1 or firm-level 
determinants seem to be the most important variables that determine both the short-
term and total debt across Malaysian listed firms. Meanwhile, the long-term debt is 
very dependent on the combination of M1, M2 and M3. After the financial crisis, the 
sector and country-level determinants become important, particularly to short-term 
and total debt. Surprisingly, the sector-level determinants become unimportant to 
                                                          
11
Defined in Appendix. 
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long-term debt. Nevertheless, these results change as the overall sample is partitioned 
into sectors. As for the technology sector, short-term debt considers the entire 
combined model whilst the long-term debt is highly dependent on firm and sector-
level determinants. In contrast, the utilization of total debt is strongly dependent on 
firm and country-level variables. In the post-crises periods, the importance of the 
sector disappears on both short-term debt and long-term debt. 
The consumer product sector’s reaction was completely opposite to the 
technology sector as they maintained a similar selection pattern during the overall 
sample period. After the crisis period, the importance of sector-level variables is 
noticeable, mainly on short-term debt, whereas the significance of country-level 
variables vanishes. Both long-term debt and total debt are strongly dependent on 
firm-level variables. Alternatively, the industrial product sector responds differently 
compared to the consumer product sector, although both are manufacturing firms. 
The importance of sector-level variables on both short-term debt and total debt is 
perceptible during the entire sample period. However, the country-level determinants 
become important after the financial crisis. The consumption of long-term debt is 
mainly dependent on firm-level determinants and is consistent across both sub-
samples. The substance of sector-level determinants is obvious across construction 
firms as both the short-term and long-term debt take into consideration the firm and 
sector level determinants during and after crisis. As for total debt, dependence on the 
sector and country-level variables disappears during the post crisis periods. 
The firm-level determinants strongly influence both the long-term debt and 
total debt amongst property firms during both sample periods. Nonetheless, short-
term debt considers both firm and sector-level variables. The importance of country-
level variables on short-term debt is visible after the crisis period. In the plantation 
sector context, M1 becomes the preferred model for both short-term and total debt, 
CHAPTER 5 
 
194 
 
while long-term debt is dependent on firm and sector-level determinants. 
Interestingly, during the post crisis period, the combined firm, sector and country 
models become important, regardless of types of leverage. Finally, the leverage of 
trade and services firms is strongly dependent on firm-level determinants. However, 
after the Asian financial crisis, the sector-level determinants become important, 
particularly for short-term and total debt. In sum, the model selection is highly 
dependent on sectors, types of leverage, and sample periods. Returning to the main 
argument, the uniqueness of each sector greatly influences the model selection 
process across the sectors in Malaysia. 
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Table 5.21:  Model Selection Analysis based on Artificial Nested Testing Procedure 
 
 
 
 
Sample 
 
Dep. 
Var. 
With Crisis Without Crisis 
MODEL F-Test Preferred 
Model 
MODEL F-Test Preferred 
Model 
Overall BSDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2+M3 
  M1+M2 2.21*  M1+M2 4.13*  
  M1 +M3 1.15  M1 +M3 2.66*  
  M2+M3 234.58*  M2+M3 135.99*  
 BLDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1+M2+M3 M1+M2+M3  M1+M3 
  M1+M2 2.80*  M1+M2 2.56*  
  M1 +M3 2.80*  M1 +M3 0.35  
  M2+M3 119.83*  M2+M3 95.06*  
 BTDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2+M3 
  M1+M2 1.90  M1+M2 3.02*  
  M1 +M3 2.31*  M1 +M3 2.84*  
  M2+M3 243.86*  M2+M3 148.76*  
 BSDA M1+M2      
  M1 0.92     
  M2 239.72*     
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 2.069  M1 3.48*  
  M3 234.86*  M3 135.58*  
 BLDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 1.04  M1 2.14  
  M2 129.76*  M2 96.39*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 1.74  M1 3.63*  
  M3 120.90*  M3 95.31*  
 BTDA M1+M2      
  M1 1.63     
  M2 247.43*     
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 1.50  M1 2.92*  
  M3 244.71*  M3 148. 51*  
        
TECH BSDA M1+M2+M3  M1+M2+M3 M1+M2+M3  M1+M3 
  M1+M2 9.80*  M1+M2 3.20*  
  M1 +M3 4.57*  M1 +M3 1.54  
  M2+M3 9.19*  M2+M3 3.54*  
 BLDA M1+M2+M3  M1+M2 M1+M2+M3  M1 
  M1+M2 1.18  M1+M2 0.50  
  M1 +M3 3.11*  M1 +M3 0.80  
  M2+M3 10.78*  M2+M3 9.42*  
 BTDA M1+M2+M3  M1+M3 M1+M2+M3  M1+M3 
  M1+M2 8.45*  M1+M2 2.86*  
  M1 +M3 1.74  M1 +M3 0.82  
  M2+M3 14.16*  M2+M3 7.87*  
 BSDA M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1   M1 6.30*  
  M3   M3 4.37*  
 BLDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 2.57*  M1 1.56  
  M2 11.94*  M2 9.51*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1   M1 0.95  
  M3   M3 9.10*  
 BTDA M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 8.62*  M1 4.00*  
  M3 14.05*  M3 8.76*  
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Sample 
 
Dep.Var 
With Crisis Without Crisis 
MODEL F-Test Pref. Model MODEL F-Test Pref. Model 
CP BSDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1+M3 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2 
  M1+M2 2.90*  M1+M2 1.45  
  M1 +M3 0.47  M1 +M3 1.39  
  M2+M3 22.15*  M2+M3 21.17*  
 BLDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1 M1+M2+M3  M1 
  M1+M2 0.24  M1+M2 0.23  
  M1 +M3 0.46  M1 +M3 0.31  
  M2+M3 19.35*  M2+M3 12.02*  
 BTDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1+M3 M1+M2+M3  M1 
  M1+M2 2.66*  M1+M2 1.37  
  M1 +M3 0.55  M1 +M3 1.31  
  M2+M3 26.31*  M2+M3 22.13*  
 BSDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1   M1 2.64*  
  M2   M2 20.94*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 4.63*  M1 2.20  
  M3 22.32*  M3 20.93*  
 BLDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 1.27  M1 1.31  
  M2 20.91*  M2 12.13*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 0.72  M1 0.83  
  M3 19.25*  M3 12.38*  
 BTDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1   M1 1.37  
  M2   M2 22.28*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 5.49*  M1 1.42  
  M3 26.46*  M3 22.39*  
        
IP BSDA M1+M2+M3  M1+M2 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2+M3 
  M1+M2 0.83  M1+M2 1.58  
  M1 +M3 1.67  M1 +M3 0.81  
  M2+M3 249.21*  M2+M3 193.99*  
 BLDA M1+M2+M3  M1 M1+M2+M3  M1 
  M1+M2 0.89  M1+M2 0.15  
  M1 +M3 1.42  M1 +M3 0.11  
  M2+M3 46.79*  M2+M3 37.39*  
 BTDA M1+M2+M3  M1+M2 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2+M3 
  M1+M2 1.40  M1+M2 1.74  
  M1 +M3 1.32  M1 +M3 0.86  
  M2+M3 288.26*  M2+M3 258.79*  
 BSDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 3.36  M1 3.98*  
  M2 250.27*  M2 193.14*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 1.85  M1 3.49*  
  M3 248.96*  M3 193.95*  
 BLDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 1.60  M1 0.98  
  M2 47.81*  M2 37.74*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 1.00  M1 0.67  
  M3 47.82*  M3 38.19*  
 BTDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 3.74*  M1 2.79*  
  M2 290.13*  M2 257.97*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 2.85*  M1 2.91*  
  M3 289.32*  M3 259.52*  
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Sample 
 
Dep.Var 
With Crisis Without Crisis 
MODEL F-Test Pref. Model MODEL F-Test Pref. Model 
CT BSDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1+M2 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2 
  M1+M2 0.96*  M1+M2 0.28  
  M1 +M3 1.03*  M1 +M3 1.79  
  M2+M3 16.29  M2+M3 10.88*  
 BLDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1+M2 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2 
  M1+M2 1.20*  M1+M2 0.95  
  M1 +M3 2.67  M1 +M3 2.94*  
  M2+M3 11.91  M2+M3 9.52*  
 BTDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1+M2+M3 M1+M2+M3  M1 
  M1+M2 1.56  M1+M2 0.25  
  M1 +M3 0.49  M1 +M3 0.01  
  M2+M3 9.21*  M2+M3 7.77*  
 BSDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 3.99*  M1 3.54*  
  M2 16.96*  M2 10.87*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 2.74*  M1 1.31  
  M3 16.71*  M3 10.54*  
 BLDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 3.40*  M1 7.38*  
  M2 12.50*  M2 9.57*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1   M1   
  M3   M3   
 BTDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 4.96*  M1 1.71  
  M2 9.84*  M2 8.03*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 4.29*  M1 1.28  
  M3 9.30*  M3 7.96*  
        
PR BSDA M1+M2+M3  M1+M2 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2+M3 
  M1+M2 1.91  M1+M2 1.84  
  M1 +M3 2.81*  M1 +M3 0.59  
  M2+M3 82.44*  M2+M3 59.50*  
 BLDA M1+M2+M3  M1 M1+M2+M3  M1 
  M1+M2 0.89  M1+M2 0.18  
  M1 +M3 0.36  M1 +M3 0.06  
  M2+M3 10.27*  M2+M3 8.46*  
 BTDA M1+M2+M3  M1 M1+M2+M3  M1 
  M1+M2 1.88  M1+M2 1.32  
  M1 +M3 1.89  M1 +M3 0.38  
  M2+M3 59.14*  M2+M3 43.28*  
 BSDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 2.35*  M1 2.60*  
  M2 83.18*  M2 60.53*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1   M1 3.06*  
  M3   M3 59.55*  
 BLDA M1+M2 0.70  M1+M2   
  M1 10.85*  M1 0.89  
  M2   M2 8.77*  
  M1+M3 1.09  M1+M3   
  M1 10.35*  M1 0.69  
  M3   M3 8.48*  
 BTDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 0.66  M1 1.33  
  M2 58.75*  M2 43.86*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 1.14  M1 1.90  
  M3 59.19*  M3 43.41*  
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Sample 
 
Dep.Var 
With Crisis Without Crisis 
MODEL F-Test Pref. Model MODEL F-Test Pref. Model 
PT BSDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2+M3 
  M1+M2 1.48  M1+M2 1.76  
  M1 +M3 1.05  M1 +M3 0.83  
  M2+M3 13.62*  M2+M3 16.20*  
 BLDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1+M2 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2+M3 
  M1+M2 0.31  M1+M2 0.87  
  M1 +M3 1.55  M1 +M3 0.56  
  M2+M3 6.60*  M2+M3 3.59*  
 BTDA M1+M2+M3 
 
M1 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2+M3 
  M1+M2 1.43  M1+M2 1.36  
  M1 +M3 0.95  M1 +M3 1.12  
  M2+M3 9.98*  M2+M3 13.44*  
 BSDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 0.69  M1 4.95*  
  M2 14.42*  M2 16.04*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 1.27  M1 4.30*  
  M3 13.69*  M3 15.96*  
 BLDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 3.09*  M1 3.63*  
  M2 6.59*  M2 3.36*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 1.21  M1 2.74*  
  M3 7.80*  M3 4.16*  
 BTDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 1.20  M1 6.19*  
  M2 10.73*  M2 13.54*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 1.59  M1 4.45*  
  M3 9.92*  M3 12.95*  
        
TS BSDA M1+M2+M3  M1 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2 
  M1+M2 0.80  M1+M2 0.12  
  M1 +M3 0.49  M1 +M3 0.36  
  M2+M3 25.45*  M2+M3 30.74*  
 BLDA M1+M2+M3  M1 M1+M2+M3  M1 
  M1+M2 0.94  M1+M2 0.21  
  M1 +M3 0.66  M1 +M3 0.06  
  M2+M3 34.69*  M2+M3 36.04*  
 BTDA M1+M2+M3  M1 M1+M2+M3  M1+M2 
  M1+M2 1.19  M1+M2 0.07  
  M1 +M3 0.80  M1 +M3 0.37  
  M2+M3 25.89*  M2+M3 28.65*  
 BSDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 0.73  M1 2.77*  
  M2 25.25*  M2 30.84*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 0.95  M1 1.57  
  M3 25.61*  M3 30.69*  
 BLDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 0.72  M1 0.82  
  M2 38.80*  M2 36.30*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 0.98  M1 0.67  
  M3 35.39*  M3 36.33*  
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The table presents the model selection analysis using the fixed effect model based on overall unbalanced sample 
and sectors, i.e., consumer product (CP), industrial product, construction (CT), property (PR), plantation (PT), 
technology (TECH) and trade and services (TS). The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt 
to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The unbalanced 
panel data includes 815 non-financial firms from 1996 until 2007. The entire samples are divided into two sub-
samples, i.e., with and without crisis. The independent variables for Model 1 (M1) are profitability, tangibility, 
liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth opportunities and risk. The independent variables for Model 2 (M2) are 
munificence, dynamism and HH Index, while, for Model 3 (M3) the independent variables are growth of GDP per 
capita, inflation, lending interest rates, debt market development and stock market development. Refer to Table 4.2 
and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The F-values are computed using standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and * denotes significance at 5% levels. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This study mainly acknowledges that capital structure determinants vary 
across sectors due to the nature or behaviour of each sector. Although the proportion 
of debt financing is similar, each sector adopts different financing patterns, slowly 
focusing on long-term debt financing. The impact of sector characteristics on capital 
structure determinants can be observed through the changes of sign and magnitude of 
the explanatory variables’ coefficients across sectors. Based on pooled OLS and 
fixed effect analysis, a few fascinating issues are visible from the overall sample. 
First, leverage is highly dependent on profitability and non-tax debt shield, whereas, 
the balanced panel data highlights non-tax debt shield and tangibility. These 
variables seem to be the most important factors relating to leverage between both 
datasets. Secondly, the association between leverage and the explanatory variables 
remained consistent between both datasets. Thirdly, risk maintains a positive 
correlation with total debt, which is inconsistent with the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory, although this variable is correlated negatively with long-term 
debt. The mechanism between the total debt and non-tax debt shield remained  
 
 
 
 BTDA M1+M2   M1+M2   
  M1 1.02  M1 3.17*  
  M2 26.15*  M2 28.81*  
  M1+M3   M1+M3   
  M1 1.32  M1 1.74  
  M3 26.03*  M3 28.60*  
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inconsistent with the trade-off theory, but the negative sign of long-term debt 
confirms the applicability of the trade-off theory. 
From the sectoral perspective, both datasets show that the relationships 
between types of leverage and firm-level determinants, such as, risk, non-tax debt 
shield, size and tangibility, differ across sectors. Secondly, discrepancies exist in the 
coefficient size of the explanatory variables across sectors, although the variables are 
statistically significant either at 1% or 5% level. This indirectly reflects the degree of 
importance of each variable in the process of leverage determination. The 
applicability of the capital structure theories diverge across sectors in Malaysia. In 
contrast, sector-level variables are strongly significant and produce a substantial 
effect on leverage, particularly in the consumer product, property and plantation 
sectors. These variables are highly responsive to the short-term debt of the plantation 
sector and the long-term debt of the consumer product sector. The uniformity of 
different size and sign of coefficient across sectors substantiates the argument of 
sectoral characteristics on leverage determination. As the cross-section is fixed by 
sector, the HH index affects long-term debt positively in the balanced dataset, and 
this is consistent with the construction sector. A similar relationship is visible in the 
unbalanced dataset between munificence and total debt, which is consistent with the 
consumer product and plantation sectors. Finally, lending interest rates persistently 
are maintained as the most significant and important factor to leverage across sectors. 
The size of the coefficients further explains the impact of lending interest rates on 
leverage across sectors in Malaysia. Other country-level determinants tend to be 
important only to specific sectors. 
In general, the significant relationship between firm, sector and country-level 
capital structure determinants, and all types of leverage across sectors, provides 
evidence that the nature of each sector tends to influence the mechanism between 
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leverage and capital structure determinants indirectly. Secondly, the size of 
magnitude of each significant variable varies greatly across sectors, and this shows 
the impact of each variable in the process of leverage determination. In other words, 
the different sizes of coefficients imply the different degrees of economic 
significance of each determinant on capital structure decisions. Since total debt is 
largely controlled by short-term debt, a few variables react similarly to leverage. 
These analyses also highlight a great divergence between the overall sample and the 
sectors’ outcomes. The chronology of the importance of each variable on leverage is 
discernible across sectors. Finally, the impact of sectoral behaviour is clearer on 
firm-level and sector-level determination than on the country-level variables. 
However, it is undeniable that the firm-level variable consistently maintained as the 
primary determinants in determining a firm’s leverage. The artificial nested testing 
procedure provides the preferred model which is customized according to each 
sector. This model selection is highly dependent on types of leverage, sectors and 
sample periods. In sum, the overall analysis revealed that the orientation between 
capital structure determinants and leverage is highly influenced by the sector 
characteristics, which are embedded indirectly, and control the direction of 
relationships and the degree of significance.
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CHAPTER 6 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS I: DIFFERENT ECONOMY 
PERIODS EFFECT ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
DETERMINANTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Past literature provides some insights into the Asian financial crisis that affect 
the financing decisions of firms as they face difficulties in raising funds to finance 
their investments. A few studies (Nagano, 2003; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004, 2009; Driffield, 2010) provide valuable insights on the 
financing behaviour of firms during different economic conditions, such as, before 
and after a crisis. The impact of a financial crisis is highly correlated with the 
institutional settings of each country. Some researchers, therefore, have diverted their 
attention from single country case studies onto Asian countries, (e.g., Suto, 2003; 
Pandey and Chotigeat, 2004; Hsien and Lie, 2005; Ariff et al., 2008). On the other 
hand, Claessens et al. (2000) argue that the profitability and financing patterns of 
firms are affected by the industry-specific shocks during the financial crisis, although 
the idiosyncratic shocks seems to be the most important factor. So far, none of the 
studies highlight the sensitivity of capital structure determinants on leverage during 
the downturn period across sectors. The unique behaviour of each sector or industry 
may influence the orientation and magnitude between capital structure determinants 
and leverage during the crisis periods. Moreover, the recovery mechanism may differ 
across sectors within Asian countries.  
Therefore, this chapter discusses the impact of different economic sub-
periods on capital structure determinants, such as, firm-level determinants and 
sector-level determinants, across sectors in Malaysia. Based on the trend of GDP, the 
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sample periods are divided into three sub-periods. First, there is the downturn period 
starting from 1996 until 1998; the recovery period starts from 1999 until 2002; and, 
finally, the stable sub-period covers 2003 until 2007. The first section discusses the 
impact of differential sub-periods on the relationship between firm-level 
determinants and leverage based on the balanced and unbalanced overall samples. 
The subsequent section focuses on the impact of different economic conditions 
across sectors in Malaysia. The final section concentrates on the relationship between 
sector-level determinants and leverage based on the two dimensions - overall sample 
and sectors.  
6.2 Firm-level Determinants Analysis 
6.2.1 Firm-level determinants based on balanced overall sample 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the following equation assesses the association 
between the firm-level determinants and leverage based on the balanced panel: 
                                                      
                                                                   (6.1) 
where    is the debt ratio for firm i in year t, with firm-level determinants such as 
tangibility (TANGIB), profitability (EBITTA), growth opportunities (GRWTH), non-
debt tax shield (NTDS), liquidity (LIQ), size (LNSALES) and risk (RISK). The firm-
fixed effects (  ) control for cross-sectional differences in the firm characteristics. 
The disturbance term is denoted as      and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated 
with mean zero. Based on the balanced overall sample, Table 6.1 shows the reactions 
between liquidity and leverage (short-term debt and total debt) which vary across 
sub-periods. The impact of liquidity is greater on leverage during the Asian financial 
crisis periods from 1996 to 1998 compared to other sub-periods, which is consistent 
CHAPTER 6 
 
204 
 
with Deesomsak et al. (2004, 2009) and Hsien and Lie (2005). This indirectly 
indicates that firms with a higher level of liquidity started to divert into long-term 
debt after the Asian financial crisis in order to avoid cash shortages. However, this 
variable is insignificantly related to long-term debt, except during the second sub-
period that shows significant results with diminutive negative coefficients. These 
firms probably utilized equity financing as the stock market recovered slowly during 
the recovery periods. In line with this explanation, Deesomsak et al. (2009) argued 
that liquidity becomes positive and significantly related to long-term debt after the 
downturn periods. This indirectly implies that the strategy of firms with higher levels 
of liquidity is to issue more long-term debt in order to avoid cash shortages after the 
crisis periods. Deesomsak et al. (2004) found that Malaysian firms tend to prefer 
equity to debt when share prices are rising. 
Tangibility tends to be the second most important variable in relation to long-
term debt across sub-periods. However, the consequences of this determinant on 
long-term debt are greater during the first and third sub-periods. The impact of 
tangibility on short-term debt is noticeable during the downturn and recovery sub-
periods. Most of the firms needed greater tangibility to raise extra amounts of short-
term financing due to the uncertainty in the economy as result of the Asian financial 
crisis. This is consistent with Pandey (2001) who found that tangibility affects 
leverage positively during the crisis periods, although the long-term debt seems to be 
insignificant during pre-crisis periods. Despite being the most important and 
significant variable that affects leverage, the impact of non-tax debt shield varies 
across sub-periods. This variable is significant to short-term debt and long-term debt 
throughout the entire sub-periods, although the consequences are greater during the 
second sub-period. Based on the previous studies, Suto (2003) found that non-tax 
debt shield is significantly related to leverage during crisis periods, but becomes 
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irrelevant as the economy stabilizes. Meanwhile, Deesomsak et al. (2004) argued that 
this variable is significant in the post-crisis periods. He argued that firms are likely to 
have looked for alternative ways to minimize tax, with the increased cost of 
borrowing and perceived risk of bankruptcy after the crisis. Both studies highlighted 
a negative association, which is inconsistent with the findings of the overall sample, 
that shows a positive relationship between non-tax debt shield and leverage. This 
variable tends to be unimportant to total debt as the role is taken by the profitability 
ratio. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, profitability plays a major role in 
determining total debt across different sub-periods, which is consistent with Pandey 
(2001), Nagona (2003), Pandey and Chotigeat (2004) and Deesomsak et al. (2004). 
However, most of the firms performed badly during the crisis sub-period, therefore, 
this variable is insignificant to total debt (based on fixed effect result). The clear 
impact of profitability on total debt is more noticeable during the two subsequent 
sub-periods - the recovery and stable sub-periods. The momentum of reduction in 
short-term debt is easily observable during the second sub-period across profitable 
firms. After the financial crisis, the dependency on leverage has been reduced as the 
profitability increases due to the recovery of the economy. Therefore, firms rely 
more on internal funds, and this result strongly supports the pecking order theory that 
emphasizes the preference of internal sources of funding as firms make higher 
profits. Nagano (2003) emphasized that Malaysian firms are highly dependent upon 
internal funds. 
Risk is perceived as an unimportant determinant to leverage across sub-
periods, although the overall sample period highlighted a few significant results. This 
result is in line with Deesomsak et al. (2004) who argued that firms may disregard 
the earnings volatility factor as their borrowing level is well below their debt 
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servicing capacity, which is common among the family-based firms in Malaysia. 
Conversely, this result is inconsistent with Pandey (2001), Suto (2003) and Pandey 
and Chotigeat (2004) who found significant influence of risk on the short-term debt 
and total debt across periods. Based on this analysis, risk is merely significant to the 
long-term debt at the 5% level during the crisis period. The majority of the firms 
reduced their consumption of long-term debt due to high volatility in corporate 
earnings. The performance of sales deteriorated badly and this has reduced corporate 
earnings tremendously. This variable affects total leverage positively during stable 
periods. Most of the listed firms increased their leverage utilization during the stable 
periods although the risk is high, which is in line with Pandey (2001), Suto (2003), 
and Pandey and Chotigeat (2004) who emphasized the positive association between 
total debt and risk. Deesomsak et al. (2004) argued that firms may ignore the 
volatility of earnings if the risk and costs of entering into liquidation are low. 
The impact of firm size on leverage, that is, short-term debt and long-term 
debt, is greater during stable periods. In accordance with Deesomsak et al. (2004), 
firm size becomes significant after the financial crises as the firms were aware of 
their survival and bankruptcy risk. In contrast, the lenders were reluctant to lend in 
order to reduce the default risk. The propensity of short-term debt usage decreases 
and the utilization of the long-term debt increases as the firms grow larger. This 
study also indicates that firm size seems to be insignificant during the crisis and 
recovery sub-periods, although the pooled OLS shows some significant results but 
indeed are not supported by the fixed effect analysis. Finally, the impact of growth 
on leverage is perceptible after the Asian financial crisis which is in line with 
Deesomsak et al. (2004). This variable influences total debt significantly during the 
third sub-period. Unexpectedly, the association between growth and leverage differs 
across the recovery and stable sub-periods. In the recovery periods, as the growth 
CHAPTER 6 
 
207 
 
opportunities increase, firms tend to increase long-term and total debt. Conversely, 
these firms decrease both long-term debt and total debt as the economy stabilizes. 
High growth firms prefer to employ a lesser amount of leverage due to possible 
restrictions imposed by lenders (Deesomsak et al. 2004). They further argued that the 
high growth firms tend to borrow less due to the rapid economic recovery of 
Malaysian. 
As shown in Table 6.2, similar results are observable between growth and 
leverage in the overall sample that excludes the trade and services sector, which 
portrays high correlation between risk and profitability. Both samples highlighted 
similar outcomes between leverage and firm-level determinants, except risk. This 
variable became significant and positively correlated to short-term debt during both 
crisis and recovery sub-periods. A similar situation is observable between total debt 
and risk. As the earnings volatility increases, firms tend to reduce their long-term 
debt in the third sub-period. The relationship between risk and long-term debt is 
suspicious due to a contradiction in the results across periods and the method of 
analysis. For instance, the fixed effect analysis shows that risk is associated 
negatively to leverage, whereas the OLS analysis produces an opposite relationship. 
Nevertheless, in the panel data context, the fixed effect results are more reliable 
compared to OLS. Alternatively, the past literature emphasized the positive 
relationship between risk and leverage across Malaysian firms. 
6.2.2 Firm-level determinants based on unbalanced overall sample 
This section focuses entirely on the unbalanced panel data, and the following 
equation assesses the relationship between the firm-level determinants and leverage: 
                                                      
                                                                                         (6.2) 
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where      is the debt ratio for firm i in year t, with firm-level determinants such as 
tangibility (TANGIB), profitability (EBIITA), non-debt tax shield (NTDS), liquidity 
(LIQ), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (MTBR), and risk (RISK). The firm-
fixed effects (  ) control for cross-sectional differences in firm characteristics.The 
disturbance term is denoted as     and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with 
mean zero. Based on Table 6.3, profitability affects leverage negatively across sub-
periods. However, the size of coefficients increases as the economy recovers, and 
this indirectly shows that firms tend to decrease further their leverage utilization as 
their profitability level increases. This further confirms the applicability of the 
pecking order theory among Malaysian listed firms. 
Likewise, the unbalanced panel reports the greater influence of non-tax debt 
shield on short-term debt during the financial crisis periods. The mechanism between 
this variable and total debt changes across the crisis and stable sub-periods. During 
the downturn periods, Malaysian firms tend to increase their total debt as the non-tax 
debt shield increases. These firms use their fixed assets for the attainment of secured 
debt. This indirectly increases the firms’ capacity to further borrow and enjoy the tax 
savings. In contrast, these firms reduced their total leverage consumption as their 
non-tax debt shield increased during the stable sub-period, which is consistent with 
studies by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Antoniou 
et al. (2008). Deesomsak et al. (2004) also argued that leverage and non-tax debt 
shield is negatively related and highly significant during post crises. However, it is 
shown that the impact of non-tax debt is superior during the downturn periods. 
A comparable situation is observable between market-to-book ratio and long-
term debt. As the growth opportunities increase, most of the firms reduced their long-
term debt financing during the crisis periods, which is in line with the findings of 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hovakimian et al. (2004) and Frank and Goyal (2009). 
CHAPTER 6 
 
209 
 
Alternatively, the firms tend to increase long-term debt during the stable economic 
periods. This result strongly supports the findings of Booth et al. (2001) who found a 
positive relationship between market-to-book ratio and long-term debt across 
Malaysian listed firms. The reaction of earnings volatility on total debt varies across 
sub-periods, as more listed firms were included in the dataset and the effect is 
perceptible during the crisis periods instead of the recovery periods, as shown in the 
balanced dataset. In accordance to Pandey and Chotigeat (2004), the risk movement 
does not only reflect the impact of economic downturn but also reveals the effect of 
new policies (e.g., fixed exchange rate regime and capital control) implemented by 
the government during that sub-period. 
However, the impact of risk on leverage reduces as the economy recovers, 
although the relationship between short-term and total debt (long-term debt) remains 
positive (negative) across sub-periods. As the unbalanced overall sample excludes 
the industrial product firms due to the high correlation between risk and profitability, 
Table 6.4 shows that the profitability affects leverage profoundly during the 
downturn period. As their profitability increases, most of the firms further reduce 
their leverage utilization. Besides that, insignificant values are noticeable between 
long-term debt and risk during the post crises periods, which is in line with the 
findings of Deesomsak et al. (2009). Risk becomes meaningless to total debt due to 
less volatility in the corporate earnings during the stable economic sub-period.  
As a whole, both samples highlighted a few interesting issues as they were 
classified into different economic sub-periods. First, the effect of firm-level 
determinants on leverage varies across different sub-periods, which is not observable 
in the overall sample period in Chapter 5. The power of magnitude changes as the 
firms operate in the different economic sub-periods - the downturn, recovery and 
stable sub-periods. Secondly, the relationship between leverage and growth diverges 
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across sub-periods. A similar situation occurs in the unbalanced dataset that revealed 
the different association between the firm-level determinants, market-to-book ratio 
and non-tax debt shield, and leverage. In other words, the relationship between these 
variables is highly dependent on the current macroeconomic conditions. Finally, the 
contradiction of signs is noticeable between risk and leverage across the methods of 
analysis, OLS and fixed effect. However, in the context of panel data, the fixed effect 
analysis outcomes are more reliable due to the drawback and bias in the OLS 
estimations. 
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Table 6.1: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Balanced Overall Sample  
The table presents estimates of equation (6.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall balanced sample includes 300 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The sample periods are 
divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are 
book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility 
(TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in 
parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-2.70)** -0.003(-1.76) -0.10(-9.16)** -0.05(-4.76)** -0.08(-5.82)** -0.003(-1.17) -0.01 (-1.87) -0.004(-1.28) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.17(-1.69) 0.02(0.08) -0.62(-13.21)** -0.21(-1.64) -0.18(-3.09)** -0.20(-0.44) -0.05(0.26) -0.39(0.64) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.93(-5.00)** -0.63(-3.83)** -0.77(-2.76)** -0.19(-0.57) -0.78(-6.39)** -0.87(-4.12) -0.71(-2.99)** -0.37(-3.99)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.78(3.72)** 4.55(2.26)* 2.78(2.11)* 7.74(2.12)** -1.00(-1.46) 8.17(2.29)* 3.07(2.55)** 3.16(1.27) 
BSDA LNSALES Size -0.02(-2.34)* -0.07(-2.20)* -0.002(-0.15) -0.02(-0.45) 0.03(4.22)** -0.05(-0.78) -0.04(-1.92) -0.25(-1.23) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.004(0.21) -0.02(-1.94) -0.02(-0.13) -0.01(-0.32) -0.01(-0.61) -0.004(-1.26) 0.001(0.40) -0.04(-9.46) 
 RISK Risk 0.03(4.93)** 0.02(3.67)** 0.09(0.90) 0.50(1.60) -0.32(-5.43)** 0.03(3.95) 0.04(0.83) 0.08(0.69) 
 F-STAT  19.54 19.22 35.83 7.38 23.81 2176.53 7.20 36.72 
 Obs.  3600 3600 900 900 1200 1200 1500 1500 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.004(-0.82) 0.000(-0.00) -0.003(-1.23) 0.01(1.75) -0.0003(-0.97) -0.003(-3.28)** -0.0002(-0.69) 0.0002(0.50) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.26(19.49)** 0.21(4.95)** 0.26(12.78)** 0.23(5.49)** 0.26(11.64)** 0.07(0.72) 0.26(11.05)** 0.20(3.94)** 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.06(-3.51)** -0.02(-1.22) -0.07(-1.85) -0.07(-1.36) -0.11(-2.35)* -0.01(-0.27) -0.02(-0.46) -0.02(-1.43) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.55(-4.62)** -0.81(-2.92)** -0.59(-2.72)** -1.25(-2.95)** -0.52(-1.99) -2.39(-2.68)** -0.59(-3.38)** -0.43(-1.68) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(18.06)** 0.04(5.89)** 0.03(9.69)* 0.02(1.98) 0,03(10.84)** 0.01(0.99) 0.03(10.33)** 0.04(5.89)** 
 GRWTH Growth 0.002(0.71) 0.0001(0.05) -0.001(-0.27) -0.01(-1.10) 0.01(5.26)** 0.01(2.25)* -0.001(-2.59)** -0.001(-1.78) 
 RISK Risk 0.002(3.69)** 0.001(1.49) 0.01(0.34) -0.05(-2.32)* 0.004(2.42)* 0.001(0.37) 0.03(1.92) -0.01(-0.75) 
 F-STAT  126.03 10.98 43.04 13.03 71.21 36.23 47.04 6.90 
 Obs.  3600 3600 900 900 1200 1200 1500 1500 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-2.59)** -0.003(-1.87) -0.10(-9.67)** -0.05(-4.32)** -0.01(-2.38)* -0.01(-2.60)** -0.01(-1.81) -0.003(-1.31) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.10(1.04) 0.23(0.94) -0.35(-7.31)** 0.02(0.11) 0.01(0.25) -0.12(-0.30) 0.32(1.65) 0.59(1.05) 
 NINC_TA Profitability -1.00(-5.45)** -0.65(-4.10)** -0.85(-3.10)** 0.12(0.38) -1.40(-6.43)** -0.89(-4.62)** -0.72(-3.15)** -0.39(-3.96)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.23(3.19) 3.74(2.03)* 2.18(1.76) 6.48(1.92) 1.33(1.90) 5.77(1.75) 2.49(2.26)* 2.74(1.15) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.002(0.25) -0.03(-0.93) 0.03(2.13)* 0.01(0.26) 0.004(0.24) -0.04(-0.58) -0.01(-0.53) -0.21(-1.04) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.002(0.69) -0.02(-1.62) -0.003(-0.20) -0.01(-1.01) 0.01(3.90)** 0.001(0.34) 0.000(0.01) -0.04(-9.35)** 
 RISK Risk 0.03(5.40)** 0.02(3.98)** 0.10(1.07) 0.46(1.44) 0.05(6.40)** 0.03(4.47)** 0.07(1.57) 0.07(0.54) 
 F-STAT  22.04 31.92 24.51 9.38 115.28 2053.91 7.65 43.49 
 Obs.  3600 3600 900 900 1200 1200 1500 1500 
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Table 6.2: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on Balanced Overall Sample without the Trade and Services Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall balanced sample includes 213 non-financial firms within six sectors after excluding the trade and 
services sector due to high correlation between risk and profitability. The sample periods are divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 
until 2002 and finally stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total 
asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK).Refer 
to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.003(-2.11)* -0.002(-1.80) -0.11(-9.08)** -0.05(-4.01)** -0.01(-2.24)* -0.004(-1.31) -0.01(-1.31) -0.002(-0.95) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.09(-0.68) 0.09(0.24) -0.64(-10.52)** -0.42(-3.66)** -0.24(3.11)** -0.40(-0.70) 0.21(0.81) 0.46(0.69) 
 EBITTA Profitability -1.13(-5.64)** -0.52(-2.24) -0.95(-2.79)** 0.27(0.89) -1.48(-5.52)** -0.60(-2.58)** -0.92(-3.20)** -0.56 (-3.52) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.89(3.26)** 4.07(1.87) 2.85(2.23)* 7.96(2.20)* 1.99(2.24)* 8.30(1.89) 3.05(2.19)* 2.39(0.95) 
BSDA LNSALES Size -0.03(-2.07)* -0.10(-2.71)** 0.001(0.09) -0.02(-0.73) -0.03(-1.46) -0.10(-1.19) -0.05(-1.77) -0.33(-1.35) 
 GRWTH Growth -0.001(-0.40) -0.02(-2.00) 0.004(0.18) 0.01(-0.42) -0.0004(-0.14) -0.001(-0.50) 0.001(0.35) -0.04(-10.31)** 
 RISK Risk -0.02(-0.40) 0.26(1.53) 0.14(1.31) 0.65(3.35)** -0.002(-0.08) 0.59(2.49)* -0.01(-0.44) -0.06(-0.61) 
 F-STAT  13.01 7.10 28.77 7.51 8.43 5.60 5.49 55.65 
 Obs.  2722 2722 693 693 924 924 1155 1155 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.001(-1.58) -0.0003(-0.54) -0.002(-0.60) 0.01(1.38) -0.001(-1.30) -0.003(-4.64)** -0.001(-1.22) -0.0001(-0.69) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.22(14.60)** 0.15(3.24)** 0.22(9.13)** 0.24(4.47)** 0.20(8.32)** 0.04(0.33) 0.22(8.57)** 0.15(3.26)** 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.02(-1.01) -0.07(-2.76)** -0.07(-1.64) -0.06(-1.03) -0.05(-1.10) -0.09(-1.45) 0.02(0.59) -0.03(-1.63) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.54(-4.12**) -0.70(-2.96)** -0.75(-2.95)** -1.45(-2.69)** -0.43(-1.45) -1.71(-2.22)* -0.48(-2.68)** -0.35(-1.60) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(15.18)** 0.03(5.28)** 0.03(8.10)** 0.02(1.39) 0.03(9.32)** 0.02(0.95) 0.03(8.88)** 0.03(4.87)** 
 GRWTH Growth 0.002(0.77) 0.001(0.24) -0.002(-0.61) -0.004(-0.56) 0.01(5.79)** 0.005(2.06)* -0.001(-1.85) -0.001(-1.33) 
 RISK Risk 0.03(3.56)** -0.06(-3.83)** 0.01(0.50) -0.04(-1.64) 0.04(4.85)** -0.12(-1.38) 0.03(2.41)* -0.03(-2.02)* 
 F-STAT  80.20 18.00 23.19 5.19 36.08 25.01 32.84 6.43 
 Obs.  2722 2722 693 693 924 924 1155 1155 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-2.08)* -0.003(-1.87) -0.11(-8.99)** -0.05(-3.41)** -0.01(-2.18)* -0.01(-2.59)** -0.01(-1.32) -0.002(-1.07) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.12(0.98) 0.24(0.71) -0.42(-6.45)** -0.18(-1.64) -0.04(-0.53) -0.36(-0.69) 0.43(1.78) 0.61(0.97) 
 EBITTA Profitability -1.15(-5.85)** -0.60(-2.65)** -1.02(-3.06)** 0.21(0.70) -1.53(-5.80)** -0.69(-3.30)** -0.90(-3.18)** -0.59(-3.65)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.36(2.83)** 3.38(1.67) 2.10(1.79) 6.52(1.99) 1.56(1.85) 6.60(1.59) 2.57(2.00)* 2.04(0.84) 
BTDA LNSALES Size -0.003(-0.19) -0.06(-1.72) 0.03(1.72) -0.002(-0.09) -0.002(-0.11) -0.09(-1.01) -0.02(-0.76) -0.29(-1.22) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.003(0.82) -0.02(-1.59) 0.001(0.06) -0.01(-0.86) 0.01(3.59)** 0.004(1.35) 0.0003(0.08) -0.04(-9.96)** 
 RISK Risk 0.04(1.23) 0.21(1.26) 0.15(1.61) 0.68(3.21)** 0.04(1.76) 0.43(2.89)** 0.02(0.66) -0.08(-0.87) 
 F-STAT  8.81 6.77 20.24 10.76 7.62 18.78 5.99 69.74 
 Obs.  2722 2722 693 693 924 924 1155 1155 
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Table 6.3: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Unbalanced Overall Sample 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall unbalanced sample includes 815 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The sample periods are divided 
into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and finally stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. This sample includes 815 non-financial 
firms within seven sectors. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent 
variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), market-to-book ratio (MBTR) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all 
variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.50 (-6.23)** -0.36(-6.51)** -0.61(-4.25)** -0.28(-2.55)* -0.75(-6.87)** -0.35(-3.14)** -0.36(-6.21)** -0.32(-3.38)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.23(-9.68)** -0.18 (-3.71)** -0.60(-15.77)** -0.48(-3.68)** -0.19(-5.27)** -0.32(-1.40) -0.20(-5.72)** -0.18(-2.14)** 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-4.04)** -0.004 (-3.63)** -0.09(-9.60)** -0.05(-6.30)** -0.01(-3.22)** -0.01(-2.24)* -0.01(-2.98)** -0.004(-2.39)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.75(1.52) 2.4(2.51)*          2.64(1.81) 8.00(2.06)* 0.09(0.27) 1.62(2.47)* -0.07(-0.30) 0.40(0.73) 
BSDA LNSALES Size -0.002(-0.30) -0.05(-2.69)** 0.001(0.11) 0.01(0.80) -0.02(-1.70) -0.09(-2.04)* 0.01(0.54) -0.12(-1.06) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0001(-1.67) 0.0004(0.45) -0.002(-0.66) 0.0003(0.17) -0.004(-1.01) -0.004(-1.74) -0.0001(-3.12)** -0.0001(-1.25) 
 RISK Risk 0.34(2.78)** 0.28(3.84)** 0.60(2.48)* 0.45(2.35)* 0.63(3.46)** 0.37(2.92)** 0.27(3.09)** 0.17(1.35) 
 F-STAT  25.25 10.30 48.95 6.92 10.58 3.64 23.10 47.10 
 Obs.  6503 6503 1002 1002 1916 1916 3585 3585 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.12(-7.03)** -0.09(-5.02)** -0.24(-7.48)** -0.06(-1.68) -0.13(-3.69)** -0.03(-0.83) -0.09(-5.56)** -0.07(-3.55)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.25 (31.07)** 0.25(16.55)** 0.22(11.83)** 0.23(4.65)** 0.24(15.10)** 0.21(4.92)** 0.26(24.83)** 0.24(8.03)** 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.0001(-0.66) 0.001(4.09)** -0.002(-0.91) 0.01(1.37) -0.0004(-1.21) 0.001(2.56)* -0.0001(-0.47) 0.001(1.59) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.51 (-7.28)** -0.53(-4.55)** -0.36(-1.89) -0.84(-1.67) -0.45(-3.62)** -0.40(-2.30)* -0.57(-6.28)** -0.44(-2.85)** 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03 (26.89)** 0.04(12.14)** 0.03(11.73)** 0.01(1.52) 0.03(13.39)** 0.03(3.54)** 0.03(20.54)** 0.03(5.80)** 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0001(3.03)** 0.0001(0.32) -0.001(-2.13)* -0.002(-4.61)** -0.001(-1.25) -0.0003(-0.51) 0.0001(7.79)** 0.000(-0.04) 
 RISK Risk 0.06(-2.81)** -0.05(-2.25)* -0.23(-6.31)** -0.06(-1.90) -0.08(-1.70) -0.09(-2.03)* -0.02(-1.09) 0.002(0.11) 
 F-STAT  269.76 56.33 54.51 8.31 70.23 5.33 192.85 15.75 
 Obs.  6503 6503 1002 1002 1916 1916 3585 3585 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.62(-7.56)** -0.46(-8.95)** -0.85(-5.72)** -0.34(-3.00)** -0.89(-7.19)** -0.38(-3.60)** -0.45(-7.31)** -0.39(-3.94)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.02(0.82) 0.03(0.93) -0.38(-9.57)** -0.24(-2.06)* 0.05(1.15) -0.11(-0.47) 0.06(1.70) 0.06(0.65) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-3.84)** -0.01(-3.25)** -0.10(-9.80)** -0.05(-5.38)** -0.01(-3.10)** -0.01(-2.06)* -0.01(-2.83)** -0.003(-2.26)* 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.24(0.49) 1.88(2.10)* 2.28(1.60) 7.16(2.03)* -0.37(-1.18) 1.22(1.93) -0.64(-2.63)** -0.04(-0.07) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.03(3.94)** -0.01(-0.64) 0.03(2.87)** 0.03(1.80) 0.01(1.06) -0.06(-1.32) 0.04(3.56)** -0.09(-0.79) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0001(-0.64) -0.0005(-0.67) -0.002(-0.90) -0.001(-0.67) -0.005(-1.33) -0.004(-1.94) -0.0003(-0.84) -0.0001(-1.28) 
 RISK Risk 0.29(2.39)* 0.23(3.71)** 0.37(1.48) 0.39(2.01)* 0.55(2.80)** 0.29(2.20)* 0.25(2.83)** 0.17(1.32) 
 F-STAT  24.51 18.61 46.95 7.20 12.85 3.88 42.57 83.53 
 Obs.  6503 6503 1002 1002 1916 1916 3585 3585 
           
 214 
 
Table 6.4:  Firm-level Determinants and Leverage based on the Balanced Overall Sample without the Industrial Product Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. Thisoverall unbalanced sample includes 815 non-financial firms within six sectors after excluding the Industrial 
Product sector due to high correlation between risk and profitability. The sample periods are divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 
until 2002 and finally stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total 
asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), market-to-book ratio (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer 
to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values are shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.54(-6.52)** -0.38(-4.31)** -0.45(-5.20)** -0.44(-5.87)** -0.68(-4.62)** -0.29(-2.55)* -0.41(-3.02)** -0.25(-3.44)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.25(-9.54)** -0.16(-1.95) -0.59(-15.90)** -0.34(-3.96)** -0.20(-4.79)** -0.31(-1.06) -0.23(-5.01)** -0.22(-1.81) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-5.45)** -0.005(-3.73)** -0.10(-8.64)** -0.06(-5.57)** -0.01(-3.14)** -0.01(-1.88) -0.01(-4.53)** -0.005(-2.11)* 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.15(0.68) 1.26(1.86) -0.25(-0.99) -0.05(-0.07) 0.35(0.79) 1.66(2.33)* -0.37(-1.17) -0.35(-0.28) 
BSDA LNSALES Size -0.01(-0.93) -0.06(-1.64) -0.02(-1.59) 0.02(1.17) -0.04(-2.22)* -0.09(-1.75) 0.003(0.31) -0.15(-1.01) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0001(-1.56) 0.0001(0.64) -0.001(-0.32) 0.001(0.55) -0.002(-0.60) -0.003(-1.19) -0.0001(-2.71)** -0.0001(-1.07) 
 RISK Risk 0.50(3.34)** 0.37(2.11)* 0.45(4.41)** 0.39(2.93)** 0.74(3.14)** 0.36(2.49)* 0.39(1.68) 0.30(0.95) 
 F-STAT  36.08 6.68 57.82 12.97 7.10 3.18 24.39 3.27 
 Obs.  4384 4384 684 684 1284 1284 2416 2416 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.11(-5.68)** -0.05(-2.39)* -0.24(-6.40)** -0.05(-0.85) -0.14(-3.24)** -0.02(-0.43) -0.09(-3.83)** -0.03(-1.30) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.25(27.61)** 0.25(8.50)** 0.22(10.33)** 0.18(3.46)** 0.26(13.93)** 0.19(4.37)** 0.26(21.74)** 0.25(6.62)** 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.0003(-1.76) 0.001(3.40)** -0.001(-0.37) 0.01(1.71) -0.0001(-0.47) 0.001(2.02)* -0.001(-2.34)* 0.001(3.16)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.50(-5.89)** -0.40(-2.70)* -0.14(-0.53) -0.03(-0.04) -0.47(-3.58)** -0.41(-2.17)* -0.64(-5.55)** -0.64(-2.32)* 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(22.47)** 0.04(7.12)** 0.03(10.91)** 0.02(1.30) 0.03(11.30)** 0.03(3.10)** 0.03(16.39)** 0.03(4.17)** 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0001(4.80)** 0.00002(1.04) -0.001(-2.43)* -0.001(-2.14)* -0.0004(-0.28) -0.0003(-0.50) 0.0001(8.32)** 0.000(0.35) 
 RISK Risk -0.05(-1.97) -0.05(-3.11)** -0.19(-4.15)** -0.01(-0.29) -0.08(-1.44) -0.08(-1.68) -0.01(-0.58) 0.001(0.04) 
 F-STAT  226.87 17.66 43.28 5.21 56.81 4.55 177.61 7.99 
 Obs.  4384 4384 684 684 1284 1284 2416 2416 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.65(-7.31)** -0.42(-4.89)** -0.69(-7.26)** -0.49(-6.51)** -0.82(-5.09)** -0.31(-2.93)** -0.49(-3.51)** 0.27(-3.71)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.01(0.21) 0.09(1.00) -0.37(-9.56)** -0.16(-1.73) 0.05(1.21) -0.12(-0.39) 0.03(0.74) 0.03(0.22) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-5.40)** -0.004(-3.48)** -0.10(-8.81)** -0.05(-5.75)** -0.01(-3.01)** -0.005(-1.73) -0.01(-4.67)** -0.004(-1.74) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.35(-1.51) 0.86(1.29) 0.39(-1.34) -0.08(-0.21) -0.12(-0.30) 1.25(1.82) -1.01(-3.05)** 0.99(-0.77) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.03(3.05)** -0.02(-0.51) 0.02(1.46) 0.04(1.99) -0.001(-0.05) -0.06(-1.21) 0.04(3.26)** -0.12(-0.83) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0003(-0.44) 0.0001(1.06) -0.002(-0.54) -0.0005(-0.56) -0.003(-0.68) -0.003(-1.31) -0.0002(-0.63) -0.0001(-1.06) 
 RISK Risk 0.45(2.90) 0.31(1.78) 0.26(2.41)* 0.37(2.90)** 0.66(2.64)** 0.28(1.93) 0.38(1.59) 0.30(0.95) 
 F-STAT  28.25 13.81 43.68 18.11 7.19 3.22 27.43 4.27 
 Obs.  4384 4384 684 684 1284 1284 2416 2416 
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6.3 Firm-level determinants and leverage based on sectors 
in Malaysia 
This argument could be further extended by focusing on the impact of 
different economic periods on the relationship between leverage and firm-level 
determinants across sectors in Malaysia. As for the consumer product sector as 
shown in the Table 6.5, liquidity strongly and significantly influences short-term debt 
and total debt during the financial crisis due to the stiff liquidity. However, the 
impact of this variable is noticeable throughout the three sub-periods. In contrast, the 
effect of tangibility on the long-term debt becomes larger, particularly after the 
downturn periods, as a result of the low interest rate regime introduced by the 
government. Another possible reason might be due to the higher bankruptcy risk 
resulting from the Asian financial crisis. 
Therefore, the firms are subjected to provision of greater capacity of 
collateral to the lenders as a mode of security in the event of financial distress. 
Tangibility becomes very important to short-term debt and total debt during the crisis 
periods and that result supports the findings of Pandey (2001) and Pandey and 
Chotigeat (2004). These results confirm the reactions of tangibility on leverage 
within consumer product firms that vary across different economic sub-periods. A 
similar situation is noticeable between non-tax debt shield and leverage. The impact 
of profitability on short-term debt and total debt is noticeable during the first and 
third sub-periods. However, the outcomes are highly significant during the crisis 
period due to higher interest rates. In other words, the profitable firms tend to cut 
down their leverage utilization during the downturn period and use internal funds 
that have been accumulated during the pre-crisis periods (Pandey, 2001; Deesomsak 
et al., 2004). Growth opportunities become a crucial factor, particularly for long-term 
debt during the first sub-period, as the coefficient reflects the level of influence on 
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long-term debt across consumer product firms. During the downturn periods, the 
growth opportunities increase mainly in overseas markets due to the instability of 
Ringgit movements. Therefore, to take advantage of the lower Ringgit, the 
manufacturers in the consumer product sector devoted their efforts to sell their 
products to overseas markets. Due to higher liquidity risk, they tended to reduce their 
short-term obligations and increase their long-term debt financing. The total debt is 
highly sensitive to this variable and reacted positively due to the lower interest rates 
during the recovery periods, which is immaterial in the overall sample result with a 
diminutive effect. Besides that, the government’s resolution to peg the Ringgit at a 
competitive rate also indirectly facilitated sales performance in the overseas markets.  
Finally, risk tends to be an influential determinant of short-term debt during 
the crisis sub-period. Despite that, the impact of this variable on total debt was 
superior during the stable periods, rather than in the crisis periods, and this is entirely 
opposite to the overall sample results. Being statistically significant, the magnitude 
indirectly confirms the influence of risk that varies between short-term debt and total 
debt. As opposed to the overall sample results, both OLS and fixed effect analysis 
produced a similar relationship between risk and leverage - short-term debt and total 
debt. The behaviour of liquidity, tangibility, profitability and firm size on leverage 
remained consistent in the unbalanced dataset, as shown in Table 6.6. Nevertheless, a 
few variations are observed between the datasets. Non-tax debt shield impacted total 
debt excessively during the downturn periods and is insignificant during other sub-
periods. Consistent with the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) hypothesis, consumer 
product firms tend to decrease their total debt financing as their non-tax debt shield 
increases due to lower capacity of debt tax benefit during the crisis periods. This is 
not the case in the previous datasetthat demonstrates the impact of this regressor on 
the other two types of leverage, short-term debt and long-term debt. 
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The unbalanced panel also discloses the sensitivity level of leverage 
consumption across consumer product firms on earnings’ volatility. Consistent with 
the outcomes of Pandey (2001), Booth (2001), Suto (2003) and Pandey and 
Chotigeat (2004), these firms tend to further increase their short-term debt and total 
debt financing as the risk level increases during the recovery periods. Suto (2003) 
also argued that firms with higher risk are more dependent on debt. The contradiction 
between risk and leverage across datasets confirms that risk is a firm-specific 
variable rather than sector-specific variable within the consumer product sector. The 
impact of market-to-book ratio on total debt remained consistent between datasets, 
except for the reactions between growth opportunities and short-term debt. However, 
the inconsistency across datasets is merely due to different proxies that have been 
utilized to measure the growth opportunities variable. As a whole, the consistency of 
outcomes between both datasets confirms the impact of different economic 
conditions on the mechanism between firm-level determinants and leverage across 
consumer product firms. This further confirms the indirect effect of sectoral 
behaviour between leverage and some firm-level determinants, such as liquidity, 
tangibility, profitability and firm size, among the consumer product firms across 
different economic sub-periods. 
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Table 6.5: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Balanced Consumer Product Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall balanced sample includes non-financial firms within the consumer product sectors. The sample 
periods are divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent 
variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), 
tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-
values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.08(-6.52)** -0.06(-2.17)* -0.17(-6.14)** -0.11(-4.20)** -0.03(-6.06)** -0.06(-1.93)* -0.03(-9.15)** -0.07(-1.62) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.46(-8.06)** -0.24(-1.70) -0.75(-12.61)** -0.78(-7.84)** -0.73(-10.65)** -0.14(-0.69) -0.54(-6.83)** -0.19(-1.87) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.40(-2.70)** -0.45(-4.92)** -0.26(-1.91) -0.36(-4.50)** 0.10(0.97) -0.16(-2.00) -0.16(-1.34) -0.46(-2.66)** 
BSDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.67(1.28) 1.48(1.27) 0.02(0.05) -0.62(-0.52) -1.25(-1.93) 1.50(1.06) -0.07(-0.09) -1.33(-0.58) 
 LNSALES Size -0.03(-6.10)** -0.06(-1.92) -0.01(-3.06)** -0.05(-1.52) -0.06(-8.25)** -0.05(-0.70) -0.04(-5.08)** -0.07(-1.44) 
 GRWTH Growth -0.003(-0.09) 0.04(1.77) -0.03(-0.79) 0.03(0.90) 0.03(0.77) 0.07(2.37) -0.002(-0.05) 0.01(0.21) 
 RISK Risk 0.76(2.23)* 0.40(1.60) 0.43(1.33) 0.86(3.10)** -0.52(-1.92) -0.06(-0.19) 0.01(0.04) 0.51(1.17) 
 F-STAT  18.54 12.92 29.69 23.03 33.55 7.16 20.55 4.27 
 Obs.  480 480 120 120 160 160 200 200 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.005(-2.43)* 0.01(1.18) 0.001(0.18) 0.01(0.68) -0.01(-1.81) 0.01(0.86) -0.01(-2.03)* 0.002(0.18) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.22(7.24)** 0.27(2.31)* 0.14(2.64)** 0.15(3.32)** 0.31(6.24)** 0.33(2.04)* 0.20(3.79)** 0.24(2.28)* 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.01(-0.26) 0.06(0.85) -0.28(-3.22)** -0.10(-1.41) 0.04(0.46) -0.04(-0.45) 0.15(1.96) 0.09(1.73) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.71(2.05)* 0.32(0.66) -0.13(-0.24) 0.07(0.09) 1.45(2.92)** 1.16(1.55) 0.84(1.43) 0.25(0.40) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.02(7.36)** 0.04(2.44)* 0.02(3.98)** -0.004(-0.17) 0.03(5.91)** -0.01(-0.17) 0.02(2.83)** 0.05(2.28)* 
 GRWTH Growth 0.02(0.95) 0.01(0.50) 0.09(2.69)** 0.05(1.54) -0.03(-1.06) 0.01(0.52) 0.02(0.54) 0.02(1.12) 
 RISK Risk 0.16(1.39) -0.24(-2.37)* -0.21(-0.90) -0.11(-1.05) 0.37(1.66) -0.34(-1.42) 0.06(0.34) -0.08(-1.12) 
 F-STAT  21.30 2.07 6.12 2.36 13.68 4.74 10.58 5.21 
 Obs.  480 480 120 120 160 160 200 200 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.08(-6.30)** -0.05(-2.03)* -0.17(-5.49)** -0.10(-3.64)** -0.12(-3.85)** -0.05(-1.92) -0.06(-5.52)** -0.07(-1.60) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.24(-3.63)** 0.02(0.19) -0.61(-7.23)** -0.63(-5.20)** -0.33(-2.11)* 0.19(1.34) -0.09(-0.87) 0.04(0.36) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.42(-2.75)** -0.39(-4.59)** -0.54(-3.01)** -0.45(-4.56)** -0.09(-0.42) -0.20(-1.66) -0.35(-1.69) -0.37(-2.34)* 
BTDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 1.39(2.15)* 1.81(1.48) -0.12(-0.14) -0.49(-0.39) 1.58(1.27) 2.72(1.82) 1.92(1.87) 1.56(0.77) 
 LNSALES Size -0.01(-1.21) -0.02(-0.50) 0.01(1.57) -0.05(-1.25) -0.02(-1.34) -0.07(-1.08) -0.02(-1.60) -0.02(-0.39) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.02(0.75) 0.05(2.58)** 0.06(1.00) 0.08(1.72) -0.07(-1.07) 0.08(2.34)* -0.06(1.37) 0.03(0.87) 
 RISK Risk 0.91(2.66)** 0.16(0.59) 0.21(0.43) 0.77(2.24)* 0.25(0.53) -0.39(-1.56) 1.07(2.48)* 0.43(1.01) 
 F-STAT  11.36 13.74 13.75 19.67 4.16 15.88 11.70 4.72 
 Obs.  480 480 120 120 160 160 200 200 
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Table 6.6: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Unbalanced Consumer Product Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall unbalanced sample includes non-financial firms within the consumer product sectors. The sample 
periods are divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent 
variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), 
tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), market-to-book ratio (MTBR) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values 
shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.02(-2.00)* -0.01(-2.26)* -0.08(-3.74)** -0.07(-2.17)* -0.08(-4.61)** -0.03(-2.70)** -0.01(-2.08)* -0.002(-1.56) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.24(-4.89)** -0.11(-1.12) -0.53(-6.44)** -0.61(-3.05)** -0.41(-5.13)** -0.16(-1.08) -0.16(-2.66)** -0.05(-0.73) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.35(-3.74)** -0.22(-3.71)** -0.41(-3.46)** -0.36(-2.47)* -0.67(-4.35)** -0.15(-1.94) -0.20(-2.22)* -0.24(-2.67)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.39(-1.13) 1.19(2.29)* -0.65(-1.30) -1.23(-0.82) -0.42(-0.77) -0.79(-1.16) -0.44(-0.84) 1.15(1.45) 
BSDA LNSALES Size -0.003(-0.80) -0.002(-1.57) -0.001(-0.22) 0.01(0.27) -0.02(-3.34)** -0.02(-0.75) 0.01(0.93) 0.005(0.30) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.004(0.87) -0.003-(1.04) 0.004(1.26) -0.001(-0.55) 0.01(1.24) 0.0001(0.03) -0.01(-1.12) -0.01(-3.13)** 
 RISK Risk 0.29(2.17)* 0.11(1.67) 0.43(2.22)* 0.22(1.22) 0.61(2.56)* 0.08(0.82) 0.27(2.18)* -0.02(-0.21) 
 F-STAT  8.53 6.06 24.77 16.07 9.46 2.03 3.76 2.91 
 Obs.  1053 1053 147 147 308 308 598 598 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.001(-1.39) 0.001(2.67)** -0.001(-0.22) 0.02(3.67)** -0.01(-3.02)** 0.003(1.35) -0.001(-1.56) 0.001(1.17) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.23(12.95)** 0.23(5.31)** 0.16(3.61)** 0.14(3.97)** 0.25(7.63)** 0.28(2.66)** 0.21(8.89)** 0.15(2.18)* 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.01(-0.36) -0.01(-0.33) -0.25(-4.07)** -0.09(-1.40) -0.02(-0.33) -0.08(-0.91) 0.04(1.07) 0.02(0.58) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.01(0.04) 0.51(-1.70) -0.84(-1.98) -0.67(-0.76) 0.30(1.00) -0.45(-1.09) 0.07(0.26) -0.89(-1.44) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.02(10.29)** 0.04(6.58)** 0.02(4.46)** 0.03(1.48) 0.03(6.84)** 0.02(0.53) 0.02(6.27)** 0.04(3.42)** 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.001(0.89) 0.001(1.03) 0.0003(0.24) 0.001(0.22) 0.0001(0.03) -0.0003(-0.31) 0.003(1.38) 0.001(0.42) 
 RISK Risk 0.01(0.39) 0.04(1.15) -0.09(-1.04) -0.07(-1.20) 0.15(1.42) -0.004(-0.04) -0.01(-0.16) -0.02(-0.74) 
 F-STAT  36.32 8.93 9.34 5.28 17.98 4.41 19.84 2.65 
 Obs.  1053 1053 147 147 308 308 598 598 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.02(-1.97) -0.01(-2.06)* -0.08(-3.32)** -0.05(-1.64) -0.08(-4.59)** -0.03(-2.58)** -0.01(-2.06)* -0.002(-1.20) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.02(-0.27) 0.12(1.33) -0.36(-3.43)** -0.47(-2.18)* -0.16(-1.76) 0.12(1.01) 0.05(0.76) 0.10(1.12) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.36(-3.47)** -0.23(-4.04)** -0.66(-4.50)** -0.45(-2.80)** -0.70(-3.79)** -0.23(-1.93) -0.17(-1.55) -0.22(-2.74)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.39(-0.92) -0.68(-1.43) -1.49(-2.06) -1.89(-1.16) -0.11(-0.18) -1.23(-1.52) -0.37(-0.61) 0.26(0.41) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.02(3.74)** 0.02(1.81) 0.02(3.01)** 0.04(0.93) 0.01(1.01) -0.01(-0.29) 0.03(3.48)** 0.04(2.30)* 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.004(1.01) -0.004(-1.76) 0.004(1.43) -0.001(-0.37) 0.01(1.10) -0.0002(-0.06) -0.004(-0.52) -0.01(-2.77)** 
 RISK Risk 0.30(2.06)* 0.07(1.15) 0.34(1.47) 0.16(0.82) 0.76(2.71)** 0.08(0.55) 0.27(1.90) -0.04(-0.43) 
 F-STAT  6.05 5.75 21.13 16.49 12.05 4.24 4.93 2.82 
 Obs.  1053 1053 147 147 308 308 598 598 
           
CHAPTER 6 
 
220 
 
In contrast to the consumer product sector, liquidity affects both short-term 
and total debt across industrial product firms during the first two sub-periods, and 
that is consistent with the findings of Deesomsak et al. (2004, 2009). As mentioned 
earlier, the rigidity of liquidity is encountered as the primary problem within the 
manufacturing sector, that is, consumer product and industrial product, during the 
Asian financial crisis periods. As shown in Table 6.7, the industrial product firms 
tend to reduce their short-term debt and increase the long-term debt as their 
tangibility becomes stronger. This is very obvious during the crisis periods and is 
strongly supported by the past literature, including Pandey (2001), Suto (2003) and 
Pandey and Chotigeat (2004). Surprisingly, the mechanism between tangibility and 
total debt diverges across sub-periods. As their tangibility increases, the industrial 
product firms tend to decrease their leverage utilization during downturn periods due 
to an increase in the interest rates, low domestic demand, sluggish sales orders from 
the East Asian regions, and strong competition in the global market. However, the 
consumption of leverage increases tremendously during the stable periods as a result 
ofthe higher growth of domestic-oriented industries and better performance of 
export-oriented industries within the industrial product sector. The industrial product 
firms need additional debt financing to meet those demands and raising funds would 
be much easier during these periods due to the stable economy together with the 
availability of collateral. As for the industrial product sector, the applicability of 
capital structure theories between tangibility and total debt is highly dependent on 
the current condition of the economy. 
Profitability affects both short-term and total debt enormously during 
recovery and stable periods, which is totally opposite to the situation for consumer 
product firms. Industrial product firms tend to reduce their consumption of total debt 
sharply and may have revolutionized their financing to equity financing as the stock 
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market recovered after the Asian financial crisis. This becomes an essential variable 
to the long-term debt during both crisis and stable sub-periods. The momentum of 
reduction was greater during the crisis period compared to the stable periods due to 
the high interest rates and liquidity risk. The level of dependency on internal funds 
increases as more funds are needed to finance their current investment and 
operations.  
From the non-tax debt shield perspective, both short-term debt and total debt 
became extremely sensitive to this variable during the crises periods, whilst long-
term debt becomes highly responsive as the economy recovers. This momentous 
effect is easily traceable within the industrial product sector compared to other 
sectors in Malaysia, and strongly supports the findings of Bowen et al. (1982). 
Industrial product firms tend to increase their debt financing as the non-tax debt 
shield increases, mainly due to the role of the non-tax debt shield that measures the 
“securability” of the assets of firms, which leads to a higher level of leverage as the 
firm is able to provide more securable assets (Bradley et al., 1984). The mechanism 
between risk and total debt alters across sub-periods. Based on the fixed effect 
analysis, as the fluctuation of earnings increases, the industrial product firms tend to 
increase their total debt financing during the downturn periods and reduce it in stable 
periods. Yet, this determinant affects total debt strongly during the downturn periods. 
As mentioned earlier, the biggest proportion of total debt is captured in short-term 
debt, therefore, the behaviour of total debt is tightly controlled by the behaviour of 
short-term debt. During the downturn periods, the industrial product firms increased 
their short-term debt consumption due to costly long-term debt financing as a result 
of higher interest rates. This is clearly observable through the long-term debt that 
maintains a negative relationship across both sub-periods. A possible reason for 
raising a larger amount of short-term funding during crisis periods is merely to 
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export products to overseas markets as a result of the instability of Ringgit 
movements. As the economy stabilizes, these firms reduce the leverage and diverge 
into equity financing as the performance of the stock market progresses. Finally, the 
effect of growth opportunities on leverage is clearer in the post-crisis periods, 
although the effect is minimal. 
Table 6.8 reports the similarity in behaviour of the industrial product sector 
and the firm-level determinants (except for tangibility and market-to-book ratio) and 
leverage across both datasets. As discussed earlier in the balanced dataset, the impact 
of tangibility on total debt is greater during the crisis period than in the stable 
periods, although both sub-periods show significant values. The validity of the 
sectoral characteristics is shown through the mechanism between tangibility and total 
debt, as both datasets sustained a similar relationship between datasets across the 
sub-periods. These firms decreased total leverage as their tangibility capacity 
increased during the crisis periods, while increasing it during the stable periods. Due 
to the diminutive effect between leverage and growth opportunities in the industrial 
product firms, the variations that exist between both datasets are not a serious issue 
in this discussion. For the remaining determinants, slight changes are visible between 
datasets. However, this is possible as the sample size gets larger. Corresponding to 
the consumer product sector, the uniformity of results between both datasets 
confirms the impact of different economic conditions on the mechanism between 
firm-level determinants, that is, liquidity, profitability, non-tax debt shield, firm size 
and risk, and leverage across the industrial product sector. 
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Table 6.7: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Balanced Industrial Product Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall balanced sample includes non-financial firms within the industrial product sectors. The sample periods 
are divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables 
are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)).The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility 
(TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in 
parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.004(-0.73) -0.001(-0.38) -0.10(-5.06)** -0.04(-3.32)** -0.07(-6.13)** -0.03(-2.36)* -0.001(-0.17) 0.001(0.55) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.37(1.38) 0.58(1.10) -0.58(-6.32)** -0.50(-3.78)** -0.24(-1.70) 0.40(0.76) 0.94(2.14)* 0.82(1.46) 
 EBITTA Profitability -1.34(-4.16)** -0.59(-1.37) -1.24(-1.92) 0.06(0.54) -1.48(-3.93)** -0.27(-0.51) -1.11(-2.56)* -0.62(-3.91)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 1.88(1.18) 3.11(1.06) 5.48(2.05)* 3.39(5.43)** 0.50(0.30) 7.65(1.95) 0.77(0.36) 0.56(0.24) 
 LNSALES Size -0.06(-2.23)* 0.13(-1.86) -0.00(-0.00) -0.02(-0.65) -0.08(-2.03)* 0.04(0.45) -0.09(-1.70) -0.64(-1.77) 
BSDA GRWTH Growth 0.003(0.53) -0.03(-8.98)** -0.02(-0.32) 0.003(0.33) 0.03(1.99) 0.01(0.78) 0.002(-0.05) -0.03(-6.48)** 
 RISK Risk -0.02(-0.58) 0.24(1.02) 0.08(1.37) 0.05(1.08) -0.03(-1.70) 0.74(2.74)** -0.06(-1.25) -0.11(-1.77) 
 F-STAT  34.89 58.87 9.33 18.51 15.21 18.16 3.11 185.47 
 Obs.  1176 1176 294 294 392 392 490 490 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.0004(-0.99) 0.0002(0.82) -0.01(-2.05)* 0.003(0.37) -0.01(-5.27)** 0.001(0.20) -0.0002(-0.67) -0.0003(-2.14)* 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.20(7.64)** 0.10(1.43) 0.25(5.64)** 0.28(3.37)** 0.14(3.45)** -0.03(-0.16) 0.19(4.44)** 0.11(2.43)* 
 EBITTA Profitability 0.02(0.86) -0.11(-2.69)** -0.01(-0.17) -0.10(-1.56) 0.04(0.64) -0.17(-1.71) 0.04(0.81) -0.05(-2.16)* 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.59(-2.50)* -0.90(-2.60)** -1.27(-3.54)** -2.32(-5.19)** -0.32(-0.56) -4.21(-3.53)** -0.42(-1.37) -0.19(-0.98) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(11.11)* 0.02(2.54)* 0.02(5.12)** 0.01(0.25) 0.02(5.55)** 0.01(0.34) 0.03(7.31)** 0.04(3.87)** 
 GRWTH Growth -0.002(-2.60)** -0.002(-1.67) -0.02(-1.42) -0.004(-0.66) -0.01(-1.21) -0.01(-1.75) -0.001(-3.73)** -0.001(-2.44)* 
 RISK Risk 0.03(4.69)** -0.07(-3.37)** 0.03(1.84) -0.05(-2.06)* 0.05(6.96)** -0.16(-1.61) 0.03(2.67)** -0.03(-2.93)** 
 F-STAT  35.30 15.26 10.68 22.51 28.24 4.58 22.55 14.33 
 Obs.  1176 1176 294 294 392 392 490 490 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.004(-0.76) -0.0005(-0.30) -0.10(-5.17)** -0.03(-1.64) -0.08(-7.02)** -0.04(-2.67)** -0.001(-0.22) -0.001(-0.73) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.57(2.28)* 0.69(1.46) -0.34(-3.47)** -0.05(-0.26) -0.11(-0.74) 0.37(0.96) 1.13(2.77)** 0.94(1.73) 
 EBITTA Profitability -1.35(-4.12)** -0.70(-1.65) -1.24(-1.90) 0.75(1.16) -1.44(-3.85)** -0.44(-0.86) -1.08(-2.51)* -0.66(-4.18)** 
BTDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 1.30(0.85) 2.21(0.81) 4.21(1.51) 9.85(2.58)** 0.19(0.11) 3.47(1.09) 0.35(0.17) 0.37(0.16) 
 LNSALES Size -0.03(-1.30) -0.11(-1.48) 0.02(0.89) -0.01(-0.20) -0.05(-1.40) 0.05(0.55) -0.06(-1.16) -0.61(-1.66) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.001(0.21) -0.03(-10.48)** -0.05(-0.60) 0.01(0.47) 0.02(0.89) -0.0002(-0.01) -0.002(-0.34) -0.03(-6.30)** 
 RISK Risk 0.01(0.37) 0.17(0.76) 0.11(2.15)* 0.88(4.42)** 0.02(1.08) 0.58(2.42)** -0.02(-0.53) -0.15(-2.19)* 
 F-STAT  4.22 92.06 7.45 7.39 25.03 19.09 4.38 207.26 
 Obs.  1176 1176 294 294 392 392 490 490 
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Table 6.8:  Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Unbalanced Industrial Product Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall unbalanced sample includes non-financial firms within the industrial product sectors. The periods are 
divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are 
book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), 
liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), market-to-book ratio (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are 
computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and ** denote  significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-1.46) -0.004(-1.72) -0.10(-8.95)** -0.06(-3.77)** -0.03(-2.70)** -0.01(-2.04)* -0.01(-1.34) -0.002(-1.60) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.19(-3.03)** -0.20(-2.49)** -0.74(-9.36)** -0.54(-2.60)** -0.25(-3.09)** -0.30(-1.08) -0.09(-1.46) -0.15(-0.94) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.53(-5.77)** -0.37(-5.04)** -0.82(-4.96)** -0.14(-0.76) -0.96(-7.79)** -0.61(-2.71)** -0.39(-5.46)** -0.54(-9.17)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.31(1.55) 4.23(1.95) 7.90(3.54)** 13.94(5.84)** -0.09(-0.14) 0.94(0.43) 0.12(0.45) 0.76(1.61) 
BSDA LNSALES Size 0.02(3.02)** 0.03(-1.82) 0.04(3.38)** 0.03(0.94) 0.01(0.88) -0.05(-1.00) 0.02(2.54)* -0.04(-0.85) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.001(-0.75) -0.003(-1.10) -0.001(-0.93) -0.01(-5.54)** -0.01(-1.53) -0.01(-1.86) 0.001(0.18) -0.01(-1.39) 
 RISK Risk 0.21(1.58) 0.22(2.54)** 0.16(0.62) 0.33(1.53) 0.28(1.31) 0.39(1.61) 0.19(2.64)** -0.05(-0.67) 
 F-STAT  5.54 7.41 25.38 32.32 18.80 3.19 12.83 143.43 
 Obs.  2119 2119 318 318 632 632 1169 1169 
           
 LIQ Liquidity 0.0002(0.61) 0.001(2.66)** -0.002(-0.46) 0.004(0.51) -0.003(-2.16)* 0.001(1.09) 0.001(3.02)** 0.0003(0.92) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.23(14.39)** 0.25(7.95)** 0.25(5.87)** 0.38(3.84)** 0.16(5.33)** 0.27(2.49)* 0.26(12.11)** 0.22(4.78)** 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.14(-5.68)** -0.16(-4.71)** -0.30(-4.74)** -0.11(-1.58) -0.16(-2.23)* -0.08(-0.84) -0.14(-5.78)** -0.11(-3.13)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.45(-3.37)** -0.74(-3.19)** -0.75(-3.03)** -1.25(-5.67)** -0.08(-0.23) -0.28(-0.36) -0.32(-2.14)* 0.30(-1.91) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(14.00)** 0.03(5.68)** 0.02(4.28)** 0.01(0.69) 0.03(6.64)** 0.05(1.82) 0.03(11.58)** 0.03(3.89)** 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.002(-1.39) -0.002(-2.02)* -0.0005(-1.12) -0.002(-8.36)** -0.004(-1.19) -0.001(-0.58) 0.004(1.52) -0.002(-0.48) 
 RISK Risk -0.07(-2.72)** -0.10(-2.76)** -0.26(-4.18)** -0.13(-1.73) -0.09(-1.08) -0.10(-1.07) -0.06(-2.53)* -0.04(-1.22) 
 F-STAT  68.44 16.53 14.30 14.73 16.50 2.18 49.13 11.05 
 Obs.  2119 2119 318 318 632 632 1169 1169 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-1.34) -0.003(-1.37) -0.11(-8.78)** -0.05(-2.90)** -0.03(-2.67)** -0.01(-2.24)* -0.01(-1.18) -0.002(-1.59) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.05(0.77) 0.05(0.65) -0.48(-5.74)** -0.16(-0.77) -0.09(-1.04) -0.03(-0.10) 0.17(2.74)** 0.06(0.42) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.67(-6.73)** -0.53(-8.42)** -1.12(-6.35)** -0.25(-1.30) -1.11(-7.62)** -0.69(-3.22)** -0.53(-6.48)** -0.66(-16.25)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 1.87(1.29) 3.45(1.75) 7.16(3.04)** 12.68(5.27)** -0.17(-0.23) 0.66(0.34) -0.20(-0.71) 0.46(0.98) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.05(7.25)** 0.003(0.20) 0.06(4.83)** 0.05(1.24) 0.03(3.67)** -0.005(-0.09) 0.05(6.88)** -0.002(-0.06) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.003(-1.70) -0.005(-2.44)* -0.002(-1.07) -0.01(-8.72)** -0.01(-2.94)** -0.01(-2.10)* 0.004(0.78) -0.02(-1.78) 
 RISK Risk 0.14(1.04) 0.12(1.70) -0.13(-0.46) 0.20(0.96) 0.18(0.78) 0.30(1.24) 0.13(1.62) -0.09(-1.62) 
 F-STAT  29.69 16.77 30.51 39.38 18.58 2.78 46.77 173.53 
 Obs.  2119 2119 318 318 632 632 1169 1169 
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The liquidity effect is entirely different across construction firms when 
compared to other sectors. As shown in Table 6.9, the impact of liquidity on both 
short-term debt and total debt is very consistent across sub-periods except in the 
downturn periods. The greater consequences of liquidity on total debt are observable 
during the stable periods as a result of a minor slowdown in construction activities. 
Nevertheless, the construction activities were kept moving at a slower rate as the 
government indirectly supported it for the betterment of this sector. This indirectly 
explains the variations of performances between sub-periods and the marginal effects 
on the relationship, and significance between liquidity and leverage.A similar 
situation is observable between tangibility and leverage. As the power of tangibility 
increases, the construction firms tend to decrease both short-term debt and total debt 
while increasing consumption of the long-term debt. The impact of this regressor on 
different types of leverage varies across sub-periods. The greater importance of 
tangibility on short-term debt and total debt is obvious during the recovery periods, 
although this variable is significant across sub-periods. During the recovery periods, 
lenders are willing to provide more long-term loans due to the increase in the value 
of collateral on offer that lowers the default risk. Additionally, the construction firms 
decreased their debt financing mainly because of the actions of developers who 
diverted their attention to low and medium-cost houses while the Government 
supported them through various housing programmes and funds. 
As the non-tax debt shield became stronger, the construction firms reduced 
both long-term debt and total debt in the downturn periods. The non-tax debt shield 
affected leverage extraordinarily during the downturn periods. The negative 
association between these variables explains the existence of non-tax debt shield 
which lowers a firm’s capacity to claim debt tax benefit during the crisis periods, 
which supports the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) hypothesis. Parallel to liquidity, 
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the importance of size on leverage is comprehensible within the construction sector 
across sub-periods. Larger construction firms decided to increase their long-term and 
total debt during the recovery periods, although the firm size is highly significant 
throughout each sample sub-period. This is, essentially, attributable to several factors 
such as a low interest rate, high demand among domestic and foreign purchasers, and 
continuous support from the Government’s housing programmes and various funds. 
In other words, during the second sub-period, the construction sector experienced a 
boom period as the sector grew rapidly in parallel to the nation’s economic 
development.  
In contrast to both the consumer and industrial product sectors, risk is 
negatively and significantly related to total debt during the stable periods, which is 
highly consistent with some of the previous studies (e.g., Titman and Wessels ,1989; 
Harris and Raviv ,1991; Pandey, 2001; Ullah and Nishat, 2008). Feidakis and 
Rovolis (2007) further support this argument by highlighting that leverage is 
negatively related in the European construction firms. This variable is highly 
significant during the third sub-period as a result of the minor slowdown in 
construction activities. Therefore, the consumption of total debt has been reduced 
further as earnings become highly volatile. The contribution of growth opportunities 
on leverage (i.e., long-term debt) is very obvious during the recovery periods, while 
most of the construction firms increased their short-term debt during stable periods. 
Compared to the unbalanced datasets, Table 6.10 shows that most of the 
determinants respond similarly to leverage, except for liquidity and market-to-book 
ratio. The impact of liquidity on leverage is very clear during the stable periods 
although other sub-periods show significant values. However, as more firms were 
included in the construction sector’s sample, the effect is greater during the downturn 
periods. Although the construction firms were subject to bad timing during both sub-
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periods (the first and third sub-periods), the impact of liquidity on leverage was 
greater during the downturn period compared to the other sub-periods. The 
association between liquidity and long-term debt in the construction firms tended to 
be unique due to the positive relationship, while other sectors in Malaysia maintained 
a negative relationship. 
The relationship between market-to-book ratio and leverage becomes an 
interesting issue as the direction of relationships changes across sub-periods. For 
instance, the market-to-book ratios related positively to short-term debt during the 
recovery periods, but changes to negative in the stable periods. An equivalent 
scenario is observable between this variable and long-term debt. The advancement of 
the construction sector is noticeable during the recovery periods, and a greater 
amount of short-term debt financing was required and attributable to the higher 
growth. The consumption of short-term debt was reduced during the third sub-period 
due to a minor slowdown in construction activities compared to the previous sub-
periods, although the residential sub-sector remained active. These firms increased 
their long-term debt during these periods due to attractive loan packages and low 
mortgage rates. However, the impact of this variable is less important due to the 
miniature coefficient size. As a conclusion, the indirect effect of sectoral behaviour 
between leverage and firm-level determinants is observable across tangibility, 
profitability, non-tax debt shield, risk and firm size in construction firms across 
different economic sub-periods. 
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Table 6.9: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Balanced Construction Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall balanced sample includes non-financial firms within the construction sectors. The sample periods are 
divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are 
book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), 
liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are 
computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.16(-13.42)** -0.14(-5.36)** -0.18(-10.49)** -0.16(-5.35)** -0.15(-6.96)** -0.09(-4.07)** -0.15(-11.92)** -0.001(-0.73) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.63(-21.05)** -0.59(-6.49)** -0.73(-12.61)** -0.50(-5.03)** -0.52(-8.11)** -0.86(-5.11)** -0.67(-19.29)** 0.94(1.73) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.33(-2.96)** -0.11(-1.19) -0.27(-0.79) -0.36(-1.44) -0.53(-3.01)** -0.46(-1.98) 0.14(0.61) -0.66(-4.18)** 
BSDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 1.09(2.74)** 0.49(1.01) 0.10(0.24) -1.08(-1.45) 0.03(2.33)* 0.12(0.17) 3.49(4.79)** 0.37(0.15) 
 LNSALES Size 0.01(2.78)** -0.01(-0.37) 0.02(1.77) 0.02(0.60) 0.01(0.19) 0.01(0.53) -0.0003(0.06) -0.61(-1.66) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.01(0.67) 0.01(0.54) 0.04(2.25)* -0.01(-0.34) -0.70(-0.77) 0.002(0.11) -0.01(-1.18) -0.03(-6.30)** 
 RISK Risk -0.59(-0.74) 0.31(0.49) -0.25(-0.17) 1.30(1.03) 0.16(0.18) -1.12(-1.69) -2.84(-2.48)* -0.15(-2.19)* 
 F-STAT  82.12 16.36 44.67 11.74 22.40 10.44 89.00 206.37 
 Obs.  252 252 63 63 84 84 105 105 
           
 LIQ Liquidity 0.03(4.60)** 0.02(2.01)* 0.03(1.59) 0.004(0.12) 0.04(5.02)** 0.001(0.03) 0.03(2.56)* 0.07(3.58)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.30(7.22)** 0.37(4.03)** 0.34(6.18)** 0.49(3.64)** 0.10(1.58) 0.15(1.43) 0.47(5.72)** 0.39(4.04)** 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.25(-3.13)** -0.16(-1.59) -0.29(-1.06) 0.08(0.42) -0.26(-1.97) -0.16(-0.67) -0.33(-1.65) -0.14(-0.54) 
BLDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.78(2.13)* 0.40(0.80) -0.20(-0.29) -3.62(-2.32)* 0.99(2.08)** 0.40(1.15) 0.78(0.97) -0.47(-0.46) 
 LNSALES Size 0.07(8.77)** 0.08(3.66)** 0.06(4.48)** 0.02(0.99) 0.08(6.98)** 0.08(2.12)* 0.06(5.16)** 0.02(0.35) 
 GRWTH Growth -0.02(-1.51) -0.01(-1.00) -0.07(-4.11)** -0.01(-0.56) 0.004(0.16) -0.04(-2.98)** -0.01(-0.60) 0.02(0.86) 
 RISK Risk 0.55(-1.18) -0.29(-0.56) -0.27(-0.22) -3.09(-1.33) -0.37(-0.67) 0.32(0.41) -1.08(-1.41) 1.54(1.22) 
 F-STAT  21.28 5.35 15.36 2.49 11.46 4.49 11.35 4.10 
 Obs.  252 252 63 63 84 84 105 105 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.12(-10.87)** -0.11(-4.82)** -0.16(-11.25)** -0.15(-7.33)** -0.11(-4.88)** -0.09(-3.53)** -0.12(-8.51)** -0.04(-3.84)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.33(-7.29)** -0.22(-1.47) -0.40(-8.69)** -0.02(-0.25) -0.42(-5.29)** -0.71(-3.53)** -0.20(-2.30)* -0.16(-2.68)** 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.60(-6.49)** -0.28(-2.32)* -0.60(-3.12)** -0.34(-1.47) -0.79(-4.05)** -0.62(-1.77) -0.18(-0.71) -0.51(-2.16)* 
BTDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 1.88(4.19)** 0.89(1.11) -0.07(-0.11) -4.56(-3.31)** 1.37(1.86) 0.53(0.76) 4.30(4.58)** -1.23(-1.84) 
 LNSALES Size 0.08(9.49)** 0.07(2.89)** 0.07(5.86)** 0.04(1.39) 0.11(6.84)** 0.09(1.64) 0.06(4.71)** 0.01(0.36) 
 GRWTH Growth -0.02(-1.11) -0.01(-0.48) -0.03(-1.99) -0.02(-0.57) 0.01(0.29) -0.04(-1.29) -0.03(-1.11) 0.03(1.15) 
 RISK Risk -1.12(-2.31)* 0.04(0.07) -0.33(-0.36) -1.43(0.71) -1.06(-1.60) -0.84(-0.93) -3.89(-3.65)** 1.59(1.02) 
 F-STAT  80.66 10.46 73.55 29.59 29.24 7.36 56.69 5.81 
 Obs.  252 252 63 63 84 84 105 105 
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Table 6.10: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Unbalanced Construction Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall unbalanced sample includes non-financial firms within the construction sectors. The sample periods are 
divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are 
book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), 
liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), market-to-book ratio (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are 
computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR. 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.04(-1.91) -0.02(-1.77) -0.11(-5.25)** -0.15(-5.86)** -0.11(-6.78)** -0.06(-3.52)** -0.03(-2.10)* -0.01(-2.90)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.44(-11.28)** -0.31(-5.25)** -0.53(-6.75)** -0.50(-4.94)** -0.54(-10.49)** -0.62(-3.85)** -0.36(-6.13)** -0.29(-2.18)* 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.41(-2.43)* -0.02(-0.25) -0.61(-2.25)* -0.35(-1.86) -0.79(-6.56)** -0.25(-1.28) -0.21(-1.01) 0.07(-0.84) 
 NTDS Non-Tax Debt Shield 0.31(0.56) 2.02(2.93)** -0.52(-0.62) -0.41(-0.49) 0.66(0.88) 0.75(1.07) -0.21(-0.24) 0.58(-0.44) 
BSDA LNSALES Size 0.004(0.44) 0.01(0.89) -0.02(-1.65) 0.01(0.44) 0.02(2.61)** 0.01(0.41) -0.01(-1.00) 0.02(0.89) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.01(4.37)** 0.003(2.82)** 0.01(1.97) 0.002(1.57) 0.004(6.26)** 0.0002(0.45) -0.01(-2.81)** 0.01(1.60) 
 RISK Risk -0.18(-0.87) 0.24(2.92)** -0.36(-0.98) 0.29(1.11) 0.004(0.02) 0.05(0.24) -0.10(-0.46) 0.09(0.92) 
 F-STAT  23.98 8.76 23.72 15.40 41.21 4.67 11.47 4.80 
 Obs.  434 434 74 74 143 143 217 217 
           
 LIQ Liquidity 0.01(2.81)** 0.01(2.13)* 0.03(2.53)* 0.004(0.14) 0.01(2.23)* -0.004(-0.69) 0.01(3.77)** 0.01(0.96) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.32(9.14)** 0.32(6.18)** 0.31(6.72)** 0.43(2.75)** 0.19(2.77)** 0.20(2.23)* 0.41(6.99) 0.35(1.85) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.17(-2.81)** -0.10(-1.77) -0.59(-3.09)** -0.17(-0.98) -0.16(-1.53) -0.001(-0.02) -0.18(-1.94) -0.02(-0.24) 
 NTDS Non-Tax Debt Shield -0.55(-1.62) -0.26(-0.59) -0.56(-0.79) -4.39(-2.72)** -0.57(-0.87) 0.45(-0.59) 0.18(0.31) 0.99(1.12) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.05(6.71)** 0.03(2.20)* 0.05(3.96)** 0.01(0.49) 0.05(3.09)** 0.04(1.70) 0.05(4.59)** -0.003(-0.10) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0004(-0.58) -0.0001(-0.95) -0.0003(-0.15) -0.003(-1.40) -0.001(-3.02)** -0.0001(-0.55) 0.01(2.20)* 0.002(0.61) 
 RISK Risk -0.09(-1.21) -0.13(-1.94) 0.37(1.43) -0.02(-0.10) -0.11(-0.91) 0.002(0.00) -0.10(-0.97) -0.14(-1.72) 
 F-STAT  16.70 6.83 18.96 1.97 5.60 2.26 10.06 4.15 
 Obs.  434 434 74 74 143 143 217 217 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.03(-1.73) -0.01(-1.46) -0.08(-4.19)** -0.14(-7.17)** -0.09(-5.62)** -0.06(-3.44)** -0.02(-1.65) -0.01(-1.75) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.13(-2.69)** 0.01(0.20) -0.22(-3.21)** -0.06(-0.62) -0.35(-4.53)** -0.42(-1.87) 0.05(0.70) 0.06(0.59) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.58(-2.74)** -0.11(-1.24) -1.20(-5.92)** -0.52(-2.34)* -0.95(-6.72)** -0.25(-1.22) -0.39(-1.36) -0.09(-0.78) 
 NTDS Non-Tax Debt Shield -0.24(-0.40) 1.77(2.82)** -1.08(-1.12) -4.80(-3.62)** 0.09(0.10) 0.31(0.43) -0.03(-0.03) 0.41(0.39) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.05(5.98)** 0.04(2.93)** 0.03(1.84) 0.02(1.03) 0.07(4.78)** 0.05(1.55) 0.04(2.91)** 0.02(0.73) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.01(3.10)** 0.002(2.20)* 0.01(1.86) -0.001(-0.52) 0.004(5.20)** 0.0001(0.23) 0.02(2.93)** 0.01(1.86) 
 RISK Risk -0.26(-1.03) -0.12(-1.02) 0.01(0.04) 0.28(1.02) -0.11(-0.52) 0.05(0.23) -0.20(-0.66) -0.04(-0.35) 
 F-STAT  9.64 4.67 18.12 12.15 32.91 7.37 4.40 6.79 
 Obs.  434 434 74 74 143 143 217 217 
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Table 6.11 explains that the significance and importance of liquidity on 
leverage (except for long-term debt) during the crisis periods is constantly pertinent 
across property firms. The slowdown in the property sector is mainly attributable to a 
sharp drop in share prices that reduced people’s financial wealth and difficulty in 
getting financing to purchase the properties.  Prospective property buyers became 
more vigilant and postponed their purchases as they foresaw a high probability of 
future price falls due to excess supply. Liquidity, therefore, became an issue in 
fulfilling short-term obligations during the downturn periods. Equally, tangibility 
affects short-term debt severely during downturn periods, which are consistent with 
the findings of Pandey (2001) and Pandey and Chotigeat (2004). As tangibility 
increases, the property firms reduce their short-term leverage consumption further 
due to the excess supply in the property market. A similar situation is observable 
between tangibility and total debt. The mechanism between this explanatory variable 
and total debt changes during the recovery periods, as the property firms started to 
increase their total debt. As these firms increase their tangibility capacity, the 
probability of raising total debt financing becomes easier due to favourable economic 
and business conditions, as compared to the previous sub-period.  
Profitability influences leverage (i.e., long-term debt) strongly during the 
second sub-period. For instance, the impact of profitability on long-term debt during 
the recovery periods is two times greater than in the stable periods. During the stable 
periods, most of the property firms had gained higher profits due to higher domestic 
demand and higher investment by the private sector in selected segments of the 
property market. The contributing factors are relatively low interest rates and 
exemption from stamp duty, relaxation of eligibility conditions for government 
housing loans, more withdrawal options provided by the Employee’s Provident 
Fund, and increases in the profitability level within the property firms. Most of the 
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property firms reduced their short-term financing as the economy stabilized and 
started to rely more on internal funds as a result of the advancement in the property 
market. The association between these variables remained consistent although the 
magnitude of the coefficients varies across these sub-periods. The larger property 
firms tend to trim down their total debt consumption during the recovery periods as 
they utilized their internal funds from their high profits. They boost up their total 
debt financing during the stable periods due to the introduction of a new interest rates 
framework offering lower interest rates. During this sub-period, the property sector 
was experiencing a minor downturn for several reasons, namely, the Iraq war and the 
global SARS epidemic, high costs of building materials and transportation, and 
vigilant buying sentiments that pulled down their profits. These firms therefore, 
relied on debt financing as their internal funds reduced. 
Comparable to the industrial product sector, the relationship between risk and 
total debt diverges across the recovery and stable sub-periods. Both sectors tended to 
increase their total debt during the second sub-period and decrease it in the third sub-
period. However, as for the property sector, the momentum of earnings’ volatility 
was greater in the second sub-period rather than in the third sub-period. As the 
earnings volatility increased, these firms tended to increase their total debt 
consumption due to the favourable conditions within the property market. As the 
condition of the property market and the number of transactions deteriorated slowly 
in the third sub-period, most firms tended to reduce their total debt as their earnings 
became highly volatile. Based on Table 6.12, the uniformity of results between both 
datasets confirms the similar impact of different sub-economic periods on capital 
structure determinants within the property sector. A few deviations are observable 
between both datasets. Based on the unbalanced dataset, profitability became 
important to long-term debt during the stable sub-period which is opposite to the 
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balanced dataset that highlights the substance of this variable during the recovery 
periods. Nevertheless, the unbalanced dataset provides stronger outcomes with 
highly significant values across both OLS and fixed effect analysis. The impact of 
the different economic sub-periods on the relationship between both non-tax debt 
shield and growth opportunities and leverage are clearer in the unbalanced dataset. 
As the non-tax debt shield increases, property firms tend to further increase their 
short-term debt financing during the recovery periods. This is not the case between 
long-term debt and non-tax debt shield, as the momentum is greater in the third sub-
period, mainly attributable to a minor slowdown in the property transactions. The 
potential tax benefits will be reduced further during this period as a result of higher 
non-tax debt shields. 
In the growth opportunities context, different relationships are noticeable 
across sub-periods between market-to-book ratio and short-term debt, although the 
impact of this determinant seems to be greater during the recovery sub-period. For 
instance, the property firms increased their short-term debt during the crisis periods 
and decreased them enormously during the recovery periods as the growth 
opportunities increased. This is possibly due to a greater reliance on internal funds or 
equity financing, as the stock market kept improving after a big drop during the 
Asian financial crisis. A similar situation is perceptible between firm size and total 
debt. As the firms grow larger, they tend to reduce total debt further during the 
recovery periods and increase it during a stable sub-period. Therefore, the orientation 
of debt financing is highly dependent on the economic condition of a sector rather 
than the nation as a whole. Overall, there is an indirect effect of sectoral behaviour 
between leverage and some of the firm-level determinants, such as liquidity, 
tangibility, non-tax debt shield, risk, firm size and growth opportunities, within the 
property firms across different economic sub-periods. 
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Table 6.11: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Balanced Property Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall balanced sample includes non-financial firms within the property sectors. The sample periods are 
divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are 
book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), 
liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are 
computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.004(-2.89)** -0.003(-5.05)** -0.13(-7.86)** -0.06(-3.56)** -0.002(-3.32)** -0.002(-2.84)* -0.01(-2.05)* -0.002(-1.85) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.14(-2.91)** -0.21(-2.12)* -0.61(-7.04)** -0.18(-1.39) -0.01(-0.05) 0.07(0.25) -0.22(-2.93)** -0.12(-2.09)* 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.72(-2.57)* -0.43(-1.50) -0.43(-1.82) -0.32(-1.38) -0.59(-2.07)* 0.19(0.53) -0.65(-2.29)* -0.34(-4.31)** 
BSDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.92(2.19)* 4.07(2.75)** 0.19(0.19) 0.20(0.13) 3.51(1.36) 4.85(1.27) 0.64(0.47) 0.62(0.45) 
 LNSALES Size -0.01(-0.57) -0.05(-2.57)* -0.01(-0.35) 0.03(0.61) -0.02(-1.02) -0.12(-3.81)** -0.01(0.72) 0.02(1.56) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.00(0.00) 0.002(0.23) 0.03(2.64)** 0.01(0.55) -0.0002(-0.11) -0.0003(-0.30) -0.01(-0.79) -0.003(-1.06) 
 RISK Risk 0.09(0.52) 0.20(1.19) 0.29(2.05)* 0.27(1.72) 2.34(6.79)** 2.46(6.42)** -0.57(-1.96) -0.27(-3.81)** 
 F-STAT  7.14 17.79 210.05 1527.13 157.95 396.00 2.61 9.17 
 Obs.  540 540 135 135 180 180 225 225 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.0002(-0.76) -0.001(-2.50)* -0.01(-0.98) 0.02(1.49) 0.0003(1.16) -0.003(-6.81)** -0.002(-1.91) 0.0003(0.77) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.23(7.87)** 0.13(2.10)* 0.22(3.51)** 0.08(0.80) 0.27(4.64)** 0.09(1.01) 0.16(3.83)** 0.15(1.76) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.26(-3.71)** -0.13(-1.56) -0.16(-1.25) -0.09(-0.58) -0.52(-2.38)* -0.15(-0.51) -0.26(-2.03)* -0.14(-1.77) 
BLDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.26(-0.62) -0.73(-2.38)* -0.36(-0.51) 1.36(1.32) -0.84(-1.26) -1.01(-1.02) 1.64(1.69) -1.83(-1.22) 
 LNSALES Size 0.05(8.44)** 0.03(3.31)** 0.05(4.11)** 0.04(1.15) 0.06(4.64)** 0.01(1.07) 0.03(4.31)** 0.02(1.71) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.01(6.64)** 0.01(4.65)** 0.01(0.98) -0.02(-1.88) 0.01(10.24)** 0.01(3.94)** 0.01(0.87) 0.004(0.85) 
 RISK Risk -0.15(-2.50)* -0.06(-0.94) -0.04(-0.65) -0.10(-1.08) -0.46(-1.82) -0.20(-0.58) -0.25(-2.09)* -0.09(-1.36) 
 F-STAT  34.95 21.61 7.32 2.23 31.47 143.00 11.38 14.12 
 Obs.  540 540 135 135 180 180 225 225 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.004(-2.64)** -0.005(-8.52)** -0.14(-7.68)** -0.04(-2.60)** -0.002(-2.26)* -0.01(-5.89)** -0.01(-2.06)* -0.002(-1.86) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.08(1.44) -0.08(-0.89) 0.40(-3.96)** -0.10(-0.82) 0.26(2.22)* 0.17(0.57) -0.06(-0.69) 0.04(0.38) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.98(-3.36)** -0.56(-1.97) -0.59(-2.22)* -0.42(-2.08)* -1.11(-3.31) 0.03(0.13) -0.91(-2.55)* -0.47(-5.15)** 
BTDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.65(1.82) 3.33(2.31)* -0.16(-0.13) 1.56(1.01) 2.67(0.99) 3.82(1.22) 2.25(1.62) -1.28(-1.33) 
 LNSALES Size 0.04(2.59)** -0.02(-0.93) 0.04(2.49)* 0.06(1.75) 0.03(1.15) -0.11(-3.97)** 0.04(2.57)* 0.04(2.63)** 
 GRWTH Growth 0.01(3.54)** 0.01(3.60)** 0.04(3.48)** -0.01(-0.97) 0.01(6.15)** 0.01(3.86)** 0.02(0.87) 0.0004(0.10) 
 RISK Risk -0.06(-0.33) 0.14(0.89) 0.25(1.72) 0.17(1.30) 1.88(4.81)** 2.25(10.99)** -0.81(-2.27)* -0.36(-4.20)** 
 F-STAT  8.43 46.80 281.12 680.68 155.35 494.51 4.64 42.82 
 Obs.  540 540 135 135 180 180 225 225 
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Table 6.12: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Unbalanced Property Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall unbalanced sample includes non-financial firms within the property sectors. The sample periods are 
divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are 
book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), 
liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), market-to-book ratio (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are 
computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.02(-1.77) -0.01(-1.63) -0.11(-8.34)** -0.05(-3.05)** -0.04(-3.28)** -0.02(-2.61)** -0.01(-1.65) -0.003(-1.41) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.27(-5.09)** -0.13(-1.66) -0.59(-8.63)** -0.29(-2.04)* -0.28(-2.90)** 0.09(0.35) -0.29(-6.10)** -0.10(-1.22) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.53(-5.19)** -0.36(-3.43)** -0.54(-4.17)** -0.77(-3.88)** -0.52(-3.35)** -0.27(-1.31) 0.28(-1.75) -0.23(-2.12)* 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 4.61(3.26)** 6.11(4.43)** 1.03(1.04) 0.30(0.36) 5.97(2.23)* 7.66(1.63) 2.99(2.25)* 1.73(1.79) 
BSDA LNSALES Size -0.02(-1.85) -0.06(-2.31)* 0.01(0.36) 0.08(1.95) -0.08(-3.14)** -0.15(-3.00)** -0.01(-0.53) 0.02(1.83) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.002(2.55)* 0.001(2.20)* 0.003(8.91)** 0.001(2.38)* -0.0001(-0.03) -0.10(-2.41)* 0.003(1.25) -0.002(-2.08)* 
 RISK Risk 0.26(1.73) 0.24(1.87) 0.17(1.15) -0.08(-0.32) 0.44(1.96) 0.33(1.71) -0.03(0.17) -0.12(-0.91) 
 F-STAT  35.91 24.68 123.42 58.75 9.27 25.59 7.90 4.13 
 Obs.  791 791 152 152 255 255 384 384 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.002(-1.88) 0.002(1.33) -0.01(-1.54) 0.01(0.52) -0.01(-2.87)** 0.003(1.29) -0.0004(-0.90) 0.001(1.28) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.19(7.51)** 0.12(3.56)** 0.19(3.24)** 0.11(1.29) 0.17(3.60)** 0.02(0.33) 0.19(5.66)** 0.20(2.94)** 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.19(-3.85)** -0.08(-1.52) -0.05(-0.47) 0.13(1.07) -0.12(-1.79) -0.04(-0.58) -0.31(-3.61)** -0.15(-2.54)* 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -1.32(-4.29)** -1.27(-3.53)** -0.72(-1.32) 0.15(0.25) -1.94(-4.61)** -0.31(-0.59) -1.26(-1.45) -3.13(-2.49)* 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.04(7.72)** 0.03(3.11)** 0.04(4.28)** -0.01(-0.60) 0.03(3.54)** 0.03(1.70) 0.06(8.66)** 0.05(2.68)** 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0001(0.21) -0.001 (-1.56) -0.001(-3.25)** -0.001(-4.80)** 0.01(2.02)* 0.004(2.09)* 0.001(0.32) 0.003(1.32) 
 RISK Risk -0.16(-3.09)** -0.10(-2.06)* 0.13(1.24) 0.16(1.25) -0.16(-2.35)* -0.16(-2.37)* -0.28(-3.01)** -0.11(-1.63) 
 F-STAT  22.26 6.52 12.37 223.58 11.22 16.02 17.94 4.17 
 Obs.  791 791 152 152 255 255 384 384 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.02(-1.80) -0.01(-1.68) -0.12(-7.18)** -0.04(-3.78)** -0.05(-3.40)** -0.02(-2.90)** -0.01(-1.70) -0.002(-1.37) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.08(-1.34) 0.01(-0.13) 0.40(-4.59)** -0.18(-1.42) -0.11(-0.98) 0.12(0.44) -0.10(-1.70) 0.10(0.87) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.72(-5.97)** -0.43(-3.89)** -0.60(-3.27)** -0.64(-3.85)** -0.64(-3.68)** -0.31(-1.58) -0.59(-2.78)** -0.38(-2.82)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 3.29(2.35)* 4.72(3.52)** 0.31(0.26) 0.45(0.55) 4.03(1.56) 7.35(1.64) 1.72(1.16) -1.39(-0.88) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.02(1.18) -0.03-(1.34) 0.05(4.88)** 0.07(1.76) -0.05(-2.04)* -0.12(-3.32)** 0.05(4.49)** 0.06(3.82)** 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.002(1.85) 0.001(1.22) 0.002(4.88)** -0.0004(-1.41) 0.01(2.66)** -0.01(-1.37) 0.004(0.75) 0.0001(0.10) 
 RISK Risk 0.10(0.58) 0.14(1.02) 0.30(1.91) 0.08(0.42) 0.28(1.10) 0.17(0.84) -0.32(-1.25) -0.23(-1.60) 
 F-STAT  14.72 15.49 51.88 229.31 17.49 35.32 6.27 3.70 
 Obs.  791 791 152 152 255 255 384 384 
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As shown in Table 6.13, tangibility affects leverage remarkably across 
plantation firms during the second sub-period. During these periods, the plantation 
firms reduced total debt and short-term debt tremendously and increased long-term 
debt at a reasonable rate, due to the moderate performance within the sector. Based 
on the Malaysian economy reports, the performance of rubber was bad throughout 
the second sub-period although the palm oil industry performed moderately well. 
Therefore, firms with a higher tangibility capacity decided to choose long-term debt 
and lenders will be more secure in the event of financial distress. Most of the 
plantation firms reduced their short-term debt during both the downturn and stable 
sub-periods. However, the level of reduction is higher during the post-crisis periods. 
These firms were relying on short-term debt during crisis periods and as the economy 
recovers and stabilizes, they tend to reduce short-term debt and rely more on other 
sources of financing. The plantation firms decreased their long-term debt and total 
debt as profitability increased, possibly due to other more attractive financing 
sources such as the stock market and internal funds (particularly for the palm oil 
industry that had performed moderately well during the previous sub-period). The 
consistencies between the three types of leverage confirm that plantation firms 
reduce their leverage financing during the stable periods. 
Both datasets presented similar results except for long-term debt that behaves 
differently across datasets during the stable periods. As profitability increases, 
plantation firms tend to increase long-term debt, while in the balanced datasets it 
presents a negative relationship. Most of the firms that have been included in the 
unbalanced dataset (particularly those that have been included in the third sub- 
sectors) might have raised long-term debt in the form of bond financing as the bond 
market developed slowly after the recovery periods. This is merely to grab more of 
the opportunities available in the sector as the economy stabilizes. The differences in 
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the firm sizes might also contribute to the differential associations between 
profitability and long-term debt, as the large firms are able to raise more long-term 
debt during the stable periods. 
The impact of a few determinants, non-tax debt shield and risk, became 
clearer as more observations were included in the unbalanced dataset. First, the 
plantation firms are likely to decrease their short-term debt financing as the non-tax 
debt shield increases during the crisis and recovery sub-periods. The momentum of 
this variable on short-term debt is large during the recovery sub-period which is 
similar to the industrial product sector. However, the industrial product firms utilize 
more short-term debt as their non-tax debt shield increases. The effect of this 
variable on long-term debt becomes obvious during the crisis periods, while total 
debt is affected during the stable periods. Surprisingly, both types of leverage are 
affected positively which is quite different from other sectors. Hereby, the fixed 
assets play a major role in “securability” in order to raise extra-long-term debt and 
total debt financing. 
The positive effect of earnings volatility on total debt is noticeable during the 
first and second sub-periods, although risk is not significant to leverage in the overall 
sample periods. The effect of earnings volatility on short-term debt became clearer 
during both the downturn and recovery periods. Being statistically significant, the 
effect of risk is greater during the second period and, therefore, the plantation firms 
increase their short-term debt tremendously and reduce the long-term debt financing. 
The magnitude of the risk is smaller during the crisis as a result of low, uncertain 
earnings and, consequently, firms are reluctant to borrow a greater amount of short-
term debt. As shown in Table 6.14, both datasets reveal the similarity of the 
relationships between a few of the determinants such as tangibility, profitability, risk, 
firm size and non-tax debt shield and leverage across plantation firms. Nonetheless, 
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liquidity and growth opportunities responded in a different way to leverage as more 
plantation firms were included in the unbalanced dataset. During the financial crisis 
periods, the plantation firms tended to increase their leverage as their size increased. 
This is an attention-grabbing issue due to its unique behaviour within the plantation 
sector, and is not observable across other sectors in Malaysia.  
Generally, the larger firms would be able to raise a greater amount of short-
term debt during the crisis period if the liquidity position of the firms is capable of 
fulfilling the short-term obligations. Therefore, this further confirms that large 
plantation firms tend to have a stronger liquidity position. As for the other sectors, 
liquidity affected short-term debt predominantly during the Asian financial crisis 
periods. This determinant also affected short-term debt and total debt during the third 
sub-period with a minor effect. Parallel to the construction sector, the fixed effect 
results confirmed that growth was an essential factor that determined the leverage of 
plantation firms, particularly during the downturn periods. The consequences of 
growth opportunities on leverage are contradictory between both datasets as the 
unbalanced one shows the momentum of this determinant is greater during the 
recovery periods. This is probably due to the behaviour of each firm in responding 
differently towards growth opportunities. As a conclusion, there is an indirect effect 
of sectoral behaviour between leverage and a few of the firm-level determinants, 
namely, tangibility, profitability, risk, firm size and non-tax debt shield within 
plantation firms across different economic sub-periods. 
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Table 6.13: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Balanced Plantation Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall balanced sample includes non-financial firms within the plantation sectors The sample periods are divided into 
three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios 
(short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt 
shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust 
to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-2.24)* -0.003(-0.85) -0.09(-7.80)** -0.06(-3.92)** -0.03(-1.23) 0.01(1.03) -0.002(-1.86) -0.001(-2.23)* 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.84(-2.03)* -1.64(-2.00)* -0.68(-5.13)** -0.72(-3.77)** -1.63(-1.47) -6.46(-4.97)** -0.13(-1.89) -0.14(-0.95) 
 EBITTA Profitability -1.12(-2.89)** -0.59-3.72)** -0.50(-1.93) -0.33(-2.67)** -1.89(-4.87)** 0.37(0.82) -0.74(-3.77)** -0.10(-1.17) 
BSDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 7.91(1.74) 9.90(1.80) 2.76(1.35) 1.85(1.25) 9.79(1.40) 9.64 (1.71) 0.54(0.64) 0.56(1.12) 
 LNSALES Size -0.03(-0.78) -0.18(-2.03)* -0.02(-1.73) 0.04(1.60) -0.06(-0.59) -0.50(-3.02)** 0.02(2.82)** 0.05(2.13)* 
 GRWTH Growth 0.003(0.15) 0.01(0.38) -0.01(0.59) -0.06(-12.25)** 0.03(0.86) -0.08(-1.35) 0.06(1.76) -0.02(-1.60) 
 RISK Risk 0.24(0.47) 0.11(0.28) 0.37(1.18) 0.66(6.57)** 1.53(2.08)* -0.15(-0.39) -0.82(-0.95) -0.50(-0.58) 
 F-STAT  4.57 629.18 96.59 138.99 391.33 930.19 10.17 54.99 
 Obs.  216 216 54 54 72 72 90 90 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.002(-1.78) -0.0000(-0.01) 0.01(0.29) 0.07(1.35) 0.0002(0.09) 0.001(0.92) -0.004(-2.31)* 0.0002(0.42) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.17(2.10)* 0.11(0.86) 0.06(0.18) 0.42(0.77) 0.21(2.17)** 0.09(0.35) -0.01(-0.99) 0.25(1.02) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.15(-1.73) -0.09(-0.99) -0.28(-0.73) 0.05(0.18) -0.06(-1.21) -0.02(-0.25) -2.05(-5.14)** -0.60(-2.20)** 
BLDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.25(-0.35) -1.01(-0.90) -1.38(-0.68) -2.49(-0.77) -0.01(-0.01) 1.12(0.52) 0.77(0.58) -3.53(-1.08) 
 LNSALES Size 0.02(4.45)** 0.07(3.00)** 0.04(1.71) -0.11(-2.09)* 0.03(3.29)** 0.12(1.41) 0.02(1.98) 0.004(0.17) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.01(2.10)* -0.001(-0.51) 0.01(2.51)* 0.04(3.23)** 0.01(0.66) -0.01(-0.33) 0.11(2.53)* 0.02(1.07) 
 RISK Risk -0.16(-1.93) -0.07(-0.96) -0.18(-0.50) 0.13(0.64) -0.05(-1.29) -0.02(-0.33) 0.84(0.40) 0.59(0.57) 
 F-STAT  12.73 3.23 4.65 104.40 7.42 144.59 13.09 1.01 
 Obs.  216 216 54 54 72 72 90 90 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-2.53)* -0.003(-0.89) -0.08(-1.82) 0.01(0.20) -0.03(-1.24) 0.01(1.08) -0.01(-2.29)* -0.001(-1.50) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.67(-1.62) -1.54(-1.81) -0.62(-1.72) -0.31(-0.44) -1.42(-1.30) -6.37(-4.45)** -0.15(-0.93) 0.12(0.55) 
 EBITTA Profitability -1.27(-2.94)** -0.67(-3.33)** -0.78(-1.51) -0.28(-0.86) -1.95(-4.92)** 0.35(0.70) -2.80(-6.19)** -0.70(-2.46)* 
BTDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 7.65(1.67) 8.88(1.53) 1.36(0.45) -0.62(-0.17) 9.77(1.39) 10.76(1.75) 1.31(0.72) -3.01(-0.94) 
 LNSALES Size -0.001(-0.02) -0.12(-1.22) 0.01(0.51) -0.07(-1.30) -0.03(-0.28) -0.38(-1.57) 0.05(3.43)** 0.05(1.70) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.01(0.65) 0.004(0.28) 0.02(1.49) -0.02(-2.11)* 0.05(1.01) -0.09(-1.26) 0.17(2.87)** -0.0003(0.01) 
 RISK Risk 0.08(0.15) 0.05(0.13) 0.20(0.41) 0.79(3.83)** 1.48(2.01)* -0.16(-0.40) 0.04(0.02) 0.13(0.09) 
 F-STAT  7.65 6934.98 15.81 2232.18 287.15 1187.55 17.27 1.79 
 Obs.  216 216 54 54 72 72 90 90 
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Table 6.14: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Unbalanced Plantation Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall unbalanced sample includes non-financial firms within the plantation sectors. The sample periods are 
divided into three sub-periods, i.e. crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are 
book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)).The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), 
liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), market-to-book ratio (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are 
computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-3.01)** -0.01(-2.22)** -0.05(-3.90)** -0.07(-2.49)** -0.02(-1.60) -0.002(-0.39) -0.01(-3.74)** -0.003(-1.75) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.40(-2.29)* -0.60(-1.43) -0.65(-10.43)** -0.49(-4.64)** -0.24(-0.72) -4.58(-2.35)* -0.34(-3.31)** -0.12(-0.47) 
 EBITTA Profitability -1.11(-3.87)** -0.46(-1.23) -0.67(-6.11)** -0.60(-3.88)** -1.39(-2.33)* 0.95(1.56) -1.06(-1.98) -1.44(-2.38)* 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.92(0.81) 2.00(1.50) 0.84(-1.11) -1.94(-3.47)** 0.94(0.60) 6.32(2.85)** 0.53(0.49) -2.92(-1.79) 
BSDA LNSALES Size 0.001(0.06) -0.13(-1.78) 0.02(2.11)* -0.09(-1.92) -0.04(-0.61) -0.35(-2.06)* 0.02(2.86)** 0.04(1.23) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.03(-1.23) -0.02(-1.07) -0.01(-1.02) -0.003(-1.01) -0.04(-0.85) -0.02(-2.01)* -0.07(-2.73)** 0.01(0.45) 
 RISK Risk 0.37(0.77) 0.47(0.90) 0.68(4.92)** 0.76(4.78)** 0.46(0.42) 1.23(2.29)* 1.02(1.27) -0.92(-1.46) 
 F-STAT  13.42 2.64 56.22 42.31 4.49 24.94 7.68 4.20 
 Obs.  345 345 68 68 110 110 167 167 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.003(-4.08)** 0.0002(0.48) 0.003(0.32) 0.07(1.33) -0.001(-1.86) 0.001(1.14) -0.004(-3.17)** 0.001(0.82) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.09(2.66)** 0.21(3.28)** 0.10(1.33) 0.32(0.83) 0.09(2.40)* -0.22(-0.99) -0.02(-0.28) 0.20(1.26) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.25(-2.21)* -0.06(-0.62) -0.30(-1.21) 0.26(1.11) -0.37(-3.50)** -0.24(-1.50) -0.16(-0.73) 0.39(3.33)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.05(0.18) -0.28(-1.02) 1.19(1.61) 1.59(2.02)* -0.16(-2.86)** 0.12(0.73) 2.43(2.22)* 1.29(1.26) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(5.65)** 0.05(4.25)** 0.04(2.96)** -0.06(-0.76) 0.03(3.08)** 0.12(1.57) 0.001(1.12) -0.02(-1.06) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0003(0.09) -0.001(-0.28) 0.004(0.54) -0.004(-0.56) -0.001(-0.28) -0.01(-1.22) -0.0004(-0.03) -0.01(-0.82) 
 RISK Risk -0.32(-2.56)* -0.08(-0.82) -0.37(-1.25) 0.20(0.92) -0.40(-3.43)** -0.27(-1.51) -0.26(-0.72) 0.15(1.00) 
 F-STAT  30.55 5.93 5.31 13.25 8.72 0.79 13.96 3.15 
 Obs.  345 345 68 68 110 110 167 167 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-3.62)** -0.004(-2.34)* -0.05(-4.01)** -0.002(-0.05) -0.02(-1.74) -0.0005(-0.11) -0.01(-4.66)** -0.003(-1.78) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.31(-1.82) -0.39(-0.92) -0.55(-7.15)** -0.18(-0.55) -0.15(-0.45) -4.81(-2.44)* -0.37(-3.73)** 0.08(0.54) 
 EBITTA Profitability -1.36(-4.35)** -0.52(-1.42) -0.97(-3.84)** -0.34(-1.34) -1.76(-2.94)** 0.72(1.09) -1.22(-2.18)* -1.05(-1.95) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.97(0.77) 1.77(1.22) 0.35(0.82) -0.36(-0.53) 0.79(0.50) 6.44(2.90)** 2.96(1.82) -1.63(-0.97) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.03(1.23) -0.08(-1.07) 0.06(3.37)** -0.15(-1.90) -0.02(-0.18) -0.23(-1.15) 0.04(3.01)** 0.02(0.63) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.03(-1.27) -0.02(-1.20) -0.001(-0.09) -0.01(-0.92) -0.04(-0.89) -0.02(-2.05)* -0.07(-2.35)* -0.002(-0.14) 
 RISK Risk 0.05(0.09) 0.39(0.76) 0.31(1.02) 0.96(4.61)** 0.06(0.06) 0.96(1.63) 0.77(0.92) -0.77(-1.24) 
 F-STAT  21.21 2.46 80.19 325.21 8.79  26.52 15.17 1.82 
 Obs.  345 345 68 68 110 110 167 167 
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Despite the smaller number of observations in the balanced dataset, Table 
6.15 explains the effect of liquidity on leverage (i.e., short-term debt and total debt) 
across technology firms which is completely unusual during the first and third sub-
periods. This indirectly shows the substantiality of liquidity within the technology 
firms compared to other sectors in Malaysia. The importance of this variable on 
leverage (except for long-term debt) is also observable across each sub-period. The 
effect of liquidity is greater during the downturn period as the firms are exposed to 
high liquidity risk. Tangibility seems to be the most important determinant that 
affects leverage across technology firms. The size and magnitude of coefficients 
further explains the consequences of this determinant on short-term debt during the 
downturn and stable periods. Even though the capacity of tangibility increases, the 
uncertainty in sales further reduced the dependency of these firms on short-term debt 
financing during the crisis periods. The liquidity risk that occurs during this period 
also weakened the firm’s ability to raise short-term debt. However, most of the 
technology firms tended to reduce their short-term debt tremendously during the 
stable periods. Instead, firms with higher tangibility were able to raise more long-
term debt during the crisis periods, and significant values are also observable during 
the stable periods. Greater amounts of long-term debt were raised during the crisis 
periods compared to the stable periods, due to a higher liquidity risk, which is 
consistent with the findings of Suto (2003). 
Consistent with the findings of Hsien and Lie (2005), total debt is more 
sensitive to tangibility during the post-crisis sub-periods, with superior effects 
particularly during the stable sub-periods. Technology firms diverted their attention 
more towards the long-term debt financing, probably by issuing more bonds after the 
recovery periods or raising other sources of long-term financing. The importance of 
growth opportunities on leverage is not traceable in any of the economic sub-periods 
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although this variable is significant to both short and long-term debt in the overall 
sample period. As more observations were included in the unbalanced panel, a few 
significant values are noticeable between market-to-book ratio and total debt during 
crisis and recovery sub-periods. After the Asian financial crisis, the leverage of the 
technology sector is highly dependent on the firm size as the clear effect is 
observable during the stable periods and consistent across datasets. The variations in 
the mechanism between short-term debt and firm size across datasets became an 
interesting issue in this discussion. The balanced dataset reveals that the technology 
firms tend to decrease their short-term debt as they grow larger, while the unbalanced 
dataset presents a positive relationship between them. These contradictory results are 
possibly due to the different mixture of technology firm sizes in each dataset. In 
other words, the reactions between large firms and short-term debt are entirely 
different from the medium and small firms. In Malaysia, small firms are highly 
dependent on short-term debt while the larger firms adopt more long-term debt 
financing. 
The two remaining explanatory variables (profitability and risk) seem 
incompatible between datasets. Based on the unbalanced dataset, both determinants 
highlight their importance during the stable periods while the other dataset shows the 
substance of these variables in the recovery sub-periods. However, both recovery and 
stable periods are known as the post-crises period and, therefore, the substance of 
these variables on leverage determination becomes highly significant after the 
financial crisis across technology firms. As shown in Table 6.16, the unbalanced 
panel reveals that profitability is an essential variable to leverage during the stable 
periods and is highly reliable compared to the balanced panel, as the results are 
supported by both OLS and fixed effect analysis. Conversely, the relationship 
between profitability and short-term debt changes across crisis and stable sub-
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periods. In other words, profitable firms within the technology sector tend to increase 
their short-term debt financing during downturn periods and decrease it during stable 
economic periods. During the crisis periods, the reliance on internal funds will 
reduce as a result of uncertainty in earnings and, therefore, firms tend to increase 
their short-term debt. As the economy stabilizes, the technology firms reduced their 
leverage as their profitability increased and the usage of internal funds increased. As 
for risk, the impact of earnings volatility on leverage is only significant during the 
stable periods as the technology firms reduced their debt financing due to volatile 
earnings, which is highly consistent with results in Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Harris and Raviv (1991), Pandey (2001) and Ullah and Nishat (2008). As a 
conclusion, there is an indirect effect of sectoral behaviour noticeable between 
leverage and some firm-level determinants such as liquidity, tangibility, firm size, 
non-tax debt shield and growth opportunities, within the technology sector across 
different economic sub-periods. 
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Table 6.15: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Unbalanced Technology Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall balanced sample includes non-financial firms within the technology sectors. The sample periods are 
divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are 
book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility 
(TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in 
parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.03(-2.35)* -0.07(-3.11)** -0.28(-3.29)** -0.20(-5.41)** -0.21(-3.74)** -0.13(-2.01)* -0.31(-4.56)** -0.17(-3.77)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.54(-4.88)** 0.72(-4.63)** -0.96(-3.43)** -0.97(-2.79)** -1.49(-3.61)** -0.58(-0.96) -0.79(-1.55) -2.61(-3.52)** 
 EBITTA Profitability 0.12(0.91) -0.13(-1.51) -0.67 (-2.20)* 0.15(1.36)) -0.56(-1.22) -0.69(-1.68) -0.02(-0.04) -0.36(-1.01) 
BSDA NTDS Non-Tax Debt Shield -1.12(-1.41) 0.89(1.70) -0.13(-0.35) 0.32(0.92) 0.71(0.36) -1.09(-0.35) -0.75(-0.65) 1.21(0.81) 
 LNSALES Size 0.04(-1.71) -0.04(-1.08) -0.10(-1.15) -0.12(-0.99) -0.16(-2.76)** -0.26(-1.00) -0.31 (-2.99)** -0.24(-2.41)* 
 GRWTH Growth -0.04(-1.71) -0.07(-2.15)* -0.03(-0.67) 0.03(0.36) -0.10(-0.49) 0.02(0.30) 0.04(0.32) 0.07(-1.29) 
 RISK Risk -0.04(-0.98) -0.24(-0.65) 1.08(0.55) -0.61(1.03) -1.47(-1.05) -0.97(-1.08) -0.91(-0.93) -0.82(-1.14) 
 F-STAT  21.03 63.70 260.55 10.83 4.46 822.46 7.31 13.92 
 Obs.  108 108 27 27 36 36 45 45 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-1.91) 0.02(0.97) 0.01(0.16) 0.01(0.40) -0.004(-0.25) 0.04(1.36) -0.01(-0.94) 0.03(2.10)* 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.25(3.05)** 0.38(3.36)** 0.48(2.81)** 0.62(2.14)* 0.05(0.19) 0.51(1.07) 0.25(2.90)** 0.44(5.24)** 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.12(-1.50) 0.16(1.81) -0.05(-0.24) 0.03(0.24) -0.55(-2.08)* 0.07(0.23) -0.17(-1.26) 0.08(0.70) 
BLDA NTDS Non-Tax Debt Shield 0.39(2.33)* -0.06(-0.26) 0.31(0.99) 1.11(1.33) 1.13(2.13)* -0.42(-0.22) 0.54(2.85)** -0.70(-1.81) 
 LNSALES Size 0.02(1.71) 0.03(1.24) 0.08(1.22) 0.07(0.65) 0.06(2.02)* 0.18(0.91) 0.02(1.12) 0.06(2.65)** 
 GRWTH Growth 0.03(1.22) 0.06(2.09)* -0.03(-0.87) -0.05(-0.67) 0.14(1.71) 0.07(0.73) 0.004(0.13) 0.01(1.13) 
 RISK1 Risk -0.36(-0.96) 0.21(0.62) -0.23(-0.29) 0.67(1.20) -1.54(-3.25)** -0.20(-0.30) -0.08(-0.24) 0.43(1.85) 
 F-STAT  16.88 96.83 8.31 7.30 4.92 7.70 9.28 312.39 
 Obs.  108 108 27 27 36 36 45 45 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.24(-6.23)** -0.18(-2.58)** -0.27(-3.07)** -0.19(-6.28)** -0.21(-3.64)** -0.09(-2.34)* -0.32(-4.74)** -0.14(-3.06)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.82(-4.67)** -0.68(-1.06) -0.48(-1.49) -0.35(-0.70) -1.44(-3.56)** -0.07(-0.18) -0.53(-1.16) -2.16(-2.64)** 
 EBITTA Profitability -1.07(-4.36)** -0.48(-1.11) -0.72(-2.21)* 0.18(0.92) -1.11(-2.35)* -0.63(-1.19) -0.18(-0.41) -0.28(-0.63) 
BTDA NTDS Non-Tax Debt Shield 0.61(1.39) 3.00(1.28) 0.18(0.42) 1.43(1.45) 1.85(0.88) -1.50(-0.69) -0.21(-0.19) -1.91(-1.08) 
 LNSALES Size -0.16(-3.54)** -0.13(-1.36) -0.02(-0.18) -0.06(-0.30) -0.10(-1.58) -0.08(-0.65) -0.29(-2.79)** -0.18(-1.74) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.04(0.60) 0.09(1.16) -0.06(-1.23) -0.02(-0.22) 0.04(0.22) 0.09(0.90) 0.04(0.38) -0.06(-1.00) 
 RISK Risk -2.89(-3.35)** -2.24(-2.40)* 0.85(0.41) 0.06(0.08) -3.02(-2.10)* -1.17(-1.38) -0.99(-1.12) -0.39(-0.43) 
 F-STAT  10.71 20.74 133.58 137.58 4.07 25.23 9.79 6.77 
 Obs.  108 108 27 27 36 36 45 45 
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Table 6.16: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Unbalanced Technology Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall unbalanced sample includes non-financial firms within the technology sectors. The sample periods are 
divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are 
book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility (TANGIB), 
liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), market-to-book ratio (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. The t-values shown in parentheses are 
computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.003(-4.79)** -0.001(-3.26)** -0.26(-3.45)** -0.16(-4.25)** -0.01(-2.60)** -0.03(-1.19) -0.003(-3.24)** -0.001(-2.23)* 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.35(-6.10)** -0.14(-2.47)* -0.92(-3.50)** -0.47(-2.63)** -0.61(-3.18)** -0.29(-1.12) -0.23(-5.10)** -0.10(-1.60) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.40(-6.66)** -0.05(-0.85) -0.38(-1.33) 0.47(2.70)** -0.99(-1.14) 0.21(-1.35) -0.35(-7.43) -0.18(-3.04)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.01(-0.03) 0.84(2.19)* -0.16(-0.61) -0.15(-0.36) -1.29(-1.86) -0.14(-0.07) 0.10(0.40) 0.69(1.52) 
BSDA LNSALES Size 0.06(8.74)** 0.03(2.17)* -0.02(-1.15) -0.04(-1.51) 0.09(2.68)** -0.06(-0.63) 0.04(6.37)** 0.05(3.31)** 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0000(-0.00) -0.003(-1.83) -0.002(-1.32) -0.005(-21.92)** -0.06(-1.65) -0.002(-0.13) -0.001(-1.10) 0.0003(0.38) 
 RISK Risk -0.18(-2.56)* -0.02(-0.24) 0.78(2.32)* -0.08(-0.27) 1.12(0.76) 0.91(1.22) -0.22(-3.49)** -0.10(-1.47) 
 F-STAT  24.41 6.05 140.80 1777.98 3.51 2.19 28.61 6.99 
 Obs.  417 417 25 25 66 66 326 326 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.0000(-0.05) 0.0002(1.02) -0.02(-0.70) 0.12(1.19) 0.0002(0.70) 0.001(0.90) -0.0001(-0.40) 0.0003(1.59) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.17(6.18)** 0.22(5.28)** 0.39(1.79) 0.79(1.11) 0.05(0.47) 0.16(1.01) 0.19(6.85)** 0.13(2.26)* 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.10(-3.76)** -0.04(-1.30) -0.26(-0.90) -0.19(-1.21) -0.003(-0.02) -0.16(-0.84) -0.10(-3.79)** -0.06(-1.78) 
 NTDS Non-Tax Debt Shield 0.16(1.10) -0.23(-1.06) 0.25(0.66) 0.94(2.26)* 0.65(1.63) -0.87(-0.75) 0.01(0.07) -0.31(-1.16) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(8.19)** 0.03(2.86)** 0.002(0.07) 0.15(0.96) 0.05(2.44)* 0.11(1.58) 0.03(7.12)** 0.02(1.52) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.001(-0.98) -0.001(-0.92) -0.001(-0.92) -0.002(-0.94) -0.01(-0.96) 0.001(0.09) -0.0001(-0.07) .0004(0.55) 
 RISK Risk -0.11(-3.63)** -0.05(-1.30) -0.06(-0.19) -0.27(-0.97) -0.47(-1.57) -0.59(-1.91) -0.10(-3.47)** -0.04(-1.21) 
 F-STAT  32.32 7.86 6.64 21.05 8.37 153.82 25.63 1.60 
 Obs.  417 417 25 25 66 66 326 326 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.003(-5.39)** -0.001(-2.94)** -0.29(-4.03)** -0.04(-0.41) -0.01(-2.58)** -0.002(-1.39) -0.003(-3.87)** -0.001(-1.96) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.18(-2.95)** -0.08(-1.34) -0.54(-1.94) 0.32(0.51) -0.56(-2.32)* -0.13(-0.74) -0.04(-0.92) 0.03(0.41) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.49(-7.78)** -0.10(-1.43) -0.63(-1.61) 0.28(0.97) -1.00(-1.15) -0.37(-1.36) -0.45(-8.49)** -0.24(-3.87)** 
 NTDS Non-Tax Debt Shield 0.17(0.64) 0.62(1.60) 0.10(0.27) 0.79(1.68) -0.64(-0.77) -1.01(-0.70) 0.12(0.46) 0.37(0.79) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.09(12.27)** 0.05(4.08)** -0.02(-0.72) 0.11(0.70) 0.14(3.82)** 0.05(0.74) 0.07(10.16)** 0.06(3.72)** 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.001(-0.17) -0.004(-2.71)** -0.003(-1.48) -0.01(-3.25)** -0.07(-2.13)* -0.001(-0.07) -0.001(-0.69) 0.001(0.65) 
 RISK Risk -0.29(-3.91)** -0.06(-0.92) 0.72(1.71) -0.36(-0.71) 0.65(0.45) 0.32(0.67) -0.32(-4.89)** -0.13(-2.06)* 
 F-STAT  67.73 14.66 47.03 9925.09 4.49 47.16 67.01 7.78 
 Obs.  417 417 25 25 66 66 326 326 
           
CHAPTER 6 
 
245 
 
When compared to the technology sector, Table 6.17 shows that the effect of 
liquidity on leverage is diminutive across trade and services firms although the 
consequences are triggered mainly through short-term debt and total debt across sub-
periods. Parallel to other sectors, this variable affects leverage deeply during the 
downturn periods although a few significant values are noticeable across post-crisis 
periods. These results improved further as more observations were included using the 
unbalanced dataset. Liquidity became more meaningful in determining short-term 
debt and total debt across trade and services firms during the downturn and stable 
periods. Generally, the impact of liquidity on leverage is common during the Asian 
financial crisis periods across sectors in Malaysia, due to high liquidity risk. The 
impact of this variable on leverage during the stable periods is uncommon and only 
perceptible across consumer product and construction sectors. 
Profitability becomes an important factor in the process of the total debt 
determination throughout the sub-periods, particularly during the crisis periods. In 
line with the pecking order theory, the profitable firms tend to reduce their total 
leverage dependency sharply due to high interest rates, reduced economic activity, 
lower real income and lacklustre external trading. These firms continuously reduce 
their total debt commitment in the third sub-period although the effect is not as 
strong as in the crisis periods. These firms diverted into equity financing as the 
economy stabilized with high turnover in the equity market. Comparable to total 
debt, the influence of profitability on both short and long-term debt is greater in the 
downturn periods. The lower reduction in long-term debt gives some indications that 
the trade and services firms probably raised their funds through bond issuance as 
well as equity financing. 
The non-tax debt shield maintains its position as the most essential factor that 
determines leverage across trade and services firms. The ultimate contribution of this 
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explanatory variable is comprehensible, as the firms increased their short-term debt 
and reduced both long-term debt and total debt significantly during the recovery 
periods. These results strongly support the ultimate model found by DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) who demonstrated the effect of non-tax debt shields on optimal debt 
level. They argue that the existence of non-tax debt shield lowers a firm’s capacity 
for debt tax benefit. The influence of firm sizes on leverage determination really 
matters during the stable periods as the larger firms tended to further increase both 
long-term and total debt financing, which is in line with the findings of Deesomsak et 
al. (2004). The remarkable increase in long-term debt is possibly due to a greater 
reliance on bond issuance as a result of advancements in the bond market. In general, 
the larger firms tend to raise more long-term debt due to their larger capacity for 
tangibility and good credit rating compared to the medium and small firms. 
Based on the fixed effect analysis, both datasets disclosed that tangibility is 
more influential on leverage during the stable periods. These results have a greater 
inter-relationship with the previous arguments related to firm sizes. These firms were 
relying more on long-term debt in the stable periods. This is not the case during the 
crisis periods, and the degree of reliance increased tremendously across sub-periods. 
Hereby, minor transitions from short-term financing to long-term financing debt 
(possibly bond financing) could be noticeable across these firms. Based on Table 
6.18, the earnings’ volatility responds differently to total debt across sub-periods. 
Based on the balanced dataset, these firms are likely to reduce their total debt 
financing as their earnings become highly volatile during the crisis periods. These 
results match the capital structure theories such as the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory. As the economy stabilizes, these firms drastically increased the 
usage of total debt although the earnings’ volatility is high. A comparable result is 
observable between long-term debt and risk. This sector plays a significant role in 
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the economy and continued to be the key driver of the Malaysian economy although 
the manufacturing sector performed equally. Therefore, the risk of raising additional 
long-term debt is lower due to less uncertainty and steady performance in this sector. 
In contrast, these results are entirely inconsistent with the unbalanced dataset 
result that highlights a positive relationship between total debt and risk during the 
downturn periods. A similar association is perceptible between short-term debt and 
risk during the crisis periods. This is mainly attributable to the different and 
unbalanced mixture of firm sizes across datasets and, thereby, it can be concluded 
that risk differs across sizes of firms. Finally, the impact of growth opportunities on 
short-term debt is imprecise across trade and services firms. This variable influences 
long-term debt during the crisis and stable periods. As a conclusion, there is an 
indirect effect of sectoral behaviour between leverage and some firm-level 
determinants such as liquidity, tangibility, profitability, non-tax debt shield, firm size 
and growth opportunities, within the trade and services sector across different 
economic conditions. 
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Table 6.17: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Balanced Trade and Services Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall balanced sample includes non-financial firms within the trade and services sector. The sample periods 
are divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables 
are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility 
(TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), growth opportunities (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in 
parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-3.43)** -0.01(-2.43)* -0.07(-5.07)** -0.19(-6.28)** -0.02(-3.44)** -0.01(-1.28) -0.01(-3.41) -0.003(-2.37)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.36(-7.73)** -0.17(-2.13)* -0.51(-8.13)** -0.35(-0.70) -0.30(-3.24)** 0.10(0.46) -0.48(-8.33)** -0.03(-0.11) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.32(-2.17)* -0.22(-2.03)* -0.60(-4.30)** -0.18(-0.92) -0.73(-3.03)** -0.24(-0.89) -0.52(-3.40)** -0.24(-1.82) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 1.03(2.12)* 3.06(2.46)* -0.90(-1.74) 1.43(1.45) 1.11(1.14) 5.49(2.92)** 1.36(2.53)* 2.37(1.21) 
 LNSALES Size -0.004(-0.72) 0.02(0.61) 0.003(0.55) -0.06(-0.30) -0.02(-1.42) 0.06(1.16) 0.01(1.00) 0.03(0.80) 
BSDA GRWTH Growth -0.03(-0.34) -0.004(-0.38) -0.02(-1.65) -0.02(-0.22) -0.09(-2.41) -0.06(-1.75) 0.01(2.57)* 0.01(1.43) 
 RISK Risk 0.01(2.09)* 0.01(1.86) 0.26(3.93)** 0.06(0.08) 0.02(2.97) 0.01(0.76) 0.34(4.26)** 0.06(0.75) 
 F-STAT  30.07 1733.86 21.27 137.71 14.92 374067.33 22.12 11.16 
 Obs.  828 828 207 207 276 276 345 345 
           
 LIQ Liquidity 0.001(2.16)* 0.002(2.04)* -0.004(-0.81) 0.01(1.46) 0.001(0.89) 0.002(1.28) 0.001(1.56) 0.003(3.92)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.40(15.01)** 0.35(4.02)** 0.33(8.03)** 0.21(2.69)** 0.42(8.30)** 0.14(1.11) 0.39(8.57)** 0.45(4.53)** 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.10(-2.49)* -0.04(-0.81) -0.17(-2.05)* -0.09(-1.09) -0.21(-1.56) -0.06(-0.42) -0.15(-1.05) -0.22(-2.13)* 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.83(-2.91)** -0.90(-1.07) -0.10(-0.20) -0.92(-1.51) -1.29(-2.38)* -4.35(-2.29)* -1.10(-2.53)* -0.91(-0.87) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.02(7.24)** 0.06(2.61)** 0.02(3.97)** 0.04(1.47) 0.02(3.94)** -0.001(-0.04) 0.03(4.45)** 0.10(4.09)** 
 GRWTH Growth -0.01(-1.11) -0.01(-1.19) 0.003(0.13) -0.02(-3.49)** 0.002(0.10) 0.02(1.25) -0.01(-1.82) -0.01(-2.50)* 
 RISK Risk 0.004(2.60)** 0.002(0.98) -0.05(-1.34) -0.07(-1.67) 0.01(1.60) 0.002(0.49) 0.08(1.08) 0.12(2.20)* 
 F-STAT  153.67 145.96 26.25 24.31 50.71 580.70 19.39 5.65 
 Obs.  828 828 207 207 276 276 345 345 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-3.31)** -0.004(-1.83) -0.08(-5.81)** -0.03(-3.24)** -0.02(-3.40)** -0.003(-1.14) -0.01(-3.36)** -0.001(-0.68) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.05(0.93) 0.17(1.61) -0.18(-3.08)** -0.18(-1.56) 0.12(1.38) 0.24(1.83) -0.09(-1.23) 0.43(2.13)* 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.41(-2.58)** -0.26(-2.43)* -0.77(-6.37)** -0.60(-3.63)** -0.93(-3.58)** -0.30(-1.64) -0.68(-3.35)** -0.47(3.32)** 
BTDA NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.21(0.41) 2.15(2.19)* -1.00(-1.46) -0.81(-1.47) -0.16(-0.18) 1.10(1.08) 0.26(0.42) 1.47(0.87) 
 LNSALES Size 0.02(3.64)** 0.08(3.50)** 0.03(4.16)** 0.10(3.08)** 0.01(0.53) 0.06(2.04)* 0.03(4.53)** 0.12(3.93)** 
 GRWTH Growth -0.01(-0.79) -0.01(-1.14) -0.01(-0.59) -0.03(-1.60) -0.09(-2.36)* -0.05(-1.70) 0.003(0.42) 0.001(0.24) 
 RISK Risk 0.01(2.54)* 0.01(2.36)* -0.31(-5.42)** -0.29(-3.81)** 0.03(3.53)** 0.01(1.51) 0.42(4.29)** 0.18(2.63)** 
 F-STAT  118.84 2958.05 23.80 6.32 70.83 3195.86 11.94 7.91 
 Obs.  828 828 207 207 276 276 345 345 
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Table 6.18: Firm-level Determinants Analysis based on the Unbalanced Trade and Services Sector 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This overall unbalanced sample includes non-financial firms within the trade and services sector. The sample 
periods are divided into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent 
variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability (EBITTA), tangibility 
(TANGIB), liquidity (LIQ), non-tax debt shield (NTDS), size (LNSALES), market-to-book ratio (GRWTH) and risk (RISK). Refer Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in 
parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.04(-3.30)** -0.02(-2.64)** -0.11(-4.94)** -0.04(-4.39)** -0.03(-2.95)** -0.01(-1.21) -0.06(-5.34)** -0.06(-2.48)* 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.20(-2.74)** -0.16(-1.58) -0.52(-6.33)** -0.13(-0.99) -0.05(-0.53) -0.02(-0.09) -0.29(-2.61)** -0.58(-1.89) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.80(-2.99)** -0.61 (-3.10) -0.36(-2.52)* -0.27(-2.73)** -0.82(-3.35)** -0.38(-1.52) -0.78(-1.50) -0.42(-1.53) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -1.53(-2.25)* -0.96(-0.80) -1.41(-2.17)* 0.72(1.53) -2.16(-2.30)* 0.87(0.92) -1.37(-1.67) -0.79(-0.37) 
BSDA LNSALES Size -0.05(-2.67)** -0.08(-1.34) -0.03(-2.37)* 0.02(1.30) -0.08(-2.64)** 0.06(0.67) -0.04(-1.37) -0.48(-1.39) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0001(-0.54) 0.0001(0.74) -0.01(-7.62)** 0.0002(0.32) -0.02(-1.57) -0.002(-0.54) 0.0003(0.44) -0.0001(-1.35) 
 RISK Risk 0.96(2.44)* 0.70(2.23)* 0.31(2.43)* 0.39(4.59)** 0.78(2.29)* 0.15(0.52) 1.07(1.58) 0.69(1.24) 
 F-STAT  11.32 3.12 48.02 16.71 3.20 1.08 23.37 1.65 
 Obs.  1344 1344 218 218 402 402 724 724 
           
 LIQ Liquidity 0.001(1.89) 0.001(3.32)** 0.002(0.53) 0.002(0.68) 0.001(2.19)* 0.003(1.21) 0.0003(0.18) 0.01(3.09)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.35(18.58)** 0.37(11.77)** 0.26(6.35)** 0.13(2.16)** 0.36(10.16)** 0.31(3.40)** 0.36(13.63)** 0.40(6.86)** 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.11(-3.18)** -0.06(-1.67) -0.23(-3.32)** -0.16(-2.21)** -0.16(-1.92) -0.01(-0.13) -0.10(-2.28)* -0.08(-1.76) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.62(-3.45)** -0.46(-1.86) -0.08(-0.17) -1.66(-2.61)** -0.72(-2.25)* -1.00(-1.29) -0.73(-2.72)** -0.74(-1.83) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(13.73)** 0.04(7.57)** 0.03(6.59)** 0.03(1.06) 0.04(8.24)** 0.02(1.45) 0.03(8.81)** 0.05(5.00)** 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0001(4.27)** 0.0004(2.98)** -0.0004(-0.53) 0.0004(0.61) -0.003(-2.41)* -0.001(-1.72) 0.0001(5.91)** 0.000(1.37) 
 RISK Risk -0.01(-0.33) -0.01(-0.31) -0.34(-3.58)** -0.13(-1.76) -0.06(-0.53) 0.04(0.46) 0.03(0.68) 0.07(1.55) 
 F-STAT  119.21 27.63 23.02 1.00 34.18 3.00 161.27 17.59 
 Obs.  1344 1344 218 218 402 402 724 724 
           
 LIQ Liquidity -0.04(-3.26)** -0.01(-2.25)* -0.11(-5.27)** -0.04(-4.34)** -0.03(-2.89)** -0.01(-1.15) -0.06(-5.28)** -0.04(-2.03)* 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.15(2.06)* 0.21(2.11)* -0.26(-3.36)** -0.004(-0.03) 0.31(3.22)** 0.30(1.59) 0.07(0.63) -0.18(-0.57) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.91(-3.38)** -0.67(-3.42)** -0.59(-3.91)** -0.42(-3.97)** -0.99(-3.79)** -0.39(-1.83) -0.88(-1.68) -0.49(-1.65) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -2.15(-3.12)** -1.42(-1.15) -1.50(-1.96) -0.94(-1.54) -2.89(-2.91)** -0.13(-0.22) -2.10(-2.61)** -1.53(-0.73) 
BTDA LNSALES Size -0.02(-0.94) -0.04(-0.59) 0.001(0.04) 0.05(1.77) -0.04(-1.42) 0.08(1.05) -0.01(-0.27) -0.44(-1.25) 
 MBTR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0000(-0.04) 0.0001(1.33) -0.01(-6.80)** 0.001(0.54) -0.02(-2.03)* -0.04(-0.84) 0.0001(1.33) -0.0001(-1.28) 
 RISK Risk 0.94(2.38)* 1.02(2.89)** -0.03(-0.21) 0.25(2.85)** 0.73(2.04)* 0.19(0.71) 1.10(1.62) 0.76(1.33) 
 F-STAT  9.53 6.07 44.73 31.33 7.48 1.47 12.35 1.57 
 Obs.  1344 1344 218 218 402 402 724 724 
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6.4 Sector-level Determinants Analysis 
As previously mentioned, the sector-level balanced dataset only covers from 
2000 until 2007. This analysis excludes the first sub-period (from 1996 to 1999, 
which includes the financial crisis period). These periods were used to forecast the 
first observation, for the year 2000, in the sector-level variables. Hence, this 
discussion mainly covers the two subsequent sub-periods after the Asian financial 
crisis periods. To assess the relationship between sector-level determinants and 
leverage, the estimated model is: 
                                                                  (6.3) 
where    is the median debt ratio for sector j in year t, with sector-level determinants 
such as munificence (MFCE), dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI). The sector-
fixed effects    control for cross-sectional differences across sectors. The disturbance 
term is denoted as     and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero. 
Based on Table 6.19, the impact of munificence on short-term debt and total 
debt is greater during the stable periods. The momentous impact of munificence on 
total debt is observable as the economy stabilized although this variable is significant 
to total debt throughout the sample periods. This indirectly explains that as the level 
of abundance of resources increases, most of the sectors tend to reduce their leverage 
financing which is attributable to the persistent growth, higher levels of profitability 
and lower levels of competition. Therefore, the dependencies on leverage further 
reduced as this variable became stronger. A reverse scenario is visible between 
dynamism and short-term debt, as the effect is clearer during the recovery periods 
and highly supported by both OLS and fixed effect. As the uncertainty increases due 
to environmental instability, each sector tends to increase their short-term debt 
financing. The dynamism affects total debt negatively across both sub-periods. Due 
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to a higher uncertainty level during the recovery sub-periods, the impact of 
dynamism is greater on total debt. In relation to the agency theory, firms that operate 
within a dynamic environment may increase equity financing in order to reduce the 
transaction cost arising from increased risk. Therefore, most of the firms adopted 
debt financing as the rate of environmental dynamism decreased. Finally, the level of 
concentration is solely significant and highly influential to total debt, although the 
overall sample period shows insignificant results. This confirms that most sectors 
have a lower concentration level and, therefore, these sectors tend to reduce their 
total debt due to slow economic recovery after the financial crisis. This further 
explains the consequences of different economic periods on the relationship between 
sector-level determinants and leverage. 
Due to the limited observations from 2000 to 2007, the sector-based analysis 
focuses primarily within the stable sub-period. Based on Table 6.20, munificence is 
highly significant to short-term debt financing across the industrial product, 
construction and trade and services sectors. The size of the coefficients confirms the 
influential level of this variable on the short-term debt of industrial product firms 
compared to the other two sectors. As this variable gets stronger, the industrial 
product firms tend to decrease their short-term debt financing due to high levels of 
profitability, as the growth of the economy increased steadily. The higher growth of 
domestic-oriented industries and the better performance of export-oriented industries 
are observable during this sub-period. Therefore, this sector might rely have relied on 
internal funds, as they had retained a greater amount of earnings during the recovery 
and stable sub-periods, or they might have diverted into equity financing as the stock 
market kept growing along with the overall economic growth. 
The other two sectors, construction and trade and services, tended to increase 
short-term debt as the level of munificence was boosted. As for the construction 
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sector, the amount of short-term debt needed to be increased due to the slowdown in 
the construction sector during the third sub-period, even though the residential sub-
sector remained active. Despite a high level of munificence, long-term debt is 
reduced tremendously during this period. The trade and services sector increased 
both debt financing, (i.e., short-term debt and long-term debt) together with the 
advancement of the sector. This sector consistently maintained its position as the 
largest sector in the economy with sturdy prospects in new growth areas during this 
sub-period. A similar situation is noticeable between total debt and munificence as 
the outcomes reveal the substance of this variable on total leverage. As this 
determinant increases, the consumer product and property sectors tend to increase 
their usage of total debt financing, while the other two sectors (technology and trade 
and services) decrease theirs. Both the technology and trade and services sectors 
tended to reduce their total debt financing and, possibly, diverged into equity 
financing due to high turnover in the equity market. The consumer product and 
property sectors increased their total debt during this sub-period, mainly attributable 
to the attractive loan packages available with lower interest rates, and the attractive 
and rapidly progressing bonds market. 
This analysis also highlights the sensitivity of short-term debt on dynamism 
among the industrial product firms as the environmental uncertainty increased. In 
other words, the industrial product firms reduced their short-term debt financing as 
the environment instability occurred and they tended to utilize other forms of 
financing such as stock or bond issuances. In contrast, the consumer product and 
construction firms increased their consumption of short-term debt financing and 
reduced long-term debt financing due to the uncertainty in the business. A similar 
reaction is observable within the trade and services sector, and the impact of 
uncertainty is greater on long-term debt within this sector compared to the 
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construction and consumer product sectors. A parallel scenario is also visible 
between total debt and dynamism across sectors, and trade and services firms are 
more responsive to uncertainty in determining the level of total debt. The 
construction sector continuously reduced their total leverage as instability was 
observed in the environment. Nevertheless, this is not the case for the other two 
sectors, the trade and services and technology firms, that increased their total debt 
financing as the level of uncertainty increased. This indirectly reflects the effect of 
sectoral behaviour on the leverage determination during the stable periods in 
Malaysia. These results further substantiate the argument of Simerly and Li (2000) 
who found that the degree of environmental dynamism varies across industries, 
which can have a differential impact on similar activities occurring across industries. 
Being highly significant, the huge coefficient between HH index and short-
term debt further confirms the importance of sector-level determinants on short-term 
debt financing among the industrial product sector. As this index increases, the trade 
and services sector tends to reduce both short-term debt and total debt and boost up 
their long-term debt consumption. Once again, this result shows some indication that 
the trade and services firms diverted into long-term debt financing, probably due to 
bond financing, as the sector became the most important sector in Malaysia due to its 
rapid growth. In contrast, the construction sector increased their short-term financing 
and total debt as this variable amplifies. The higher dependency on short-term debt 
and total debt is mainly due to the minor slowdown in the construction sector during 
this sub-period. As an implication of the slowdown in the construction sector, the 
property sector also reduced their long-term debt and total debt as the sector became 
more concentrated. A similar situation is observable within the industrial product 
sector that highlights the greater influence of the HH index on short-term debt, 
although the sector grew only moderately within the stable periods due to a global 
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economy slowdown in 2005. The fundamental nature of the HH index on total debt is 
clear across all the sectors except industrial product and plantation. From this 
balanced panel data analysis, a few captivating issues are noticeable. First, the 
pattern of results between types of leverage and sector-level determinants across 
sectors is the most attention-grabbing issue. Secondly, the short-term debt of the 
industrial product and construction sectors, and the long-term debt of the trade and 
services sector, are highly responsive to the changes in sector-level variables. 
Finally, the leverage of the trade and services and technology sectors is highly 
sensitive and responsive to these sector-level regressors. 
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Table 6.19: Sector-level Determinants Analysis based on the Overall Balanced Panel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.3) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes 300 non-financial firms within 
seven sectors. The dependent variables are median book leverage ratios (median of short-term debt to total asset (MEDBSDA), median of long-term debt 
to total asset (MEDBLDA) and median of total debt to total asset (MEDBTDA)). The sample periods are divided into two sub-periods, i.e., recovery sub-
period that covers from 2000 until 2002 and stable sub-period from 2003 until 2007. The independent variables are munificence (MFCE), dynamism 
(DYSM) and HH Index (HHI). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
2000-2007 
OLS 
2000-2007 
FE 
2000-2002 
OLS 
2000-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 Munificence -1.15 (-3.32)** 0.15(-0.72) -0.45(-1.07) 0.44(1.20) -1.83(-2.68)** 0.11(0.51) 
MEDBSDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-5.94 (-4.26)** 
0.36 (0.73) 
0.88(0.92) 
-1.36(-1.62) 
-6.08(-3.90)** 
0.23(0.36) 
3.84(4.52)** 
-1.99(-0.75) 
-4.92(-1.99) 
0.58(0.94) 
0.22(0.45) 
-1.77(-1.43) 
 F-Test 10.49 8.19 5.47 8.28 5.73 0.90 
 Obs. 56 56 21 21 35 35 
        
 Munificence 0.32 (3.22)** 0.10(0.79) -0.10(-0.97) -0.19(-1.32) 0.33(1.57) -0.12(-0.84) 
MEDBLDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
0.88 (1.63) 
-0.15 (-0.99) 
-0.49(-1.08) 
0.81(2.08)* 
0.33(-0.55) 
-0.13(-0.70) 
-0.88(-1.38) 
0.88(0.85) 
0.89(1.37) 
-0.11(-0.53) 
-0.39(-0.99) 
1.23(1.92) 
 F-Test 3.51 11.55 0.58 0.84 2.07 3.08 
 Obs. 56 56 21 21 35 35 
        
 Munificence -0.48 (-2.25)* 0.06(0.34) -0.76(-2.88)** 0.14(0.97) -1.43(-4.54)** -0.56(-1.51) 
MEDBTDA Dynamism) 
HH Index 
-3.71 (-4.08)** 
-0.18 (-0.56) 
0.10(0.38) 
-0.12(-0.08) 
-4.24(-4.64)** 
-0.79(-2.28)* 
1.48(1.50) 
1.39(1.30) 
-3.32(-2.75)** 
0.59(1.96) 
-0.93(-1.35) 
1.13(1.23) 
 F-Test 16.75 0.09 23.86 1.13 17.15 1.20 
 Obs. 56 56 21 21 35 35 
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Table 6.20:  Sector-level Determinants Analysis across Sectors based on Balanced Sample 
 The table presents estimates of equation (6.3) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes 300 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The stable sub-period covers from 2003 
until 2007. The dependent variables are book median leverage ratios (median of short-term debt to total asset (MEDBSDA), median of long-term debt to total asset (MEDBLDA) and median of total debt to total 
asset (MEDBTDA)). The independent variables are Munificence (MFCE), Dynamism (DYSM) and HH Index (HHI). Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. The t-values shown in 
parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
.
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
CONSTRUCTION PROPERTY PLANTATION TECHNOLOGY TRADE & 
SERVICES 
 Munificence -1.83(-2.68)** -0.20(-0.44) -31.38(-6.71)** 5.27(28.08)** -1.18(-0.92) 0.09(0.11) 0.72(0.40) 1.40(17.67)** 
MEDBSDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-4.92(-1.99) 
0.58(0.94) 
2.96(2.34)* 
-1.05(-0.66) 
-68.75(-6.64)** 
205.09(6.76)** 
14.18(34.02)** 
7.93(18.17)** 
5.04(1.05) 
4.89(0.95) 
-0.26(-0.18) 
-1.16(-0.47) 
-1.09(-0.12) 
-10.73(-1.32) 
3.29(1.76) 
-5.82(-6.67)** 
 F-Test 5.73 17.02 29.42 1198.39 0.44 0.65 0.95 1783.52 
 Obs. 56 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
          
 Munificence 0.33(1.57) 0.08(0.26) 14.02(0.92) -2.23(-2.61)** 0.90(1.65) -0.05(-0.34) -0.34(-0.34) 0.77(2.26)* 
MEDBLDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
0.89(1.37) 
-0.11(-0.53) 
-1.76(-2.07)* 
0.01(0.01) 
31.31(0.93) 
-89.27(-0.91) 
-7.47(-3.93)** 
-1.81(-0.91) 
-1.17(-0.57) 
-5.04(-2.30)* 
-0.12(-0.41) 
-0.67(-1.47) 
2.46(0.51) 
4.48(1.01) 
-23.09(-2.87)** 
14.82(3.95)** 
 F-Test 2.07 6.70 1.62 41.21 13.06 1.71 0.35 114.84 
 Obs. 56 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
          
 Munificence -1.43(-4.54)** 1.05(3.05)** -21.68(-0.69) 0.12(0.36) 0.90(4.18)** 0.50(1.25) -2.78(-24.95)** -1.13(-8.77)** 
MEDBTDA Dynamism) 
HH Index 
-3.32(-2.75)** 
0.59(1.96) 
-0.80(-0.87) 
-3.91(-3.41)** 
-45.90(-0.66) 
139.44(0.68) 
-2.09(-2.93)** 
3.10(4.15)** 
0.28(0.35) 
-2.25(-2.61)** 
0.78(1.09) 
-2.21(-1.84) 
6.70(12.51)** 
4.56(9.19)** 
23.39(7.71)** 
-15.20(-10.73)** 
 F-Test 17.15 6.62 1.09 234.01 41.72 1.15 428.56 360.77 
 Obs. 56 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
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Based on the overall unbalanced sample, as shown in Table 6.21, the impact 
of different economic sub-periods on the relationship between sector-level 
determinants and leverage is immaterial during the crisis periods, except for the 
significance of dynamism on long-term debt. As uncertainty increased, most of the 
firms tended to increase their long-term debt during the crisis periods. This is 
contradictory to Boyd (1995) who argues that firms that operate within a dynamic 
environment may increase the use of equity financing as the firms are reluctant to use 
debt due to its high cost. Nevertheless, this result is highly consistent with that of 
Kayo and Kimura (2011) who found that environmental dynamism and long-term 
debt are positively correlated. The repercussions of the sector-level determinants are 
clearer and observable during the second sub-period (i.e., the recovery period) and 
are strongly supported by the sector-fixed effect analysis. During this sub-period, 
sectors tended to increase their leverage regardless of the types of leverage as their 
HH Index increased. 
These sectors tend to increase their leverage financing as their concentration 
level increases, and this result is in line with MacKay and Phillips (2005) who 
emphasize that firms in highly-concentrated industries will use larger amounts of 
leverage, and vice-versa low-concentrated industries. As the munificence level 
magnifies, the sectors increase their total debt financing and reduce long-term debt 
utilization during the recovery periods. The associations between dynamism and 
long-term debt change from positive to negative during downturn and stable periods, 
respectively. In other words, each sector tends to increase long-term debt during the 
crisis periods and reduce it during the stable periods as the uncertainty increases. 
These results are contradictory to the previous arguments that firms tend to reduce 
their long-term debt during downturn periods, and increase it during stable periods. 
The increase in the long-term debt during crisis periods is possibly attributable to 
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high liquidity risk and, therefore, firms needing to divert into long-term debt 
financing. However, the level of long-term debt increment is smaller during the crisis 
periods compared to the level of reduction during the stable periods. 
Once again, both OLS and fixed effect analysis were performed, by sector, to 
capture the sectoral behaviour across different economic sub-periods based on the 
unbalanced dataset. Due to limited observations, the periods are divided into two 
sub-periods instead of three sub-periods. Therefore, the downturn and recovery 
periods are combined together across sectors. Although the regressors are 
meaningless in explaining the short-term debt in the overall sample periods, the 
sector-based analysis highlights some interesting results. During the first and second 
sub-periods, short-term debt of the consumer product, plantation, technology and 
trade and services sectors tends to move positively and is significantly related with 
munificence, although the trade and services sector demonstrates an enormous 
coefficient with significant values. However, this variable affects exclusively long-
term debt across consumer product firms. As for total debt, a few sectors such as 
consumer product, construction, property and technology reacted rigorously to 
munificence. The variations of a sector’s characteristics could be seen clearly as the 
dynamism factor influencedshort-term debt and total debt across sectors. During the 
first and second sub-periods, the consumer product and technology sectors increased 
the usage of short-term financing, whilst the trade and services sector reacted 
inversely. An equivalent situation occurs between plantation and technology sectors 
as the mechanism varies between dynamism and total debt. These results confirm the 
variations of sectors, particularly in responding to the environmental instability. 
From the sectoral concentration context, the significant effect of the HH 
Index on short-term debt is obvious across sectors, except for the industrial product 
sector. Being statistically significant, the momentum of this variable is greater among 
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the trade and services sector followed by the property sector. As the sectors become 
highly concentrated, they tend to increase their short-term debt, except for the 
consumer product and plantation sectors that respond inversely. This variable 
becomes important to construction and plantation in the process of long-term debt 
determination. Both sectors increased their long-term debt as this index increased, 
although the effect is greater on the construction sector. The substance of HH Index 
on total debt is evident across the property, plantation, technology and trade and 
services sectors. The property, technology and trade and services sectors increased 
their total debt, while the plantation sector decreased as this index increased. As a 
whole, the results reveal that a small number of sectors are highly sensitive to sector-
level determinants. For instance, the consumer product, technology and trade and 
services sectors are more receptive to these variables as they determine their short-
term financing, while technology sector is responsive in setting their total debt 
consumption. 
As shown in Table 6.22, remarkable changes are obvious during the third 
sub-period as most of the variables became insignificant to leverage across sectors. 
As for short-term debt, dynamism becomes significant to the industrial product and 
construction sectors. Likewise, the short-term debt of the property and technology 
sectors remains significant to the HH index. The association between these variables 
changes in the third sub-period from positive to negative. These sectors increase their 
short-term debt in the downturn periods and reduce tremendously in the stable 
periods as the HH index increases. Consistent with the overall sample, the sector-
level determinants are significant to the construction and plantation sectors. 
However, the mechanism transformation is noticeable between the sector-related 
variables such as munificence, the HH Index and leverage. For instance, construction 
firms tend to decrease long-term debt financing while plantation firms increased it as 
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munificence increased. A comparable reaction is visible between the HH index and 
long-term debt. In the previous sub-periods, both sectors responded correspondingly 
in increasing long-term leverage as the HH index amplifies. Nevertheless, the 
plantation sector reacted inversely as the economy stabilized, that is, it reduced long-
term debt consumption. 
The effect of dynamism is greater on the property firms compared to the 
construction and plantation sectors. The property sector increases its long-term debt 
although it is exposed to a higher level of uncertainty, while the other two sectors 
reduced it during this sub-period. Although, the construction sector reduced long-
term debt utilization during the stable periods, it increased both short-term debt and 
total debt as the dynamism increased. In contrast, the industrial product sector 
reduced both short-term and total debt during these periods. The impact of sector-
level determinants (except the HH index) on total debt is limited among the industrial 
product and construction sectors. 
As a whole, the results reveal that a few sectors are highly sensitive to sector-
level determinants. For instance, the consumer product, technology and trade and 
services sectors are more receptive to these variables as they determine their short-
term financing, while the technology sector is responsive in setting their total debt 
consumption. The consistency of relationships between sector-level determinants and 
leverage across both the balanced and unbalanced datasets further substantiates the 
effect of sectoral behaviour on sector-level capital structure determinants, which is 
not observable in the overall sample. 
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Table 6.21: Sector-level Determinants Analysis based on the Overall Unbalanced Panel Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The table presents estimates of equation (6.3) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes 815 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The sample periods are divided into 
three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables are book 
median leverage ratios (median of short-term debt to total asset (MEDBSDA), median of long-term debt to total asset (MEDBLDA) and median of total debt to total asset (MEDBTDA)). The independent 
variables are munificence, dynamism and HH Index.Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
1996-2007 
OLS 
1996-2007 
FE 
1996-1998 
OLS 
1996-1998 
FE 
1999-2002 
OLS 
1999-2002 
FE 
2003-2007 
OLS 
2003-2007 
FE 
 Munificence 0.04 (0.38) 0.11(1.96) -0.02(-0.10) -0.42(-1.18) -0.18(-0.60) 0.11(0.45) 0.07(0.37) 0.13(1.65) 
MEDBSDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
0.45 (0.94) 
-0.38 (-1.71) 
0.24(0.58) 
-0.04(-0.24) 
-0.06(-0.07) 
0.25(0.80) 
0.45(0.74) 
2.39(1.37) 
0.30(0.36) 
-0.58(-0.91) 
0.76(0.89) 
0.76(2.82)** 
0.16(0.17) 
-0.36(-0.98) 
0.20(0.60) 
-0.17(-1.05) 
 F-Test 1.32 21.63 0.62 37.56 1.52 33.21 1.30 44.25 
 Obs. 84 84 21 21 28 28 35 35 
          
 Munificence -0.04 (-0.95) 0.02(0.95) -0.03(-0.49) -0.09(-0.78) -0.24(-3.55)** -0.11(-2.70)** -0.23(-2.04)* 0.001(0.01) 
MEDBLDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-0.09 (-0.30) 
-0.04 (-0.27) 
-0.32(-1.69) 
0.19(1.39) 
0.64(2.74)** 
-0.23(-1.26) 
0.35(2.60)** 
-0.08(-0.15) 
0.37(1.27) 
-0.27(-1.63) 
-0.39(-1.87) 
0.17(3.75)** 
-1.02(-2.01)* 
0.54(2.57)* 
-0.24(-0.87) 
0.10(0.65) 
 F-Test 2.08 2.50 2.66 1682.32 5.79 5.75 7.46 5.04 
 Obs. 84 84 21 21 28 28 35 35 
          
 Munificence -0.03 (-0.19) 0.19(2.58)** -0.05(-0.26) 0.60(0.89) -0.23(-0.61) 0.66(2.66)** -0.45(-1.86) 0.0001(0.00) 
MEDBTDA Dynamism) 
HH Index 
0.36 (0.70) 
-0.44(-1.84 
-0.13(-0.23) 
0.15(0.79) 
0.59(0.52) 
-0.16(-0.44) 
-1.16(-1.25) 
-4.01(-1.35) 
0.09(0.09) 
-0.80(-1.04) 
0.09(0.10) 
0.80(3.54)** 
-0.83(-1.01) 
0.34(1.03) 
-0.60(-0.95) 
0.29(1.33) 
 F-Test 3.29 12.98 0.10 159.23 2.41 38.23 4.92 15.90 
 Obs. 84 84 21 21 28 28 35 35 
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Table 6.22: Sector-level Determinants Analysis across the 
Unbalanced Sector Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
(1996-2007) 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
(1996-2002) 
CONSUMER 
PRODUCT 
(2003-2007) 
 Munificence 0.28 (1.65) 0.51(11.36)** -1.57(-1.05) 
MEDBSDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
1.98 (2.98)** 
0.06 (0.07) 
3.20(5.98)** 
-2.11(-2.45)* 
8.95(1.26) 
10.97(1.15) 
 F-Test 4.37 72.88 19.80 
     
 Munificence 0.11 (3.57)** 0.10(2.44)* 0.29(0.58) 
MEDBLDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
0.28 (2.36)* 
-0.55 (-3.21)** 
0.28(1.39) 
-0.52(-1.66) 
0.22(0.09) 
-0.73(-0.23) 
 F-Test 7.05 2.59 145.68 
     
 Munificence 0.32 (2.23)* 0.43(3.17)** 1.16(0.22) 
MEDBTDA Dynamism) 
HH Index 
1.07 (2.32)** 
0.77 (1.52) 
1.03(0.82) 
0.27(0.23) 
-6.14(-0.24) 
8.69(-0.25) 
 F-Test 20.50 4.88 0.32 
     
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCT 
(1996-2007) 
INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCT 
(1996-2002) 
INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCT 
(2003-2007) 
 Munificence -0.03 (-0.51) -0.07(-0.73) -0.02(-0.33) 
MEDBSDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-0.19 (-0.80) 
2.68 (2.29)* 
0.18(0.49) 
2.68(0.99) 
-0.70(-5.14)** 
0.39(0.46) 
 F-Test 2.53 0.33 10.23 
     
 Munificence 0.06 (1.53) 0.01(0.40) 0.28(3.54)** 
MEDBLDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-0.02 (-0.08) 
-1.30 (-2.07)* 
0.32(1.94) 
0.72(0.82) 
0.06(0.31) 
-2.37(-1.89) 
 F-Test 3.79 6.18 19.71 
     
 Munificence 0.15 (1.63) 0.03(0.22) -0.67(12.56)** 
MEDBTDA Dynamism) 
HH Index 
-0.24 (-0.53) 
3.66 (2.29)* 
0.56(0.67) 
5.74(1.19) 
-0.56(-4.02)** 
-0.88(-1.04) 
 F-Test 3.29 0.74 143.46 
     
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
CONSTRUCT. 
(1996-2007) 
CONSTRUCT. 
(1996-2002) 
CONSTRUCT. 
(2003-2007) 
 Munificence 0.04 (0.27) 0.06(1.43) 0.06(0.16) 
MEDBSDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
1.09 (1.75) 
-0.93 (-0.61) 
-0.18(-1.00) 
1.46(2.41)* 
2.41(2.49)* 
-1.70(-0.60) 
 F-Test 3.82 68.95 4.87 
     
 Munificence 0.02 (0.76) 0.02(1.09) -0.79(-11.23)** 
MEDBLDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-0.13 (-0.45) 
1.91 (3.53)* 
0.18(1.16) 
1.96(3.45)** 
-0.62(-3.49)** 
1.74(3.33)** 
 F-Test 5.51 14.24 53.01 
     
 Munificence 0.23 (1.90) 0.24(4.59)** -0.92(-6.54)** 
MEDBTDA Dynamism) 
HH Index 
0.88 (1.51) 
-1.64 (-1.24) 
0.19(0.57) 
0.28(0.46) 
1.95(5.48)** 
-1.85(-1.76) 
 F-Test 9.35 12.00 59.69 
     
CHAPTER 6 
 
263 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
PROPERTY 
(1996-2007) 
PROPERTY 
(1996-2002) 
PROPERTY 
(2003-2007) 
 Munificence -0.10 (-1.40) -0.09(-1.46) 0.09(0.69) 
MEDBSDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-0.07 (-0.11) 
6.39 (2.32)* 
-0.59(-0.79) 
5.67(2.77)* 
-0.06(-0.17) 
-5.78(-2.24)* 
 F-Test 3.14 2.57 1.91 
     
 Munificence 0.07 (1.06) 0.01(0.17) 0.03(0.16) 
MEDBLDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
0.83 (2.08)* 
-4.90 (-2.44)* 
0.55(0.96) 
-0.62(-0.24) 
1.11(2.60)* 
-6.58(-1.95) 
 F-Test 2.70 0.31 6.30 
     
 Munificence -0.09 (-3.87)** -0.10(-4.52)** -0.33(-1.37) 
MEDBTDA Dynamism) 
HH Index 
0.15 (0.68) 
7.67 (8.36)** 
0.29(0.88) 
8.98(5.31)** 
-0.19(-0.32) 
5.92(1.28) 
 F-Test 45.40 63.88 1.17 
     
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
PLANTAT. 
(1996-2007) 
PLANTAT. 
(1996-2002) 
PLANTAT. 
(2003-2007) 
 Munificence 0.21 (5.31)** 0.25(6.96)** 0.14(1.75) 
MEDBSDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-0.58 (-2.95)** 
-1.90 (-10.02)** 
-0.95(-1.96) 
-0.96(-4.58)** 
-0.25(-1.20) 
-0.64(-1.03) 
 F-Test 155.20 27.87 9.74 
     
 Munificence 0.15 (1.78) -0.02(-0.66) 0.34(7.28)** 
MEDBLDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
0.32 (0.50) 
3.64 (7.90)** 
0.23(0.65) 
0.60(3.01)** 
-0.47(-3.86)** 
-1.88(-5.22)** 
 F-Test 23.95 3.18 143.29 
     
 Munificence 0.37 (2.51)* 0.03(0.29) 0.27(0.67) 
MEDBTDA Dynamism) 
HH Index 
-2.09 (-1.92) 
0.40 (0.39) 
-4.94(-18.16)** 
-4.47(-15.10)** 
-1.81(-1.71) 
-1.83(-0.59) 
 F-Test 7.18 111.64 6.37 
     
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
TECHNO. 
(1996-2007) 
TECHNO. 
(1996-2002) 
TECHNO. 
(2003-2007) 
 Munificence 0.12 (0.59) 0.24(10.60)** 0.02(0.47) 
MEDBSDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-0.73 (-0.74) 
0.32 (0.76) 
1.32(5.06)** 
0.63(14.92)** 
0.97(5.22)** 
-0.42(-5.02)** 
 F-Test 0.61 187.18 19.56 
     
 Munificence 0.01 (0.14) 0.06(1.38) -0.04(-1.36) 
MEDBLDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-0.11 (-0.21) 
0.08 (0.30) 
0.81(1.57) 
0.18(1.36) 
0.23(1.64) 
-0.07(-1.06) 
 F-Test 0.18 2.74 1.33 
     
 Munificence 0.06 (0.19) 0.23(2.58)** -0.11(-0.44) 
MEDBTDA Dynamism) 
HH Index 
-0.88 (-0.55) 
0.49 (0.68) 
2.28(2.16)* 
0.95(6.12)** 
1.44(1.22) 
-0.51(-0.97) 
 F-Test 0.12 13.61 0.77 
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The table presents estimates of equation (6.3) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. 
This sample includes 815 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The sample periods are divided 
into three sub-periods, i.e., crisis sub-period from 1996 until 1998, recovery sub-period that covers 
from 1999 until 2002 and, finally, stable sub-periods from 2003 until 2007. The dependent variables 
are book median leverage ratios (median of short-term debt to total asset (MEDBSDA), median of 
long-term debt to total asset (MEDBLDA) and median of total debt to total asset (MEDBTDA)). The 
independent variables are munificence, dynamism and HH Index.Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for 
all variables definitions. The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust 
to heteroskedasticity. * and **denote significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This study reveals the impact of different economic sub-periods on capital 
structure determinants across seven sectors in Malaysia that survived consistently 
from 1996 until 2007. Most of the Malaysian listed firms were highly sensitive to 
current economic conditions as the effect is observable between the firm-level 
determinants and leverage across sub-periods. The magnitude changes as the firms 
operate in different economic sub-periods (i.e., downturn, recovery and stable). 
The mechanism between these variables is highly dependent on current 
macroeconomic conditions.To capture the variations across sectors, the firms were 
clustered into seven sectors based on balanced and unbalanced datasets. The 
uniformity between both datasets confirms the impact of the different economic 
conditions on the mechanism between firm-level determinants and leverage which 
varies between and within each sector in Malaysia. Each sector reacted differently 
and was highly responsive to the prevailing economic conditions. The 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
TRADE AND 
SERVICES 
(1996-2007) 
TRADE AND 
SERVICES 
(1996-2002) 
TRADE AND 
SERVICES 
(2003-2007) 
 Munificence 0.96 (1.45) 8.62(2.79)** 0.58(0.71) 
MEDBSDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-0.14 (-0.05) 
4.43 (2.27)* 
-4.79(-2.03* 
8.07(2.60)** 
-0.97(-0.44) 
1.27(0.44) 
 F-Test  7.16 3.46 7.47 
     
 Munificence -0.19 (-0.85) -1.15(-0.59) 0.09(0.11) 
MEDBLDA Dynamism 
HH Index 
-0.91 (-1.11) 
-0.15 (-0.17) 
-0.87(-0.79) 
0.44(0.24) 
0.24(0.11) 
1.09(0.38) 
 F-Test 1.42 1.23 0.52 
     
 Munificence -0.14 (-0.63) -0.91(-0.36) 0.46(0.45) 
MEDBTDA Dynamism) 
HH Index 
-1.62 (-1.68) 
4.69 (6.68)** 
-3.13(-1.62) 
5.31(2.39)* 
0.61(0.22) 
5.57(1.51) 
 F-Test 18.08 3.50 6.42 
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consistencies between both datasets confirm the indirect effect of different 
economic periods on the relationship between firm-level determinants and 
leverage. 
For instance, the mechanism between leverage and firm-level 
determinants, such as liquidity, tangibility, profitability and firm size within the 
consumer product sector, is greatly influenced by the different economic sub-
periods. The trade and services sector highlighted that the firm-level determinants, 
except for risk, are affected indirectly by the different economic periods. Besides 
the firm-level determinants, the sector-level determinants such as munificence, 
dynamism and the HH Index, are also indirectly affected by the different 
economic sub-periods. Dynamism affected short-term debt and total debt during 
the recovery periods, while munificence influenced total debt during both the 
recovery and stable sub-periods, i.e. recovery and stable. Nevertheless, the impact 
of dynamism on long-term debt is only observed during the crisis periods. The 
consistency of the relationship between sector-level determinants and leverage, 
across both the balanced and unbalanced datasets during the stable periods, further 
substantiate the effect of sectoral behaviour on sector-level capital structure 
determinants, which is not observable in the overall sample outcomes.
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CHAPTER 7 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS II: FIRM SIZE EFFECT ON 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE DETERMINANTS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Past studies have shown that financial structure differences exist across 
large and small firms (Gupta, 1969; Bates, 1971; Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Chittenden et al., 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Voulgaris et al., 
2004; Bas et al., 2009). However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, little attention has 
been paid to the impact of sectoral behaviour on leverage amongst different firm 
sizes across sectors, particularly across the developing countries. The financing 
patterns vary across large and small firms due to their different characteristics and 
different levels of development (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). 
Additionally, firms with different characteristics have different access to financial 
markets and institutions although they are operating within a particular economy 
(Beck et al., 2008). The research to date has tended to focus on the financial 
structure differences across large and small firms within a particular sector rather 
than across sectors. The past literature emphasizes the substance of firm-level 
characteristics being the most powerful determinants that influence the capital 
structure decision-making. Nevertheless, the previous analysis in Chapter 5 and 
Chapters 6 has demonstrated the indirect behaviour of sectors via the relationship 
between firm-level determinants and leverage although the sector-level 
determinants become less important. Therefore, this chapter will critically 
examine the impact of sectoral behaviour on the relationship between capital 
structure determinants (i.e., firm-level determinants and leverage) within and 
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between each sector across different firm size based on both the balanced and 
unbalanced datasets. 
This study focuses primarily on four selected sectors - consumer product, 
industrial product, construction, and trade and services. The remaining sectors - 
property, plantation and technology - were dropped from this analysis due to 
limited observations, hence they were, not comparable with the other sectors. To 
capture the firm size effect on capital structure determinants, the firms are divided 
into three categories, namely, the main board (large firms), the second board 
(medium-sized firms), and the MESDAQ (small-sized firms) based on Bursa 
Malaysia’s listing requirements. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Bursa Malaysia 
(Stock Exchange of Malaysia) listing is based on paid-up capital requirements. In 
this chapter, the first section covers the overall sample analysis that provides 
evidence related to firm size effect, as the firms were classified into different sizes 
based on the balanced panel data. Subsequently, the second section explains the 
impact of different firm sizes on leverage based on the unbalanced panel data. The 
third section provides a detailed analysis on each sector by highlighting the impact 
of sectoral behaviour on the relationship between leverage and firm-level 
determinants across different firm sizes, large firms and medium firms, based on 
both the balanced and unbalanced datasets. The final section presents the analysis 
on small firms across selected sectors. 
7.2 Firm-level Determinants Based on Balanced Panel 
Data 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, both pooled OLS and fixed effect analyses are 
used to assess the association between firm-level determinants and leverage. The 
estimated equation is: 
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                                                                                 (7.1) 
where    is the debt ratio for firm  in year  , with firm-level determinants such as 
tangibility (      ), profitability (      ), growth opportunities (     ), 
non-debt tax shield (    ), liquidity (   ), firm size (       ) and risk 
(    ). The firm-fixed effects    control for cross-sectional differences in the 
firm characteristics. The disturbance term is denoted as     and is assumed to be 
serially uncorrelated with mean zero. Based on the balanced overall sample, as 
shown in Table 7.1, the impact of profitability is greater on leverage among the 
larger firms than on the medium-sized firms, although both types of firms 
maintain a negative relationship that supports the pecking order theory. This is 
mainly due to higher profit margins on sales attained by the larger-sized firms 
compared to the medium-sized firms (Gupta, 1969). Consequently, retained 
earnings are accumulated to be utilized for future investments. As a result, larger 
firms tend to use debt when they need additional funds (Voulgaris et al., 2004). 
Therefore, the dependency on leverage reduces tremendously as their income 
increases. Alternatively, asset tangibility becomes an important variable and is 
significantly related to leverage at the 1% level, specifically to short-term debt 
and total debt across the medium-sized firms. Most of these firms rely more on 
short-term debt due to less collateral and this forces them to employ more short-
term financing rather than long-term financing. Conversely, the large firms have a 
stronger borrowing capacity backed up by larger amounts of tangible assets 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). 
The medium-sized firms perceive liquidity as a crucial factor in the 
process of leverage determination. These firms tend to reduce their leverage 
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utilization as the level of liquidity increases. In general, the liquidity levels of the 
medium-sized firms are lower than the larger firms. According to the relationship 
between stage of development and liquidity, the younger firms have weaker 
liquidity levels which are attributable to several reasons failure to raise long-term 
financing and lack of internal reserves (Chittenden et al., 1996). As a result, the 
medium-sized firms tend to react more as their liquidity position gets stronger 
which encourages them to raise long-term debt. Upholding a positive relationship, 
a parallel situation is discernible between non-tax debt shield and leverage across 
the medium-sized firms. The consequences of non-tax debt shield on leverage 
become stronger as the cross-section is fixed. Remarkably, risk and growth 
opportunities produce great discrepancies across types of firms. As earnings 
volatility increases, the larger firms tend to increase their short-term debt and total 
debt, while the medium-sized firms reduce it in larger proportions. This indirectly 
explains the greater effects of earnings volatility on the medium-sized firms 
compared to larger firms. Remmers et al. (1974) stress that firm size could 
possibly be a good proxy for perceived business risk. Larger firms are less risky 
due to multi-product diversification compared to medium-sized firms. Thus, large 
firms may utilize a larger amount of leverage although they are exposed to high 
earnings volatilities. 
A similar relationship is observable between short-term debt and growth 
opportunities. Larger firms tend to decrease their short-term debt financing as 
their growth opportunities increase funded by high retained earnings that have 
been accumulated in their reserves, whereas the medium-sized firms tend to 
increase their short-term debt as growth opportunities increase. In order to take 
advantage the profitable opportunities, these firms have the flexibility to alter their  
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Table 7.1: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on Balanced Overall Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (7.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes 300 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The 
dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The firms are 
divided into Main Board firms (large firms) and Second Board firms (medium firms). The independent variables are profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, 
size, growth and risk. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR. 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Overall 
Sample (OLS) 
Overall 
Sample (FE) 
Main Board  
OLS 
Main Board 
FE 
Second Board 
OLS 
Second Board 
FE  
 EBITTA Profitability -0.93(-5.00)** -0.63(-3.83)** -1.00(-4.83)** -0.72(-3.77)** -0.43(-2.86)** -0.36(-2.85)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.17(-1.69) 0.02(0.08) -0.15(-1.34) 0.08(0.23) -0.49(-11.54)** -0.38(-4.35)** 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-2.70)** -0.003(-1.76) -0.01(-2.70)** -0.003(-1.44) -0.08(-11.53)** -0.06(-4.75)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.78(3.72)** 4.55(2.26)* 3.86(3.73)** 4.84(1.92) 0.64(2.09)* 2.64(3.93)** 
BSDA LNSALES Size -0.02(-2.34)* -0.07(-2.20)* -0.03(-2.73)** -0.08(-2.00)* -0.002(-0.32) -0.06(-2.58)** 
 RISK Risk 0.03(4.93)** 0.02(3.67)** 0.03(4.77)** 0.02(3.64)** -0.01(-1.18) -0.21(-3.01)** 
 GRWTH Growth 0.004(0.21) -0.02(-1.94) -0.001(-0.30) -0.02(-2.02)** 0.01(1.68) 0.02(2.42)* 
 Obs.  3600 3600 2868 2868 732 732 
 F-STAT  19.54 19.22 9.92 16.13 41.27 9.33 
         
 EBITTA Profitability -0.06(-3.51)** -0.02(-1.22) -0.07(-3.28)** -0.03(-1.11) 0.05(1.52) 0.01(0.12) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.26(19.49)** 0.21(4.95)** 0.28(17.88)** 0.20(3.93)** 0.19(8.49)** 0.26(5.89)** 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.004(-0.82) 0.000(-0.00) -0.0001(-0.34) -0.0001(-0.17) -0.002(-0.97) 0.01(2.66)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.55(-4.62)** -0.81(-2.92)** -0.59(-3.81)** -0.66(-1.94) -0.49(-2.55)* -1.14(-2.94)** 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(18.06)** 0.04(5.89)** 0.03(17.32)** 0.04(5.31)** 0.02(4.02)** 0.04(3.18)** 
 RISK Risk 0.002(3.69)** 0.001(1.49) 0.003(3.44)** 0.001(1.31) 0.04(6.55)** 0.01(0.27) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.002(0.71) 0.0001(0.05) 0.002(0.81) 0.0004(0.18) -0.01(-2.86)** -0.01(-2.18)* 
 Obs.  3600 3600 2868 2868 7.32 732 
 F-STAT  126.03 10.98 164.35 8.06 21.60 6.82 
         
 EBITTA Profitability -1.00(-5.45)** -0.65(-4.10)** -1.07(-5.26)** -0.75(-4.05)** -0.38(-2.34)* -0.36(-2.86)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.10(1.04) 0.23(0.94) 0.13(1.19) 0.28(0.94) -0.30(-6.69)** -0.12(-1.43) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-2.59)** -0.003(-1.87) -0.01(-2.55)** -0.003(-1.53) -0.08(-11.57)** -0.05(-4.43)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.23(3.19) 3.74(2.03)* 3.27(3.39)** 4.19(1.82) 0.14(0.52) 1.50(2.71)** 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.002(0.25) -0.03(-0.93) -0.01(-0.51) -0.04(-0.88) 0.02(2.22)* -0.03(-0.85) 
 RISK Risk 0.03(5.40)** 0.02(3.98)** 0.04(5.22)** 0.03(3.95)** 0.03(3.34)** -0.20(-2.74)** 
 GRWTH Growth 0.002(0.69) -0.02(-1.62) 0.001(0.51) -0.02(-1.63) 0.004(0.53) 0.01(1.99) 
 Obs.  3600 3600 2868 2868 732 732 
 F-STAT  22.04 31.92 12.91 27.35 31.04 10.34 
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assets, mainly the short-term assets and their operating structure (Scherr and 
Hulburt, 2001). This provides an indication that the orientation between leverage 
and capital structure determinants changes as the firm size (control variable) is 
embedded in the model. 
7.3 Firm-level Determinants Based on Unbalanced 
Panel Data 
To capture further consistencies of the firm size effect on capital structure 
determinants across sectors in Malaysia, a similar analysis was undertaken on the 
unbalanced data set. The estimated equation is: 
                                                      
                                                                                    (7.2) 
where    is the debt ratio for firm  in year  , with firm-level determinants such as 
tangibility (      ), profitability (      ), growth opportunities (     ), 
non-debt tax shield (    ), liquidity (   ), firm size (       ) and risk 
(    ). The firm-fixed effects    control for cross-sectional differences in the 
firm characteristics. The disturbance term is denoted as     and is assumed to be 
serially uncorrelated with mean zero. Based on Table 7.2, the overall unbalanced 
sample analysis demonstrates that profitability is highly significant and negatively 
related to leverage across different sizes of firms. 
Thus, the result is consistent with the findings of Bas et al. (2009) and 
strongly supports the pecking order theory. Nevertheless, studies such as Pettit 
and Singer (1985) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) found a positive relationship 
and further argue that large firms tend to utilize more leverage in order to enjoy 
the tax benefits, as they are more likely to generate high profits. Equally, the 
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richness of tangibility is essential to long-term debt financing regardless of firm 
size. As firms strengthen their tangibility position, the probability of insolvency 
will be reduced and more long-term debt can be raised (Bas et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, the larger firms are sensitive towards this variable as they take into 
consideration the level of collateral in determining their short-term debt. As 
tangibility increases, they tend to increase their long-term debt and reduce the 
short-term debt. In relation to the trade-off theory, both types of firms maintain a 
similar relationship between long-term debt and tangibility. In accordance with 
Scott (1977), firms that invest largely in tangible assets are exposed to smaller 
costs of financial distress than the firmsthat rely on intangible assets. Hence, firms 
that fail to provide some kind of guarantees in the form of collateral would face 
problems in raising debt, particularly long-term debt. 
In line with the balanced dataset, the impact of liquidity and non-tax debt 
shield on the leverage among medium-sized firms is greater than on the larger 
ones. An inverse relationship between liquidity and leverage indirectly confirms 
the applicability of the pecking order theory. Small firms do not consider non-tax 
debt shield as an important variable in the process of leverage determination, 
although the other two types of firms maintain a negative relationship with their 
long-term debt which supports the trade-off theory. This relates to the argument of 
Pettit and Singer (1985) who found that the small firms may not choose debt 
financing for the purpose of tax shields as their profits are lower compared to 
those of the larger firms. Alternatively, the small firms are more concerned about 
the size of the firm as the results highlight the substance of the proxy of firm size, 
i.e. natural logarithm of sales (lnsales) on leverage (regardless of types of 
leverage). In line with the trade-off theory, the utilization of leverage increases as 
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the firms grow larger, which is attributable to greater and more adequate access to 
external financing (Beck et al., 2008). These variations could not be traced from 
the balanced dataset, possibly due to variations within the large and medium-sized 
firms. Additionally, the differences could be observed after the inclusion of small 
firms in the unbalanced datasets. As the proportion of sizes changes within each 
firm size, the impact of firm size on leverage varies between balanced and 
unbalanced. Secondly, the differences might be attributable to the different 
number of observations, as the unbalanced panel includes a greater number of 
observations compared to the balanced dataset. Nevertheless, a weaker effect is 
noticeable between firm size and leverage although the magnitude has improved 
from the balanced to the unbalanced dataset. Since firm size is correlated with 
other omitted variables that affect leverage, the pure effect of size could not be 
traced and, thereby, produces a small coefficient (Parson and Titman, 2008). 
The sensitivity of leverage on earnings volatility is clear across different 
types of firm size, particularly between total debt and risk. The mechanism 
between these variables diverges across large, medium and small firms. In relation 
to both trade-off theory and pecking order theory, the small-sized firms tend to 
reduce the total leverage as their risk level increases, while the other two 
categories of firms increase the leverage consumption, although the impact is 
greater on the larger firms. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) found that smaller firms 
with greater earnings volatility use lower amounts of leverage, while the larger 
ones utilize more leverage. Once again, growth opportunities appear to be relevant 
to leverage among the medium-sized firms with diminutive effects. As a 
conclusion, both datasets confirm the effect of capital structure determinants, that 
is, firm-level determinants on leverage differ across firm sizes. The substance of 
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each variable on leverage varies across large, medium and small firms. In general, 
profitability is the most important determinant of leverage regardless of firm size, 
although it is highly influential to the larger firms. The sensitivity between long-
term debt and firm-level determinants is traceable among the large firms, while 
the short-term debt is more responsive to these variables among the medium-sized 
and small firms. The relationships between firm-level determinants and leverage 
remain consistent across firm sizes, except risk. To this point, the overall sample 
provides an indication about the orientation between leverage and capital structure 
determinant changes, as the firm size is controlled in this model. These variations 
could be further observed as the firms are categorised into different sizes 
according to the paid-up capital. 
7.4 Firm-level Determinants based on Sectors with 
Different Firm Size 
To this point, past literature has addressed this issue across developed and 
developing countries. The subsequent investigation considers the unique 
behaviour of each sector and its impact on leverage, although a few studies have 
taken place at the industry or sector level across developed and developing 
countries. In most cases, the emphasis is more pertinent to intra-sectors analysis 
rather than inter-sectors analysis within a nation. Therefore, to analyse the effect 
of sectoral behaviour on different firm sizes across sectors in Malaysia, the model 
considers another factor, sector classifications, in the regression analysis. The 
following discussion concentrates on two different aspects. First, the focus will be 
on variations within a sector across types of firms, either large, medium or small. 
Secondly, attention will be diverted to analysing the differences between sectors. 
Based on Table 7.3, profitability seems to be an important factor to short-term 
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debt and total debt among the consumer product firms. However, the impact of 
this variable is greater on short-term debt among the medium-sized firms, while 
the total debt of larger firms are more responsive to this variable, which is similar 
tothe findings of Voulgaris et al. (2004). They argue that the large-sized firms 
prefer to use their internal reserves and raise external debt only when additional 
finance is needed. Both types of firms maintained a negative relationship between 
these variables which indirectly strengthens the applicability of the pecking order 
theory among the consumer product sector.  
Tangibility becomes highly significant to long-term debt merely among 
the larger firms, whereas the medium-sized firms lay a greater emphasis on the 
variable in order to determine their short-term debt and total debt. The larger firms 
are highly supported by the long-term debt financing due to their strong 
borrowing capacity as a result of their high fixed asset to total asset ratio. 
However, the medium firms are likely to generate additional amounts of short-
term debt as they manage to maintain high sales to net fixed asset ratio 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). Nevertheless, the relationship supports 
the pecking order theory in contrast to the overall sample results that support the 
trade-off theory. Based on the huge magnitude and high significance level 
between liquidity and leverage, the medium-sized firms consider liquidity more 
than larger firms in deciding the amount of leverage. In most cases, medium-sized 
firms are less liquid compared to large firms and are, therefore, more sensitive to 
leverage as their liquidity position changes. The applicability of the pecking order 
theory remains across types of firms among the consumer product sectors. 
Additionally, the leverage of the medium-sized firms is highly sensitive to non-tax 
debt shield. This is strongly supported by the fixed effect analysis, although the 
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relationship contradicts the trade-off theory. This indirectly emphasizes the 
importance of collateral value for the attainment of secured debt, which in turn 
increases the debt capacity of the medium-sized firms to borrow and save more on 
tax. 
The medium-sized firms are more responsive to earnings volatility 
compared to larger firms. Therefore, the medium-sized firms pay more attention 
to this determinant while deciding on their short-term debt and total debt, as this 
decision is controlled by the risk level of the firm. Alternatively, the larger firms 
consider their risk as the need for long-term debt financing materializes. 
Moreover, the differences in the relationship between risk and short-term debt 
across types of firm sizes are the most interesting issue. The medium-sized firms 
tend to reduce their short-term debt utilization as their earnings become more 
volatile, while the larger firms tend to increase their short-term debt and reduce 
their long-term debt as they are exposed to higher earnings’ volatility. In 
accordance with Remmers et al. (1974), large and multi-product firms are 
generally less risky compared to less diversified firms. Given that the medium-
sized firms are heavily financed by short-term debt, the dependency on earnings is 
higher due to short-term obligations. High earnings’ volatilities discourage short-
term financing due to its debt maturity.  
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Table 7.2: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on Unbalanced Overall Sample 
The table presents estimates of equation (7.2) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes 799 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The dependent variables are book leverage 
ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The firms are divided into Main Board firms (large firms) and Second Board firms 
(medium firms). The independent variables are profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth and risk. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. The t-values shown in 
parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR. 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Overall 
Sample (OLS) 
Overall 
Sample (FE) 
Main Board  
OLS 
Main Board 
FE 
Second Board 
OLS 
Second Board 
FE  
MESDAQ 
OLS 
MESDAQ 
FE 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.50(-6.18)** -0.37(-6.04)** -0.71(-7.03)** -0.54(-5.37)** -0.39(-5.46)** -0.30(-5.56)** -0.35(-6.91)** -0.20(-3.45)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.23(-9.60)** -0.18(-2.59)** -0.26(-10.20)** -0.24(-3.03)** -0.31(-5.39)** -0.07(-0.59) -0.07(-1.59) -0.02(-0.39) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-4.00)** -0.004(-3.34)** -0.01(-3.34)** -0.004(-2.90)** -0.05(-3.29)** -0.03(-2.08)* -0.003(-3.27)** -0.001(-2.15)* 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.77(1.55) 2.42(2.07)* 0.96(1.75) 2.70(1.56) -0.02(-0.11) 1.00(2.05)* -0.43(-1.20) 0.46(1.17) 
BSDA LNSALES Size -0.003(-0.37) -0.05(-1.81) -0.01(-1.21) -0.05(-1.61) 0.02(1.35) -0.03(-1.34) 0.06(6.54)** 0.04(2.21)* 
 RISK Risk 0.34(2.76)** 0.28(3.41)** 0.76(4.91)** 0.53(3.08)** 0.13(1.83) 0.16(3.03)** -0.19(-3.29)** -0.09(-1.52) 
 MTBR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0001(-1.66) 0.000(0.44) -0.0001(-1.29) 0.0001(0.72) 0.001(0.54) -0.004(-3.78)** 0.0002(0.10) 0.001(0.49) 
 Obs.  6432 6432 4346 4346 1748 1748 338 338 
 F-STAT  24.63 6.58 23.55 5.35 60.45 31.97 20.29 5.12 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.12(-6.95)** -0.09(-5.13)** -0.14(-5.52)** -0.08(-4.52)** -0.04(-1.57) -0.05(-2.10)* -0.09(-3.10)** -0.06(-1.92) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.25(30.79)** 0.25(9.59)** 0.27(26.64)** 0.27(8.24)** 0.21(12.90)** 0.19(4.81)** 0.15(6.51)** 0.11(2.65)** 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.0002(-0.65) 0.001(3.69)** -0.0001(-0.31) 0.001(3.41)** 0.004(0.47) 0.003(1.20) -0.0003(-1.22) 0.0004(1.59) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.52(-7.25)** -0.53(-3.98)** -0.60(-6.05)** -0.47(-2.52)* -0.36(-3.33)** -0.39(-2.51)* -0.08(-0.48) -0.05(-0.30) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(26.86)** 0.04(8.67)** 0.04(21.66)** 0.04(7.14)** 0.03(8.62)** 0.04(4.21)** 0.03(4.85)** 0.03(1.96) 
 RISK Risk -0.06(-2.80)** -0.50(-2.13)* -0.07(-2.49)* -0.10(-3.71)** 0.03(1.19) 0.02(0.94) -0.11(-3.65)** -0.05(-1.71) 
 MTBR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0001(2.96)** 0.000(0.32) 0.0001(2.64)** 0.000(0.46) -0.0002(-0.39) -0.001(-2.12)* 0.002(1.37) 0.002(1.30) 
 Obs.  6432 6432 4346 4346 1748 1748 338 338 
 F-STAT  265.14 24.68 187.05 19.56 35.29 11.66 11.14 1.70 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.62(-7.50)** -0.46(-7.91)** -0.85(-7.80)** -0.62(-5.93)** -0.43(-5.67)** -0.35(-6.14)** -0.44(-7.96)** -0.26(-3.93)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.02(0.82) 0.07(0.98) 0.02(0.61) 0.03(0.33) -0.10(-1.69) 0.12(1.14) 0.08(-1.62) 0.08(1.19) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-3.79)** -0.003(-3.03)** -0.01(-3.06)** -0.003(-2.53)* -0.05(-3.32)** -0.02(-2.24)* -0.003(-3.72)** -0.001(-1.79) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.25(0.52) 1.89(1.70) 0.36(0.66) 2.19(1.29) -0.38(-2.14)* 0.62(1.59) -0.51(-1.46) 0.42(1.02) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.03(2.37)* -0.01(-0.45) 0.02(2.20)* -0.01(-0.43) 0.05(3.82)** 0.01(0.47) 0.09(9.14)** 0.07(3.64)** 
 RISK Risk 0.29(2.37)* 0.23(3.18)** 0.69(4.20)** 0.43(2.50)* 0.16(2.16)* 0.19(3.14)** -0.30(-4.73)** -0.14(-2.15)* 
 MTBR Market-to-Book Ratio -0.0001(-0.63) 0.000(0.67) 0.000(-0.13) 0.000(1.08) 0.001(0.38) -0.01(-4.33)** 0.002(0.78) 0.003(0.97) 
 Obs.  6432 6432 4346 4346 1748 1748 338 338 
 F-STAT  23.65 14.35 17.44 8.17 78.42 30.07 32.84 8.31 
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Table 7.3: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on Consumer Product Sector 
The table presents estimate of equations 7.1 for balanced panel data and 7.2 for unbalanced panel data using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes non-financial firms within the consumer 
product sector. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The firms are divided into Main Board 
firms (large firms-LF) and Second Board firms (medium firms-MF). The independent variables are profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth and risk. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all 
variables definitions. The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR. 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Balanced 
OLS(LF) 
Balanced 
FE(LF) 
Unbalanced 
OLS(LF) 
Unbalanced 
FE(LF) 
Balanced 
OLS(MF) 
Balanced 
FE(MF) 
Unbalanced 
OLS(MF) 
Unbalanced 
FE(MF) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.41(-2.01)* -0.48(-5.29)** -0.33(-2.14)* -0.16(-2.33)* -0.68(-3.90)** -0.66(-2.07)* -0.11(-1.34) -0.36(-2.78)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.38(-5.99)** -0.17(-0.87) 0.20(-4.03)** -0.12(-0.77) -0.70(-7.96)** -0.50(-6.69)** -0.37(-6.12)** 0.35(-1.68) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.07(-6.20)** -0.05(-1.97) -0.01(-2.06)* -0.01(-2.81)** -0.17(-7.40)** -0.13(-4.47)** -0.13(-17.77) -0.10(-8.09)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 1.10(1.87) 1.22(0.74) 0.91(2.60)** 1.25(1.47) -0.94(-0.84) 2.25(2.03)* -2.01(-3.06)** 1.27(1.55) 
BSDA LNSALES Size -0.04(-4.68)** -0.04(-1.16) 0.01(1.41) -0.01(-0.68) -0.004(-0.29) -0.08(-1.95) -0.02(-1.46) 0.04(-1.28) 
 RISK Risk 0.84(1.84) 0.61(2.60)** 0.41(1.96) 0.18(2.42)* -1.33(-2.31)** -1.94(-2.92)** 0.06(0.58) -0.28(-2.47)* 
 GRWTH Growth 0.02(0.63) 0.04(1.28) -0.0002(-0.03) -0.005(-2.00)* -0.03(-0.43) 0.06(1.60) 0.01(1.28) 0.001(0.34) 
 Obs.  360 360 668 668 120 120 367 367 
 F-STAT  12.92 38.43 7.87 7.70 17.64 82.08 56.41 14.95 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.08(-1.58) 0.01(0.19) -0.03(-0.76) -0.02(-0.76) 0.32(1.46) 0.33(0.90) 0.14(1.35) 0.05(0.38) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.32(8.65)** 0.32(2.07)* 0.27(11.13)** 0.27(2.87)** 0.02(0.32) 0.18(1.67) 0.14(6.32) 0.15(1.37) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.001(-0.51) 0.01(1.33) 0.0001(0.27) 0.001(2.27)* -0.02(-2.87)** 0.01(0.23) -0.01(-6.25) 0.01(0.76) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 1.51(4.18)** 1.00(1.52) 0.20(0.92) -0.77(-1.60) -1.32(-1.77) -0.54(-0.73) 0.11(0.29) 0.43(0.68) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(7.70)** 0.05(2.26)* 0.03(10.12)** 0.04(3.88)** 0.03(3.91)** 0.04(1.23) 0.02(3.88) 0.03(2.93)** 
 RISK Risk 0.30(2.27)* -0.19(-2.09)* 0.02(0.37) -0.07(-2.15)* 0.59(0.74) 0.59(0.73) 0.11(0.91) 0.07(0.55) 
 GRWTH Growth 0.03(1.05) 0.01(0.44) 0.001(0.75) -0.001(-1.59) -0.05(-1.45) -0.03(-0.86) -0.001(-1.21) -0.001(-0.82) 
 Obs.  360 360 668 668 120 120 367 367 
 F-STAT  27.99 2.07 32.96 2.89 5.21 3.36 16.54 2.25 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.50(-2.23)** -0.47(-5.46)** -0.36(-2.04)* -0.18(-2.64)** -0.36(-1.19) -0.33(-2.25)* 0.03(0.37) -0.30(-5.70)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.06(-0.74) 0.15(1.72) 0.07(1.21) 0.16(1.34) -0.68(-6.74)** -0.31(-2.41)* -0.23(-3.55) -0.19(-1.28) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.07(-5.93)** -0.05(-1.84) -0.01(-1.98) -0.005(-2.51)* -0.19(-8.36)** -0.12(-6.44)** -0.14(-19.15) -0.10(-8.68)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.61(3.72)** 2.22(1.28) 1.11(2.53)* 0.48(0.54) -2.26(-1.92) 1.70(1.59) -1.90(-2.68) 1.70(2.54)* 
BTDA LNSALES Size -0.01(-0.67) 0.001(0.02) 0.04(5.55)** 0.03(1.79) 0.03(1.97) -0.04(-1.35) 0.01(0.43) -0.003(-0.12) 
 RISK Risk 1.14(2.30)* 0.42(1.61) 0.43(1.80) 0.11(1.50) -0.74(-0.66) -1.34(-3.58)** 0.18(1.48) -0.22(-3.48)** 
 GRWTH Growth 0.04(1.36) 0.05(2.13) 0.001(0.12) -0.01(-2.38)* -0.08(-1.35) 0.03(1.50) 0.004(1.03) -0.0005(-0.23) 
 Obs.  360 360 668 668 120 120 367 367 
 F-STAT  14.47 25.29 13.78 5.08 15.12 198.84 62.37 25.19 
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In line with the trade-off theory, the impact of growth opportunities is only 
noticeable across larger firms among the consumer product sector, with smaller 
effects on leverage. Inconsistent with the consumer product sector, the larger 
firms among the industrial product sector are more responsive to the level of 
profitability. Table 7.4 shows that larger and medium firms adjust their leverage 
based on the level of profitability which supports the pecking order theory. In 
addition, medium-sized firms also consider this variable to determine their long-
term debt, which is not the case in the consumer product sector. These firms are 
highly sensitive towards long-term debt, essentially due to insufficient internal 
funds. In general, the amount of retained earnings of the medium-sized firms is 
lower than for the larger firms which could be attributable to lower profits. As 
profit margins increases, this leads to an increase in the internal reserves and the 
need for long-term debt financing diminishes.  
Nevertheless, a similar result between tangibility and leverage is 
perceptible. In relation to the trade-off theory, the power of collateral becomes 
essential in the leverage decision-making process across both the larger and 
medium firms. This variable becomes significantly related to long-term debt 
among the large and medium-sized firms, which is completely opposite to the 
consumer product sector. This is highly possible within the industrial product 
firms due to the nature of their production, which needs a big investment in fixed 
assets and, therefore, a greater amount of long-term debt financing is needed. This 
indirectly explains the variations in the importance of asset tangibility between the 
medium-sized firms across the consumer product and industrial product sectors, 
although both sectors are categorised as manufacturing firms. However, this 
regressor consistently sustains its role with the short-term debt among the 
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medium-sized firms. Alternatively, the magnitude of the coefficient further 
explains the substance of tangibility across larger firms due to the greater amount 
of long-term debt required to invest in a larger amount of long-term assets (Scherr 
and Hulburt, 2001). Additionally, Petti and Singer (1985) documented that greater 
numbers of large manufacturing firms require a substantial investment in long-
term assets and, therefore, raise more long-term debt. The relevance of liquidity 
on short-term debt and total debt is observable within the medium-sized firms, 
regardless of sectors (i.e. industrial product and consumer product sectors). 
Though both sectors highlight similar significant results and sustain the pecking 
order theory, the impact of this variable on leverage differs across these sectors. 
The liquidity position becomes more influential to medium-sized firms among the 
industrial product sector than the consumer product sector. Parallel to liquidity, 
the medium-sized firms consider non-tax debt shield as a critical determinant as 
the variable becomes more influential on short-term debt financing. This is not the 
case in the previous sector although the results are supported with significant 
values.  
Consistent with the trade-off theory and pecking order theory, the larger 
firms reduce their long-term debt as their risk level increases. However, these 
firms increase their short-term debt and total debt due to holding a larger 
proportion of short-term debt in their total debt. Nonetheless, a contradiction of 
relationship is observable between these variables among the medium-sized firms 
across both the balanced and unbalanced datasets. This is possibly due to the 
different sets of firms within each dataset that behave differently. Due to these 
variations, this indirectly provides an indication that the relationships between risk 
and leverage among the medium-sized firms are not influenced mainly by the  
 281 
 
Table 7.4: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on Industrial Product Sector 
The table presents estimate of equations 7.1 for balanced panel data and 7.2 for unbalanced panel data using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes non-financial firms within the industrial 
product sector. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The firms are divided into Main 
Board firms (large firms-LF) and Second Board firms (medium firms-MF). The independent variables are profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth and risk. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 
for all variables definitions. The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR. 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Balanced 
OLS(LF) 
Balanced 
FE(LF) 
Unbalanced 
OLS(LF) 
Unbalanced 
FE(LF) 
Balanced 
OLS(MF) 
Balanced 
FE(MF) 
Unbalanced 
OLS(MF) 
Unbalanced 
FE(MF) 
 EBITTA Profitability -1.19(-2.70)** -0.83(-1.48) -0.74(-5.48)** -0.61(-5.22)** -0.32(-2.09)* -0.35(-2.05)* -0.61(-7.30)** -0.24(-3.71)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.49(1.52) 0.83(1.40) -0.16(-2.35)* -0.24(-1.89) -0.41(-6.03)** -0.37(-2.31)* -0.25(-3.71)** -0.22(-1.58) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.004(-0.86) 0.001(0.58) -0.01(-1.50) -0.003(-1.79) -0.06(-10.72)** -0.04(-4.05)** -0.03(-2.85)** -0.02(-2.33)* 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.12(1.05) 2.35(0.72) 2.12(1.52) 4.04(1.65) 1.33(2.12)* 1.79(2.87)** 0.30(0.82) 0.93(1.58) 
BSDA LNSALES Size -0.11(-3.02)** -0.14(-1.69) 0.02(2.19)* -0.03(-1.08) 0.02(1.57) -0.07(-2.76)** 0.05(3.69)** -0.02(-0.99) 
 RISK Risk 0.28(1.15) 0.26(1.01) 0.69(3.90)** 0.47(3.09)** -0.01(-2.33)* -0.22(-2.27)* -0.09(-1.12) 0.24(4.02)** 
 GRWTH Growth 0.001(0.13) -0.02(-6.85)** -0.002(-1.08) -0.001(-0.20) 0.03(1.72) 0.05(2.16) 0.003(1.25) -0.004(-1.62) 
 Obs.  780 780 1197 1197 396 396 852 852 
 F-STAT  5.42 59.46 6.76 10.31 34.96 6.29 70.30 41.68 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.08(-2.04)* -0.12(-2.37)* -0.10(-3.03)** -0.12(-2.43)* 0.01(0.33) -0.03(-0.53) -0.17(-5.56)** -0.15(-3.22)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.19(5.79)** 0.09(1.03) 0.24(11.00)** 0.30(4.20)** 0.25(6.56)** 0.14(1.77) 0.26(9.32)** 0.16(2.84)* 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.0001(-0.15) 0.001(0.50) 0.0001(0.27) 0.001(2.77)** -0.002(-0.11) 0.01(1.52) 0.001(1.11) 0.001(0.63) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.38(-1.33) 0.80(-2.06)* -0.04(-0.21) -0.39(-1.85) -1.16(-3.78)** -1.11(-2.34)* -0.95(-5.46)** -0.87(-3.14)** 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(11.42)** 0.02(2.16)* 0.03(11.15)** 0.03(3.41)** 0.02(3.56)** 0.04(1.80) 0.03(6.33)** 0.03(2.14)* 
 RISK Risk -0.05(-2.78)** -0.08(-3.20)** -0.12(-3.39)** -0.17(-3.87)** 0.04(6.19)** -0.004(-0.11) -0.09(-2.78)** -0.06(-1.39) 
 GRWTH Growth -0.001(-2.75)** -0.002(-1.66) -0.002(-0.99) -0.002(-1.44) -0.03(-3.37)** -0.04(-4.46)** -0.001(-3.97)** -0.002(-4.36)** 
 Obs.  780 780 1197 1197 396 396 852 852 
 F-STAT  32.29 0.15 49.18 7.11 18.18 4.98 28.31 23.80 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -1.27(-2.83)** -0.95(-1.72) -0.84(-5.84)** -0.72(-5.40)** -0.30(-1.65) -0.38(-2.40)* -0.78(-8.34)** -0.40(-5.64)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.68(2.27)* 0.93(1.78) 0.08(1.15) 0.06(0.43) -0.16(-2.12)* -0.23(-1.83) 0.002(0.04) -0.06(-0.52) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.004(-0.80) 0.001(0.67) -0.1(-1.33) -0.002(-1.20) -0.06(-10.51)** -0.04(-3.84)** -0.03(-2.94)** -0.02(-2.86)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 1.74(0.90) 1.55(0.51) 2.08(1.53) 3.65(1.52) 0.18(0.28) 0.68(1.10) -0.65(-1.70) 0.07(0.12) 
BTDA LNSALES Size -0.08(-2.17)* -0.11(-1.37) 0.05(5.66) 0.01(0.23) 0.04(3.90)** -0.03(-1.01) 0.08(6.25)** 0.003(0.11) 
 RISK Risk 0.23(0.91) 0.17(0.73) 0.57(3.10)** 0.30(2.39)* 0.03(3.56)** -0.22(-2.21)* -0.18(-2.02)* 0.18(2.80)** 
 GRWTH Growth -0.001(-0.11) -0.03(-7.87)** -0.004(-2.04)** -0.003(-1.45) 0.01(0.25) 0.01(0.57) 0.002(0.73) -0.01(-2.52)* 
 Obs.  780 780 1197 1197 396 396 852 852 
 F-STAT  5.20 83.71 21.16 10.15 30.73 4.31 100.90 43.00 
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sectoral behaviour. In other words, the mechanism of these variables is mainly 
controlled at the firm level rather than the sector-level. The substance of growth 
opportunities on leverage becomes clearer as the larger firms decrease their short-
term debt and total debt as they are exposed to higher growth opportunities. In 
contrast, the medium-sized firms emphasize more on long-term debt although 
both types of firms maintain a similar relationship and sustain the trade-off theory. 
So far, the discussion concentrates mainly on the reactions of 
manufacturing firms in the consumer product and industrial product sectors, and 
the relationship between leverage and firm-level determinants. Though both 
sectors are manufacturing-oriented, huge variations can be observed between 
them. To provide a better understanding about firm size effects on the capital 
structure determinants among the non-manufacturing sectors, construction and 
trade and services sectors were chosen. Due to the limited number of observations 
among the medium-sized firms, a few sectors were excluded from both datasets as 
the fixed effect analysis could not be performed. The panel data analysis relies 
more on the fixed effect analysis outcomes rather than OLS. Based on the results 
reported in Table 7.5, as profit margins increase, the large construction firms tend 
to decrease their total debt while the medium-sized firms are more concerned with 
reducing their short-term debt and total debt. This result indirectly explains the 
sustainability of the pecking order theory across types of firms and sectors. The 
diminution level of leverage is greater among the medium-sized construction 
firms compared to larger firms.The medium-sized firms tend to finance their 
investment through internal reserves that have been accumulated from higher 
profits. Besides relying on their internal funds, the larger firms raise additional 
funds through share issuance rather than utilizing long-term debt.  
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Inconsistent with the manufacturing sectors, the larger firms place greater 
importance on asset tangibility, and they also increase their long-term debt as their 
tangibility gets stronger and reduce their other two types of leverage. Voulgaris et 
al. (2004) suggest that credit becomes available as the firms grow larger with 
more fixed assets and lower risks of information asymmetry. Conversely, the 
medium-sized firms maintain their collateral level in order to reduce their 
dependency on short-term debt. Liquidity plays a major role in the process of 
leverage adjustment among the construction firms. In line with the pecking order 
theory, this variable affects both large and medium firms although the impact is 
huge on their short-term debt and total debt across the medium-sized firms. 
Medium-sized firms have lower liquidity compared to larger firms and rely more 
on self-financing, trade credits or banking financing. As the liquidity level 
increases, the dependency on short-term debt reduces and these firms divert into 
other sources of financing. Surprisingly, the larger firms are more responsive to 
the non-tax debt shield as this variable influences leverage strongly. They treat 
non-tax debt shield as a mode of security in order to raise debt financing, which is 
not the case amongst larger firms within the manufacturing industry. This result 
strongly supports the findings of Bowen et al. (1982) who report the variations of 
non-tax debt shield across industries. Alternatively, a different relationship is 
observed between these variables across medium-sized firms. They tend to 
decrease their short-term and total debt financing as their non-tax debt shield gets 
stronger, and this is consistent with the model of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
that supports the trade-off theory. This association seems to be unique as other 
sectors maintain a positive relationship. 
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Correspondingly, the larger capitalised firms respond positively to long-
term debt and total debt with superior effect compared to other sectors. This 
indirectly explains the consistency of the trade-off theory between manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing sectors. The short-term debt will be reduced as the 
medium-sized firms grow larger. In other words, their reliance on short-term debt 
will be reduced as these firms grow larger. Similar to the consumer product 
sector, the medium-sized firms are sensitive to earnings volatility and tend to alter 
their short-term debt and total debt accordingly. As usual, the larger firms reduce 
their long-term debt as more fluctuations are observed in their current earnings. 
The reactions of large and medium firms differ greatly between total debt and 
risk. The large-sized firms tend to reduce their total debt as their risk level 
increases, as their total debt is mainly controlled by the long-term debt. 
Meanwhile, the medium-sized firms tend to increase their total debt consumption 
as the level of risk amplifies. This is possible within the medium-sized firms as 
their larger proportion of total debt is controlled by the short-term debt. 
Furthermore, the firms may ignore earnings volatility as the amount of total debt 
is well below their debt servicing capacity (Deesomsak et al., 2004). Although the 
growth opportunities appear to be significant, the effect is minimal compared to 
leverage in the construction sector. 
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Table 7.5: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on Construction Sector 
The table presents estimate of equations 7.1 for balanced panel data and 7.2 for unbalanced panel data using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes non-financial firms within construction 
sector. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The firms are divided into Main Board firms 
(large firms-LF) and Second Board firms (medium firms-MF). The independent variables are profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth and risk. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all 
variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR. 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Balanced 
OLS(LF) 
Balanced 
FE(LF) 
Unbalanced 
OLS(LF) 
Unbalanced 
FE(LF) 
Balanced 
OLS(MF) 
Balanced 
FE(MF) 
Unbalanced 
OLS(MF) 
Unbalanced 
FE(MF) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.48(-3.88)** -0.19(-1.79) -0.31(-1.86) 0.05(0.85) -0.17(-1.52) N/A -0.24(-2.07)* -0.29(-2.10)* 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.68(-20.18)** -0.65(-5.01)** -0.46(-10.52)** -0.37(-2.91)** -0.51(-9.95)** N/A -0.60(-11.45)** -0.56(-16.53)** 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.16(-12.95)** -0.14(-5.14)** -0.03(-1.84) -0.02(-1.83) -0.16(-5.40)** N/A -0.31(-16.74)** -0.32(-12.24)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 1.67(3.32)** 1.18(1.76) 0.29(0.51) 2.41(2.06)* -0.1(-0.03) N/A -1.56(-3.13)** 1.22(0.87) 
BSDA LNSALES Size 0.01(1.82) -0.02(-1.05) -0.02(2.45)* 0.01(0.61) 0.06(2.79)** N/A -0.02(-2.22)* -0.04(-2.41)* 
 RISK Risk -0.13(-0.23) 0.76(1.86) -0.14(-0.73) 0.21(2.69)** -0.31(-0.78) N/A 0.74(3.56)** 0.42(3.43)** 
 GRWTH Growth 0.01(0.62) 0.01(0.58) 0.01(4.40)** 0.003(2.98)** 0.01(0.42) N/A -0.003(-1.65) -0.01(-3.69)** 
 Obs.  216 216 348 348 36 N/A 86 86 
 F-STAT  75.69 18.94 22.82 11.59 59.80 N/A 62.12 890.24 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.19(-2.32)* -0.17(-1.46) -0.16(-2.49)* -0.08(-1.03) -0.07(-0.66) N/A -0.20(-1.18) -0.6(-1.97) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.28(6.14)** 0.24(2.63)** 0.34(8.30)** 0.36(3.34)** 0.46(11.92)** N/A 0.26(2.24)* 0.27(1.36) 
 LIQ Liquidity 0.04(5.29)** 0.02(1.39) 0.01(2.79)** 0.01(1.69) 0.12(5.83)** N/A 0.03(0.80) 0.07(0.91) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.71(1.88) 1.12(2.30)* -0.34(-0.90) -0.44(-0.70) -1.77(-2.47)* N/A -0.53(-0.46) -1.07(-0.46) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.08(10.69)** 0.09(3.72)** 0.06(6.28)* 0.03(0.97) 0.06(2.26)* N/A 0.01(0.71) 0.06(1.29) 
 RISK Risk -0.69(-2.44)* -0.74(-2.24)* -0.04(-0.53) -0.11(-1.81) 2.08(4.30)** N/A -0.06(-0.25) -0.24(-0.88) 
 GRWTH Growth -0.02(-1.44) -0.01(-0.97) -0.001(-2.77)** -0.001(-2.50)** -0.02(-0.92) N/A 0.01(2.07)* 0.005(5.25)** 
 Obs.  216 216 348 348 36 N/A 86 86 
 F-STAT  24.18 4.52 15.53 4.08 37.48 N/A 4.70 35.44 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.67(-5.97)** -0.36(-2.22)* -0.46(-2.20)* -0.03(-0.27) -0.23(-1.90) N/A -0.44(-1.98) -0.65(-2.43)* 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.40(-7.95)** -0.41(-2.44)* -0.12(-2.19)* -0.01(-0.07) -0.05(-1.04) N/A -0.33(-2.62)** -0.29(-1.54) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.12(-10.03)** -0.12(-5.19)** -0.02(-1.58) -0.01(-1.44) -0.4(-1.66) N/A -0.28(-6.81)** -0.25(-3.21)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 2.39(4.43)** 2.31(2.89)** -0.05(-0.08) 1.97(1.61) -1.79(-2.91)** N/A -2.09(-1.80) 0.16(0.08) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.09(9.93)** 0.07(2.57)** 0.08(7.25)** 0.04(1.70) 0.11(4.22)** N/A -0.01(-0.43) 0.02(0.73) 
 RISK Risk -0.83(-1.68) 0.01(0.02) -0.18(-0.73) 0.11(1.19) 1.78(3.31)** N/A 0.68(2.00)* 0.18(0.70) 
 GRWTH Growth -0.02(-1.07) -0.01(-0.50) 0.01(3.68)** 0.002(2.22)* -0.02(-0.71) N/A 0.003(0.88) -0.0004(-0.26) 
 Obs.  216 216 348 348 36 N/A 86 86 
 F-STAT  87.74 11.63 15.03 3.37 9.99 N/A 22.07 54.22 
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As for the trade and services sector, profitability plays a major role 
particularly among the medium-sized firms. Table 7.6 reports the importance of 
this variable on short-term debt and total debt. Consistent with other sectors, a 
certain level of collateral is essential to short-term debt among the medium-sized 
firms, while the larger ones focus more on their long-term debt. In general, both 
types of firms emphasize the importance of asset tangibility in setting their 
leverage. The liquidity position is crucial to short-term debt and total debt among 
the medium-sized firms. These firms tend to decrease their short-term debt as 
their liquidity levels become stronger. Nevertheless, the impact of liquidity on 
leverage is weaker than in the construction sector. Comparable to industrial 
product firms, medium-sized firms also decide their leverage (i.e., both short and 
long-term debt) based on non-tax debt shield. Hereby, the impact of this regressor 
is large on leverage and highly significant at the 1% level. As this variable 
increases, the medium-sized firms reduce their long-term debt which is 
attributable to the reduction of the potential tax benefits (DeAngelo and Masulis, 
1980) and, as a substitute, they increase short-term debt financing. This result is 
entirely contradictory to the medium-sized firms across the construction sector. 
Most trade and services firms are committed to long-term debt financing as their 
firm size increases. This is mainly due to the level of tangibility ownership that 
increases their borrowing capacity, particularly long-term debt financing.  
The sensitivity of earnings volatility, specifically on short-term debt and 
total debt, is noticeable among the medium-sized firms. Inconsistent with both the 
trade-off theory and the pecking order theory, consumption of short-term debt and 
total debt increases as earnings become volatile. This indirectly explains why the 
medium-sized firms are highly dependent on short-term debt rather than other 
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sources of financing, as they realize the uncertainty in their earnings. Higher 
dependency on long-term debt might increase the probability of insolvency. 
Conversely, the medium-sized firms reduce the usage of leverage as they are 
exposed to growth opportunities. However, both datasets report different 
relationships between short-term debt and growth opportunities, possibly for 
several reasons. First, the nature of the datasets might affect the results since both 
datasets maintain different characteristics. Secondly, a different proxy is used to 
measure growth opportunities; the balanced dataset uses sales growth while the 
unbalanced datasetuses the market-to-book ratio. Finally, the mechanism between 
growth opportunities and leverage is possibly influenced at the firm-level instead 
of the sector-level. The comparison analysis has shown the variations of different 
firm sizes and the influence on a firm’s leverage via capital structure determinants 
across four selected sectors, namely, the consumer product, industrial product, 
construction, and trade and services sectors. First, the orientation between 
leverage and capital structure determinants differs across manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms. Besides the commonalities, differences exist between the 
consumer product and industrial product sectors, although both sectors are 
classified as manufacturing firms. The underlying characteristics between these 
sectors create the differential impacts on leverage determinations. 
The previous analysis shows the great discrepancies of leverage 
determination between large and medium-capitalised firms within and across 
sectors in Malaysia. The following section will pay attention to the small-
capitalised firms among the industrial product, technology and trade and services 
sectors that are listed on MESDAQ.
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Table 7.6: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect Analysis based on Trade and Services Sector 
The table presents estimate of equations 7.1 for balanced panel data and 7.2 for unbalanced panel data using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. This sample includes non-financial firms within trade and 
services sector. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios (short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The firms are divided into Main 
Board firms (large firms-LF) and Second Board firms (medium firms-MF).  The independent variables are profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth and risk. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 
for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR. 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Balanced 
OLS(LF) 
Balanced 
FE(LF) 
Unbalanced 
OLS(LF) 
Unbalanced 
FE(LF) 
Balanced 
OLS(MF) 
Balanced 
FE(MF) 
Unbalanced 
OLS(MF) 
Unbalanced 
FE(MF) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.20(-1.56) -0.12(-1.44) -1.24(-2.81)** -0.99(-1.53) -0.70(-2.96)** -0.58(-5.76)** -0.26(-3.41)** -0.32(-3.99)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.35(-7.45)** -0.23(-2.33)* -0.31(-4.57)** -0.23(-1.80) -0.62(-5.92)** -0.44(-2.05)** -0.42(-3.90)** -0.27(-1.55) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.1(-3.61)** -0.01(-2.65)** -0.04(-3.33)** -0.02(-1.88) -0.11(-5.64)** -0.08(-3.93)** -0.12(-8.88)** -0.10(-4.18)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield 0.01(0.01) 1.19(1.00) -1.20(-1.15) -4.06(-0.94) 3.65(3.38)** 4.98(2.84)** 0.74(1.74) 0.38(0.43) 
BSDA LNSALES Size 0.004(0.73) 0.03(1.02) -0.08(-2.92)** -0.09(-0.97) -0.04(-2.18)* -0.05(-0.87) 0.02(1.15) -0.02(-0.48) 
 RISK Risk 0.01(1.50) 0.003(1.23) 1.52(2.52)* 1.28(1.28) 0.16(0.99) 0.12(0.92) 0.32(3.62)** 0.22(2.42)* 
 GRWTH Growth 0.03(-1.61) -0.02(-1.18) 0.000(0.50) 0.00(0.76) 0.01(3.06)** 0.01(3.76)** -0.01(-2.52)** -0.01(-2.64)** 
 Obs.  708 708 958 958 120 120 316 316 
 F-STAT  29.01 4507.72 15.16 1.64 11.77 40.97 20.66 11.13 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.12(-2.57)** -0.07(-1.07) -0.17(-2.87)** -0.09(-1.35) 0.06(0.52) -0.01(-0.12) 0.01(0.36) -0.004(-0.14) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.42(14.73)** 0.35(3.56)** 0.39(18.16)** 0.41(6.17)** 0.32(6.52)** 0.51(4.31)** 0.27(6.25)** 0.31(3.14)** 
 LIQ Liquidity 0.001(2.08)* 0.002(2.04)* 0.001(2.16)* 0.01(2.62)** 0.001(0.18) 0.02(1.68) 0.01(1.30) 0.02(1.78) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.56(-1.82) -0.16(-0.16) -0.86(-3.70)** -0.40(-0.61) -1.92(-2.80)** -2.43(-2.36)** -0.10(-0.48) -0.37(-1.1) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.02(5.70)** 0.05(2.17)* 0.04(10.97)** 0.04(3.77)** 0.06(2.90)** 0.08(3.23)** 0.05(5.01)** 0.05(2.13)* 
 RISK Risk 0.004(2.66)** 0.002(1.19) 0.02(0.23) 0.01(0.10) 0.06(0.58) -0.05(-0.52) -0.03(-0.74) -0.01(-0.19) 
 GRWTH Growth -0.01(-0.60) -0.001(-0.15) 0.00(4.32)** 0.0004(5.49)** -0.01(3.83)** -0.01(-3.42)** 0.002(1.66) 0.001(0.35) 
 Obs.  708 708 958 958 120 120 316 316 
 F-STAT  142.58 81.99 103.34 14.69 8.26 10.17 7.66 2.86 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.32(-2.11)* -0.18(-1.91) -1.42(-3.23)** -1.08(-1.70) -0.64(-2.60)** -0.59(-5.27)** -0.25(-3.22)** -0.33(-4.05)** 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.06(1.26) 0.12(0.90) 0.08(1.21) 0.18(1.24) -0.30(-2.98)** 0.07(0.36) -0.15(-1.60) 0.04(0.30) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.01(-3.45)** -0.003(-1.90) -0.04(-3.30)** -0.1(-1.53) -0.11(-6.06)** -0.06(-4.35)** -0.11(-9.33)** -0.08(-5.08)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.55(-1.09) 1.02(0.99) -2.05(-2.01)* -4.46(-1.02) 1.73(1.56) 2.55(1.79) 0.64(1.54) 0.01(0.01) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.03(4.19)**  0.08(3.87)** -0.04(-1.53) -0.05(-0.50) 0.01(0.55) 0.04(0.52) 0.07(4.30)** 0.03(0.74) 
 RISK Risk 0.01(2.08)* 0.01(1.84) 1.53(2.58)** 1.29(1.31) 0.22(1.19) 0.07(0.61) 0.29(3.26)** 0.21(2.55)* 
 GRWTH Growth -0.04(-1.99) -0.02(-1.63) 0.00(1.15) 0.0001(1.22) 0.002(0.47) 0.003(0.69) -0.01(-2.07)** -0.01(-2.43)** 
 Obs.  708 708 958 958 120 120 316 316 
 F-STAT  124.80 5941.38 6.19 4.26 10.21 96.34 25.02 24.25 
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In general, these firms are not only categorised based on their paid-up 
capital, but they are homogenous on the basis of technology advancement. In 
other words, these firms are classified and known as high-technology based firms. 
Based on the overall sample, Table 7.7 shows that profitability is consistently 
maintained as the main variable that affects leverage (i.e., short-term debt and 
total debt) among the small-sized firms. Consistent with the findings of Bas et al. 
(2009), the small-sized firms decrease their leverage utilization as their profit 
increases, probably due to an increase in internal funds as a result of the increase 
in profits. Internal reserves become important as a source of financing, which is 
mainly attributable to a higher cost of debt and external equity (Voulgaris et al., 
2004). Nevertheless, the magnitude of reduction is smaller compared to large and 
medium-sized firms, as the sales margins of the small-sized firms are much lower 
due to the diseconomies of scale within their operations (Gupta, 1969). 
Risk is perceived as the second most important determinant in explaining 
leverage, particularly total debt. Surprisingly, most of the small-sized firms reduce 
their leverage, regardless of the type of leverage, as their earnings become 
volatile. This scenario is completely opposite to the large and medium listed 
firms. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) found that smaller firms with greater earnings 
volatilityuse a lower amount of leverage compared to the larger ones. In addition, 
thesmall firms are risky and use a lower amount of leverage which is possibly 
attributable tothe higher probability of insolvency (Berryman, 1982). 
Alternatively, small-sized firms increase their long-term debt as their collateral 
level increases, which is common across different types of firms. Through 
utilizing a greater amount of collateral, the small-sized firms can raise their long-
term debt financing and indirectly reduce their agency problems (Chittenden et 
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al., 1996). They further argue that small firms are forced to use short-term debt 
instead of long-term debt, mainly because of their weak asset structure. As the 
overall sample is partitioned into sectors, a clearer picture can be seen as each 
sector tends to report different results while maintaining minor commonalities 
across sectors. The impact of profitability is clearer on leverage among the 
technology firms, although the other two sectors report significant results, but this 
is not supported by the fixed effect analysis. A similar situation is noticeable 
between tangibility and long-term debt. Hereby, most of the small-sized firms, 
especially the technology firms, are strengthening their collateral position in order 
to raise more long-term debt financing.  
Liquidity becomes more meaningful to short-term debt among the 
industrial product sector compared to both the technology and trade and services 
sectors. Nevertheless, in most cases, the small-sized firms maintain a lower 
current ratio compared to the medium-sized firms, particularly among the 
construction firms that maintain a higher level of liquidity. As the liquidity level 
gets stronger, the small-sized firms reduce their short-term debt, but not to the 
extent of the medium-sized firms that reduce their short-term debt hugely. In line 
with the trade-off theory, the substance of non-tax debt shield on short-term debt 
and total debt is observable although the overall sample reports insignificant 
values. Unlike the large and medium firms, the small-sized firms decrease their 
leverage as this variable becomes stronger, and this is perceptible across the 
industrial product sector. A similar relationship is observed among the trade and 
services firms although it is supported solely by the OLS analysis. The smaller 
coefficient size indirectly explains the power of the non-tax debt shield on 
leverage. Since small-sized firms generate lower profits, the tax shield advantage 
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might not be the main reason to choose debt financing (Bas et al., 2009). 
Therefore, the influence of non-tax debt shield on leverage is lesser among the 
small-sized firms compared to medium and large-sized firms. 
In line with the trade-off theory, the small-sized firms rely more on debt 
financing as they grow larger. Though this is common across sectors, this variable 
is highly influential within the industrial product sector. These firms have a 
greater propensity to increase long-term debt instead of short-term debt as they 
grow larger, due to their superior borrowing capacity and credibility. An 
analogous situation is noticeable across different types of firms within the trade 
and services firms. Furthermore, the effect of firm size on financing patterns will 
be clear as the firms are exposed to financial constraints (Beck et al., 2008) and 
this is applicable to small-sized firms. In relation to both the trade-off theory and 
pecking order theory, technology firms maintain a negative relationship between 
risk and leverage. However, it is difficult to draw a conclusion based on the OLS 
results as the fixed effect outcome is insignificant. Finally, the industrial product 
firms also consider growth opportunities as a relevant factor due to their 
significant positive association with long-term debt which is completely opposite 
to the medium-sized firms. This relationship highlights the existence of the 
pecking order theory in relation to growth opportunities and leverage. 
As a conclusion, the small-sized firms also differ within and across 
sectors. In most cases, profitability, liquidity and risk become crucial in the 
process of leverage determination. Although the numbers of observations are not 
comparable between these three sectors, the sectoral characteristics and firm size 
effects are noticeable.  
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Table 7.7: Pooled OLS and Fixed Effect based on Firm-level Determinants from 1996-2007(MESDAQ) 
The table presents estimates of equation (7.1) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007.This sample include 61 non-financial firms within seven sectors. The dependent variables are book leverage ratios 
(short-term debt to total asset (BSDA), long-term debt to total asset (BLDA) and total debt to total asset (BTDA)). The independent variables are profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth and 
risk. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The t-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
IND. 
VAR. 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
(OLS) 
OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
(FE) 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
(OLS) 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCT 
(FE) 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
(OLS) 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
(FE) 
TRADE & 
SERVICES 
(OLS) 
TRADE & 
SERVICES 
(FE) 
 EBITTA Profitability -0.35(-6.91)** -0.20(-3.45)** -0.34(-2.85)** -0.27(-1.96) -0.28(-5.13)** -0.16(-2.44)* -0.50(-4.83)** -0.19(-1.67) 
 TANGIB Tangibility -0.07(-1.59) -0.02(-0.39) -0.21(-2.44)* -0.07(-0.77) -0.04(-0.79) -0.06(-0.79) -0.24(-3.54)** -0.13(-1.15) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.003(-3.27)** -0.001(-2.15)* -0.04(-7.26)** -0.03(-9.45)** -0.003(-3.42)** -0.001(-2.23)* -0.01(-2.04)* -0.01(-2.45)* 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.43(-1.20) 0.46(1.17) -0.92(-2.65)** -1.14(-2.43)* 0.05(0.09) 0.77(1.66) -1.38(-2.58)** -0.28(-0.60) 
BSDA LNSALES Size 0.06(6.54)** 0.04(2.21)* 0.05(3.48)** 0.06(2.55)** 0.04(4.30)** 0.02(1.12) 0.09(5.24)** 0.07(3.01)** 
 RISK Risk -0.19(-3.29)** -0.09(-1.52) -0.05(-0.24) 0.07(0.64) -0.19(-2.89)** -0.07(-1.06) 0.14(1.16) 0.16(1.60) 
 MTBR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.0002(0.10) 0.001(0.49) 0.002(0.25) -0.01(-0.63) 0.0003(0.14) 0.0002(0.11) -0.001(-0.36) 0.004(1.87) 
 Obs.  338 338 59 59 217 217 50 50 
 F-STAT  20.29 5.12 22.55 203.79 11.36 4.04 30.61 4.90 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.09(-3.10)** -0.06(-1.92) -0.16(-1.42) -0.28(-2.29)* -0.10(-2.52)** -0.02(-0.72) -0.13(-0.88) -0.04(-0.81) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.15(6.51)** 0.11(2.65)** 0.13(2.20)* 0.14(1.35) 0.12(3.48)** 0.11(2.23)* 0.11(1.79) 0.04(0.60) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.0003(-1.22) 0.0004(1.59) 0.001(0.20) -0.002(-0.47) -0.0002(-0.77) 0.003(1.34) -0.003(-1.83) 0.001(0.73) 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.08(-0.48) -0.05(-0.30) -0.67(-2.66)** -0.53(-1.21) -0.03(-0.11) 0.09(0.42) 0.37(1.50) 0.22(0.79) 
BLDA LNSALES Size 0.03(4.85)** 0.03(1.96) 0.03(2.27)* 0.09(3.16)** 0.03(4.10)** 0.03(1.11) 0.002(0.15) 0.001(0.05) 
 RISK Risk -0.11(-3.65)** -0.05(-1.71) -0.17(-0.83) -0.27(-1.91) -0.11(-2.73)** -0.02(-0.66) 0.08(0.45) 0.11(1.26) 
 MTBR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.002(1.37) 0.002(1.30) 0.01(2.37)* 0.04(2.97)** 0.002(1.27) 0.002(1.00) 0.001(0.31) 0.001(0.72) 
 Obs.  338 338 59 59 217 217 50 50 
 F-STAT  11.14 1.70 6.04 4.10 4.07 0.96 2.64 6.57 
           
 EBITTA Profitability -0.44(-7.96)** -0.26(-3.93)** -0.50(-3.44)** -0.55(-3.96)** -0.38(-5.81)** -0.18(-2.66)** -0.63(-2.99)** -0.23(-1.97) 
 TANGIB Tangibility 0.08(-1.62) 0.08(1.19) -0.08(-0.74) 0.08(0.48) 0.08(1.31) 0.05(0.61) -0.14(-1.43) -0.09(-0.76) 
 LIQ Liquidity -0.003(-3.72)** -0.001(-1.79) -0.04(-6.70)** -0.03(-4.80)** -0.003(-3.91)** -0.001(-2.05)* -0.01(-2.19)* -0.01(-3.61)** 
 NTDS Non Tax Debt Shield -0.51(-1.46) 0.42(1.02) -1.60(-3.26)** -1.66(-2.02)* 0.03(0.05) 0.86(1.81) -1.01(-1.67) -0.06(-0.13) 
BTDA LNSALES Size 0.09(9.14)** 0.07(3.64)** 0.09(3.91)** 0.16(3.69)** 0.07(6.78)** 0.04(2.18)* 0.09(3.57)** 0.07(3.31)** 
 RISK Risk -0.30(-4.73)** -0.14(-2.15)* -0.22(-0.88) -0.20(-1.21) -0.29(-4.05)** -0.09(-1.31) 0.21(0.89) 0.27(1.96) 
 MTBR Market-to-Book Ratio 0.002(0.78) 0.003(0.97) 0.02(1.92) 0.03(1.98) 0.002(0.68) 0.002(0.63) -0.0002(-0.07) 0.005(2.50)* 
 Obs.  338 338 59 59 217 217 50 50 
 F-STAT  32.84 8.31 31.58 73.72 18.38 6.45 18.65 8.59 
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Most of the time, the industrial product sector shows stronger results compared to the 
technology sector, although the small firm sample is dominated by technology firms. 
Moreover, the results also highlight a few different relationships between leverage 
and firm-level determinants, non-tax debt shield and risk, among the small firm 
sample.  
7.5 Conclusion 
This study reveals that the relationship between firm-level determinants and 
debt financing patterns are greatly affected by firm size and sectoral characteristics. 
Based on the overall sample, both datasets confirm the effect of capital structure 
determinants, (i.e., firm-level determinants) on leverage which differs across firm 
sizes. The substance of each variable on leverage varies across large, medium and 
small firms. In general, profitability is the most important determinant of leverage 
regardless of firm size, although it is highly influential amongst the larger firms. The 
sensitivity between long-term debt and firm-level determinants is traceable amongst 
large-sized firms, while short-term debt is more responsive among the medium-sized 
and small firms. The relationship between firm-level determinants and leverage 
remains consistent across firm sizes, except for risk. Therefore, the overall sample 
provides evidence related to the firm size effect, as the firms were classified into 
different sizes according to paid-up capital. 
The impact of sectoral characteristics and different firm sizes can be seen as 
the model controls for these variables. First, the orientation between leverage and 
capital structure determinants differs across manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
firms. Besides the commonalities, differences exist between the consumer product 
and industrial product sectors although both sectors are classified as manufacturing 
firms. A great inconsistency is perceptible amongst the large and medium-sized firms 
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across selected sectors. The mechanism between capital structure determinants and 
leverage differs across medium-sized firms as the orientation is highly controlled by 
the nature of the sector. 
A similar pattern is observable among the small firms as they differ within 
and across sectors. In most cases, profitability, liquidity and risk become crucial in 
the process of leverage determination. Although the number of observations are not 
comparable between these three sectors, the sectoral characteristics and firm size 
effect are noticeable. Most of the time, the industrial product sector produces 
stronger results, although the sample is strongly dominated by the technology firms 
due to the greater number of observations. Moreover, the results also highlight some 
different relationships between leverage and firm-level determinants, for example, 
non-tax debt shield and risk among the small firms sample. The decision-making on 
leverage is highly driven by the sectoral characteristics via different firm size, 
although a few commonalities are noticeable within and between sectors in Malaysia.
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CHAPTER 8 
SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT AND TARGET CAPITAL 
STRCUTURE ACROSS SECTORS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters assumed that the capital structure choice of Malaysian 
listed firms is static. Nevertheless, the firms adjust their financing based on internal 
and external shocks. According to the dynamic trade-off theory, firms tend to adjust 
their leverage ratio in order to maintain or achieve a target capital structure (Marsh, 
1982; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Fama and French, 2002; 
Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Chakraborty, 2010; Guney et al., 2011). The dynamic 
capital structure theory predicts that firms can systematically deviate from target 
leverage with the presence of adjustment cost (Fischer et al., 1989). So far, the 
research to date has tended to concentrate on the target debt ratio and speed of 
adjustment across firms rather than across sectors. On the other hand, MacKay and 
Phillips (2005) emphasized the importance of industry that affects the financial 
structure of each firm at the intra-industry level. In other words, a firm’s financial 
structure is dependent on the firm’s position within its industry or sector. This view 
is mainly attributable to the empirical literature confirming that firms within an 
industry or sector may face similar conditions, risk behaviour, tax status and leverage 
ratios (Ozkan, 2001). 
Recently, Elsas and Florysiak (2011) found heterogeneity in the speed of 
adjustment across industries as they grouped firms based on industry classifications. 
Nevertheless, this result is based on US sample that might not be similar to the 
emerging market samples due to different institutional settings. However, they did 
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not observe the magnitude and relationship between leverage and capital structure 
determinants across industries, in the context of dynamic capital structure. Industries 
might react differently as shocks occur in the operating environment, and this might 
indirectly affect the relationship between leverage and firm-level determinants. 
According to Ovtchinnikov (2010), capital structure is highly responsive to 
exogenous shocks such as deregulation, and firms are sensitive to changes in the 
operating environment which are industry or sector-specific. Due to the existence of 
sector-based adjustment costs, target leverage might be similar at the intra-sector 
level and variations across sectors might be possible.  
This provides a gap in the series of dynamic capital structure literature as less 
attention has been paid this matter which has been untapped in the context of 
developing countries’ sample analysis. Therefore, this chapter critically examines the 
impact of sectoral behaviour on target debt adjustment, and the dynamic process 
between firm-level determinants and leverage across sectors in Malaysia. In this 
chapter, the first section provides evidence on the relationship between firm-level 
determinants and leverage based on the overall balanced and unbalanced datasets 
under the dynamic framework. Subsequently, the second section concentrates on the 
impact of sectoral behaviour on the capital structure decision-making process across 
sectors using similar dynamic models. The final section presents the analysis on the 
speed of adjustment based on the overall sample and selected sectorsin Malaysia. 
8.2 Dynamic Capital Structure among the Malaysian 
Listed Firms 
At the initial stage, the GMM-System and GMM-Difference estimation 
techniques were undertaken. Nevertheless, the GMM-Difference outperformed the 
GMM-System (not reported) and better satisfies the basic assumptions of GMM. 
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Therefore, four models based on GMM-Difference were adopted in this study. As 
mentioned in the methodology chapter, these models are tested on two different 
dimensions, that is, the overall sample and sectors across the balanced and 
unbalanced datasets. In order to capture the past history of the independent variables, 
the first model includes the current and lag of explanatory variables with the 
inclusion of unobservable firm fixed effect and time fixed effect. 
                                                                    
                                              
                                                   
                                     
(8.1) 
where      is the difference in the debt ratio for firm i in year t, with firm-level 
determinants such as tangibility (TANGIB), profitability (EBITTA), growth 
opportunities (GRWTH), non-debt tax shield (NTDS), liquidity (LIQ), size 
(LNSALES) and risk (RISK). This analysis assesses the factors that are associated 
with a firm’s leverage. The  
 
 denotes the time-invariant unobservable firm-specific 
fixed effects and  
 
 represents the firm-invariant time-specific fixed effects. The 
disturbance term is denoted as     and is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with 
mean zero. As for the unbalanced dataset, the growth variable will be replaced by 
market-to-book ratio (MTBR) as a proxy for growth opportunities. The second 
model retains the entire components but the lags of explanatory variables were 
excluded from the model. 
                                                                   
                                            
(8.2) 
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The third model maintains similar components to Model 8.1 but excludes the 
component of time fixed effect. 
                                                                      
                                              
                                                    
                                  
(8.3) 
Finally, the fourth model excludes both the lag independent variables and time fixed 
effect. 
                                                                   
                                       
(8.4) 
Based on Table 8.1, the substance of past leverage on current total debt is 
clear across both datasets. This confirms the existence of target capital structure 
across Malaysian listed firms and supports the dynamic trade-off theory. This result 
is strongly consistent with other Malaysian studies such as Ariff et al. (2008) and 
Mat Nor et al. (2011). The level of profitability relates extensively to total debt and 
the relationship further strengthens the applicability of the pecking order theory. 
Profitability does not only affect the current leverage but also affects the target ratio 
(Hovakimian et al., 2001). As firms submissively hold sufficient reserves, they tend 
to use less leverage (Ozkan, 2001; Antoniou et al., 2008; Lemmon et al., 2008; 
Chakraborty, 2010; Guney et al., 2011). Profitable firms with larger amounts of cash 
tend to avoid external financing (Leary and Roberts, 2005).  
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The balanced dataset highlights that firm size became an important 
determinant to total debt, thus upholding a positive relationship. In other words, as 
the firms grow larger, the consumption of total debt increases. This result is highly 
consistent with the findings of Hovakimian et al. (2001), Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) and Antoniou et al. (2008). Larger firms maintain a higher level of debt 
capacity as they are more diversified and less exposed to bankruptcy risk (Titman 
and Wessels, 1988). They have an added advantage in accessing the credit market 
due to their cash flow stability and ability to exploit the economies of scale in issuing 
securities (Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Gaud et al., 2005). This is not the case for past 
firm size as this determinant affects the total debt negatively. This is possible as the 
larger firms are more diversified and infrequently fail to fulfil their obligations 
compared to smaller firms. As the past value of firm size increases, the probability of 
bankruptcy will be reduced across larger firms (Ozkan, 2001). 
Besides profitability and firm size, total debt is also dependent on growth 
opportunities. As the growth opportunities increase, firms tend to decrease their debt 
financing. This result strongly supports the findings of Ozkan (2001), Flannery and 
Rangan (2006), Antoniou et al. (2008), Lemmon et al. (2008) and Nunkoo and 
Boateng (2010). Additionally, Hovakimian et al. (2001) argued that debt is used to 
finance assets, while growth opportunities are relatively financed by equity. In 
addition, as the proportion of intangible assets is larger than tangible assets, firms are 
not able to raise a larger amount of leverage as the debt holders are reluctant to lend 
as they feel insecure about a firm’s future projects (Ozkan, 2001). From the agency 
theory point of view, firms with a larger amount of cash tend to use debt to alleviate 
the opportunistic behaviour of managers (Jensen, 1986). Hereby, debt is used as an 
instrument to overcome the agency problems by reducing the free cash flow and 
abnormal capital expenditure (D’Mello and Miranda, 2010). 
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Inconsistent with the trade-off theory and pecking order theory, firms 
increase their total leverage utilization as their earnings become volatile. Conversely, 
the unbalanced dataset shows the importance of past risk level on total debt. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between these variables is highly supported by both 
the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. Most of the listed firms tend to 
reduce their debt financing as their past earnings become volatile. The size of 
coefficients further emphasizes the magnitude of the past earnings volatility on 
current total debt consumption. Though liquidity is significantly related to total debt, 
the impact on leverage is minimal. From the modelling point of view, the inferences 
are not strong and may not explain the true dynamic relationship between leverage 
and firm-level determinants. This is mainly attributable to the failure of the Sargan 
test, although the Hansen test confirms the validity of the instrumental variables used 
in the model. Alternatively, as the sample is partitioned into sectors, the models 
become stronger and the Sargan test produces better results across sectors compared 
to the overall sample regressions. 
In sum, the overall sample analysis reveals the existence of a dynamic pattern 
between leverage and firm-level determinants across listed firms in Malaysia. The 
substance of past leverage on current total debt is observable across both datasets. 
The level of profitability matters extensively to total debt and the relationship further 
strengthens the applicability of the pecking order theory. Despite that, other 
determinants, such as firm size, risk and growth opportunities, seem to be influential 
in the process of leverage determination. Some of the past history of the independent 
variables, that is, past firm size and past risk, affects the consumption of current total 
debt.  
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Table 8.1: Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure based on Overall Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (8.1), (8.2), (8.3) and (8.4) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variable is book leverage ratio of total debt to total asset (BTDA). 
The independent variables are lag leverage, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth, risk, lag profitability, lag tangibility, lag liquidity, lag non-tax debt shield, lag size, lag 
risk and  lag growth. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions. The z-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote 
significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. AR (1) and AR (2) are the first- and second-order autocorrelations of residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test and Hansen test 
provide the over-identifying restrictions under the null of the instruments’ validity. The Wald statistics test the joint significance of estimated coefficients under the null of no relation.
 
DEP. 
VAR 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
BALANCED DATASET 
 
UNBALANCED DATASET 
 
GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 
 Lag Leverage 
Profitability 
0.78 (4.08)** 
-0.81(-6.02)** 
0.81 (3.65) ** 
-0.86 (-4.61) ** 
0.77(4.09)** 
-0.79(-6.13)** 
0.85(3.66)** 
-0.84(-4.81)** 
0.74(12.66)** 
-0.67(-4.93)** 
0.60(5.57)** 
-0.66(-6.62)** 
0.69(10.37)** 
-0.65(-4.68)** 
0.57(6.20)** 
-0.65(-6.28)** 
 Tangibility 0.24(0.76) 0.24 (0.72) 0.21(0.67) 0.22(0.69) -0.04(-0.46) -0.01(-0.07) -0.04(-0.54) -0.01(-0.20) 
 Liquidity -0.002(-1.37) -0.002 (-1.63) -0.002(-1.71) -0.003(-2.11)* -0.003(-3.45)** -0.002(-3.58)** -0.003(-3.39)** -0.003(-3.63)** 
 Non-Tax Debt Shield 3.27(1.43) 3.10(1.52) 3.18(1.41) 3.07(1.52) 1.31(0.89) 1.50(0.93) 1.35(0.91) 1.48(0.92) 
 Size 0.16(2.60)** 0.13 (2.16)* 0.15(2.93)** 0.12(2.32)* -0.07(-1.13) -0.05(-0.79) -0.07(-1.14) -0.05(-0.85) 
 Risk 0.03(5.61)** 0.03 (4.32) ** 0.03(5.71)** 0.03(4.49)** -0.05(-0.40) 0.09(0.81) -0.03(-0.26) 0.10(0.86) 
BTDA Growth 
Lag Profitability 
Lag Tangibility 
Lag Liquidity 
Lag Non-Tax Debt Shield 
Lag Size 
Lag Risk 
Lag Growth  
-0.09(-2.74)** 
0.07(0.30) 
-0.21(-0.81) 
0.001(0.84) 
-0.34(-0.34) 
-0.15(-2.38)* 
-0.002(-0.23) 
-0.01(-1.78) 
 
-0.08(-2.33) ** 
 
-0.09(-2.82)** 
0.09(0.40) 
-0.23(-0.92) 
0.00(0.59) 
-0.32(-0.32) 
-0.16(-2.56)* 
-0.002(-0.33) 
-0.01(-1.79) 
 
-0.08(-2.36)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00(-0.34) 
0.05(0.55) 
-0.002(-0.03) 
-0.00(-0.04) 
-1.21(-0.96) 
0.04(0.88) 
-0.30(-3.25)** 
0.00(0.08) 
 
0.00(-0.07) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00(-0.30) 
0.05(0.66) 
-0.01(-0.17) 
-0.00(-0.42) 
-1.11(-0.99) 
0.03(0.79) 
-0.27(-3.50)** 
0.00(0.08) 
 
-0.00(-0.03) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Obs. 3000 3000 3000 3000 4707 4707 4707 4707 
 AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
Hansen Test 
Wald Test 
Cross-section Fixed Effect 
Time Fixed effect 
Half-life 
0.01 
0.66 
0.00 
0.25 
0.003 
Yes 
Yes 
2.79 
0.00 
0.60 
0.00 
0.49 
0.002 
Yes 
Yes 
3.29 
0.00 
0.64 
0.00 
0.42 
 
Yes 
No 
2.65 
0.00 
0.58 
0.00 
0.22 
 
Yes 
No 
4.27 
0.03 
0.36 
0.00 
0.36 
0.07 
Yes 
Yes 
2.30 
0.05 
0.30 
0.00 
0.60 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
1.39 
0.01 
0.36 
0.00 
0.20 
 
Yes 
No 
1.87 
0.02 
0.29 
0.00 
0.29 
 
Yes 
No 
1.23 
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8.3 Sectoral Analysis on Dynamic Capital Structure 
As shown in Table 8.2, past leverage and profitability become essential to 
total debt among the consumer product firms. These firms tend to depend on 
leverage as their internal reserves diminish as a result of low profit margins. 
Profitable firms with greater cash balances are less likely to use external 
financing, while firms with large anticipated investment expenses are more likely 
to use external financing (Leary and Roberts, 2005). Liquidity is also important in 
explaining total debt but this is not supported by results from the unbalanced 
dataset due to the weak coefficient, although it is significantly related to total debt 
at the level of 5% significance. An equivalent situation is perceptible between lag 
liquidity and total debt. Consumer product firms decrease the amount of leverage 
as their liquidity position improves, which is consistent with Guney et al. (2011). 
From the pecking order theory perspective, firms tend to use liquid assets to 
finance their investment as their liquidity becomes stronger (Ozkan, 2001). In line 
with the agency theory, Prowse (1990) further argued that shareholders tend to 
manipulate the assets at the expense of debt holders. This indirectly increases the 
agency cost of debt and creditors tend to limit the amount of financing for those 
particular firms.  
Consistent with the trade-off theory, non-tax debt shield is significant and 
is negatively related to total debt particularly, within the unbalanced dataset. This 
outcome is observable in past studies by Ozkan (2001), Miguel and Pindado 
(2001), Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Antoniou et al. (2008). This further 
strengthens the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) model that emphasizes the 
reduction of the potential tax benefit as the firm’s non-tax debt shield increases. 
The past firm size affects total debt negatively. According to Ozkan (2001), past 
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firm size values are treated as an inverse proxy for the direct costs of bankruptcy 
of small firms. Therefore, as the direct cost of bankruptcy increases, smaller firms 
tend to reduce their borrowing compared to larger firms. As for the consumer 
product sector, Models 1 and 2 seem to be good models as they fulfil the basic 
requirements of Difference-GMM tests. As the models exclude the time fixed 
effect, the models become weak. This is highly consistent across datasets and 
helps to further explain the effect of sectoral characteristics across consumer 
product firms. Moreover, the results further confirm the impact of the unobserved 
time fixed effect on leverage determination amongst the consumer product sector. 
Once again, the importance of past leverage and profitability is perceptible 
across datasets in the industrial product sector. However, as shown in Table 8.3, 
the impact of profitability on total debt is large when compared with the consumer 
product sector. A similar result is noticeable between firm size and total debt. As 
the firms grow larger, most of the industrial product firms tend to increase their 
debt utilization. Some studies, namely, Ozkan (2001), Flannery and Rangan 
(2006), Antoniou et al. (2008) and Guney et al. (2011), provide a little evidence 
that firm size has a positive effect on their leverage ratios. This is possible 
because the large firms must be more transparent with their information to obtain 
greater amounts of financial resources from lenders. Similar to the overall sample, 
past firm size affects total debt negatively. These results are very consistent with 
the consumer product firms. Correspondingly, Ozkan (2001) and Nunkoo and 
Boateng (2010) show a negative relationship between these variables. The 
balanced dataset highlights the substance of growth opportunities on total debt. In 
line with the agency theory, industrial product firms reduce their debt financing as 
more growth opportunities arise in the market. Debt mitigates the agency 
CHAPTER 8 
 
304 
 
problems such as excessive perquisites, adverse selection and moral hazard in a 
particular firm that possesses a greater amount of cash with limited growth 
opportunities (Jensen, 1986) 
Conversely, the unbalanced dataset shows that risk plays a major role in 
the process of leverage determination. The negative effect of earnings volatility on 
total debt is large which is opposite to the overall sample results. The inverse 
relationship supports the trade-off theory and pecking order theory. The industrial 
product firms tend to reduce debt financing when they face uncertainty in their 
earnings. In addition, the firm’s leverage is also dependent on the past risk level as 
the reaction is similar to current risk. On average, the industrial product firms are 
mindful of their current and past earnings volatility. As a whole, lag leverage, 
profitability and firm size seem to be the most influential variables across both 
datasets. Nonetheless, the reliability of the results is unclear due to validity of the 
models between balanced and unbalanced datasets. In other words, the models fail 
to overcome the serial correlation problems and over-identification restrictions in 
GMM. Therefore, all the models are considered weak and the results are 
ambiguous. 
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Table 8.2: Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure based on Consumer Product Sector 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (8.1), (8.2), (8.3) and (8.4) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variable is book leverage ratio of total debt to total asset (BTDA). 
The independent variables are lag leverage, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth, risk, lag profitability, lag tangibility, lag liquidity, lag non-tax debt shield, lag size, lag 
risk and  lag growth. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The z-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote 
significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  AR (1) and AR (2) are the first- and second-order autocorrelations of residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test and Hansen test 
provide the over-identifying restrictions under the null of the instruments’ validity. The Wald statistics test the joint significance of estimated coefficients under the null of no relation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
BALANCED DATASET 
 
UNBALANCED DATASET 
GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 
 Lag  Leverage  
Profitability 
0.89(10.36)** 
-0.36(-3.66)** 
0.82(8.25)** 
-0.39(-3.20)** 
0.62(3.25)** 
-0.33(-4.14)** 
0.54(2.66)** 
-0.33(-3.01)** 
0.83(9.98)** 
-0.40(-3.39)** 
0.80(11.12)** 
-0.37(-3.51)** 
0.64(5.09)** 
-0.36(-3.25)** 
0.66(5.54)** 
-0.33(3.48)** 
 Tangibility 0.11(0.99) 0.11(0.86) 0.06(0.57) 0.07(0.67) 0.09(0.79) 0.10(0.88) 0.11(0.92) 0.11(1.01) 
 Liquidity -0.04(-2.70)** -0.04(-2.22)* -0.05(-2.56)* -0.05(-2.32)* -0.002(-1.43) -0.003(-2.25)* -0.002(-1.55) -0.002(-2.08)* 
 Non Tax Debt Shield 0.24(0.21) -0.01(-0.01) 0.06(0.06) -0.09(-0.10) -1.19(-2.13)* -1.35(-2.51)* -1.02(-2.06)* -1.19(-2.31)* 
 Size 0.01(0.27) -0.003(-0.13) 0.003(0.08) -0.02(-0.89) 0.03(1.93) 0.02(1.48) 0.02(1.67) 0.05(1.01) 
 Risk 0.002(0.01) -0.01(-0.04) -0.01(-0.04) -0.02(-0.07) -0.03(-0.24) -0.04(-0.38) -0.02(-0.19) -0.03(-0.33) 
BTDA Growth 
Lag Profitability 
Lag Tangibility 
Lag Liquidity 
Lag Non Tax Debt Shield 
Lag Size 
Lag Risk 
Lag Growth  
-0.01(-0.17) 
-0.02(0.29) 
0.12(0.78) 
0.05(2.47)* 
-0.29(-0.31) 
-0.02(-0.34) 
0.17(1.32) 
0.004(0.23) 
0.02(0.80) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.02(-0.57) 
-0.04(-0.45) 
0.04(0.32) 
0.03(2.16)* 
-0.43(-0.38) 
-0.04(-0.89) 
0.08(0.61) 
0.01(0.76) 
0.01(0.85) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.002(0.96) 
-0.01(-0.28) 
0.06(0.49) 
0.002(2.61)** 
0.54(1.25) 
-0.04(-2.82)** 
0.01(0.34) 
-0.001(-0.49) 
0.002(0.99) 
 
0.002(0.92) 
-0.02(-0.52) 
0.05(0.53) 
0.001(1.53) 
0.45(1.13) 
-0.03(-2.67)** 
0.01(0.31) 
-0.00(-0.36) 
0.002(0.98) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Obs. 400 400 400 400 766 766 766 766 
 AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
Hansen Test 
Wald Test 
Cross-section Fixed Effect 
Time Fixed effect 
Half-life 
0.29 
0.06 
0.13 
0.91 
0.07 
Yes 
Yes 
5.95 
0.07 
0.31 
0.30 
0.61 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
3.49 
0.12 
0.17 
0.00 
0.50 
 
Yes 
No 
1.45 
0.22 
0.35 
0.004 
0.28 
 
Yes 
No 
1.12 
0.02 
0.86 
0.27 
0.42 
0.04 
Yes 
Yes 
3.49 
0.01 
0.80 
0.30 
0.49 
0.06 
Yes 
Yes 
3.11 
0.06 
0.85 
0.01 
0.85 
 
Yes 
No 
1.55 
0.03 
0.69 
0.03 
0.37 
 
Yes 
No 
1.73 
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Table 8.3: Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure based on Industrial Product Sector 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (8.1), (8.2), (8.3) and (8.4) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variable is book leverage ratio of total debt to total asset (BTDA). 
The independent variables are lag leverage, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth, risk, lag profitability, lag tangibility, lag liquidity, lag non-tax debt shield, lag size, lag 
risk and  lag growth. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The z-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote 
significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  AR (1) and AR (2) are the first- and second-order autocorrelations of residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test and Hansen test 
provide the over-identifying restrictions under the null of the instruments’ validity. The Wald statistics test the joint significance of estimated coefficients under the null of no relation. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
BALANCED DATASET 
 
UNBALANCED DATASET 
GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 
 Lag  Leverage  
Profitability 
0.89(3.48)** 
-1.44(-2.67)** 
0.87(2.74)** 
-0.94(-2.12)* 
0.92(3.93)** 
-1.38(-2.49)* 
0.85(2.64)** 
-0.84(-1.83) 
0.50(3.79)** 
-1.29(-5.33)** 
0.31(3.08)** 
-1.11(-5.10)** 
0.61(3.69)** 
-1.33(-4.67)** 
0.37(2.30)* 
-1.11(-4.45)** 
 Tangibility 0.52(1.59) 0.68(1.58) 0.45(1.33) 0.61(1.47) -0.22(-1.58) -0.17(-1.18) -0.25(-1.68) -0.20(-1.44) 
 Liquidity 0.001(0.71) -0.001(-0.63) 0.00(1.33) -0.002(-1.40) -0.00(-0.11) -0.001(-0.54) -0.00(-0.06) -0.001(-0.68) 
 Non Tax Debt Shield 3.23(1.39) 2.98(1.22) 3.29(1.38) 3.21(1.28) 3.16(1.20) 3.62(1.33) 3.12(1.14) 3.71(1.36) 
 Size 0.25(3.70)** 0.22(2.46)* 0.25(4.27)** 0.15(1.51) 0.08(2.37)* 0.10(3.15)** 0.09(2.23)* 0.09(2.52)* 
 Risk -0.38(-1.68) 0.07(0.23) -0.36(-1.52) 0.10(0.31) -0.66(-2.81)** -0.43(-1.94) -0.71(-2.62)** -0.43(-1.76) 
BTDA Growth 
Lag Profitability 
Lag Tangibility 
Lag Liquidity 
Lag Non Tax Debt Shield 
Lag Size 
Lag Risk 
Lag Growth  
-0.12(-14.24)** 
-1.01(-1.97) 
-0.70(-1.46) 
0.003(1.63) 
2.19(1.03) 
-0.16(-3.25)** 
-0.83(-1.97) 
-0.003(-0.51) 
-0.11(-6.67)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.13(-20.93)** 
-0.89(-1.86) 
-0.72(-1.46) 
0.002(1.27) 
2.17(1.10) 
-0.18(-4.06)** 
-0.81(-1.92) 
-0.003(-0.50) 
-0.11(-6.79)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.01(0.58) 
-0.11(-1.03) 
0.02(0.11) 
0.00(0.15) 
-2.19(-1.16) 
-0.04(-1.54) 
-0.31(-4.41)** 
0.004(1.62) 
0.004(0.38) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.01(0.65) 
-0.02(-0.14) 
0.01(0.03) 
0.00(0.11) 
-2.84(-1.72) 
-0.05(-2.04)* 
-0.29(-3.40)** 
0.01(2.14)* 
0.01(0.42) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Obs. 980 980 980 980 1560 1560 1560 1560 
 AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
Hansen Test 
Wald Test 
Cross-section Fixed Effect 
Time Fixed effect 
Half-life 
0.02 
0.13 
0.00 
0.01 
0.08 
Yes 
Yes 
6.58 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
Yes 
Yes 
4.98 
0.01 
0.10 
0.00 
0.10 
 
Yes 
No 
8.31 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.04 
 
Yes 
No 
4.27 
0.01 
0.12 
0.00 
0.15 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
1.00 
0.01 
0.51 
0.00 
0.19 
0.02 
Yes 
Yes 
0.59 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.02 
 
Yes 
No 
1.40 
0.01 
0.67 
0.00 
0.01 
 
Yes 
No 
0.70 
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Comparable to the previous sectors, past leverage and profitability remained 
as the main determinants that affect total debt strongly across construction firms. As 
shown in Table 8.4, the impact of profitability on leverage is greater when compared 
to both the consumer product and industrial product sectors. Nevertheless, the impact 
of non-tax debt shield is extremely huge as the coefficient confirms the substance of 
this variable on leverage among the construction sector. The tendency of using 
leverage decreases as the firms increase their non-tax debt shield, and this further 
strengthens the trade-off theory. Hereby, the differential impact of non-tax debt 
shield on leverage is clear across the construction and consumer product sectors, 
although both sectors produce significant results with similar relationships. Likewise, 
the effect of liquidity is obvious among the construction firms compared to the 
consumer product sector. The inverse relationship between these variables is 
consistent with the previous studies (e.g., Prowse, 1990; Ozkan, 2001; Guney et al., 
2011) which strongly support both the pecking order theory and the agency theory. 
Furthermore, the past liquidity level also affects leverage positively. 
Inconsistent with the manufacturing sectors, the balanced dataset highlights 
the significance of tangibility on total debt across construction firms. As the 
collateral level increases, the construction firms tend to decrease their leverage 
(Hovakimian et al., 2004; Guney et al., 2011). Firms with lower levels of collateral 
tend to increase their leverage utilization merely to limit the manager’s’ consumption 
of perquisites, and this argument strongly supports the agency theory (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). Alternatively, the unbalanced dataset provides evidence on the past 
firm size effect on total debt. Based on the different Difference-GMM assumptions, 
Models 1 and 2 provide reliable results.
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The power of the models increases as the models controlled by the cross-
sectional fixed effect together with the unobserved time fixed effects. This is 
solely based on the unbalanced panel regressions, as the balanced panel regression 
faces some serial correlation problems. In sum, lag leverage, profitability and non-
tax debt shield seem to be the most influential variables across both datasets 
amongst construction firms. The significance of profitability on total debt is 
unclear among the property sector as the balanced dataset provides insignificant 
results. However, the unbalanced dataset shows the negative significance of 
profitability on leverage in the property firms. The dependency of current total 
debt on past leverage remains significant across datasets. The impact of liquidity 
on total debt is perceptible but the consequences are immaterial. Based on the 
unbalanced dataset, the property sector tends to decrease its leverage consumption 
as firms grow larger.  
In conjunction with that, studies such as Fischer et al. (1989), Lemmon et 
al. (2008), Nunkoo and Boateng (2010), Chakraborty (2010) and Sbeiti (2010) 
found a similar relationship between firm size and leverage.These results are 
completely opposite to those for the consumer product and industrial product 
sectors that sustained a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. Some 
past Malaysian studies, for example, Ariff et al. (2008) and Mat Nor et al. (2011), 
obtained a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. However, these 
outcomes are entirely based on the overall sample rather than on the sectors. This 
exercise explains the uniqueness of the way each sector affects the orientation 
between leverage and firm size across the sectors in Malaysia. 
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Table 8.4: Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure based on Construction Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (8.1), (8.2), (8.3) and (8.4) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variable is book leverage ratio of total debt to total asset (BTDA). The 
independent variables are lag leverage, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth, risk, lag profitability, lag tangibility, lag liquidity, lag non-tax debt shield, lag size, lag risk and  
lag growth. Refer to Table to 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The z-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote significance 
at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  AR (1) and AR (2) are the first- and second-order autocorrelations of residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test and Hansen test provide the over-
identifying restrictions under the null of the instruments’ validity. The Wald statistics test the joint significance of estimated coefficients under the null of no relation. 
 
 
 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
BALANCED DATASET 
 
UNBALANCED DATASET 
GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 
 Lag  Leverage  
Profitability 
0.72(3.37)** 
-0.66(-4.40)** 
0.68(4.17)** 
-0.59(-4.24)** 
0.96(9.64)** 
-0.70(-3.65)** 
0.75(7.70)** 
-0.62(-3.67)** 
0.96(4.91)** 
-0.32(-3.14)** 
0.98(6.31)** 
-0.30(-2.71)** 
0.83(6.05)** 
-0.28(-2.73)** 
0.89(7.30)** 
-0.24(-2.28)* 
 Tangibility -0.20(-2.41)* -0.26(-3.24)** -0.17(-1.96) -0.22(-2.43)* -0.08(-1.15) -0.06(-0.68) -0.06(-0.75) -0.06(-0.65) 
 Liquidity -0.06(-3.43)** -0.07(-3.48)** -0.06(-3.00)** -0.08(-3.46)** -0.003(-0.97) -0.01(-2.28)* -0.01(-1.52) -0.01(-2.43)* 
 Non Tax Debt Shield -2.27(-2.58)** -2.44(-2.41)* -2.47(-2.43)* -2.83(-2.26)* -2.17(-1.65) -2.86(-2.06)* -1.73(-1.33) -2.34(-1.76) 
 Size 0.06(3.43)** -0.02(-0.55) 0.04(0.75) -0.001(-0.04) 0.01(0.54) -0.01(-0.38) 0.01(0.58) -0.01(-0.46) 
 Risk 0.50(1.19) 0.39(0.90) 0.50(0.97) 0.51(1.08) 0.12(1.28) 0.08(0.64) 0.14(1.56) 0.12(1.10) 
BTDA Growth 
Lag Profitability 
Lag Tangibility 
Lag Liquidity 
Lag Non Tax Debt Shield 
Lag Size 
Lag Risk 
Lag Growth  
-0.05(-1.75) 
-0.13(-0.59) 
0.19(2.17)* 
0.041(2.01)* 
-0.49(-0.70) 
-0.09(-1.61) 
0.21(0.31) 
0.03(1.62) 
0.01(0.74) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.04(-0.63) 
0.18(1.09) 
0.18(1.56) 
0.05(2.78)** 
-0.60(-0.67) 
-0.08(-1.18) 
0.62(0.87) 
0.02(1.57) 
0.01(0.75) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.002(-0.83) 
-0.04(-0.35) 
0.08(0.94) 
0.01(3.07)** 
1.03(1.21) 
-0.05(-2.52)** 
0.13(1.23) 
-0.00(-0.33) 
-0.002(-0.82) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.002(-0.84) 
-0.02(-0.24) 
0.04(0.49) 
0.01(2.26)* 
1.01(1.19) 
-0.04(-2.70)** 
0.13(1.32) 
-0.00(-0.48) 
-0.002(-0.84) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Obs. 210 210 210 210 325 325 325 325 
 AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
Hansen Test 
Wald Test 
Cross-section Fixed Effect 
Time Fixed effect 
Half-life 
0.03 
0.01 
0.66 
1.00 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
2.11 
0.01 
0.01 
0.78 
1.00 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
1.80 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.29 
 
Yes 
No 
16.98 
0.00 
0.06 
0.01 
0.11 
 
Yes 
No 
2.41 
0.00 
0.30 
0.54 
0.58 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
13.51 
0.00 
0.17 
0.69 
0.64 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
34.31 
0.00 
0.49 
0.04 
0.23 
 
Yes 
No 
3.72 
0.00 
0.27 
0.07 
0.18 
 
Yes 
No 
5.95 
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Table 8.5: Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure based on Property Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (8.1), (8.2), (8.3) and (8.4) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variable is book leverage ratio of total debt to total asset (BTDA). The 
independent variables are lag leverage, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth, risk, lag profitability, lag tangibility, lag liquidity, lag non-tax debt shield, lag size, lag risk and  
lag growth. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The z-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote significance at 
1% and 5% levels, respectively.  AR (1) and AR (2) are the first- and second-order autocorrelations of residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test and Hansen test provide the over-
identifying restrictions under the null of the instruments’ validity. The Wald statistics test the joint significance of estimated coefficients under the null of no relation.
 
DEP. 
VAR 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
BALANCED DATASET 
 
UNBALANCED DATASET 
GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 
 Lag  Leverage  
Profitability 
0.59(5.22)** 
-0.56(-1.77) 
0.41(4.09)** 
-0.61(-1.73) 
0.68(3.30)** 
-0.53(-1.69) 
0.41(3.86)** 
-0.60(-1.73) 
0.53(3.16)** 
-0.43(-2.76)** 
0.42(3.16)** 
-0.43(-3.15)** 
0.50(1.89) 
-0.41(-2.65)** 
0.36(2.51)* 
-0.41(-2.95)** 
 Tangibility 0.04(0.23) 0.03(0.19) 0.04(0.22) -0.002(-0.01) 0.05(0.32) 0.08(0.57) 0.04(0.26) 0.06(0.47) 
 Liquidity -0.004(-3.70)** -0.004(-4.23)** -0.004(-3.88)** -0.004(-4.78)** -0.01(-2.43)* -0.004(-1.37) -0.01(-2.25)* -0.003(-1.26) 
 Non-Tax Debt Shield 3.50(1.43) 3.97(1.49) 3.53(1.43) 3.75(1.42) 4.60(1.66) 4.49(1.62) 4.47(1.60) 4.31(1.54) 
 Size -0.04(-1.09) -0.05(-1.75) -0.04(-0.96) -0.04(-1.42) -0.07(-3.22)** -0.07(-4.02)** -0.07(-3.32)** -0.07(-4.05)** 
 Risk -0.03(-0.18) 0.04(0.22) -0.01(-0.12) 0.07(0.35) 0.18(0.91) 0.23(1.02) 0.21(1.06) 0.23(1.04) 
BTDA Growth 
Lag Profitability 
Lag Tangibility 
Lag Liquidity 
Lag Non-Tax Debt Shield 
Lag Size 
Lag Risk 
Lag Growth  
-0.01(-1.36) 
0.32(1.19) 
0.12(1.74) 
0.002(1.63) 
-1.59(-0.67) 
-0.03(-1.02) 
-0.02(-0.08) 
-0.004(-3.51)** 
-0.01(-0.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.01(-1.48) 
0.43(1.81) 
0.10(1.54) 
0.002(1.46) 
-2.07(-0.72) 
-0.03(-1.00) 
0.02(0.11) 
-0.01(-3.81)** 
-0.01(-0.71) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.01(-3.49)** 
-0.003(-0.03) 
0.10(1.22) 
0.01(1.62) 
-1.11(-0.55) 
0.02(0.99) 
-0.15(-0.94) 
0.00(0.33) 
-0.01(-4.23)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.01(-3.00)** 
0.04(0.34) 
0.08(0.89) 
0.01(1.44) 
-1.07(-0.45) 
0.02(0.72) 
-0.08(-0.59) 
0.001(0.60) 
-0.01(-4.59)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Obs. 450 450 450 450 591 591 591 591 
 AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
Hansen Test 
Wald Test 
Cross-section Fixed Effect 
Time Fixed effect 
Half-life 
0.003 
0.943 
0.55 
0.20 
0.02 
Yes 
Yes 
1.36 
0.01 
0.37 
0.60 
0.10 
0.08 
Yes 
Yes 
0.78 
0.00 
0.93 
0.75 
0.16 
 
Yes 
No 
1.80 
0.02 
0.30 
0.79 
0.48 
 
Yes 
No 
0.78 
0.00 
0.87 
0.38 
0.45 
0.05 
Yes 
Yes 
1.09 
0.01 
0.69 
0.45 
0.43 
0.23 
Yes 
Yes 
0.80 
0.00 
0.75 
0.40 
0.52 
 
Yes 
No 
1.00 
0.01 
0.55 
0.44 
0.35 
 
Yes 
No 
0.68 
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The role of growth opportunities is observable across the property firms, 
and the significance of past growth opportunities on total debt is visible in the 
balanced dataset with a minor effect. Most of the property firms tend to decrease 
leverage as they face more growth opportunities in the market. These firms 
probably financed their investments through equity financing. This situation is 
applicable firms that issue larger amounts of equity when they perceive their stock 
price is high relative to book value and earnings. An increase in the perceived 
value of the growth opportunities is observable as the equity produces a higher 
return (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Hovakimian et al., 2001). Interestingly, all the 
sets of models seemed to be good as the models satisfied the requirements of the 
diagnostic tests. Additionally, the impact of time on leverage is noticeable as the 
model includes time fixed effect. As a whole, lag leverage is the most influential 
variable across both datasets. Nevertheless, the unbalanced dataset shows the 
substance of other variables, such as profitability and firm size, that influence the 
leverage determination within the property firms in Malaysia.  
The dynamic structure of the plantation sector is completely different from 
other sectors. The impact of past leverage on current leverage is unclear although 
some of the models provide significant results. A similar scenario is visible 
between profitability and leverage within the unbalanced dataset. Only a few 
variables seem to be significant in the unbalanced dataset although the number of 
observations is greater than the balanced dataset. Furthermore, these models face 
some serial correlation and over-identification restriction issues. Nevertheless, 
these issues are well addressed in the balanced datasets as the models are reliable 
and valid according to GMM specifications. Therefore, the subsequent discussion 
will be focusing on the balanced data set. Consistent with the construction sector, 
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the plantation firms tend to decrease their total debt as their tangibility capacity 
increases, and this result supports the pecking order theory. In line with the result, 
Wijst and Thurik (1993), Pandey (2001), and Pandey and Chotigeat (2004) found 
that tangibility is negatively correlated with total debt. In addition, Booth et al. 
(2001) concluded that tangibility affects total debt negatively across developing 
countries, except for Mexico. 
As the model includes the time fixed effect, non-tax debt shield becomes 
the most important determinant to leverage. Most of the plantation firms tend to 
increase their leverage as their non-tax debt shield increases which is 
incompatible with the results of the consumer product and construction sectors. 
Firms that possess a larger amount of tangible fixed assets tend to produce 
proportionally higher levels of depreciation and tax credits. These assets become a 
mode of security in order to increase the debt capacity of firms to raise a greater 
amount of leverage and enjoy the tax deductibility benefits (Bradley et al., 1984; 
Titman and Wessels, 1988; Wald, 1999; Antoniou et al., 2008; Chakraborty, 
2010). The impact of tangibility is very clear on leverage across plantation firms 
compared to other sectors in Malaysia. These firms decrease the use of leverage as 
their tangibility power increases (Hovakimian et al., 2004; Guney et al., 2011). 
Instead of profitability, most firms are very dependent on the past profitability 
while maintaining a similar relationship. The past history of profitability becomes 
significant to the plantation sector and they are most likely to reduce their 
leverage consumption while they make good profits (Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Hovakimian et al., 2004).
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According to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), the values of past profitability 
could be seriously damaged in the case of financial distress as this variable is 
treated as a proxy for growth opportunities. Moreover, the pecking order theory 
implies that internal equity is less costly than external equity, and profitable firms 
normally use their internal reserves as a primary source of financing.  
In general, all the models performed well in the balanced dataset. 
However, Model 1 is the only model that produces a significant result between 
current and lag leverage, while the rest of the models failed to provide significant 
results. A contemporaneous relationship is observable in Model 1 as lagged 
leverage is significantly related to current leverage. On the other hand, the long-
run relationship is perceptible between leverage and explanatory variables as the 
lag of dependent variable produces insignificant results. The relationship between 
past leverage and current leverage becomes insignificant as Model 3 excludes the 
time fixed effect. Thus, Model 1 seems to be an appropriate model as the model 
acts in accordance with the GMM’s rule of thumb, and produces a significant 
result between current and past leverage. 
As for the technology firms, Table 8.7 explains the significance of past 
leverage on current leverage across models. Parallel to the pecking order theory, 
profitable firms tend to decrease their debt financing at a slower rate compared to 
other sectors. This indirectly explains the reliance on total debt although the firms 
make good profits. This situation portrays the nature of the sector and the impact 
on the firm’s financings within the technology sector. On the other hand, a great 
contradiction is observable between datasets, as the balanced dataset shows a 
negative association between firm size and leverage, while the unbalanced dataset 
provides a positive relationship between these variables. A similar outcome is 
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observable between liquidity and total debt. The sizes of coefficients are different 
between datasets although they maintained a similar relationship. This is probably 
attributable to several reasons. Firstly, the composition of firm sizes is unbalanced 
across datasets. Secondly, the number of observations is incompatible as the 
unbalanced dataset consists of a larger number of firms compared to the balanced 
dataset that may not represent the true sample size of the sector.  
The models become stronger as the model excludes the time fixed effect 
and, therefore, Models 3 and 4 tend to be the best models. Based on these models, 
tangibility becomes one of the prominent factors that affects total debt 
enormously. Technology firms tend to reduce their debt financing as their 
collateral levels increase. Nonetheless, the impact of tangibility on leverage is 
lower compared to the plantation sector. Subsequently, the effect of firm size on 
leverage does matters across technology firms. As the firms grow larger, the 
dependency on total debt reduces. Inconsistent with other sectors, the liquidity 
level affects the leverage determination greatly. From the modelling point of 
view, Model 4 provides an insignificant result between past leverage and current 
leverage.This situation occurs as the model excludes the time fixed effect 
component in the regression. The Wald test further substantiates the importance of 
time fixed effect on leverage across technology firms. Therefore, Model 3 is most 
likely to be the best model to estimate the dynamic capital structure among the 
technology firms, as this model satisfies the basic specifications of GMM. 
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Table 8.6: Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure based on Plantation Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (8.1), (8.2), (8.3) and (8.4) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variable is book leverage ratio of total debt to total asset 
(BTDA). The independent variables are lag leverage, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth, risk, lag profitability, lag tangibility, lag liquidity, lag non-tax debt shield, 
lag size, lag risk and  lag growth. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The z-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** 
and * denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. AR (1) and AR (2) are the first- and second-order autocorrelations of residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test 
and Hansen test provide the over-identifying restrictions under the null of the instruments’ validity. The Wald statistics test the joint significance of estimated coefficients under the null of no 
relation. 
 
 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
BALANCED DATASET 
 
UNBALANCED DATASET 
GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 
 Lag  Leverage  
Profitability 
0.41(2.72)** 
-0.04(-0.10) 
0.29(1.17) 
-0.20(-0.53) 
0.31(1.26) 
-0.03(-0.07) 
0.24(0.86) 
-0.18(-0.40) 
0.62(3.04)** 
-0.63(-1.78) 
0.53(2.36)* 
-0.69(-2.38)** 
0.51(1.99) 
-0.45(-1.54) 
0.55(1.92) 
-0.58(-2.36)** 
 Tangibility -2.56(-3.91)** -3.24(-4.04)** -2.57(-3.42)** -3.55(2.92)** 0.11(0.53) -0.01(-0.02) 0.10(0.53) -0.10(-0.29) 
 Liquidity -0.004(-1.79) -0.004(-1.16) -0.005(-2.37)** -0.005(-1.87) -0.002(-1.53) -0.003(-1.91) -0.002(-1.90) -0.004(-1.87) 
 Non-Tax Debt Shield 17.17(2.17)* 21.08(2.23)* 16.92(1.90) 19.87(1.89) -0.81(-1.57) -0.15(-0.51) -0.37(-0.78) 0.12(0.60) 
 Size -0.31(-1.23) -0.43(-1.40) -0.17(-0.85) -0.22(-0.98) -0.002(-0.03) 0.04(0.95) -0.02(-0.31) 0.02(0.34) 
 Risk -0.07(-0.26) -0.37(-2.05)* -0.02(-0.07) -0.18(-1.13) -0.28(-0.86) -0.52(-1.91) -0.16(-0.55) -0.33(-1.43) 
BTDA Growth 
Lag Profitability 
Lag Tangibility 
Lag Liquidity 
Lag Non-Tax Debt Shield 
Lag Size 
Lag Risk 
Lag Growth  
-0.05(-1.07) 
-0.71(-2.44)* 
0.62(1.35) 
-0.01(-2.52)* 
-10.57(-1.91) 
0.11(1.18) 
0.84(7.18) 
-0.03(-1.63) 
-0.02(-0.32) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.07(-1.50) 
-0.76(-2.33)* 
0.39(0.42) 
-0.002(-0.90) 
-9.58(-1.91) 
0.07(0.85) 
0.71(6.74)** 
-0.05(-4.54)** 
-0.04(-0.74) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00(0.03) 
-0.51(-2.76)** 
0.05(0.49) 
0.002(2.09)* 
-0.39(-1.47) 
0.03(0.53) 
0.19(0.64) 
-0.01(-1.67) 
-0.01(-0.71) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003(-0.29) 
-0.32(-1.79) 
0.03(0.29) 
0.00(0.00) 
-0.40(-1.27) 
0.01(0.42) 
0.34(1.43) 
-0.01(-0.89) 
 
-0.02(-1.14) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Obs. 180 180 180 180 259 259 259 259 
 AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
Hansen Test 
Wald Test 
Cross-section Fixed Effect 
Time Fixed effect 
Half-life 
0.01 
0.08 
0.93 
1.00 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
0.78 
0.51 
0.03 
0.83 
1.00 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
0.56 
0.00 
0.07 
0.83 
0.97 
 
Yes 
No 
0.59 
0.77 
0.01 
0.44 
0.15 
 
Yes 
No 
0.49 
0.59 
0.38 
0.00 
0.42 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
1.45 
0.20 
0.18 
0.00 
0.34 
0.05 
Yes 
Yes 
1.09 
0.48 
0.95 
0.00 
0.18 
 
Yes 
No 
1.03 
0.45 
0.32 
0.00 
0.09 
 
Yes 
No 
1.16 
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Table 8.7: Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure based on Technology Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (8.1), (8.2), (8.3) and (8.4) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variable is book leverage ratio of total debt to total asset (BTDA). 
The independent variables are lag leverage, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth, risk, lag profitability, lag tangibility, lag liquidity, lag non-tax debt shield, lag size, lag 
risk and  lag growth. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The z-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote 
significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. AR (1) and AR (2) are the first- and second-order autocorrelations of residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test and Hansen test 
provide the over-identifying restrictions under the null of the instruments’ validity. The Wald statistics test the joint significance of estimated coefficients under the null of no relation.
 
DEP. 
VAR 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
BALANCED DATASET 
 
UNBALANCED DATASET 
GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 
 Lag  Leverage  
Profitability 
0.67(9.15)** 
-0.22(-2.26)* 
0.69(6.23)** 
-0.33(-2.50)* 
0.31(3.17)** 
-0.03(-0.12) 
0.52(1.91) 
0.01(0.03) 
0.60(3.28)** 
-0.37(-4.51)** 
0.66(4.69)** 
-0.34(-5.05)** 
0.64(2.84)** 
-0.27(-3.74)** 
0.73(3.06)** 
-0.21(-2.73)** 
 Tangibility -0.24(-1.31) -0.27(-1.39) -0.48(-2.62)** -0.60(-3.32)** -0.07(-0.99) -0.06(-0.93) -0.11(-1.47) -0.12(-1.75) 
 Liquidity -0.11(-5.24)** -0.11(-4.14)** -0.10(-4.60)** -0.11(-3.05)** -0.001(-2.03)* -0.001(-1.81) -0.002(-2.48)* -0.001(-2.53)* 
 Non-Tax Debt Shield -0.10(-0.12) 1.32(1.13) 0.08(0.09) 0.49(0.47) -1.33(-2.42)* -0.76(-1.32) -1.17(-1.97) -0.95(-1.99) 
 Size -0.27(-2.45)* -0.11(-2.44)** -0.24(-2.54)* -0.19(-2.07)* 0.08(4.80)** 0.08(5.00)** 0.06(3.28)** 0.05(2.44)* 
 Risk 0.14(0.56) -0.24(-0.59) 0.27(0.49) 0.34(0.39) -0.15(-2.36)* -0.18(-2.57)** -0.07(-1.02) -0.06(-0.64) 
BTDA Growth 
Lag Profitability 
Lag Tangibility 
Lag Liquidity 
Lag Non-Tax Debt Shield 
Lag Size 
Lag Risk 
Lag Growth  
0.20(2.19)* 
-0.19(-1.91) 
0.25(1.34) 
0.01(0.18) 
0.88(0.81) 
0.23(2.34)** 
-0.35(-3.60)** 
-0.02(-1.10) 
0.04(1.18) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.12(2.02)* 
0.11(0.33) 
0.01(0.09) 
-0.04(-1.53) 
1.02(0.81) 
0.08(0.79) 
0.30(0.89) 
-0.02(-1.22) 
0.03(0.77) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.002(-1.37) 
0.03(0.29) 
0.16(2.20)* 
-0.00(-0.29) 
-0.004(-0.01) 
-0.07(-2.23)** 
0.11(1.33) 
-0.001(-1.56) 
-0.002(-1.94) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.002(-1.14) 
0.09(0.72) 
0.14(1.59) 
-0.00(-0.85) 
-0.10(-0.16) 
-0.08(-2.42)* 
0.14(1.26) 
0.0001(0.22) 
-0.002(-1.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Obs. 90 90 90 90 231 231 231 231 
 AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
Hansen Test 
Wald Test 
Cross-section Fixed Effect 
Time Fixed effect 
Half-life 
0.15 
0.17 
0.00 
1.00 
0.23 
Yes 
Yes 
1.73 
0.06 
0.15 
0.00 
1.00 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
1.87 
0.45 
0.17 
0.22 
0.99 
 
Yes 
No 
0.59 
0.42 
0.19 
0.28 
1.00 
 
Yes 
No 
1.06 
0.22 
0.33 
0.07 
0.72 
0.00 
Yes 
Yes 
1.36 
0.17 
0.46 
0.15 
0.31 
0.01 
Yes 
Yes 
1.67 
0.28 
0.39 
0.01 
0.65 
 
Yes 
No 
1.55 
0.26 
0.55 
0.03 
0.27 
 
Yes 
No 
2.20 
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Based on Table 8.8, the leverage utilization among the trade and services 
firms is extremely dependent on past leverage and profitability. The sets of models 
perform poorly in the unbalanced dataset as none of the explanatory variables is 
significant. The Sargan test further substantiates the validity of the models and 
provides a strong inference between these variables. Therefore, attention will be 
diverted to the balanced dataset as the models meet all the requirements of GMM. 
Based on the balanced dataset, risk affects leverage positively with minimal effect. 
The trade and services firms tend to increase their debt financing at a slower rate as 
their earnings become more volatile. This positive relationship is only observable 
among the technology firms while the industrial product and plantation sectors 
maintained a negative relationship between risk and leverage. Consistent with the 
plantation sector, past profitability affects leverage negatively among the trade and 
services sector, which is in line with Titman and Wessels (1988) and Hovakimian et 
al. (2004). However, the impact of past profitability on total debt is lower compared 
to plantation firms. 
All the models within the balanced dataset are known as good models as they 
meet all the basic assumptions of GMM. A greater number of variables are 
significant with leverage, as the lag of explanatory variables were included in the 
models. Trade and services firms are highly responsive to the unobserved time fixed 
effect shock on leverage. Being the key driver of the Malaysian economy, this sector 
underwent solid growth after the financial crisis. Taking this into account, Models 1 
and 2 seem to be the best models to explain the relationship between leverage and 
firm-level determinants among the trade and services firms. 
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Table 8.8: Alternative Estimates of Dynamic Capital Structure based on Trade and Services Sector 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equation (8.1), (8.2), (8.3) and (8.4) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variable is book leverage ratio of total debt to total asset (BTDA). The 
independent variables are lag leverage, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth, risk, lag profitability, lag tangibility, lag liquidity, lag non-tax debt shield, lag size, lag risk and  
lag growth. Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The z-values shown in parentheses are computed using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. ** and * denote significance at 
1% and 5% levels, respectively. AR (1) and AR (2) are the first- and second-order autocorrelations of residuals under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test and Hansen test provide the over-
identifying restrictionsunder the null of the instruments’ validity. The Wald statistics test the joint significance of estimated coefficients under the null of no relation. 
 
DEP. 
VAR 
 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
BALANCED DATASET 
 
UNBALANCED DATASET 
GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 GMM 1 GMM 2 GMM 3 GMM 4 
 Lag  Leverage  
Profitability 
0.77(6.06)** 
-0.60(-7.89)** 
0.90(7.47)** 
-0.60(-7.78)** 
0.94(8.06)** 
-0.66(-8.17)** 
0.93(8.24)** 
-0.61(-7.81)** 
0.74(24.87)** 
-0.59(-6.08)** 
0.58(3.57)** 
-0.76(-3.92)** 
0.55(5.55)** 
-0.54(-5.86)** 
0.42(2.38)* 
-0.66(-4.13)** 
 Tangibility -0.03(-0.37) -0.05(-0.63) -0.06(-0.72) -0.07(-0.84) 0.15(1.00) 0.14(0.79) 0.09(0.54) 0.05(0.26) 
 Liquidity -0.002(-1.92) -0.002(-1.70) -0.002(-1.70) -0.003(-1.58) -0.02(-1.55) -0.01(-1.57) -0.02(-1.56) -0.02(-1.59) 
 Non-Tax Debt Shield -0.71(-0.61) -0.66(-0.53) -1.23(-1.06) -1.07(-0.92) -2.56(-1.64) -2.29(-1.75) -2.51(-1.66) -2.31(-1.69) 
 Size 0.001(0.04) -0.01(-0.29) 0.002(0.05) -0.003(-0.15) -0.32(-1.19) -0.27(-1.18) -0.34(-1.24) -0.29(-1.23) 
 Risk 0.02(7.46)** 0.02(7.34)** 0.02(7.76)** 0.02(7.41)** 0.40(1.41) 0.59(1.42) 0.43(1.32) 0.58(1.38) 
BTDA Growth 
Lag Profitability 
Lag Tangibility 
Lag Liquidity 
Lag Non-Tax Debt Shield 
Lag Size 
Lag Risk 
Lag Growth  
0.01(0.92) 
-0.13(-2.40)* 
1.00(0.95) 
0.004(3.11)* 
0.63(1.10) 
0.03(0.90) 
0.004(2.48)* 
-0.01(-0.63) 
0.01(1.21) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.02(0.87) 
-0.11(-2.10)* 
0.09(0.74) 
0.005(2.92)** 
0.26(0.43) 
0.03(0.69) 
0.004(2.27)* 
-0.01(-0.49) 
0.01(1.25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00(-1.83) 
0.20(0.82) 
-0.10(-0.67) 
0.001(0.14) 
0.26(0.31)  
0.24 (1.33) 
-0.53(-1.34) 
0.00(0.48) 
 
-0.00(-1.74) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00(-2.68)** 
0.12(0.96) 
-0.11(-0.90) 
-0.003(-0.44) 
-0.15(-0.18) 
0.17(1.48) 
-0.43(-1.49) 
-0.00(-1.57) 
-0.00(-1.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Obs. 690 690 690 690 977 977 977 977 
 AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
Hansen Test 
Wald Test 
Cross-section Fixed Effect 
Time Fixed effect 
Half-life 
0.00 
0.35 
0.91 
0.98 
0.04 
Yes 
Yes 
2.65 
0.00 
0.71 
0.96 
0.98 
0.30 
Yes 
Yes 
6.58 
0.00 
0.29 
0.82 
0.77 
 
Yes 
No 
11.20 
0.00 
0.70 
0.54 
0.59 
 
Yes 
No 
9.55 
0.14 
0.22 
0.00 
0.71 
0.64 
Yes 
Yes 
2.30 
0.08 
0.21 
0.00 
0.59 
0.59 
Yes 
Yes 
1.31 
0.06 
0.20 
0.00 
0.33 
 
Yes 
No 
1.16 
0.02 
0.20 
0.00 
0.23 
 
Yes 
No 
0.80 
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8.4 Speed of Adjustment across sectors in Malaysia 
Based on the past literature, observed leverage ratio would not be equal to the 
optimal debt ratio at any time. In the presence of adjustment costs, firms do not 
completely adjust their actual debt to optimal leverage and, therefore, only partial 
adjustment takes place in order to attain the optimal leverage. If the coefficient of the 
lag dependent variable is between zero and one, the leverage ratio converges to its 
desired level over time. This is an indication that firms tend to adjust their leverage 
ratio to attain their target debt ratio and substantiates the existence of dynamism in 
the capital structure decision (Antoniou et al., 2008). Generally, the adjustment of a 
firm’s capital structure is highly dependent on time and speed of adjustment. A 
slower speed of adjustment occurs when the adjustment cost is higher, while lower 
cost of adjustment allows a faster pace of adjustment towards the target debt ratio 
(Guney et al., 2011). Hereby, the trade-off between the cost of adjustment and the 
cost of being off-target exists. 
According to Ozkan (2001), the target debt ratio is a function of several 
variables, and the estimated model is as follows: 
     
   ∑                                              (8.5) 
where     
 is the firm’s target debt ratio for firm i in year t which is explained by the k 
number of explanatory variables, i.e.   ,   , ….,  , and     is known as the error 
term that is serially uncorrelated with mean zero.  
Firms adjust their current debt ratios     with degree of adjustment 
coefficient “λ” to achieve the desired capital structure and the following equation 
(8.6) explains the partial adjustment model. 
                
                                          (8.6) 
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where 0< <1,     is the current debt ratio and    
  is the target debt ratio of firm i at 
time t.     
         is the target change while only a portion of λ of the target 
change is achieved, which is equal to (         ). The coefficient ( ) represents the 
magnitude of desired adjustment between two subsequent periods, or the rate of 
convergence.The combination of Models 8.5 and 8.6 produces the following 
equation (8.7): 
                                     = (1  )        ∑                                                           (8.7) 
Based on this equation, if   = 1, the actual change in leverage is equal to the desired 
change, and the adjustment is transaction cost free. The entire adjustment is made 
within one period and the firm is consistently at its optimal level. If   = 0, there is no 
adjustment in leverage and, therefore, firms set their current debt ratio to the past 
leverage. In most cases, the value of   or the rate of convergence varies between zero 
to one due to the adjustment process. If the value of   is greater than one, it implies 
that the firm makes more adjustments than necessary and is eventually unable to 
achieve the optimal level. 
The following discussion will concentrate on the speed of adjustment of 
Malaysian listed firms across four selected models, based on the GMM-Difference 
model proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Based on Table 8.9, the overall 
sample provides evidence that Malaysian firms take approximately 1.9 to 2.8 years if 
the leverage is dependent on the current and past history of the firm-level 
determinants. The speed of adjustment tends to slow down as the model excludes the 
unobserved time fixed effect. This indirectly explains the importance of time effect 
in explaining the speed of adjustment between current debt and target debt ratio. As 
the models dropped the lagged independent variables, Table 8.10 shows that the 
range of speed of adjustment becomes wider (based on Models 2 and 4) between 
balanced and unbalanced datasets. In other words, the results are inconsistent across 
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datasets. As for the balanced dataset, the speed of adjustment becomes slower, 3.29 
to 4.27 years. The speed of adjustment increases as the model includes the 
unobserved time fixed effect. In contrast, the unbalanced dataset showed a faster rate 
of adjustment - approximately 1.23 to 1.36 years. In this case, the speed of 
adjustment reduces as the model includes the unobserved time fixed effect. Based on 
the diagnostic test, the models experience some problems related to the over-
identification restriction issues. The inferences are not strong due to the failure of the 
Sargan test, although the Hansen test confirms the validity of the instrumental 
variable used in the model. 
A clearer picture can be observed when the sample is classified into sectors. 
However, the industrial product sector needs to be dropped from this discussion as 
the model experiences a similar problem to that which occurs in the overall sample 
results. Interestingly, the entire models fulfil the basic criteria of GMM, regardless of 
datasets, across the property firms. These firms adjust relatively faster than other 
sectors, except for the plantation sector, in order to achieve their target leverage. The 
duration of adjustment is roughly from 0.78 to 1.36 years. In general, the intensity of 
asset (level of collateral) increases the debt raising capacity within the property firms 
(Ooi, 1999; Wan Mahmood et al., 2011). In addition, these firms are highly 
profitable and less risky compared to those in the construction sector (Chiang et al. 
2002). This indirectly enables the developers to have better access to the capital 
market, that is, mainly to bank loans with attractive interest rates due to lower risk 
premiums. Hence, the property firms are able to adjust frequently and relatively 
faster than the other sectors. The speed of adjustment become faster as the model 
includes the time fixed effect (refer to the half-life of Model 1 and Model 3). This 
indirectly explains the substance of the unobservable time fixed effect in explaining 
the evolution of leverage ratios amongst property firms. Again, this indirectly 
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explains the impact of the market sentiments of the property sector as well as the 
differing macroeconomic conditions within the sample period of this study. 
Nevertheless, the pace of adjustment seems to be fastest among the plantation 
firms as the results report that plantation firms achieved their targeted debt ratio 
within a year (within the range of 0.49 to 0.78 years). Generally, the commodity 
market is highly volatile due to strong competition, particularly from the global 
market (i.e., foreign firms). The fluctuation of global commodity prices and other 
market forces affect the financial condition of plantation firms in Malaysia. As a 
result, these firms tend to adjust their leverage frequently in accordance with the 
trends of demand and supply that are extremely sensitive towards the global 
commodity market. Inconsistent with the property sector, the pace of adjustment is 
faster as the model excludes the component of the unobservable time fixed effect. 
This is based on the balanced dataset regression as the unbalanced models fail to 
fulfil the criteria of GMM. In the case of Malaysia, the production of the plantation 
firms isvery highly sensitive to climatic conditions. Hence, the firms are reluctant to 
alter their leverage when production slows down. The adjustment process of leverage 
is highly influenced by sector-specific rather than firm-specific seasonal effects. 
A similar scenario is perceptible across technology firms. Nonetheless, the 
speed of adjustment is slower than in the plantation sector. These firms take 
approximately one year to attain their desired level of debt ratio. As for the consumer 
product sector, Models 1 and 2 seem to be good models as the probabilities of the 
Sargan test are greater than 0.20. On average, consumer product firms take 
approximately 3.1 to 5.9 years to attain their target capital structure. The nature of 
the trade and services sector allows a slower pace of adjustment compared with other 
sectors. Based on the balanced dataset, it takes roughly between 3 to 9 years. A huge 
gap is observable within the range of speed of adjustment. This is probably due to the 
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inclusion of lagged independent variables together with time effects. As the time 
fixed effect is removed from the model, the pace of adjustment reduces to the range 
of 7 to 9 years. This is highly consistent with the results for the property sector that 
are affected by the unobserved time fixed effect. 
Based on the unbalanced dataset using Models 1 and 2, the construction firms 
take a longer period (within the range of 13.51 to 34.31 years) to achieve their target 
debt ratio. This is probably due to the nature of the sector that requires a longer time 
period to complete a particular project which involves many sequential activities. 
Another possible reason would their failure to raise funds frequently, particularly 
from the banks, as a result of the high business and bankruptcy risk (Chiang et al., 
2002). Despite that, the banking institutions have become more cautious lending their 
funds to construction firms as they do not accept moving assets such as construction 
equipment as collateral (Baharuddin et al., 2011). Additionally, the lower profit 
margins from the projects and other unforeseen obstacles probably delay the 
adjustment process of leverage. 
Despite those arguments mentioned earlier, some factors can be generalized 
across sectors although they are sector-specific. The speed of adjustment is mainly 
dependent on the cost of rebalancing towards the target level. Sectors such as 
plantation, property, technology and consumer product maintain a faster pace of 
adjustment probably due to the lower cost of adjustment compared to the cost of 
being off-target. Another possible reason would be due to relying more on private 
debt rather than public debt (De Miguel and Pindado, 2001). The cost of transaction 
is lower when the firms depend on private debt compared to public debt although the 
development of the bond market has progressed well.  
Alternatively, the trade and services and construction sectors maintained a 
slower rate of adjustment due to the higher cost of adjustment. In other words, the 
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cost of being off-target is lower than the cost of adjusting to the target debt ratios 
(Hovakimian et al., 2001). This is probably attributable to the sector-based 
adjustment cost that indirectly affects the firm-based adjustment cost (Elsas and 
Florysiak, 2011). Firms are exposed by the sector-based shocks that indirectly affect 
the adjustment process of leverage. In general, managers tend to assess the trade-off 
between the cost of adjustment and the cost of being off-target (Antoniou et al., 
2008). As a whole, the speed of adjustment varies across selected sectors in 
Malaysia, being fastest in the plantation sector, followed by the property, technology, 
consumer product, trade and services and construction sectors, respectively. This 
further substantiates the impact of sectoral characteristics on the evolution of 
leverage across sectors in Malaysia.  
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Table 8.9: Speed of Adjustment using Current and Lag Explanatory Variables based on Overall Sample and Sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table presents estimates of equations (8.1) and (8.3) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variable is book leverage ratio of total debt to total asset 
(BTDA). The independent variables are lag leverage, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth, risk, lag profitability, lag tangibility, lag liquidity, lag non-
tax debt shield, lag size, lag risk and  lag growth.Refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for all variables definitions.The speed of adjustment, or SOA, is given by λ. Leverage half-life is 
defined as the time (inyears) that it takes a firm to adjust back to the target leverage after a one-unit shock to ε, ln(0.5)/ ln(1 − λ).  
 
 
SECTOR BALANCED UNBALANCED 
 
ANALYSIS λ 
SARGAN 
TEST 
HANSEN 
TEST 
HALF-
LIFE ANALYSIS λ 
SARGAN 
TEST 
HANSEN 
TEST 
HALF-
LIFE 
OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
Model 1(34) 0.22 0.00 0.25 
2.79 
Model 1(34) 0.26 0.00 0.36 
2.30 
Model 3 (24) 0.23 0.00 0.42 
2.65 
Model 3 (24) 0.31 0.00 0.20 
1.87 
 
CP 
Model 1 (34) 0.11 0.29 0.91 
5.95 
Model 1 (34) 0.18 0.27 0.42 
3.49 
Model 3 (24) 0.38 0.00 0.50 
1.45 
Model 3 (24) 0.36 0.01 0.85 
1.55 
 
IP 
Model 1 (34) 0.10 0.00 0.01 
6.58 
Model 1 (34) 0.50 0.00 0.15 
1.00 
Model 3 (24) 0.08 0.00 0.10 
8.31 
Model 3 (24) 0.39 0.00 0.02 
1.40 
 
CT 
Model 1 (34) 0.28 0.66 1.00 
2.11 
Model 1 (34) 0.05 0.54 0.58 
13.51 
Model 3 (24) 0.04 0.00 0.29 
16.98 
Model 3 (24) 0.17 0.04 0.23 
3.72 
 
PR 
Model 1 (34) 0.40 0.55 0.20 
1.36 
Model 1 (34) 0.47 0.38 0.45 
1.09 
Model 3 (24) 0.32 0.75 0.16 
1.80 
Model 3 (24) 0.50 0.40 0.52 
1.00 
 
PT 
Model 1 (34) 0.59 0.93 1.00 
0.78 
Model 1 (34) 0.38 0.00 0.42 
1.45 
Model 3 (24) 0.69 0.83 0.97 
0.59 
Model 3 (24) 0.49 0.00 0.18 
1.03 
 
TECH 
Model 1 (34) 0.33 0.00 1.00 
1.73 
Model 1 (34) 0.40 0.07 0.72 
1.36 
Model 3 (24) 0.69 0.22 1.00 
0.59 
Model 3 (24) 0.36 0.01 0.65 
1.55 
 
TS 
Model 1 (34) 0.23 0.91 0.98 
2.65 
Model 1 (34) 0.26 0.00 0.71 
2.30 
Model 3 (24) 0.06 0.82 0.77 
11.20 
Model 3 (24) 0.45 0.00 0.33 
1.16 
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Table 8.10: Speed of Adjustment using Current Explanatory Variables based on Overall Sample and Sectors 
SECTOR BALANCED DATASET UNBALANCED DATASET 
 
ANALYSIS λ 
SARGAN 
TEST 
HANSEN 
TEST 
HALF 
-LIFE ANALYSIS λ 
SARGAN 
TEST 
HANSEN 
TEST 
HALF-
LIFE 
OVERALL 
SAMPLE 
Model 2 (27) 0.19 0.00 0.49 
3.29 
Model 2 (27) 0.40 0.00 0.60 
1.36 
Model 4 (17) 0.15 0.00 0.22 
4.27 
Model 4 (17) 0.43 0.00 0.29 
1.23 
 
CP 
Model 2 (27) 0.18 0.30 0.61 
3.49 
Model 2 (27) 0.20 0.30 0.49 
3.11 
Model 4 (17) 0.46 0.00 0.28 
1.12 
Model 4 (17) 0.33 0.03 0.37 
1.73 
 
IP 
Model 2 (27) 0.13 0.00 0.00 
4.98 
Model 2 (27) 0.69 0.00 0.19 
0.59 
Model 4 (17) 0.15 0.00 0.04 
4.27 
Model 4 (17) 0.63 0.00 0.01 
0.70 
 
CT 
Model 2 (27) 0.32 0.78 1.00 
1.80 
Model 2 (27) 0.02 0.69 0.64 
34.31 
Model 4 (17) 0.25 0.01 0.11 
2.41 
Model 4 (17) 0.11 0.07 0.18 
5.95 
 
PR 
Model 2 (27) 0.59 0.60 0.10 
0.78 
Model 2 (27) 0.58 0.45 0.43 
0.80 
Model 4 (17) 0.59 0.79 0.48 
0.78 
Model 4 (17) 0.64 0.44 0.35 
0.68 
 
PT 
Model 2 (27) 0.71 0.83 1.00 
0.56 
Model 2 (27) 0.47 0.00 0.34 
1.09 
Model 4 (17) 0.76 0.44 0.15 
0.49 
Model 4 (17) 0.45 0.00 0.09 
1.16 
 
TECH 
Model 2 (27) 0.31 0.00 1.00 
1.87 
Model 2 (27) 0.34 0.15 0.31 
1.67 
Model 4 (17) 0.48 0.28 0.99 
1.06 
Model 4 (17) 0.27 0.03 0.27 
2.20 
 
TS 
Model 2 (27) 0.10 0.96 0.98 
6.58 
Model 2 (27) 0.41 0.00 0.59 
1.31 
Model 4 (17) 0.07 0.54 0.59 
9.55 
Model 4 (17) 0.58 0.00 0.23 
0.80 
The table presents estimates of equations (8.2) and (8.4) using annual OSIRIS data from 1996 through 2007. The dependent variable is book leverage ratio of total debt to total asset 
(BTDA). The independent variables are lag leverage, profitability, tangibility, liquidity, non-tax debt shield, size, growth and risk.Refer to Table 4.2and Table 4.3 for all variables 
definitions.The speed of adjustment, or SOA, is given by λ. Leverage half-life is defined as the time (inyears) that it takes a firm to adjust back to the target leverage after a one-unit 
shock to ε, ln(0.5)/ ln(1 − λ).  
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8.5 Conclusion 
Under the dynamic framework, this study reveals the substantiality of past 
leverage on current total debt, which that is highly significant and observable across 
both datasets and, thus, confirms the existence of optimal capital structure across 
Malaysian listed firms. The level of profitability matters extensively to total debt and 
the relationship further strengthen the applicability of the pecking order theory. The 
impact of past firm size and risk are also noticeable among the balanced and 
unbalanced datasets, respectively. Nevertheless, the reliability and validity of these 
models are unclear and seem to be weak as the models fail the Sargan test. 
Interestingly, the model specifications become valid when the sample is partitioned 
into sectors. The property sector provides the most interesting results across models 
as it satisfies all the diagnostic tests of GMM. This is highly comparable across 
datasets and further substantiates the impact of sectoral characteristics. 
A similar situation is perceptible in the consumer product and construction 
firms although the dynamic relationship is merely explained by Models 1 and 2. 
Conversely, the leverage determination of the trade and services sector is highly 
dependent on the past history of dependent and independent variables. The models 
become weaker as the time fixed effect is removed from the models. In other words, 
Models 1 and 2 tend to be the most suitable to explain the dynamic patterns that exist 
between leverage and firm-level determinants across the trade and services firms. 
Nevertheless, the results are inconsistent across datasets and only supported by the 
balanced dataset. The strong impact of the past historiesof the explanatory variables, 
i.e. past profitability and liquidity, are evident across the plantation firms. Thus, 
Model 1 seems to be the best model as the remaining models fail to prove the 
importance of lag leverage on current leverage. Surprisingly, the leverage among 
technology firms is unaffected by the unobserved time fixed effect and, therefore, 
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Model 3 is able to explain the relationship between leverage and capital structure 
determinants. 
From the speed of adjustment context, this study also confirms the 
heterogeneity of speed of adjustment across sectors. Despite employing target 
leverage, the excursion process towards the target differs across sectors in Malaysia. 
In other words, the convergence rates vary across sectors. Further, the selected 
models provide evidence of the variation of speed of adjustment across selected 
sectors in Malaysia, with the fastest in the plantation sector, followed by property, 
technology, consumer product, trade and services, and the construction sectors, 
respectively. This is probably attributable to the sector-based adjustment cost that 
indirectly affects the firm-based adjustment cost. Hereby, this provides further 
evidence of the impact of sectoral characteristics on the evolution of leverage across 
sectors in Malaysia in the context of dynamic capital structure.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the overall summary of the study by highlighting the 
main key findings of each hypothesis based on the four research questions. 
Subsequently, the second section explains the contributions of this study towards the 
theory development and policy implications. This is followed by a discussion on the 
limitations of the study that lead to future research. 
9.2 Summary of the Key Findings 
9.2.1 Research Question 1 
This study acknowledges that capital structure determinants vary across 
sectors due to the nature or the behaviour of each sector. Most Malaysian firms 
employ a larger amount of short-term debt than long-term debt. Thus, the total debt 
financing is highly controlled by the short-term debt. However, each sector adopted a 
different financing pattern and slowly re-focused on long-term debt financing as a 
result of the bond market development that picked up after the CMP in 2001. The 
impact of sector characteristics on capital structure determinants can be observed 
through the changes of sign and magnitude of the explanatory variables’ coefficients 
across sectors. Based on the overall samples (i.e., balanced and unbalanced), 
leverage is highly dependent on profitability, non-tax debt shield and tangibility. The 
association between leverage and the explanatory variables remains consistent 
between both datasets. Risk maintains a positive correlation with total debt, which is 
inconsistent with the trade-off theory and pecking order theory, although this 
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variable is correlated negatively with long-term debt. Likewise, the mechanism 
between total debt and non-tax debt shield remains inconsistent with the trade-off 
theory, but the negative sign of the long-term debt coefficients confirms the 
applicability of the trade-off theory. From the sector perspective, both datasets show 
that the association between types of leverage and firm-level determinants such as 
risk, non-tax debt shield, size and tangibility, differs across sectors. The discrepancy 
exists in the magnitude and size of explanatory variables across sectors although the 
variables are statistically significant at either the 1% or 5% level. The applicability of 
capital structure theories (the trade-off theory, agency theory and pecking order 
theory) diverge across sectors in Malaysia. In contrast, sector-level variables are 
strongly significant and produce a substantial effect on leverage, particularly in the 
consumer product, property and plantation sectors. The uniformity of the different 
size and sign of coefficients across sectors further substantiates the argument of 
sectoral characteristics on leverage determination. 
Finally, lending interest rates persistently remained the most significant and 
important factor to leverage across sectors. The size of the coefficients further 
explains the impact of lending interest rates on leverage across sectors in Malaysia. 
Other country-level determinants tend to be important to a specific sector. Since the 
total debt is largely controlled by short-term debt, some of the variables react 
similarly to both short-term and total debt. The chronology of the importance of each 
variable on leverage is discernible across sectors. Finally, the impact of sectoral 
behaviour is clearer on firm-level and sector-level determination than on the country-
level variables. However, it is undeniable that the firm-level variables are 
consistently the primary determinants in determining a firm’s leverage. The artificial 
nested testing procedure provides the preferred model which is customized according 
to each sector. This model selection is highly dependent on the types of leverage, 
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sectors and sample periods. Overall, the analysis revealed that the orientation 
between capital structure determinants and leverage is influenced greatly by the 
sector characteristics which are embedded indirectly and control the direction of 
relationships and the degree of significance.  
9.2.2 Research Question 2 
Most of the Malaysian listed firms are extremely sensitive to the current 
economic conditions the effect is observable between the firm-level determinants and 
leverage across sub periods. The power of the magnitude and mechanism changes as 
the firms operates in the different economic sub-periods - downturn, recovery and 
stable. The uniformity of both datasets confirms the impact of different economic 
conditions on the varying mechanisms relating to firm-level determinants and 
leverage between and within each sector in Malaysia. Despite the firm-level 
determinants, the sector-level determinants have also been affected indirectly by the 
different economic sub- periods, and this scenario is obvious across the listed firms 
in Malaysia. Dynamism affects short-term debt and total debt during the recovery 
periods, while munificence influences the total debt during both the recovery and 
stable sub-periods. Nevertheless, the impact of dynamism on long-term debt is only 
observed during the crisis periods. The consistency of the relationship between 
sector-level determinants and leverage across both balanced and unbalanced datasets 
during the stable periods further substantiates the effect of sectoral behaviour on 
sector-level capital structure determinants, as it is not observable in the overall 
sample outcomes. 
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9.2.3 Research Question 3 
The effect and substance of capital structure, firm-level determinants, on 
leverage differ across large, medium and small firms, and the results are robust 
across datasets. In general, profitability is the most important determinant of leverage 
regardless of firm size, although it is highly influential among the larger firms. The 
sensitivity between long-term debt and firm-level determinants is traceable among 
the large-sized firms, whilst the short-term debt is the more responsive among the 
medium-sized and small firms. The relationship between firm-level determinants and 
leverage remains consistent across firm sizes, except for risk. The impact of sectoral 
characteristics and different firm sizes can be seen as the model controls for those 
variables. First, the orientation between leverage and capital structure determinants 
differs across manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. 
Besides the commonalities, differences exist between consumer product and 
industrial product sectors, although both sectors are classified as manufacturing 
firms. Secondly, a great inconsistency is perceptible among the large and medium-
sized firms across selected sectors. Subsequently, the mechanism between capital 
structure determinants and leverage differs between and within medium-sized and 
small-sized firms, as the orientation is highly controlled by the unique behaviour of 
each sector. Thirdly, the results also highlight some of the different relationships 
between leverage and the firm-level determinants, such as non-tax debt shield and 
risk, within small firms. Finally, the decision-making behaviour is strongly driven by 
firm size and sectoral characteristics, although a few commonalities are noticeable 
within and between sectors in Malaysia. 
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9.2.4 Research Question 4 
Under the dynamic framework, the past leverage on current total debt is 
highly significant and observable across both datasets and, thus, confirms the 
existence of optimal capital structure across Malaysian listed firms. The level of 
profitability matters extensively to total debt and the relationship further strengthens 
the applicability of the pecking order theory. The impact of past firm size and risk 
are also noticeable among the balanced and unbalanced datasets, respectively. 
Nevertheless, the reliability and validity of these models are unclear and seem to be 
weak as the models fail to fulfil the basic requirements of the Sargan test. 
Interestingly, the model specifications become valid when the sample is partitioned 
into sectors. The property sector provides some interesting results across models as 
they satisfy the entire diagnostic tests of GMM. A similar situation is perceptible 
among the consumer product and construction firms, although the dynamic 
relationship is merely explained by Model 1 (with lag of explanatory variables) and 
Model 2 (without lag of explanatory variables). Conversely, the leverage 
determination of the trade and services sector is very dependent on the past history of 
dependent and independent variables. Nevertheless, the results are inconsistent 
across datasets and only supported by the balanced dataset. This is probably due to 
short time lags for some firms in the unbalanced dataset. The strong impact of the 
past histories of explanatory variables, namely, past profitability and liquidity, are 
evident across the plantation firms. Thus, Model 1 seems to be the best model as the 
remaining models fails to provide evidence on the importance of lagged leverage on 
current leverage. 
Surprisingly, the leverage amongst technology firms is unaffected by the 
unobserved time fixed effect and, therefore, Model 3 is able to explain the 
relationship between leverage and capital structure determinants. Further, the 
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selected models provide evidence of the variation of speed of adjustment across the 
selected sectors in Malaysia, the fastest being the plantation firms followed by 
property, technology, consumer product, trade and services and construction firms, 
respectively. This is probably attributable to the sector-based adjustment cost that 
indirectly affects the firm-based adjustment cost. In addition, the unobserved time 
fixed effect affects the pace of adjustment across sectors. Despite employing a target 
for leverage, the excursion process towards the target differs across sectors in 
Malaysia. 
 
9.3 Contribution of the Study 
9.3.1 Contribution to the theory development 
The outcomes of this study make several contributions to the literature on 
capital structure theories and empirical evidence, particularly within developing 
economies. Essentially, this study extends the paper of Kayo and Kimura (2011) that 
highlights the indirect effect of industry-level factors on the relationship between 
leverage and firm-level determinants of capital structure across developed and 
developing nations. Nevertheless, the behaviour of each sector is unique and diverse 
across sectors. This diversity affects the relationship between leverage and capital 
structure determinants, particularly the firm-level determinants. In addition, the 
degree of significance and magnitude of coefficients further corroborates the indirect 
effect of a unique sector rather than sectors or industries as a whole. The behaviour 
of sectors varies between and across developed and developing nations and, 
therefore, generalizing the outcomes based on the overall sample might not reflect 
the actual behaviour of each sector of a particular country. It is undeniable that the 
firm-level determinants consistently maintained their position as the primary 
determinants of a firm’s debt policy. However, the results reveal that the orientation 
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between firm-level determinants and leverage is indirectly influenced by the sector’s 
characteristics that control the mechanism of relationships and the degree of 
significance. Hence, this study fills the gap in the body of the literature pertinent to 
the capital structure determinants, and its importance to the capital structure 
decision-making by capturing the indirect impact of sectoral behaviour across 
sectors. 
Secondly, this study also fills the gap of empirical evidence in the context of 
developing markets. Most of the sector or industry-related studies were concentrated 
within the developed markets, while the developing markets are still under-explored 
due to data limitations. The impact of sector on capital structure decision-making 
may differ across developing countries due to its enormous institutional differences, 
particularly among the emerging markets. Once again, drawing conclusions based on 
the overall sample within the developing countries may not provide the true 
behaviour of each sector within a developing economy. Furthermore, the divergence 
of capital market development across the emerging markets affects the capital 
structure decision-making across sectors. Therefore, Malaysia was chosen for several 
reasons and the impact of sectoral behaviour on capital structure choices is evident 
across the selected sectors. The variations of relationships and degrees of 
significance between leverage and capital structure determinants at firm-level, 
sector-level and country-level are observable across sectors in Malaysia. These 
findings become the main contribution towards emerging market evidence. 
Thirdly, this study further extends the applicability of capital structure 
theories that are highly dependent on the types of leverage despite sector behavioural 
issues. The series of literature concludes there is a greater utilization of short-term 
debt across developing countries relative to developed countries. However, the 
evolution of leverage differs significantly across the emerging markets although the 
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consumption of short-term debt is greater than long-term debt. Most of the 
relationships between total debt and capital structure determinants are highly 
influenced by the larger proportion of short-term debt. Therefore, similar 
relationships are observable between the total debt and short-term debt. This is 
completely the opposite in the developed country studies that document similar 
associations between long-term debt and total debt, when long-term debt is the 
primary mode of debt financing. These findings have huge implications on the 
capital structure theories as the application of these theories should be based on the 
types of leverage rather than the total leverage. Furthermore, the treatment of theory 
applications should consider the debt evolution of a particular country, mainly within 
the developing nations. 
Finally, a few aspects of the theoretical contributions are noticeable as the 
study concentrates on different economic conditions and firm size across sectors that 
indirectly affect the capital structure choices. The reaction of sectors diversifies 
within and across different economic sub-periods, and the impact is perceptible via 
the relationship between leverage and capital structure determinants. Likewise, a 
similar scenario is visible as the sectors are divided according to their firm size. 
These findings further extend the literature by emphasizing the impact of a unique 
sector that is highly dependent on the current economic condition and firm size. 
Additionally, the evidence on the differential speeds of adjustment across sectors 
further contributes towards the dynamic capital structure literature series. 
9.3.2 Policy Implications of the Study 
In addition to the theory development contributions, this study provides some 
valuable insights for the corporate sector and banking institutions, mainly in 
Malaysia. First, the study provides a proper guideline for management to consider 
the appropriate determinants of sector-specific capital structure in their capital 
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structure decision-making. The chronology of importance of determinants varies 
across sectors and is highly sensitive to the current economic conditions. Likewise, 
the substance of each determinant tends to vary across and between different firm 
size, that is, large, medium and small. Therefore, management should be aware of 
these issues as they reflect the overall capital structure decision-making at different 
stages of the economy within Malaysia. Effective and efficient decision-making 
leads to cost reductions and, thus, maximizes the wealth of the shareholders.  
In addition, the outcomes of this study could be beneficial for the banking 
institutions in Malaysia. The corporate lending procedures and evaluations could take 
into consideration the underlying determinants that are sector or industry-specific 
rather than depending on the general determinants. The differential types of leverage 
across sectors demonstrate different debt financing patterns across sectors and, 
hence, provide a good benchmark for firms within each sector in Malaysia. 
Furthermore, the trend of leverage is diverting slowly to long-term debt, probably 
due to the implementation of Malaysia’s Capital Market Plan in 2001. This provides 
some extra information for the banking sector about the influence of capital market 
development on the financing behaviour of firms across sectors. Additionally, the 
banking institutions could further strategize their lending exercises, as the 
fundamental determinants vary across and within sectors due to the differential 
impacts of different changing economic conditions and firm size on capital structure 
decision-making. As a result, this information would be helpful for the banking 
sector to design dynamic, custom-made evaluations and procedures based on each 
sector that eventually reduce the default risk issues. 
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9.4 Limitations of the Research 
Despite the substantial contributions of this study, it has several limitations 
that may represent possibilities for future research. Data limitations seem to be the 
primary problem as the study focuses on Malaysia, one of the emerging markets. 
First, the study excludes the information on market values due to the limited data that 
only caters for a shorter period of observations. In order to maintain a larger sample 
size over a longer period, the market values are excluded from this study. Therefore, 
this study is mainly restricted to book values of debt, namely, total debt, long-term 
debt and short-term debt, as the dependent variables. Secondly, this study faces some 
problems in constructing the sector or industry-related variables due to the 
unavailability of data, mainly from the developing countries. Data on advertising, 
tax, research and development expenses, selling and administration and 
uniquenessare lacking in both the OSIRIS database and the other databases. 
However, as suggested by Kayo and Kimura (2011), this problem can be solved by 
developing three variables, that is, munificence, dynamism and the HH Index based 
on the firm-level data. Hence, the sector-specific variables are mainly captured on a 
few dimensions such as resources abundance within a sector (munificence), 
uncertainty of environment within a sector (dynamism), and sector concentration 
(HH Index). 
Thirdly, as it is difficult to obtain data for each firm on specific variables 
during different time periods, firms with missing data were excluded from the study. 
The numbers of firms could be increased if the numbers of variables or the sample 
period of the study were reduced. In relation to the country-level determinants, the 
study adopts the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP to proxy the debt market 
development, instead of using the ratio of bond market capitalization to GDP data. 
This is because the sample period of this study covers from 1996 until 2007, while 
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the data is only available after 2001. Despite the data limitations, this study imposed 
some boundaries within the context of the capital structure literature, as the model 
excludes ownership structure variables that are highly consistent with the agency 
theory. Likewise, this study did not address the influence of Islamic financing on the 
capital structure decision-making, as the Islamic bond market is progressing 
successfully and contributes towards the development of the capital market of 
Malaysia.  
9.5 Future Research 
As more data becomes available in the future, one could further investigate 
incorporating the market values of leverage, and test whether the results deviate from 
the book values of leverage. Subsequently, the availability of other sector or 
industry-specific data (e.g., advertising, tax, research and development expenses, 
selling and administration and uniqueness) will further complement the sector-level 
variables. Extension of the sample periods of the study may provide a better 
understanding of an additional sub-period as the country experiences the world credit 
crunch crisis in early 2008. Hereby, one could examine the impact of different crises 
on the capital structure decision-making across sectors in Malaysia. The ownership 
structure of Malaysian listed firms is entirely unique as a result of the social 
dispersion of corporate ownership related to the Bumiputera (native Malay) or non-
Bumiputera. The inclusion of ownership structure in the current model may provide 
better understanding of the agency theory. This study will be possible as more data 
related to firms’ ownership become available in the future. 
Secondly, the future study could address the impact of Islamic financing on 
firms’ capital structure across sectors. A comparative analysis between the 
conventional and Islamic financing could be undertaken within each sector or 
industry. Thirdly, the advancement of capital market development is observable 
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since the implementation of the CMP in 2001. The vibrancy and robustness of the 
bond market, particularly the Islamic bond or Sukuk bond, may affect the orientation 
of capital structure choices of firms across sectors. In relation to that, one could test 
the impact of the CMP implementation on firms’ financial structure by partitioning 
the sample periods into pre- and post-CMP implementation in the Malaysian capital 
market. 
9.6 Conclusion 
This study highlights the sensitivity of capital structure determinants in each 
sector within the groups of Malaysian listed companies. Based on pooled OLS, fixed 
effect analysis and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), the findings of this 
study reveal that the relationship between capital structure determinants, that is, firm-
level, sector-level and country-level, and leverage vary across sectors due to the 
nature or characteristics of each sector. This study also demonstrates that overall 
sample results do not provide the actual mechanism between leverage and capital 
structure determinants. As the scope becomes narrower, the indirect impact of 
sectoral behaviour on capital structure determinants can be observed through the 
changes of sign and magnitude of the explanatory variables’ coefficients across 
seven sectors. The chronology of importance of each variable on leverage is also 
visible across sectors. Furthermore, the sensitivity analyses (i.e., different economic 
conditions) further substantiate the main hypothesis of this study. Sub-sample 
analysis is also employed to gauge differing impacts of the Asian financial crisis, 
capital market development and high growth periods. In addition, the mechanism 
between capital structure determinants and leverage is shown to vary across different 
firm size, as the orientation is highly controlled by the nature of the sector. 
Under the dynamic framework, this study confirms the existence of optimal 
capital structure across sectors. In addition, the speeds of adjustment are 
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heterogeneous across sectors in Malaysia. Both balanced and unbalanced datasets for 
the period 1996 to 2007 were employed to check the robustness of these results. As a 
conclusion, the impact of sectoral behaviour is clearer on the firm-level and sector-
level determinants than on the country-level variables. However, it is incontestable 
that the firm-level variables are the most dominating determinants due to their 
explanatory power. Nevertheless, the overall entire analyses reveal that the 
orientation between firm-level determinants and leverage is greatly influenced by 
each sector’s characteristics that control the direction of relationships and the degree 
of significance. The artificial nested testing procedure provides the preferred model 
which is customized according to each sector. This model selection is strongly 
dependent on types of leverage, sectors and sample periods. Finally, the results are 
broadly consistent with the prominent capital structure theories, and the applicability 
of these theories is highly dependent on the uniqueness of each sector in Malaysia.
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Appendix 1 – Hausman Test 
Random Effects versus Fixed Effects 
In the fixed effect estimator, the system M-equation is 
                               
(A.1.1) 
This equation can be rewritten as  
             
                            or 
        
      
                                 
(A.1.2) 
where the    
  is the m-th row of   . The fixed-effect estimator is defined for the 
transformed system. Multiplying both sides of (A.1.2) from the left by   and making 
use of the fact that        we obtain  
              
(A.1.3) 
or 
 ̃    ̃     ̃                
(A.1.4) 
where 
 ̃       ̃       ̃      
  (M x1)(M x no. of  )(M x1) 
 
The fixed effect estimator of    denoted  ̂  , is the pooled OLS estimator. 
In accordance with Hayashi (2000), the orthogonality conditions that is not 
utilized by the fixed effects estimator are 
E (           for all m, E (         , E (            for all m 
(A.1.5) 
where    is the unobserved component without subscript and common to all 
equations,      denotes other unobserved components which is specific to firm   at 
year  and    represents the vector of common regressors. 
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The fixed effect estimator is robust as equation (A.1.5) fails. Let  ̂   be the 
element of  ̂   that correspond to  : 
 ̂     (
 ̂  
 ̂  
) 
(A.1.6) 
where  ̂   is the random effect estimator,  ̂   denotes the beta coefficient of random 
effect and  ̂   is  the coefficient that cannot be identified after the transformation. 
The random-effects estimator  ̂   is an efficient estimator whilst the fixed-effect 
estimator  ̂   is consistent but not efficient. Nevertheless,  ̂   is no longer assured to 
be consistent, while  ̂   tend to remains consistent as equation (1.1) is violated. 
Therefore, equation (1.1) considers the difference between the two estimators,  
  ̂    ̂     ̂   
(A.1.7) 
where   ̂ represent the difference between two estimators. It is easy to prove that 
√  ̂ is asymptotically normal. The Hausman principle indicates that  
        ̂       ( ̂  )        ( ̂  ) 
(A.1.8) 
In general, the Hausman test is used to check for any correlation between the 
error component    and the regressors in a random effects model. The test compares 
the coefficient estimated from the random effects model against the fixed effect 
model. Both estimators, i.e. random and fixed effect estimators are consistent if there 
is no correlation between    and the explanatory variables. Hence, they should 
converge to the true parameter values    in large samples. Conversely, if    is 
correlated with any of the explanatory variables, the random effect estimators is 
inconsistent while the fixed effect estimator is remains consistent. Therefore, the 
fixed effects estimators converges to the true parameter values in large samples but 
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the random effects estimator converges to some other value that is not the value of 
the true parameters. Hereby, there are differences between the fixed and random 
effects estimates. Let parameters of interest be      denote the fixed effect estimate as 
       and the random effects estimates as       . Then, the t-test for testing that there 
is no difference between the estimators is 
     
            
           ̂                 
̂
   
            
                             
 
(A.1.9) 
In accordance with Hayashi (2000), as the assumptions of the error-component 
model hold, the Hausman statistic is as follows. 
         ̂          ̂       ̂ 
 (A.1.10) 
is distributed asymptotically chi-square with number of   degrees of freedom. This 
test has its own specification that could detect a failure of equation (1.1) which is 
part of the maintained assumptions of the error-components model. In detail, 
consider a sequence of local alternatives that satisfy the entire assumptions of the 
error-components model except equation (1.1). With some additional technical 
assumptions, it can be shown that the Hausman statistics converges to a non-central 
   distribution with a non-centrality parameter along those sequences of local 
alternatives. Therefore, the Hausman statistics has power against local alternatives 
under which the random-effects estimators is inconsistent. 
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APPENDIX 2 – Testing Overidentifying Restrictions 
The overidentifying restriction test identify whether the additional 
instruments are valid in the sense that they are correlated with   . According to 
Hayashi (2000), if the equation is exactly identified, then it is possible to choose 
(Lx1)-dimensional coefficient vector,   ̃ so that all the elements of the sample 
moments   ( ̃) are zero and the distance  
    ̃  ̂        ( ̃)
 
 ̂  ( ̃) 
(A.2.1) 
is zero. If the equation is overidentified, then the distance cannot be set to zero 
exactly, but we would expect the minimized distance to be close to zero. If the 
weighting matrix ̂  is chosen optimally so that plim ̂     , then the minimized 
distance is asymptotically chi-squared.  
 Lets  ̂ be a consistent estimator of S (matrix of fourth moments) and consider 
first the case where the distance is evaluated at the true parameter value  , J 
(  ,     . Since by definition    ( ̃)     ̅( 
 
 
∑    ) for  ̃ =  , the distance equals 
  (   ̂  )      ̅  ̂    ̅   √   ̅   ̂   √   ̅  
(A.2.2) 
Since √   ̅          and  ̂    , its asymptotic distribution is  
     , where K is 
the number of orthogonality conditions. Now if   is replaced by  ̂  ̂   , then the 
degrees of freedom change from   to      The intuitive reason is that we have to 
estimate L parameters   before forming the sample average of   .  
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Proposition 1: Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982) 
 Suppose there is available a consistent estimators,   ̂ of         
 )). 
   ̂( ̂  ) ̂           ̂( ̂
  )     ̂      ̂( ̂
  )     
        
(A.2.3) 
Since  ̂ is consistent, the minimized distance calculated in the second step of the 
efficient two-step GMM is asymptotically          Three aspects on the use and 
interpretation of the J test. First, if the J statistic is surprisingly large, it means that 
either the orthogonality conditions or the other assumptions (or both) are likely to be 
false unless K instruments included in    for endogeneity purposes. Secondly, the 
test is not consistent against some failures of the orthogonality conditions. The 
essential reason is the loss of the degrees of freedom from K to       It is easy to 
show that   ̅is related to its sample counterpart,     ̂( ̂
  )  as 
√    ( ̂( ̂
  ))    ̂√   ̅  ̂√   ̅  ̂               
  ̂      
      
  ̂   
(A.2.4) 
where X represents denotes the vector of instruments and Z denotes the regressors.  
The problem is that, since  ̂       this matrix  ̂ is not of full column rank. 
If the orthogonality conditions fail and E (       then elements of √   ̅ will 
diverge to +  or   . But, since  ̂ is not of full column rank,  ̂√   ̅and hence  
    ̂( ̂  )  ̂    may remain finite for some pattern of nonzero orthogonalities. 
Finally, it is only recently that the small-sample properties of the test became a 
concern. A few journal papers report that finite-sample or actual size of the J test in 
small samples far exceeds the nominal size, i.e. the test rejects too often. 
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Implication of Conditional Homoscedasticity  
Under conditional homoscedasticity, the matrix of fourth moments S 
(=      
 ) =    
     
 )) can be written as a product of second moments: 
         
(A.2.5) 
where           
  . The decomposition of   have several implications: 
(i) Since   is non-singular, the decomposition implies that   > 0 and     is 
non-singular. 
(ii) The estimator exploiting this structure of   is 
  ̂    ̂ 
 
 
∑    
    ̂ 
 
   
    
(A.2.6) 
where  ̂  is some consistent estimator to be specified below. By ergodic stationarity,               
             . Thus, provided that  ̂
  is consistent, there is no need for the fourth-
moment assumption for   ̂to be consistent. 
 
Efficient GMM becomes 2SLS  
In the efficient GMM estimation, the weighting matrix is    . As    ̂ is set in GMM 
estimator,  
 ̂(  ̂  )   [    
   ̂     
     ]
       
   ̂     
      
             
    
      
      
    
      
         ̂    
    
          ̂     
(A.2.7) 
where X represents denotes the vector of instruments, Z denotes the regressors and Y 
represent the dependent variable.  In the general case, the whole point of the first step 
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in the efficient two-step GMM was to obtain a consistent estimator of S. Under 
conditional homoscedasticity, there is no need to do the first step because the second-
step estimator collapses to the GMM estimator with     used for   ̂  ̂    
     This 
estimator   ̂    , is called the Two-Stages Least Squares (2SLS or TSLS).  
 
J becomes Sargan’s Statistics 
When ̂  is set to ( ̂     
   , the distance becomes  
     ̃   ̂       
        
          ̃ 
    
            ̃  
 ̂ 
 
(A.2.8) 
 
Proposition 1 then implies that the distance evaluated at the efficient GMM estimator 
under conditional homoskedasticity,  ̂      is asymptotically chi-squared. This 
distance is called Sargan’s statistic (Sargan, 1958): 
Sargan’s statistic =    
          ̂      
    
            ̂       
 ̂ 
 
(A.2.9) 
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APPENDIX 3 – Artificial Nested Testing Procedure 
In accordance with the nested testing procedure, two models are nested if 
both contain the same terms and one has at least one additional term. For instance,  
                                                                              (A.3.1) 
                                                                                                  (A.3.2) 
Model A.3.1 (main model) is known as the unrestricted model whilst Model A.3.2 is 
known as the restricted model. Model A.3.2 is nested within Model A.3.2. The 
hypothesis is as follows: 
   =        = 0 
                                   
 
The F-test is used to compare nested models that compares the Sum of Squared Error 
(SSE) for the restricted models (     ) against the SSE for the unrestricted model 
(      ). The following equation is used to calculate the nested F-test. 
   
                 
             
 
(A.3.3) 
where      denotes the sum squared error from the restricted model whilst        is 
the sum squared errors from the unrestricted model. The number of variables that 
have been excluded from the restricted model is captured in  . Meanwhile, 
  represents the total number of regressors in the unrestricted model.   denotes the 
total number of observations in the sample. As the calculated value of F is greater or 
equal than the critical value, reject  . In general, the restricted models (     ) with 
k parameters is compared against the SSE for the unrestricted model (      ) with k 
+ r parameters. Based on the hypotheses,    =            = ……. =      = 0 
versus                      
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